PRESS CONFERENCE on ‘ iraq and the Security Council’

 

by former president, international peace academy

At a Headquarters press conference this morning on "Iraq and the Security Council:  Lessons from the Past, Suggestions for the Future", David Malone, author of The International Struggle Over Iraq:  Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980-2005, predicted a much greater effort to involve the Security Council in Iraq, as some actors sought to withdraw and others sought new roles for themselves in the region.

A Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations from 1992 to 1994, Mr. Malone observed that, after a period in which several capitals had been disengaged from the United Nations, international diplomacy seemed once more to revolve around hot Security Council issues:   Lebanon, Iran and North Korea.  No less pressing was Iraq, where, as discussed in The International Struggle Over Iraq, Security Council engagement had spanned 25 years.

Producing both successes and catastrophes, he said the Council’s involvement with Iraq had begun in 1974 -- when the country had begun encountering difficulties with neighbouring Iran -- and had lasted through two coalition-based wars that ultimately led to the ouster of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.  Very early on, the Council had succeeded in earning the “undying suspicion” of Iran when it had failed to react meaningfully to an unprovoked attack from Iraq in 1980.

Yet, Mr. Malone explained, the Council’s engagement with Iraq had brought out its best, especially so when it rose to the challenge of then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to end what had turned into the Iran-Iraq War.  “It wasn’t used to adopting proactive strategies to bring wars to an end,” Mr. Malone told reporters.  “But by the middle of 1987, the Council had a strategy, adopted in Resolution 598, to bring the war to an end.  It took another year for that to happen, but it did happen.”

In 1990, the Council again had acted resolutely regarding Iraq, when it provided a mandate to coalition forces, during the first Gulf War in 1990, to chase the country out of Kuwait, he continued.  Following that episode, the body had started to move away from its traditional “political-military” mode and onto a regulatory track, creating large subsidiary bodies.  Among the biggest were the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in charge of weapons inspections in Iraq and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in charge of ongoing monitoring.  The establishment of others soon followed, such as the $22 billion Iraq Compensation Commission, tasked with processing claims and paying compensation for losses and damage suffered during the Kuwait invasion, and the estimated $60 billion oil-for-food programme.

James Cockayne, an Associate of Mr. Malone at the International Peace Academy, where Mr. Malone had been President until 2004, said that the precision required in the legal framework of its subsidiary bodies had become a burden for the Security Council.  Vague mandates -- where the exact consequences of violations were often not spelled out -- created oversight difficulties, and a lack of transparency within those bodies contributed to bringing the Council’s role into disrepute.

As the body proceeded on its new mode, what followed was a muddy period culminating in the Volcker investigation into the oil-for-food programme.  The period was crowned by what Mr. Malone called “a period of eclipse” in March 2003, when the world, disappointed that the Council -- a body charged with maintaining international peace and security -- had failed to avert another Iraq war, came to see it as less and less relevant.

As he interacted with reporters, Mr. Malone said he believed the Council would re-engage with the issue of Iraq, primarily as a broker between regional players and other actors.  Indeed, neutralizing spoilers or preventing them from emerging had been extremely important in Security Council strategies, as would need to be the case in the present.

“Somebody needs to engage neighbourhood,” Mr. Malone stressed.  “You don’t want to set up a situation in which some of the neighbours feel slighted and become spoilers.”

For instance, he explained that Iranian influence, which was significant in the region, would play out much more subtly than what was currently reflected in the media, as would the influence of other neighbouring countries.  “The idea that the Iranians are going to move into Iraq and take over the Shia community in Iraq is, in my view, completely wrong,” he said, adding that, in turn, “the Iraqis themselves do not want to be run out of Tehran.”

As a by-product of a strengthened Council role, the relevance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations would be heightened.  “The idea of the United Nations working, either through the new Secretary-General himself, or through a Special Envoy or two, is something that could be helpful in engaging neighbouring States and finding out what the neighbourhood is willing to do,” he said.

In contrast to the Council’s permanent members -- United States, Russian Federation, France, United Kingdom and China -- who tended to mind their own interests, he said there was more likelihood that the United Nations Secretariat would keep Iraqi interests in mind when forming strategies, perhaps producing ideas that the Permanent Five would not have arrived at by themselves.

“Nobody thinks they have the magic bullet solution on Iraq,” said Mr. Malone, which, to his mind, left a great deal of flexibility on what might be done to solve the country’s -- and indeed the world’s -- problems.

He added:  “My sense is that the Permanent Five don’t enjoy being split on issues,” saying that, with prospects being so worrying in Iraq, even countries that disagreed with coalition action would be open to positive ideas for Iraq’s future.  Restoring a sense of Council unity and an active sense of engagement, with the Permanent Five working with each to bring stability to Iraq, would be a step forward.

It was also his strong belief that direct engagement by the incoming Secretary-General himself was needed, and perhaps a Special Envoy or two in the field, a point which Mr. Malone mentioned repeatedly.

“Special Envoys have worked quite well when they have been the right people.  Mr. Ban has a huge rolodex of applicants for these types of jobs.”

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For information media • not an official record