FULLY OPERATIONAL TEST-BAN TREATY ‘FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE’ AGAINST RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, HEADQUARTERS CONFERENCE TOLD

Conference on Comprehensive

 Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

2^nd & 3^rd Meetings (AM & PM)

FULLY OPERATIONAL TEST-BAN TREATY ‘FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE’ AGAINST RESUMPTION

OF NUCLEAR TESTING, HEADQUARTERS CONFERENCE TOLD

On Second Day of Meeting Aimed at Treaty’s Entry Into Force,

Speakers Say Testing Moratoriums No Substitute for Treaty’s Legal Power

With global security under threat from all directions and in unprecedented ways, a fully operational Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be the first line of defence against the resumption of nuclear testing, a Headquarter Conference aimed at facilitating the treaty’s entry into force was told today. 

On the second day of the three-day meeting, the representative of New Zealand, whose Government joined a coalition of countries in 1998 seeking to rid the world of nuclear weapons following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, told delegations she did not imagine the parties would be meeting for a fourth time to consider why the test-ban Treaty had not entered into force.  For New Zealand, the CTBT was still worth fighting for, and that required a serious look at the challenges and States preventing its operation. 

The Conference heard from 36 speakers today, including three nuclear-weapon States, and many of them expressed concern that the 1996 Treaty -- with the potential of banning nuclear weapons tests everywhere for all time and setting a safe barrier against the further development of those weapons -- had still not entered into force.  Speakers insisted that national moratoriums on nuclear testing, while valuable, were no substitute for the Treaty’s legal, binding power.  While the treaty has been ratified by 125 countries, ratification by 44 States listed in its annex is required for the Treaty to take effect and among the 11 whose ratifications’ still pending are two nuclear-weapon States:  China and the United States.   

France’s representative, whose Government ratified the CTBT in April 1998, said that, although the parameters of international security had changed in the nine years since the Treaty was concluded -- a situation made even more complex by the development of clandestine proliferation networks and the ever present danger that links might be formed between them and terrorist groups -- the test-ban Treaty was “fully relevant”.  Given that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions would halt the appearance of new arms stockpiles and new types of weapons, the CTBT had become a fundamental component of strategic stability.  She repeated her call on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it. 

Today, the representative of the Russian Federation called the CTBT one of the most important elements of the international security system and of the containment of mass destruction weapons.  Expressing satisfaction with the progress and pace of activities to set up the Treaty’s verification mechanism, he said that that system, along with modern national monitoring instruments, would make it impossible to conceal any attempts to violate the Treaty, once it took effect.  Thus, he could not accept the arguments of those who delayed ratification that the verification regime was not ready and only minimally effective. 

China’s representative said the CTBT was conducive to preventing nuclear proliferation and promoting nuclear disarmament, and it had China’s firm support.  Although the global security situation had changed dramatically in the decade since the Treaty was adopted, China’s support of its early entry into force, for which its ratification was required, had not changed.  Flowing from the position that the CTBT served the interests of the international community, his Government had worked actively towards that goal and had submitted the text to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval.  Thus, all relevant work was under way “in a serious and orderly fashion”, he said. 

Commending the six-party talks for this week’s “important breakthrough in containing the most imminent spectre of nuclear proliferation”, which had been haunting the Korean peninsula and North-East Asia, the Republic of Korea’s representative warned that proliferation threats were on the rise, while the existing mechanisms for dealing with those threats were under severe stress.

Seeking to boost declining confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), he also called for a prompt launch of talks for a fissile material cut-off treaty to reinforce the CTBT.  The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate their collective political commitment to accelerate the long-overdue entry into force.

Pending the Treaty’s operation, which was “presently not in sight”, the representative of Israel, whose country’s ratification was still pending, said adherence to the Treaty would be influenced by three factors:  the readiness of its verification regime and immunity to abuse; Israel’s sovereign equality status in the Treaty’s policymaking organs and in the Executive Council of the CTBTO; and adherence to the CTBT by States in the Middle East.  He highlighted the fact that efforts to function within the Treaty-defined Middle East and South Asia geographical region had been consistently blocked by one delegation for reasons completely alien to the purposes of the Treaty.

Statements were also made by the representatives of:  Bulgaria; Philippines; Sierra Lone; Nigeria; Belarus; Austria; Greece; Italy; Ukraine; Mexico; Morocco; Algeria; Chile; Brazil; Switzerland; Colombia; South Africa; Kenya; Burkina Faso Sweden; Japan; Ireland; Guatemala; Libya; Uruguay; Indonesia; Netherlands: Bolivia; and Jordan.  The Permanent Observer of the Holy See also spoke.

The Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT will meet again at 10 a.m. Friday, 23 September, to continue its general exchange of views.

Background

The Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which began yesterday afternoon, met today to continue its exchange of views.

Statements

IVAILO KALFIN, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, said that, together with many other countries, Bulgaria regretted that the 2005 Summit outcome lacked language addressing the role of non-proliferation and disarmament in the maintenance of international peace, security and stability.  However discouraging, the outcome of the Conference should reinforce the determination of States and strengthen the political will of many countries to overcome the current impasse.  The full implementation of the Treaty would help the world address more effectively the newly emerging threats and the growing risks of nuclear proliferation.

Universal adherence was still a goal that needed to be pursued vigorously as a collective commitment, he continued.  His Government had faith in the multilateral approach and remained convinced that, if nations stood together, they could make a difference in the global efforts to remove the existing obstacles.  For that reason, Bulgaria supported the measures outlined in the draft Final Declaration of the Conference.  It was necessary to have consistency and sustainable effort to bring about the conditions for an early entry into force of the Treaty.  To achieve that, both ratifying and signatory States had to cooperate at global and regional levels.

Calling upon the “Annex 2” countries whose signature and/or ratification was still pending, he said it was necessary for them to consider the benefits of joining the ranks of those that had done their share in promoting the Treaty.  It was encouraging that more than eight years since the last nuclear weapon test explosion, the countries that had yet to ratify the Treaty continued to maintain moratoria on such explosions.  He expressed hope that the situation would remain unchanged.  His Government also believed that an acceleration of the ratification process would also bring important benefits to the regional climate of security and stability, and, therefore, increasingly turned its attention to joint initiatives promoting cooperation at the regional level.

Bulgaria also supported the idea that, in addition to its essential functions in verifying compliance with the Treaty, the verification system should be capable of bringing significant scientific and civil benefits.  Areas of perspective cooperation, such as environmental projection projects, earth science and technology, development of tsunami warning systems and other disaster alert systems, should be carefully examined.  The disturbing images on the worldwide networks showing a real human tragedy were still vivid in his country’s mind.  He encouraged a careful examination of the modalities for using data from the verification technologies to limit the impact of such disastrous events.

ALBERTO ROMULO, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, said that recent events had provided some hope, including the latest outcome of the six-party talks concerning the Korean peninsula.  The decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abandon nuclear weapons and return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was most welcome, especially for the countries of the region.  The Philippines had joined others in signing the new convention on nuclear terrorism.  That instrument struck a blow against terrorism and tightened the noose around those who sought to acquire nuclear weapons in carrying out terrorist attacks.  He welcomed and joined the bold move to transfer the draft of the CTBT from Geneva to New York nine years ago.  Today, however, the challenge remained the same -- to convince States of the need for universal adherence, for which he was willing to consider and support creative measures.

He said his country, as a ratifying State of the CTBT, had acknowledged the Treaty’s critical role in prohibiting all nuclear test explosions, whether for military or any other purpose.  During the NPT review in May, he had reiterated that, given the potential fearsome destructive force of nuclear weapons, their mere possession was cause for very serious concern.  Claims of the inalienable right to nuclear technology, without adequate checks and safeguards, was dangerous and should be rejected, and international commitments on the treatment of nuclear technology, including the production of plutonium and uranium, should be strictly observed.  The CTBT, with its comprehensive testing ban, remained an important part of overall efforts to prevent proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament.  His country’s Constitution had enshrined a policy of freedom from those weapons, and it had worked closely with others in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region.  Those countries were negotiating with the nuclear Powers, with a view to having them sign the nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaty’s protocol. 

