PRESS CONFERENCE ON FACILITATING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), once it entered force, would ban nuclear weapon tests and, through an extensive verification system whose capabilities had increased by 60 per cent since 2005, ensure that no such tests went undetected, including on the territories of nuclear-weapon States, correspondents were told today at a Headquarters press conference.

Briefing correspondents in the wake of the fifth conference to facilitate the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty, held on 17 and 18 September in Vienna, Austria, Tibor Toth, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), explained the Treaty’s two-fold function: to serve as a prohibition norm banning all future nuclear weapon tests; and to ensure that the norm was respected through an extensive monitoring system.

He stressed the importance for all nuclear-weapon States to subscribe to that norm.  Also important was for the same “rules of engagement” to apply equally to all nuclear-weapon States.  Today 140 countries had ratified the Treaty, making it a more universally accepted norm.  The monitoring system was a safeguard against “cheating”.

Joining him at the press conference were Ursula Plassnik, Minister of European and International Affairs of Austria, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, both of whom had presided over the Vienna conference.  The United Nations High Representative for Disarmament, Sergio Duarte, also attended today’s briefing.

Ms. Plassnik said that the biennial meeting hosted by her country last week in Vienna had sought to pass on the message that the Test-Ban Treaty should enter into force.  Ten more ratifications were required to reach that goal, for which leadership by the United States -- which had not yet ratified the Treaty -- was needed.  It was important for the world not to resign itself “too easily” to the existence of weapons of mass destruction.

The international verification system had already provided first proof of its efficiency and operability, despite the fact that the monitoring system was not yet complete, she said, referring to its detection in 2006 of the nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  That, in itself, deserved attention, apart from the need for the Treaty to come into force.

Recalling the huge gap that had persisted in disarmament and non-proliferation decisions in various international meetings, particularly in the Outcome Document adopted by world leaders at the 2005 World Summit, Mr. Duarte said that the declaration adopted at the latest CTBT meeting in Vienna marked a beginning in efforts to fill that gap.  Indeed, the issue of non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, was beginning to be addressed.  To be effective, non-proliferation required confidence-building and verification.  The CTBT, a pillar of the multilateral system, was required for a safe and secure world.

Austria and Costa Rica had assumed the co-presidency (of the CTBTO) for a period of two years, he explained.  The thrust was to press ahead for additional ratifications, especially with regard to the so-called “Annex 2” countries, which referred to the list of 44 States whose ratification was required for the Treaty’s operation.  There still remained 10 countries to be “lobbied and convinced” as to the virtues and necessities of the Test-Ban Treaty.  Advantage was being taken of the General Assembly’s general debate and bilateral meetings to underscore the importance of the Treaty to those States that had not yet joined.

Noting that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had made disarmament one of his priorities, Mr. Duarte said that bringing the CTBT into force was, perhaps, the most pressing issue on the disarmament agenda.  That goal could be achieved in a relatively short period if States parties understood what was at stake.  Hopefully, other disarmament instruments would also get Member States’ attention, so that disarmament, once again, could sit high on the United Nations agenda.

Mr. Toth pointed out that consensus was a rare commodity in the area of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.  Following the 2005 biennial meeting of CTBT States parties in New York, a number of signatures had been added and the future verification system had been enhanced.  The intention now was to carry forward the process and to use the momentum of the latest meeting.  It was expected that, in the next two or three years, another 60 to 70 stations would be functioning as part of the monitoring or verification system.

Responding to a correspondent’s question, Ms. Plassnik said that it was through awareness that disarmament could be put back on top of the United Nations agenda.  People needed to be made aware of the basic facts.

Leadership was also critical in achieving that goal, added Mr. Ugarte.  The United Nations Charter was very clear on disarmament, and the Security Council could address disarmament in a more forthright manner.  The Council’s permanent members should abide by the responsibilities that their permanent status implied.  There had been an initiative by many countries to hold a fourth special session on disarmament as soon as possible, and work had already begun in that direction.

Mr. Toth said that, while many of the instruments adopted in the 1960s had retained their importance, new developments were raising the need for new solutions. For instance, in the nuclear area, the increase in nuclear energy capacities and capabilities was raising the question of the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in that respect, the CTBT from a totally new angle

On the United States nuclear weapons posture and the potential for a new cold war, Mr. Ugarte called for leadership from the United States.  A Wall Street Journal op-ed article by several prominent Americans suggesting a bipartisan approach to review the country’s nuclear posture and appealing for the entry into force of the CTBT was an indication that some people were ready to change their positions.  There was room for negotiations.  Other nuclear-weapon States should also be ready to provide confidence-building and verification measures.

In terms of verification, early efforts by the United States had been most welcome, Mr. Toth said.  Of the nearly 40 United States monitoring stations, nearly 90 per cent were in place.  The country was also engaged in some of the technical discussions.  The same was true of the Russian Federation.  Those countries were building up the monitoring stations on their territories to ensure that no explosions were taking place or would remain undetected on the territories of nuclear-weapon States.

He pointed out, however, that outstanding financial obligations were a problem for the CTBTO.  The preparatory commission had an annual budget of $110 million, but nearly a quarter of that amount had not been received.  Some of the big contributors owed it money.  At the moment, about 80 per cent of the budget was being devoted to creating the monitoring and verification system, which required a nearly $1 billion investment.

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For information media • not an official record