Press conference by Special Representative of Secretary-General for Burundi

Burundi was, by and large, a success story -- the United Nations had arrived at a critical point in the peace process, and Burundians had looked the issues of domestic strife in the face and moved on, Carolyn McAskie, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Burundi, said today at a Headquarters press conference.

Ms. McAskie said that what Burundi needed now, as the drawdown of United Nations peacekeepers continued was the same sustained support in the economic and social fields that it had benefited from in the security and political fields.  The international community should come together and get it right in Burundi.  It was a small country in need of massive assistance.  But massive assistance in Burundi was manageable, certainly more so than, say, in the Congo.  If it was not possible to get the “development equation” right in Burundi, then where could the international community get it right?

Her challenge to the world community at the end of her term as the head of the United Nations Operation there was:  “You’ve done the peacekeeping job.  Now do the peacebuilding job.”

A day before presenting the latest of the Secretary-General’s reports on the situation to the Security Council, Ms. McAskie told correspondents that the Burundi peace process, based on the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, was well advanced.  That accord had given rise, starting in 2000, to a transitional government, put in place with both regional and international support.  Elections had been held in the summer of 2005, and by August, a new Government had assumed power.  By the fall, the proposal was on the table to begin to draw down the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Burundi.

That suggestion had caused some controversy, as questions were asked about why the Government wanted the United Nations to leave, she said.  But Burundi was not a traditional peacekeeping client; it had never been close to collapse.  Even in its darkest moments, it remained in control of its territory, with a parliament capable of drafting and passing legislation.  So, it was never classified as a failed-State peacekeeping client.  It had always been a functioning client requiring peacekeeping to come in and complete a peace process.  So, it was not illogical for the United Nations to withdraw.

By next month, she continued, the United Nations would have completed 40 per cent of a drawdown of troops.  Most police advisers would have left by April-May.  At the Government’s request, an extensive human rights capacity would be retained, and the United Nations would also support the establishment of judicial mechanisms.  That had been the subject of a separate Security Council resolution, which called for a national truth and reconciliation commission.  The United Nations would also continue to support the Government in the much-needed security sector reform, and additional humanitarian and development teams would also continue to work closely.

She said that the remaining outstanding security issue in Burundi was the FNL (Forces nationals de liberation-Palipehutu) -- the last hold-out rebel group.  They had finally offered to negotiate with the Government, without preconditions, and the Government was considering that request, under an offer brokered by the United Republic of Tanzania.  The Tanzanians, correspondents might recall, had brokered the Arusha Peace Accord.  So, they had remained true to the cause and were confident they could bring about an agreement with the FNL.  That would remain a question mark, however, until that was concluded.  The FNL were seriously reduced militarily, but they still represented a small presence in the hills around Bujumbura.  A related issue for the Security Council was the human rights abuses perpetuated by the FNL.

In her 35 years of working in Africa or with African issues, there had been an unprecedented coherent approach in Burundi among the African Union, donors, the United Nations and others, she said.  There had not been any jockeying for position.  The Burundians had benefited from that, but they, themselves, had done the job.  But that job would not be over until the FNL was brought in, and she very much hoped that would happen in the next three months.  There was the potential that it could.  In her view, a negotiated solution was the only solution.

Asked about the “big issue” for the Government in accepting the offer to negotiate with the FNL, Ms. McAskie said the FNL was the very first rebel movement on the ground, and they did not now really represent any kind of logic in terms of political gain.  They were caught up in their own rebellion and did not know anything else.  Moreover, they were extremely difficult to negotiate with.  The Government had tried and was frustrated.  It was also true that the FNL and former rebels, now the Government, had fought alongside each other on the ground.  So, there were other issues about why they did not wish to talk to each other.

Was there a lesson learned from Burundi that could be useful for Darfur? another correspondent asked.

Ms. McAskie said that every situation was unique and should be addressed on its own terms.  The Sudan and Burundi experiences were so different that it was difficult to drawn lessons from one to the other.  In Burundi, there had been an internal conflict where everyone knew who had done what to whom.  The denial prevalent in Darfur was missing in Burundi.  There were moderate elements in Burundi.  Plus, the Burundians themselves were talking quietly behind the scenes, in the days when it was dangerous to do so.  She did not know if that applied to the Sudan as well.  Also, in Burundi, the region had a lot of leverage because the situation was negatively affecting stability in the Congo, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania, with the latter being very anxious to have a peaceful neighbour.

It could be said that the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) ( Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) was similarly motivated, she said.  If there was a lesson to learn, it was that, at end of the day, it was a United Nations peacekeeping force –- the most broadly based and most effective of peace operations –- that “brought it home”.  The African Union mission had started things off, but it had not had the resources or the capacity to “bring it home”, she added.

“Nothing sends chills down my spine more thoroughly than ... a long history of the international community going in somewhere, a fragile peace emerging, everyone leaves too early, and everything goes to hell in a couple of years”, another correspondent said.  Was Ms. McAskie, independent of financial and budgetary constraints, “absolutely convinced that the time is ripe for the peace mission to leave Burundi” and could Burundi enjoy peace with a resolution of the conflict that continued in the eastern Congo?

She said she believed now that there was no justification for spending $300 million for keeping foreign troops “sitting” in Burundi.  The process agreed with the Burundian Government had been to pull out initially now, 60 per cent, with a total drawdown one year after the new Government was in place, and there was no justification currently to prolong that.  That being said, the FNL represented “a major worry for us, a warning flag for Burundi”.

The United Nations had agreed with the Government that the United Nations would continue to monitor the situation, and if serious problems emerged, and the United Nations and the Government agreed that there was a United Nations role, then the United Nations would look at the phase-out.  But right now, it was committed by phasing out the troops by 31 December 2006.

“You said that declaring a mission a success story sends chills down your spine.  Let me pour a little warm water on those chills”, Ms. McAskie said to the correspondent.  Far be it for her to declare success in Burundi “forever and ever”.  She believed the United Nations had accomplished “quite well” what it set out to do:  to bring an end to the transition process, which was starting to look a bit shaky; complete the political requirements of drafting a constitution and holding elections; disarm the ex-combatants; and put in place a police force and a national defence force in such a way that met the standards on the ground.  She believed that had been done and that Burundi had been able to achieve all that more quickly and effectively because of the United Nations presence and input.

In order to consolidate those gains, there was an enormous job to do, she added, but that was not the job of paying $300 million to have five battalions watch that process.  That money should be put into the economy and social infrastructure.  The challenge now –- for the United Nations, donors and the region -– was to find a way to ensure that support for Burundi had the same determination, commitment and resources of the peacekeeping support.  That meant not five battalions, but operating health and education systems, a functioning economy, and so forth.  Political and economic fragility could incite ethnic hatred once more.

As to how serious was the threat of spillover from the eastern Congo into Burundi, she felt that was pretty small in the scale of things.  But, the northern border with the Congo should be watched, although it was impossible to patrol every square inch.  One worry might be if the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) army, with the support of United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), was successful in its campaign against the FDLR (Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda), which might then want to cross into Burundi for safe haven.  That could destabilize Burundi.  Rwanda-Burundi relations were at an all-time high, however, and that was an extremely good sign because it ensured cooperation on those spillover issues.  That was another reason why a piece of paper with the FNL was so important.  The FNL might disappear from Burundi, but they could recoup in the Congo.  That was a long shot, but it was something to be avoided.

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For information media • not an official record