Also, he said the Philippines hosted two auxiliary seismic stations as part of its commitment to non-proliferation.  He called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT soon.  He reiterated his strong support for the joint ministerial statement made last September, and he urged the remaining 11 “Annex 2” States, whose ratification was needed for the Treaty to take effect, to complete the ratification processes without delay.  The sooner the Treaty entered into force, the sooner the testing moratorium, adhered to by the five nuclear Powers, would be legally binding.  Those five nations bore the responsibility and burden of leadership.  They must honour their commitment to the full implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review towards the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the NPT.  In that regard, he aligned himself with the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  The cold war had ended, yet the deadly legacy of nuclear weapons lived on, not only in the arsenals of nuclear Powers, but also in the hidden corners of presumed non-nuclear-weapon States.

ALHAJI MOMODU KOROMA, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Sierra Leone, said he considered the CTBT one of the pillars for the disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as relevant as the NPT.  He said he was disappointed that the outcome released during last week’s Summit did not include the disarmament and non-proliferation elements.

And while he welcomed the moratorium on nuclear test explosions or any type of nuclear explosions, he said a moratorium was a voluntary initiative and not a permanent substitute for a legally binding instrument on an issue that was crucial for international peace and security.  Because of that urgency, Sierra Leone and other members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were transforming the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa into a legally binding instrument.

He believed that compliance with existing instruments that were legally binding was essential, as was highlighting the consequences of States’ non-compliance with their Treaty commitments.  But, the universality of disarmament and non-proliferation regimes was equally essential and in the interest of international peace and security.  Therefore, he urged all States still outside the CTBT to translate multilateralism into action and ensure that the Treaty entered into force without additional delay.

AMINU B. WALI ( Nigeria) said that, while his Government was pleased to see that the Treaty had almost reached universality, it was concerned that nine years after the signing ceremony of the Treaty, it had not yet come into effect.  That situation needed to be reversed, in view of the current volatile global situation, particularly with regards to the potential threats of nuclear terrorism.  The failure of the NPT Review Conference had further placed a sense of urgency on the international community to close the wide gaps in the positions of States on issues concerning disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

There was, unfortunately, no agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the outcome adopted at the recently concluded Summit.  However, the fact that disarmament was not mentioned did not vitiate the importance of the pursuit of the Treaty’s goal of universality, through ratification and its early entry into force.  His Government believed that the Conference provided an opportunity for State signatories, non-State signatories and ratifiers to reinvigorate the Treaty through practical commitments.  He also urged the remaining 11 “Annex 2” States to make their best efforts to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

It was no accident, he continued, that 30 per cent of State signatories of the Treaty came from Africa, which had a record number of 52 signatories.  That was in consonance with the commitment to denuclearize Africa under the Pelindaba Treaty.   Africa held more than a passing interest in the task of the Preparatory Commission in fostering international cooperation, especially those activities that concerned the promotion of technical capacity and the provision of access to information and experience in Treaty-related matters.  He added that his Government believed that CTBT technology could promote technological advancement, mitigate disasters and provide early warning of tsunamis and other natural disasters.

SERGEY MARTYNOV, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, said that the delay with the coming into force of the CTBT was further eroding the foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  The testing moratorium was definitely a positive development, but that was not, in any way, an adequate substitute for a legally binding international instrument.  He unconditionally supported the appeal in the draft final declaration of the Conference to urge all States to sign and ratify the CTBT.  The crucial moment was fast approaching when all States of the world, without exception, must demonstrate their political will and prevent any further undermining of the foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  Belarus had optioned for non-nuclear-weapon status from the first days of its independence and remained an adherent to the processes of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.  His country had possessed nuclear weapons and had voluntarily surrendered them, joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as other related instruments, including on missiles.  It had also been among the first to sign the CTBT in 1996, and ratify it in 2000. 

He said his country was also interested in strengthening the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and enhancing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Recently, his President decided to sign the Additional Protocol with the IAEA on NPT safeguards.  That instrument empowered the Agency to verify that Belarus did not possess undeclared nuclear materials and did not use declared nuclear material for military purposes, or carry out secretive military programmes.  Belarus had also signed the international Convention for the suppression of nuclear terrorism, which sought to strengthen the foundation of international cooperation to combat that evil.  Belarus had suffered one of the most devastating man-made disasters in history -- the destruction of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.  In the Conference’s final declaration, he sought the possible inclusion of widening the data acquired by the CTBT’s verification system for early disaster warning.  That would not only not undermine the Treaty’s primary goal, but promote broader trust and respect for it.

HANS WINKLER, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Austria, said that, at a time when the risk of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States or non-State actors had become imminent, non-proliferation, as well as the prevention of the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons, remained of the utmost priority.  At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and agreed to 13 practical steps towards that goal.  The 2005 NPT Review, as well as the World Summit last week, unfortunately failed to produce substantive documents in that common field of interest.  Thus, those “practical steps” consensually agreed in 2000 remain “state of the art”.

He said that, although the present number of 125 ratifications of the CTBT was itself remarkable in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation and should give rise to optimism, it was clear that the present Conference must proactively address the recent slower progress in ratifications.  He sought a renewed impetus and fresh ideas.  Looking pragmatically at the issues in a regional context, he felt that the possibility of States contributing to the Treaty’s operation in a coordinated manner was worth exploration.  Such an initiative might also build confidence among geographical regions, thereby further contributions to the improved functioning of the United Nations.  Renewed emphasis should also be given to the additional benefits of civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies in manifold areas, including disaster mitigation.

CATHERINE COLONNA, Minister Delegate for European Affairs of France, said that, almost a decade after the conclusion of the CTBT, the parameters of international security had changed.  The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, particularly the proliferation of nuclear weapons, had become more sharply defined; that threat was now present in several locations around the world.  That had been made even more complex by the development of clandestine proliferation networks and by the ever-present danger that links might be formed between them and terrorist groups.  In that new context, the test-ban Treaty was fully relevant.  Its credibility had been affirmed since 1996, particularly through the work done by the Preparatory Commission.

She said that given that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions would put an end to the appearance of new arms stockpiles and new types of weapons, the CTBT had become one of the fundamental components of strategic stability.  It also preserved the right and duty of nuclear-weapon States to guarantee the safety and reliability of their nuclear arms.  Several States that had not ratified the Treaty had announced moratoriums, and since 1998 not a single nuclear test had occurred.  That situation, however, was precarious.  Work must continue to ensure that the entry into force of the CTBT, in conjunction with a determined non-proliferation policy, would provide the assurance that the halt to nuclear tests was truly conclusive.  The last French nuclear test took place in January 1996.  In September of that year, France signed the CTBT, which it ratified along with the United Kingdom, in April 1998.

That decision had had implications beyond the effective end to such tests, she said.  Indeed, France had wished to go further, deciding to close down and dismantle its Pacific Ocean test site.  Her country was the only nuclear Power to have made such a gesture.  Today, France possessed no facilities allowing it to carry out nuclear test explosions.  The broad scope of its decisions, which had been accompanied by measures for extensive reductions in its weapons stockpile and the shutting down of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons at Pierrelatte and Marcoule, encouraged France to approach the nuclear disarmament debate in a serious and rigorous spirit.  The only commitments by France in that field were those contained in article VI of the NPT.  Regrettably, the present Conference’s draft declaration did not appropriately reflect that fact.

