PRESS CONFERENCE BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NEPAL
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Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York |
PRESS CONFERENCE BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NEPAL
With Nepal’s peace process at a critical juncture, the United Nations had an opportunity to support that country’s best hope for sustaining the peace it had negotiated, Ian Martin, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Nepal told correspondents at a Headquarters press conference today.
Mr. Martin, who also heads the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), noted that, the first time he had briefed the Security Council on Nepal, he had made the point that Nepal was being considered, not because it had fallen into a new crisis, but because of an opportunity to end a 10-year conflict. Nepal, a strong contributor to United Nations peacekeeping activities, was now asking the United Nations to support it in its own process.
Describing the peace process as fully Nepalese, he noted that, on 21 November 2006, the Government -- an alliance of seven political parties and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) -- had reached a comprehensive peace accord. While the negotiation process had not been mediated or facilitated by the United Nations or any other external actor, the parties had, throughout the process, made clear that they would seek the United Nations support in certain key areas of implementation.
The parties had set a rapid timetable for the implementation of the process, which would culminate in elections for the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent drafting, for the first time, of a Constitution through a fully democratic process. Elections were to take place by mid-June, before the monsoon season would make electoral activities impossible for some time. Given the urgency of the timetable, Secretary-General Kofi Annan had asked the Security Council to authorize an advanced deployment of armed monitors and electoral advisers, while also sending a full technical assistance mission to plan for the United Nations mission. The Council had supported those proposals in a presidential statement adopted on 1 December. (See Press Release SC/8883.) The United Nations had then gone ahead with the deployment of initial personnel and the sending of a technical assistance mission, which had drawn up proposals for a full mission.
Outlining key components of UNMIN’s mandate, he said the Mission’s first mandate was to monitor the “management of arms and armies”. The parties had agreed that, to ensure a climate for Constituent Assembly elections in which no one would fear the threat of violence from either of the previously contending sides to the armed conflict, the Maoist army would be restricted to cantonment sites and the Nepal army would be restricted to its barracks, with the exception of certain normal national security functions. The cantonment process had begun and had just completed the first stage of the registration of Maoist combatants and weapons at seven main sites throughout the country.
On Friday, he had announced in Kathmandu the number of Maoist combatants that had been registered at the first stage of the process and the number of weapons recorded, he explained. The parties had previously agreed to form an interim Government, in which the Maoists would have a number of ministerial appointments when the process of arms management and the separation of Maoist fighters from their weapons had taken place. It was now for the alliance to decide whether the conditions were in place for the formation of an interim Government, which in turn would announce a date for Constituent Assembly elections.
The second part of the Mission’s mandate was electoral assistance and monitoring, he said. UNMIN now had some 21 electoral advisers working with Nepal’s election commission, which faced considerable challenges if an election were to take place by mid-June. The challenges were not only technical in nature, but also political. Indeed, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had warned that the debate over the country’s political future could quickly exacerbate ethnic, regional, linguistic and other tensions.
If Nepal failed to include traditionally marginalized groups in the peace process, the country would lose a crucial opportunity to harness the strength and vision of its own people and leave some of the key underlying causes of the conflict unaddressed, he cautioned. There had been considerable unrest in Nepal’s southern plain area, the Terai, where indigenous people had protested what they saw as their exclusion from the peace process and, potentially, the Constituent Assembly. Other previously excluded groups were also involved in discussions. Unless a consensus could be reached soon on the electoral arrangements for the Constituent Assembly election, the intention to hold elections by mid-June would be called into question.
A third area of United Nations support to the peace process was the monitoring of non-military aspects of the comprehensive peace agreement, he added. A large United Nations Human Rights Office had been in Nepal since May 2005. The parties had asked for continued human rights monitoring by that Office. UNMIN also planned to include a civil affairs component to help ensure a climate that was conducive for the holding of elections. That was no small challenge in a country where the State had been absent for many years from areas where the Maoists were, and remained, the dominant political force.
Responding to a question on the Madeshi people, he said traditionally excluded groups had pointed to their historically limited representation in Government and political parties. They were not convinced that the proposed electoral arrangements would guarantee their participation in the Constituent Assembly. At the moment, it would depend on the goodwill of the political parties in ensuring that the candidates they put forward in an election were drawn from the traditionally excluded groups. The question of women’s representation was another major issue, as women had been extremely poorly represented in Nepalese politics.
Regarding the King, he noted that, under the decisions taken so far, the King was exercising no Government functions at all. Most of the functions of Head of State were now under the interim constitutional arrangements being carried out by the Prime Minister. The parties had agreed that the question of the future of the monarchy would be the first decision to be taken by the Constituent Assembly once it was elected and began meeting.
Asked to elaborate on factors that could delay mid-June elections, he said the Chief Election Commissioner had stated publicly that the legislative basis for the elections needed to be in place soon, in order for the timetable to go forward. While the process had already begun, a final decision on the electoral system had not yet been reached. Another issue was the need to guarantee adequate security, not just ahead of the ballot, but also during the campaign period. That was no small challenge.
The United Nations had not been asked to provide security, he said in response to another question. The Secretary-General had proposed the inclusion of a small number of police advisers to advice on election security arrangements. To that extent, the Mission would be advising Nepal’s police. Security could only be provided on the basis of a request from the Government.
Regarding the number of weapons registered, he said there had not been a definitive statement on the part of the Government. It was generally understood, however, that the majority of weapons held by Maoists had been captured from the State security forces, which had made available a list of the weapons they believed they had lost to the Maoists. The list of security forces weapons lost and the list of weapons registered were now being studied in the joint monitoring coordination committee, which was a tripartite body chaired by the United Nations. That report would be an important part of the Government’s consideration.
He agreed that there was a striking difference between the number of weapons registered, a little less than 3,500, and the number of combatants, which was over 30,000. It had always been understood, however, that the number of weapons and the number of Maoist combatants had never corresponded. A significant part of their weaponry was improved explosive devices. Those had been gathered at cantonment sites but, for safety reasons, not individually registered. There would undoubtedly be a continuing argument as to whether the numbers showed that the Maoists had complied with their commitments to register all their weapons. The United Nations could not make a definite judgement.
Both India and the United States had been supportive of the United Nations role, he said in response to another question. As a United Nations operation, UNMIN had the unanimous support of the Council’s five permanent members, as well as its entire membership.
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