She said that, nine years after it was opened for signature, the CTBT had still not come into force, although the increasing ratifications had allowed it to approach its goal of universality.  At the same time, the work done since 1996 by the Treaty’s Provisional Technical Secretariat had been outstanding.  Thanks to the efforts made since 1996, a universal, effective and dissuasive verification regime had gradually been put in place, which would strengthen global capacity to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.  The international monitoring system of nuclear tests was among its most remarkable aspects.  Deployment of that system, whose stations were now dispersed around the globe, including its remotest regions, was an example of successful international cooperation, which honoured the State signatories.

The principal task of the verification regime must remain the detection, around the world, of nuclear tests, she said.  Her country, nevertheless, supported the parallel development of civilian and scientific applications of its technologies.  The tragic tsunami of 26 December 2004 must encourage examination of the possible contribution of the CTBT network to natural disaster warning systems.  Last March, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)had decided to conduct testing for that purpose, while ensuring that it did not stray, in terms of its budget, from its priority objectives.  France was host to 16 stations and a laboratory of the international monitoring system.  It provided experts and equipment for on-site inspections, as well as training for the benefit of State signatories.  In that way, her country made a practical contribution to the implementation of the verification regime.

She stressed that France had never ceased its bilateral dialogues, and in multilateral forums, to call on those States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to add their efforts to those of the rest of the international community.  She repeated that call, today.  The European Union’s call was directed specifically at those countries whose ratification was necessary under the terms of article XIV of the Treaty for its entry into force.  In a world marked by proliferation crises, which fostered regional instability and endangered strategic balances, the test-ban Treaty was a major contribution to the organization of the world’s collective security.

YANNIS VALINAKIS, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, said that the proliferation challenges and new threats that the world faced today highlighted the necessity of strengthening the non-proliferation regime.  His Government believed that the Treaty was an important tool in the efforts to meet those threats.  It also constituted an essential part of the nuclear disarmament and global non-proliferation regime.  His Government was deeply concerned, however, that nine years after the Treaty was opened for signature, its entry into force was unfortunately still pending, although 125 States had already ratified it.  He joined the call to States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty to sign and ratify it without further delay.

Noting the progress achieved in establishing the verification regime, with the International Monitoring System close to completion, he said he expected the system to provide reassurance that all States were complying with their obligations under the Treaty.  His Government attached great importance to the enhancement of the exploitation of the data and scientific knowledge produced by the verification systems for civil purposes.  In particular, he appreciated the value of that data for efforts to mitigate the consequences of natural disasters.  He added that he was convinced that the Conference would succeed in demonstrating the determination of States that were committed to the Treaty to promote its entry into force and build an effective verification system.

GIAMPAOLO BETTAMIO, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, said his country and other European Union nations were actively promoting the signing and ratification of the Treaty.  He said the Treaty was not only a test of the international community’s capacity to take the road towards nuclear non-proliferation, but a cornerstone of the global fight for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

While he regarded countries’ support for extending the moratorium on nuclear testing as a positive development, he said new terrorist threats created challenges that minimized the benefits of a moratorium extension.  Global leaders should make incontrovertible and strong commitments that stated that nuclear tests were no longer necessary, and then act accordingly.

For that reason, Italy had supported the Treaty from the beginning, helped set up the Vienna structures and helped them achieve their task, drawing on its experience in areas such as seismic and radionuclide monitoring.  And the country’s National Geophysical Institute had provided generous in-kind contributions, in terms of expertise, personnel and equipment.

He said the final declaration the States would adopt at the end of the Conference would prove their political commitment toward the provision of a functioning CTBT for the entire world that would enhance global peace and overall security.

IHOR DOLHOV, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, said Ukraine agreed with the Statement made by the Presidency of the European Union and strongly supported its appeal to bring the Treaty into force as quickly as possible.  He also welcomed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s decision to finalize its national procedure in order to join the Treaty, Lebanon’s recent signing of the Treatym, and its ratification by Vanuatu.

He said the role of nuclear weapons should be diminished in national security doctrines and any upgrading of nuclear weapons, including the miniaturization of nuclear warheads, would only lead to their vertical proliferation and would increase the risk of their falling into terrorists’ hands.  He said it was very important that nations respect the integrity of the norms set by the CTBT and, pending the Treaty’s entry into force, the moratorium on nuclear tests or any other nuclear explosions should be maintained.

Ukraine was encouraged by the CTBT Preparatory Commission’s efforts to establish the Treaty’s verification machinery.  By hosting the International Monitoring System station, Ukraine was committed to making a strong contribution towards the goal of developing a monitoring and verification system that would provide an effective way to monitor Treaty compliance.   Ukraine also supported the Preparatory Commission’s decision to explore ways to make practical contributions to the tsunami warning system.

MARÍA DEL REFUGIO GONZÁLEZ DOMÍNGUEZ, Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, Mexico, said that in the nine years since the Treaty opened for signature, much progress had been achieved by the Provisional Technical Secretariat, which had advanced the gradual implementation of the Treaty’s verification regime.  Monitoring stations were already established at key points around the globe, which sent data back to Vienna.  The growing capacity of the detection network would make it possible to detect any nuclear test explosions, or any other similar explosions.  The treaty’s effectiveness in that regard would restrict testing and put an end to the development of new, more sophisticated, nuclear weapons.  The Treaty’s general objective, namely nuclear disarmament in support of efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation, supplemented the regime established by the NPT Review.  He was very sorry, therefore, about the inconclusive result of the 2005 NPT and the fact that the outcome text of last week’s World Summit had not contained a section on the very important question of disarmament and the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

He said that the purpose of the present Conference was to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.  It was essential, therefore, to recognize that the political task of revitalizing the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime required a fertile environment.  The provisional operation of the Treaty’s verification, which demonstrated a capacity to detect nuclear test explosions, could motivate States that had not ratified the Treaty to do so with confidence in its verification system and with the knowledge that no State would be able to carry out nuclear test explosions without the international community learning about it immediately, should it occur.  Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was the only path towards a safer world and lasting peace for present and future generations.

ZOHOUR ALAOUI, Director of United Nations International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Morocco, said that the conference was being held in a difficult context that was characterized by a profound crisis in the multilateral system in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation.  The difficulties of undertaking substantial negotiations, the failure of the Review Conference earlier in the year, the lack of any reference to those issues in the outcome of the Summit, and the dynamics that had emerged in recent years could lead to pessimism and even discouragement.  Nevertheless, States collectively had an obligation to be optimistic, and the current Conference was an opportunity that had to be seized in order to reaffirm confidence in multilateral instruments.

Recalling that the negotiations surrounding the Treaty required 40 years, she said she asked how such a valuable achievement could not be confirmed by the international community as a whole, especially when the challenges to international security were so difficult.  Today, the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was no longer a subject for just a few States, she said, and the present global situation confirmed the urgent need for the Treaty to enter into force.  It was through the universality of the Treaty that the response to the global threats of the new millennium lay.

Since its signature in 1996, Morocco had resolutely committed itself to the effective implementation of the Treaty.  In carrying out its ratification in 2000, her Government sought to join in the collective struggle against the global threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  While its importance had been recognized and reiterated by most of the States present at the Conference, as an advocate of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons her Government regretted that the Treaty still had not entered into force.  Despite the slow entry into force, however, Morocco welcomed the progress made since the last conference in 2003 and noted with satisfaction that seven new States had signed and 17 others had ratified the Treaty.  She also expressed hope that States would work towards an unambiguous reaffirmation of the Treaty for the sake of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

ABDALLAH BAALI (Algeria), noting that the Conference was exploring ways and means to speed up the Treaty’s entry into force, said that was a reflection of a determination on the part of States to support that important non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament instrument, which, unfortunately, had been best by difficulties.  The fourth such meeting gave pause; it was regrettable that the CTBT was finding it difficult to gather the required ratifications, while a number of instruments concluded well after its adoption were already being implemented.  The CTBT was facing an increasingly less favourable environment in support of nuclear disarmament and multilateralism, and the promotion of the role of law.  Those principles previously had been the pedestal on which so many past achievements in the field had been built, but those no longer enjoyed the same unanimity.  The delay in the CTBT’s operation was not an isolated case, but one of numerous phenomena caused by thwarted efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. 

He cited, in particular, the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament over its agenda, as well as the lamentable failure of the seventh Review Conference of the NPT in May.  All of that had prompted him to add his voice of frustration to all countries whose faith in the cause of disarmament was being “sorely tried”.  The hopes nourished at the important fifth and sixth NPT Review Conferences had been blunted over the years through a lack of multilateral action to give effect to article VI of that Treaty.  The question of the CTBT went beyond the 11 remaining outstanding ratifications.  In current circumstances, namely the absence of joint action to revive the nuclear disarmament debate, it was difficult to imagine that the CTBT would be able to enter into force in the near future.  A renewal of the political will, however, would make everything possible, and past achievements could be built upon. 

The 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which had been agreed at the 2000 NPT Review, contained language agreed by all States, and the entry into force of the CTBT was among those steps, he said.  Their implementation placed a particular burden on the nuclear Powers.  Likewise, the decisions taken at the 1995 NPT Review had also identified specific steps, including a commitment to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.  Fifteen years later, those talks had not managed to start.  In addition, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, had unanimously concluded that there was an obligation incumbent mainly on nuclear-weapon States to pursue, in good faith, negotiations to conclude an international arrangement on nuclear disarmament, under strict and effective global control.  There again, despite numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, that opinion had remained a “dead letter”.  Those commitments must be fulfilled, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, whose responsibility was paramount in nuclear disarmament matters, if progress was to be made towards the CTBT’s operation. 

ALFREDO LABBÉ ( Chile) said the Treaty was undoubtedly a cornerstone of the juridical “corpus” of international disarmament law, and its essential prohibition of nuclear explosions advanced through praxis toward its consolidation as customary law.  The next step in the journey toward nuclear disarmament was the negotiation of the Treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.  Reiterating an appeal to the 11 remaining “Annex 2” States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, he emphasized the value of the nuclear test moratoriums that several of them had proclaimed.

Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, he said signatory States must continue to cooperate closely with the Provisional Technical Secretariat, which had developed and set up much of the International Monitoring System.  Chile was already contributing, with seven stations covering the four verification technologies, and was prepared to increase that number, since the stations on Chilean territory covered a huge maritime space in the South Pacific and the Drake Sea.

Sharing the frustration of some States at the failure of the Review Conference and the absence of a section on disarmament and non-proliferation in the 2005 Summit outcome, he said that despite that, States must continue to support the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes relating to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, using all means at their disposal.  He reiterated his Government’s support of the initiative spearheaded by Norway to incorporate a balanced and satisfactory section on disarmament and non-proliferation in the outcome, which was supported by 80 States.  His Government also supported the extension of the application of the International Monitoring System to early warning of natural disasters, as that would promote the effective multilateralism desired within the framework of the United Nations reform process.

ANDREY I. DENISOV ( Russian Federation) said that increased global efforts to combat the new challenges, including the serious threat of international terrorism, should not undermine the non-proliferation issues.  The CTBT was one of the most important elements of the international security system and of the containment of mass destruction weapons.  Moreover, the Treaty would set a safe barrier to the development and modernization of nuclear weapons -- the most destructive weapons of modern times.  Delay of its entry into force was worrying.  Hopefully, the remaining 11 States from the “list of 44” would take the necessary steps to join the Treaty as soon as possible.  Their position would determine the future of the CTBT.  Having ratified that Treaty five years ago, his country continued to actively participate in joint efforts aimed at its earliest operation.  He emphasized, once again, the need for all signatory States to implement their key obligations under the Treaty and not to violate it prior to its entry into force, and to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing.

He said his country intended to “stick to this position”, provided that the other nuclear Powers applied the same approach.  The voluntary maintenance of the nuclear testing moratorium was an important measure, but that was no substitute for an even more vital task -- ensuring that the CTBT entered into force.  He was satisfied, meanwhile, with the progress and pace of activities aimed at establishing the verification mechanism.  And, he was confident that its technical level within the Treaty’s framework, along with modern national monitoring instruments, would make it impossible to conceal any attempts to violate the Treaty by the time it took effect.  At the same time, he could not accept the arguments of those who delayed ratification that the verification regime was not ready and was only minimally effective.  He called on those States that had not signed or ratified the Treaty, particularly those who accession was required, to do so without delay and without preconditions. 

RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG ( Brazil) said the current year had so far disappointed disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, as well as public opinion.  The fact that the Summit outcome lacked reference to disarmament and non-proliferation was an inexcusable omission that sent a worrisome signal of insufficient commitment to multilateralism as the only means of effectively tackling security concerns common to all humankind.  Such a development should highlight the importance of adopting a strong Final Declaration at the Conference.  The Declaration was a glimmer of hope for those nations that, like Brazil, had consistently and relentlessly strived to promote the elimination of all existing weapons of mass destruction and their non-proliferation.

The Treaty was a key element in the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, he continued.  It was well on its way to becoming a universal instrument of a non-discriminatory nature, and its full and effective implementation would represent a significant step towards nuclear disarmament.  Despite widespread adherence to the Treaty, it was clear that its objectives would not be fully attained before ratification by all States listed under Annex 2, and he expressed deep concern that the prospects of the entry into force remained bleak.  Particularly disquieting was the fact that one of the five nuclear-weapon States had declared its unwillingness to ratify the Treaty, which was a decision that Brazil continued to deplore.  His Government also equally deplored the announcement made by another “Annex 2” country -- which had not signed or ratified the Treaty -- that it was in possession of nuclear weapons and intended to continue to develop them.

Expressing concern at the lack of progress in the implementation of the 13 practical steps on nuclear disarmament agreed to by all States parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, he said he was troubled by the fact that some countries were now trying to renege on those commitments, particularly the early entry into force, the irreversibility of arms reduction measures, and the unequivocal commitment to achieve total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.  There could be no lasting progress in non-proliferation efforts in the absence of commensurate developments in nuclear disarmament, he said.  He also expressed hope for a change in the political attitude of relevant “Annex 2” countries toward ratification of the Treaty, thus allowing it to fully make its contribution for a world free from nuclear weapons.

ROSEMARY BANKS ( New Zealand) said her Government did not imagine it would be meeting for a fourth time to consider why the Treaty had not entered into force and what might be done to accelerate the ratification process.  For New Zealand, the Treaty continued to be worth fighting for, and that required a serious look at the challenges and States preventing entry into force -- and treating those challenges with the utmost urgency.  Global security continued to be under threat from all directions and in unprecedented ways, and a fully operational Treaty would be the first line of defence against the resumption of nuclear testing and a fundamental contribution toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Her Government was profoundly disappointed that this year’s NPT Review Conference could not agree on an outcome and that the Summit outcome did not include any reference to disarmament and non-proliferation, let alone the CTBT.  The Outcome in no way reflected the vital place that disarmament and non-proliferation held in the peace and global security framework.  While there continued to be positive trends toward the universality of the Treaty, she said that ratifications by “Annex 2” countries remained discouraging.  Furthermore, the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan remained a serious concern, and States must find ways to engage those countries that were actively pursuing nuclear weapons programmes and had indicated a willingness to test.  She also expressed hope that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would return to full compliance with its NPT obligations and its early ratification of the Treaty.

In the meantime, she said that maintaining the moratorium on testing was of the highest importance to her Government.  The moratorium kept alive hope of ongoing resistance to proliferation through development of new types of weapons, and any threat to that moratorium would be a threat to all States.  While acknowledging that the Provisional Technical Secretariat’s primary role was monitoring for nuclear tests, she supported those benefits being shared where the international community could benefit from applications of the same technologies.  States must also make available sufficient resources to allow the Secretariat to do its job in a timely manner.  She added that, while her Government was frustrated with the obstacles the Treaty was encountering in its entry into force, it believed that the work required collective and thoughtful effort, as well as patience and an unwavering commitment.

ZHANG YISHAN ( China) said that the conclusion of the CTBT had marked an important step and milestone towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament and the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.  The Treaty was of great significance in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and promoting nuclear disarmament.  Its purposes and objectives had become basic international norms, and its role in effectively preventing horizontal and vertical proliferation could never be ignored.  In today’s world, the multilateral arms control and disarmament process and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime were confronted with severe challenges.  It was urgent, therefore, for the international community to consolidate its basic consensus on banning nuclear tests and accelerate the Treaty’s ratification process, with a view to bringing about its early operation. 

He stressed that, first, efforts should be made to establish a new international security concept centering on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, and to resolve international disputes by peaceful and diplomatic means.  Also crucial was to create an international security order under which all nations enjoyed peace and security.  That would help countries to give up the nuclear option, thereby realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.  The purposes and principles of the CTBT, meanwhile, must be safeguarded.  The nuclear-weapon States should honour their commitment on nuclear testing moratoriums and refrain from research and development of new types of nuclear weapons.  They should also reduce their reliance on those weapons and lower the status of those arms in their national security strategies.  Above all, they should unconditionally undertake not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons.  Those measures would facilitate nuclear disarmament, leading to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. 

In the current situation, pursuit of nuclear weapons would not help increase security, but would trigger international and regional tension, and undermine world peace and stability, he said.  Also important was to actively support the work of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, for an early completion of the construction of the monitoring and verification system.  In that respect, all signatories should pay their contribution to the Commission on time and in full.  For its part, China had long advocated a complete ban on, and thorough destruction of, nuclear weapons, and the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world.  It had developed its nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of self-defence, and it exercised the utmost restraint in maintaining its nuclear arsenal at the lowest level necessary for that purpose. 

He said that the CTBT was conducive to preventing nuclear proliferation and promoting nuclear disarmament, and it had China’s firm support.  As one of the first signatories, his country firmly believed in the Treaty’s purposes and objectives.  Although the global security situation had undergone major changes in the past decade since the Treaty opened for signature, China’s support of its early entry into force had not changed, as that entry would be conducive to world peace and stability and serve the common interest of the international community.  Flowing from that position, his Government had worked actively towards the Treaty’s ratification and had already submitted the text to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval, while promoting its early ratification.  At present, all relevant work was under way “in a serious and orderly fashion”, he concluded. 

RUDOLF SCHALLER ( Switzerland) said the uncertainty surrounding the near-term entry into force of the CTBT was compromising the credibility of the Treaty and its organisation.  The deadlock became apparent during the seventh Review Conference of the NPT held in New York City in May and the impasse that emerged during the high-level Summit last week, which led to the elements on disarmament and non-proliferation being dropped from the Summit outcome.

As one of the States that had adhered to the CTBT, Switzerland deeply regretted the deadlock surrounding the Treaty, he continued.  But as global leaders worked towards bringing the CTBT into force, his Government advocated the following actions:

-- All States listed in Annex 2, whose ratification was necessary for the CTBT’s entry into force, and which bore a greater responsibility, should make a political commitment similar to many States that have already ratified the Treaty;

-- the same States listed in Annex 2 that were located in regions of high tension should take the initiative of ratifying the CTBT simultaneously, which would create trust and security that could, in turn, reduce the regional tensions;

-- States should keep supporting the implementation of a complete system of verification, so the system would be ready to work as soon as the CTBT came into force;

-- and all concerned States should maintain the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.

CELESTINO MIGLIORE, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, said that the CTBT’s goal -- to put an end forever to nuclear weapons testing -- should be the aim of every State.  Nuclear weapons were incompatible with the peace being sought for the twenty-first century.  Yet, progress towards the Treaty’s operation was impeded by a lack of universality.  He added his voice in appealing to those States whose ratification was required to proceed without delay.  Achievement of universality in ending the development of nuclear weapons would show courageous leadership and a high sense of political responsibility in advancing the culture of peace, based on the primacy of law and respect for human life.  It was already past time for the Treaty to take effect; the persistent blockage impeded the world community’s progress.

He said that the failure of the recent NPT Review showed the weaknesses in the non-proliferation regime.  All humanity should be concerned that nuclear weapons were becoming a “permanent feature” of some military doctrines.  Nuclear deterrence, as an ongoing reality after the cold war, became more and more untenable, even in the name of collective security.  Indeed, that was threatening the existence of peoples in several parts of the world and might end up being used as a convenient pretext for building nuclear capacity.  The response to those growing dangers must be increased resolve to build a body of international law to sustain a nuclear-weapon-free world.  The CTBT, once in effect, would be a pillar of international law.  It would be an encouragement for subsequent measures, such as the systematic destruction of all nuclear warheads and their delivery systems.  That would greatly strengthen the architecture for a new human security regime.   

ALEJANDRO BORDA, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, said his Government was convinced of the worthy contribution of the CTBT to international peace and security.  Calling his country one of the greatest promoters of the Treaty during its negotiation process, he said Colombia was always convinced that, without a prohibition of that nature, the NPT would remain unfulfilled.  His Government believed the Treaty was one of the essential disarmament and non-proliferation pillars, which contributed to increased international security in a meaningful fashion.  Notwithstanding that 10 years had passed since the Treaty was open to signature, States faced the deceiving fact that it had not entered into force yet, because of the lack of political will of those nuclear States included in Annex 2 to ratify it.

The entry into force of the Treaty was absolutely necessary for political, legal and economic reasons, he continued.  Among the political reasons was the need to measure the real commitment of States to disarmament and non-proliferation in strict compliance with the Treaty; the strengthening of international peace and security while assuring that no new types of nuclear weapons were under development; and the expressed will to work in a multilateral framework toward that goal for mutual benefit.  Discussing the legal reasons, he said it was important to count on an international legal basis to allow for information transmission and exchange, so that everyone would benefit and commit at the same time.  Without such a legal basis, it was difficult to demand commitment from those States with the technical specifications of the Treaty.

As for economic reasons, he said that the fact that the Treaty had not entered into force meant that a significant amount of money was being spent for the functioning of the Preparatory Commission, as well as for the installation of expensive equipment for the International Verification System.  Such a system would not become fully operational if the Treaty did not enter into force.  For non-nuclear countries such as Colombia, he said the financial effort surpassed its current internal abilities in spite of the commitment his country had demonstrated to disarmament and non-proliferation.  The Treaty’s entry into force would help the Colombian internal control organs and public opinion accept it as an instrument that guaranteed international peace and security.

The Treaty had not entered into force yet, because States themselves established lists with specific names of countries, he said.  That had hindered the Treaty’s entry into force and would continue to do so. Everyone in the room was fully aware that it was not feasible to achieve the full ratification of the 44 countries listed in Annex 2, and it was, therefore, urgent to think about that with honesty and determination, so that States found a way to change that situation.  His Government proposed the convening of a group of experts to study the relevant mechanisms and possibly eliminate the list of 44 ratifying States as a fundamental requirement for the Treaty’s entry into force.

DUMISANI SHADRACK KUMALO ( South Africa) added his voice to the large number of Treaty parties for the early entry into force of the CTBT, and called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it.  He particularly called on all “Annex 2” States, whose signature and ratification was required, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay.  Disappointment at the lack of any substantive outcome at the 2005 NPT Review had underlined the importance, and strengthened the resolve, to work towards full implementation of all obligations and undertakings made at previous Review Conferences.  South Africa’s position on the CTBT was well known.  He called on all NTP States parties to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the principles and objectives agreed at the 1995 NPT Review, and he urged those parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to recommit themselves to accelerating implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, agreed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review. 

He stressed that the early entry into force of the CTBT was a “pressing goal and a non-negotiable commitment” of all States signatories.  During the final stages of the CTBT negotiations in 1995, the nuclear testing conducted during that time, and later in 1998, had increased the international community’s awareness of the dangers of continued testing and development of nuclear weapons.  That had brought about the commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world through a legally binding regime.  The development of new types of nuclear weapons, or rationalization of their use, contradicted the spirit of the NPT and went against the agreement reached in 2000 for a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.  The modernization of nuclear weapons raised concerns that nuclear testing might be resumed.  That would impact negatively on international peace and security.  While he welcomed the declarations of some nuclear-weapon States to observe nuclear testing moratoriums, he urged them to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay.  He noted with serious concern the lack of any real progress by some of them to meet their disarmament obligations in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.

South Africa placed a special emphasis on the role of the five nuclear-weapon States.  They had a moral responsibility to ensure the early entry into force of the CTBT.  He reiterated the position of the Non-Aligned Movement that the early ratification of the Treaty by the remaining nuclear-weapon States could only encourage the remaining “Annex 2” States to sign and ratify as well.  The global environment had changed since 11 September 2001.  Today, the world was facing new additional threats to international peace and security, including the possibility of nuclear terrorism.  States not party to the CTBT must not undermine any joint international efforts aimed at addressing such threats by declaring their intention not to join, or by delaying their signature and ratification of the CTBT.  Following the tragic tsunami disaster, several signatories and ratifiers had called for the CTBT to share its information-gathering systems for a possible tsunami early warning system.  Any decision taken regarding the use of the CTBT systems for any purpose other than to detect nuclear seismological activity due to nuclear testing, would have to be evaluated in terms of its impact on the CTBTO.  No decision should be allowed to dilute the Treaty’s primary purpose.

JULIUS KANDIE ( Kenya) said his country had always supported the objectives of the Treaty, but was disappointed to note that, despite its near universal status, the Treaty still lacked the necessary ratification required for entry into force.  In that regard, his delegation greatly appreciated activities undertaken by some signatory and ratifying States, as well as outreach activities by the Provisional Technical Secretariat to encourage further signatures and ratifications.  While Kenya would continue to support efforts toward universal ratification of the Treaty, he particularly urged those States whose ratifications were required for entry into force to consider early ratification.

The total ban of all nuclear-weapon testing would contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as enhance international peace and security, he said.  The ratification by three of the five nuclear-weapon States was a clear indication that the Treaty enjoyed global support.  He urged the remaining nuclear-weapon States to consider taking measures towards prompt ratification without conditions, saying that such action would encourage the other States to sign and ratify the Treaty.  Furthermore, the commitment to continue a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing was a positive step, but that was not enough.  The longer the delay in entry into force, the more likely that nuclear weapon testing would continue, he said.

His Government would continue to support the work of the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat.  It was also following with interest the ongoing consultations on the potential civil and scientific applications of verification data to disaster warning systems.  In that regard, his Government believed that the possible contribution by the Preparatory Commission to natural disasters, including tsunamis, had merit, but it should be considered in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty and without additional financial implications to Member States.  He added that Kenya looked forward to the adoption by consensus of the draft final declaration, and urged collective efforts toward the early entry into force of the Treaty.

BÉATRICE DAMIBA ( Burkina Faso) said that, despite efforts, unfortunately only 33 of the 44 countries of the Annex 2 had carried out the formality of ratifying the Treaty.  Africa could be gratified to have a total of 51 signatory countries of the CTBT.  On the whole, however, the situation was all the more regrettable in international peace and security, because the Treaty was the only universal legally binding instrument that protected against nuclear explosions.  For that reason, States must ensure that it entered into force.  States at the conference must also identify both international and regional actions to be taken to expedite the process.

She said that, as many others at the Conference had done, she was reiterating the urgency of the immediate entry into force of the Treaty.  Likewise, as a representative of a country that ratified the Treaty in 2002, she made an appeal to all countries that not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to join those who had, in order to make the instrument operational as soon as possible.  Ratification of the Treaty would have civilian benefits, particularly regarding climate and the environment, as well as for natural disasters, such as the tsunami.  Developing countries such as hers had great expectations with regard to the civilian benefits, she added.

ANDERS LIDÉN, ( Sweden), said the opening of the CTBT for signatures nine years ago was the positive culmination of years of negotiations that operated on the assumption that the banning of testing would lead to the abolition of nuclear weapons, the negotiations’ ultimate goal.  It was a very serious matter that the CTBT had not yet entered into force, even though 125 countries had ratified it and 176 countries had signed it.  It was a grave matter because the CTBT was a critical element in the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and serious threats to that regime were mounting.

These threats included the nuclear programmes of a number of States, States with nuclear weapons with questionable commitments to disarmament and the possibility that non-State actors would obtain weapons of mass destruction, he said.  The international community’s efforts to address those threats had not been adequate.  The outcome document of the World Summit did not even mention disarmament or non-proliferation; the NPT Review Conference had not produced any substantive results; and the Conference for Disarmament, the principal international forum for disarmament negotiations, was deadlocked.

Despite those impasses, the threats had to be tackled on a collective and multilateral basis, he said.  It was vitally important that the CTBT enter into force.  He called on all the States that had not yet ratified the Treaty, especially those States whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty to enter into force, to do so.  The two nuclear States that had not yet ratified, the United States and China, had a special responsibility to ratify.  It was also important, as a confidence-building measure for States in South Asia and the Middle East who had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty.  In the meantime, he urged all States to honour a moratorium on nuclear explosions and any actions that would undermine or contravene the Treaty.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Hans Blix, was likely to help address the challenges posed by the existence of nuclear weapons.  Sixty years ago the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  That gave the world reason to, as it states in the NPT, “consider the devastation that would be visited upon mankind by a nuclear war” and the consequent need to make every effort to avoid that danger.  The CTBT was such an effort. That was why it should enter into force, and should do so now.

TATSUO ARIMA, Special Envoy, Japan, said that, in order to maintain the momentum for the Treaty’s entry into force, it was essential to continue the steady build-up of its verification regime.  The benefits of the verification system extended to the promotion of public welfare and science, also.  In that context, Japan, together with Germany, held an experts’ discussion on civil, scientific and other applications of the CTBT verification technologies in May 2004.  The Preparatory Commission was currently carrying out a technical test involving the provisions of data for tsunami warning systems.  In view of the tremendous loss of life and damage that caused last year, the provision of such information would be quite significant, from a humanitarian perspective. 

Noting that this year was the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he said his country, as the only nation ever to have suffered nuclear devastation, was totally committed to peace and nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  The Japanese, thus, wished to see the early operation of the CTBT and they had worked hard to achieve that goal.  Japan took every diplomatic opportunity to urge the States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so.  It was extremely regrettable that the international community had been unable to agree on the urgency of the CTBT at the NPT review in May, or at the 2005 World Summit last week.  To avoid such failures in the future, he called on the international community, at the highest political levels, to take the decisive step of ratifying the CTBT at the earliest possible date.  He especially called on the 11 remaining “Annex 2” States to do so.

Japan’s delegation would also submit a draft resolution to the General Assembly this year, containing such concrete steps as the early entry into force of the CTBT, he said.  His country was also contributing to the establishment of the verification system, and it was providing technical assistance to developing countries to improve their verification capacity through training courses for global seismological observation.  To date, it had welcomed 97 trainees from 63 countries.  Before the CTBT was adopted in 1996, all the nuclear-weapon States had declared a moratorium on nuclear testing.  India and Pakistan did so after conducting nuclear tests in 1998.  Although moratoriums did not substitute for the Treaty, he still valued those and strongly urged those States with such testing bans in place to maintain them, pending the Treaty’s operation.  He also strongly urged all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere. 

RICHARD RYAN ( Ireland) said the Conference was an opportunity to demonstrate the overwhelming support for the CTBT.  It also made it possible to send a strong political signal confirming the relevance and vitality of that key international instrument.  The CTBT was a fundamental step in strengthening the current international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.  By aiming to prevent testing and contribute to the halting of nuclear weapons development, the Treaty served both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.  Regrettably, nearly a decade after its adoption, it had still not become operational.  Since the last such Conference in Vienna two years ago, there had been some welcome progress, but he urged the remaining 11 “Annex 2” States to review their positions and take the necessary steps towards ratification.  Pending the Treaty’s entry into force, all States should continue to abide by a testing moratorium, support the establishment of an effective verification system, and refrain from any action contrary to the Treaty.  The continuing observance of the moratorium was welcome, but it could never substitute for the legally binding prohibition enshrined in the Treaty. 

He said that the significance of the CTBT was greatly enhanced by its link to other crucial instruments in the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime, particularly the NPT.  The latter remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.  The NPT’s preamble referred to the determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear test explosions for all time.  At the 1995 NPT Review, the negotiation of the CTBT was included in an agreed action programme.  In the Final Document of the 2000 Review, the CTBT again featured prominently, in the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement the NPT’s article VI.  He continued to regard those as the benchmarks for nuclear disarmament.  Meanwhile, he was deeply disappointed at the outcome of the seventh Review Conference of the NPT in May, which failed to produce a single conclusion.  That was a missed opportunity for the international community.

Last week, the international community again failed to rise to the occasion on nuclear issues, he said.  The agreement reached by heads of State and government contained nothing on disarmament and the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, or on the need to strengthen the NPT.  Those setbacks were very disappointing.  Still, present challenges would not vanish by simply being ignored.  All countries, especially small countries like Ireland, had a fundamental stake in a rules-based international order and strong international institutions.  He continued to believe that a multilateral regime of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, and the universalization of the norms which those contained, offered the best guarantee of international peace and security.  The CTBT had a central place in that architecture, and he hoped that the Conference would help to develop added momentum towards its operation. 

JORGE SKINNER-KLÉE ( Guatemala) said, it was more important than ever for the international community to address international peace and security because of the new threats that had arisen, including that terrorists might acquire weapons of mass destruction.  It was very unfortunate that neither the outcome document of the World Summit or the NPT Review Conference had reached any new agreements regarding disarmament and non-proliferation but Guatemala was optimistic that progress would be made at the current Conference.

Guatemala’s commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation were evidenced by its participation in the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT, along with its conclusion of an IAEA Safeguard Agreement, he said.  It had also worked towards its own ratification of the CTBT.  Last March, Guatemala ratified an agreement with the Preparatory Commission to establish an auxiliary seismic station in the country.  The station, which would be able to detect seismic activity throughout Guatemala and the region, would increase the effectiveness of both the verification network and the potential use of the network as an early warning system for tsunamis.

Guatemala’s Foreign Ministry, with the Preparatory Commission, conducted a seminar in March on the management of natural disasters and the importance of non-proliferation, he said.  Its purpose was to both underscore the benefits of participating in the Treaty and of the potential peaceful uses of its proposed verification techniques.   Guatemala just hosted a CTBT regional workshop for Latin America and the Caribbean on the topic.

His Government had been making every effort to break the legal impasses which was blocking Guatemala’s ratification of the Treaty.  There had been progress, in that the Foreign Ministry had decided to support it and that had cleared the way for the President to put it before the legislature for ratification.  His country urged the Conference to eliminate the financial barriers developing countries, including Guatemala, faced in becoming parties to the Treaty. 

CHUN YUNG-WOO, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, said that earlier in the week, the six-party talks in Beijing had made an important breakthrough in containing the most imminent spectre of nuclear proliferation, which had been haunting the Korean peninsula and North-East Asia, while in another part of the world, the spectre was slipping out of control.  From a global perspective, proliferation threats were on the rise, while the existing mechanisms for dealing with those threats were under severe stress.

At a time when threats to collective peace and security were mounting, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT was languishing, he said.  Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the NPT Review Conference, was in limbo.  It was also a pity, he said, that last week’s Summit failed to include in its outcome any agreement on nuclear non-proliferation or disarmament.  All those disappointing developments made the entry into force of the Treaty more urgent than ever.  Its entry into force would make a substantial contribution towards making the world a safer and more peaceful place, as well as help boost declining confidence in the NPT, which had been stuck in an existential crisis.

Reiterating a call on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, he said his Government also added its voice to the call for all States to refrain from acts that would defeat or undermine the objective of the Treaty pending its entry into force.  He also called for a prompt launch of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty to supplement and reinforce the CTBT.  Furthermore, nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate their collective political commitment to accelerate the long-overdue entry into force.  They could also do a great service to the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation by irreversibly abandoning the options of making qualitative improvements to their nuclear arsenals and developing advanced new types of nuclear weapons.  Welcoming the progress that had been made in building an extensive Treaty verification system, he reaffirmed his Government’s support for the efforts of the Preparatory Commission and the Special Representative to facilitate the signature and ratification process.

ALI MOHAMED GASHUT, Director General, National Centre for Research and Development, Libya, said he was fully aware of the danger of mass destruction weapons, but calls to eliminate them had not always been heeded.  There seemed to be a double standard when it came to the nuclear Powers.  Some wanted to extend their hegemony and ensure that their interests would be imposed on others.  That led small countries to think of acquiring weapons of mass destruction, despite their exorbitant cost and mandatory supplementary protection, which was beyond those countries’ means.  It was essential to ensure that the entire world’s interest prevailed through reason and dialogue. 

He recalled that, on 19 December 2003, his country had renounced its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programmes.  It was still awaiting the benefits of that decision.  A great deal of progress had been made globally in the area of information technologies, and Libya’s action should be encouraged through economic and political incentives.  At the same time, countries that possessed nuclear weapons must have a timetable for their elimination.  Nuclear weapon explosions must be banned, and it must be ensured that those countries that had not yet ratified the CTBT, do so.  Countries that possessed nuclear weapons and which had not ratified the Treaty must do so as soon as possible.  He called on all countries to ensure that the spirit of dialogue and cooperation prevailed, as the world community experienced new problems and challenges.  All tools should be used and adapted to ensure the well-being and prosperity of peoples everywhere. 

ENRIQUE LOEDEL ( Uruguay) said that his country had repeatedly expressed its views against nuclear weapons in all forums where the subject had been debated.  Such forums were often being reduced or cancelled, or concluded with States not agreeing on an agenda.  An alarming example was the Summit outcome, in which nuclear weapons, which had threatened international relations during the last 60 years, had not been mentioned.  The non-discriminatory nature of the Treaty, as well as its universal scope, made it a positive instrument, and one that was complementary to the rest of the instruments that created the international binding network for disarmament and non-proliferation.

The activities established by the Treaty, he continued, were relevant and of equal importance, and there should be no ambiguity when detailing the commitments for the entry into force of the Treaty.  There should be no difference between the international monitoring system and on-site inspections, and it was important to make clear that such activities could not be accelerated to come into force with no legal framework in place.  Likewise, in the area of technical cooperation, developing countries should be treated equally, because such cooperation was essential to many countries that granted their support to the entry into force of the Treaty.

Regarding the mechanism of conferences established under article XIV, he said it was necessary to review such a mechanism, which until now had been expensive and had had very poor results.  One possibility could be to hold consultations in Vienna, and to make them as open as possible, with a large participation of countries that had signed and/or ratified the Treaty.  He added that the current political landscape in the field of nuclear weapons was not encouraging at all, but the Treaty could help improve such landscape.

IMMANUEL ROBERT INKIRIWANG ( Indonesia) said his Government reiterated the importance of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable Treaty as a measure to enhance international peace and security.  Noting with concern that the Treaty had not yet entered into force, he said he was gratified that it was now approaching universal status.  As a signatory to the CTBT, Indonesia shared the view that the prohibition of nuclear-test explosions anywhere constituted an effective measure toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  He also believed that cessation of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions and the production of all nuclear explosive devices would effectively pave the way to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and providing an effective legal obstacle to the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

Indonesia had demonstrated its serious commitment to prohibiting nuclear testing for military purposes and to supporting the inalienable right of all States to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  As a country that was severely devastated by the tsunami, Indonesia fully supported the decision taken by the Preparatory Commission to task the Provisional Technical Secretariat to explore the tsunami early warning system.  He added that his Government believed that disarmament and non-proliferation were imperative in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.  Therefore, it deplored the omission of those pertinent issues from the outcome of the recent Summit.  That was another dismal failure following the NPT Review Conference last April, as well as another black eye to the efforts of States to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as an important agenda item of the international community.

FRANK A.M. MAJOOR ( Netherlands) said, nearly ten years after the CTBT was opened for signature, it was more important than ever that it enter into force.  It was critical, because it was the cornerstone of non-proliferation efforts and a vital link in the mutually reinforcing treaties, arrangements and regimes concerning weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems.   Netherlands was a strong believer in international law as the foundation for stable and beneficial relations between States.  Because of this belief, it was particularly concerned that the NPT review conference in May produced no results.

It was important that existing treaties on weapons of mass destruction were not eroded, he continued.  The fact that existing treaties were under pressure did not bode well for the prospects of the CTBT.  The fact that, for the ninth year in a row, the Conference on Disarmament had ended in an impasse and that negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty were long overdue, contributed to a sense of pessimism.  But, the Netherlands would continue to try to launch those negotiations.  It was imperative to redouble efforts to get the CTBT into force.  Otherwise, there would be negative consequences for all disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.  International law was based on the willingness to be bound, but there were a number of States that refused to be.  Any effort to put the Treaty into force had to begin with an appreciation of that reality.

Perseverance and political will were required to keep the CTBT alive, he said.  The Netherlands was making every effort to increase the number of ratifying countries and its Ambassador, Jaap Remaker, as Special Representative of the CTBT was working with the President of the CTBT Conference, Alexander Downer of Australia, to achieve that goal.  The Netherlands was also working bilaterally, and with European Union member states, to persuade other states to ratify.  It was important to realize that the group that had not ratified was diverse, and that no one approach would persuade all of them to ratify.  One group of non-ratifiers had not decided whether to ratify, or had not given sufficient attention to the Treaty.  That group was probably the easiest to persuade to ratify.  Another group was impeded by technical difficulties, frequently concerning national implementing legislation, and could use assistance.   Netherlands had made voluntary contributions so that the CTBTO’s work in that area could continue.  A third group faced political and other obstacles to ratification.  That group would be the most difficult to move towards ratification and the nature of effective assistance depended on the unique obstacles the individual countries faced.

It was necessary to accept that the CTBT might not go into effect for a long time, he said.  While that was disappointing, it was heartening that the CTBTO existed and that a verification system was being developed.  It was important to continue to expand the verification network and include States that had neither signed nor ratified the Treaty.  It was also important to ensure that the CTBTO continued to have the resources to carry on its work.  That would mean acknowledging that, in some cases, even though a State hadn’t ratified, it was promoting the Treaty by contributing financially to the CTBTO’s existence.

MARÍA ALICIA TERRAZAS ONTIVEROS ( Bolivia) said that the current conference was being held at an important time for the United Nations, which, at the recent Summit, had reaffirmed its faith in the principles of the Charter and in the essential principles of multilateralism.  Also being celebrated this month was another milestone on the path to international peace and security, and that was the anniversary of the adoption of the CTBT.  Nuclear weapons continued to be a genuine threat and a constant factor of concern, because there had been an increase in the number of States that possessed such weapons and because of the threat of terrorists that could acquire them.  In her view, the existence of nuclear weapons was one of the most urgent problems facing the international community.

The international community, she continued, has seen its hopes dashed by the discouraging results of the NPT Review Conference and the outcome of the recent Summit.  However, the participation of countries having ratified and signed the Treaty at the fourth Conference showed political will and the high value attached to multilateral efforts being made to bring about the entry into force.  It was also encouraging that significant progress had been made in establishing the global verification regime, she added.

Bolivia had given clear indications of its peace-loving traditions by participating actively in various multilateral initiatives, and by encouraging and supporting the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.  She reiterated her Government’s resolute support for the speedy entry into force of the Treaty as a fundamental instrument in the regime of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and with a view to the maintenance of international peace and security.  The entry into force required concrete measures that went beyond the aspirations and objectives of national policies, she added, and it was necessary to provide joint responses to the challenges resulting from the broader concept of universal participation.

SAJA MAJALI, ( Jordan), said Jordan was in agreement with the position of the State signatories and ratifiers of the Non-Aligned Movement to the CTBT.  Threats from nuclear weapons to international peace and security were graver than ever, making nuclear disarmament efforts of great importance.  The international community knew what was required to produce a nuclear-free world.  Universal adherence to the NPT, as well as the entry into force of the CTBT were necessary.  Nuclear weapon States had to work towards ridding themselves of their nuclear stockpiles and had to comply with their obligations under the NPT.  It was also necessary for the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament to be broken so that negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material could begin.  Political will was needed to accomplish those objectives.

The failure of the NPT, the deadlock of the Conference on Disarmament and the lack of mention of disarmament and non-proliferation in the World Summit Outcome Document made the work of the current conference particularly urgent, she said.  The CTBT was essential for preventing the proliferation and improvement of nuclear weapons.  Entry into force of the CTBT would be a major step towards stopping proliferation and ultimately achieving a nuclear-free world.   Jordan, as an early ratifier of the CTBT, was committed to working towards its earliest possible entry into force.   Jordan urged all States, and particularly nuclear-weapon States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, to do so right away.   Jordan welcomed voluntary moratoria on nuclear-test explosions, but did not regard them as substituting for the Treaty.

An international mechanism ought to be created that would assist ratifiers, particularly developing countries, in acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as for energy and in medicine, she said.  As one of the first ratifiers from the Middle East, Jordan supported the creation of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the region.   Israel’s accession to the NPT was particularly crucial, as it would facilitate negotiations on arms control and regional security, promote other tracks of the peace process and support confidence-building measures.  IAEA safety measures should be implemented in Israel to safeguard unprotected nuclear facilities, in order to prevent nuclear accidents and radiological contamination.  The ratification of the CTBT by all Middle East countries would also promote a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

ITSHAK LEDERMAN, Senior Director for CTBT and Special Projects, Atomic Energy Commission, Israel, reiterated his Government’s support for the CTBT and added his hope that the Conference would succeed in advancing the Treaty’s early operation.  The nuclear testing ban was an important pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as part and parcel of Israel’s overall national approach to nuclear security and stability.  The importance of the norm embodied in the Treaty was especially pronounced in light of the nuclear challenges of proliferation and non-compliance so evident in recent years, and most acute in the Middle East.  The CTBT was one significant tool for addressing those challenges; others included nuclear export controls and conventions, and corresponding national practices. 

He said his country had been supporting the CTBT since its inception and had undertaken new responsibilities, including comprehensive export control legislation.  The looming threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists was paramount, and must be prevented.  Israel, thus, welcomed adoption of Security Council resolution aimed at preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation, particularly to non-State actors.  Israel also supported the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Code on the Safety of Research Reactors.  It had also lent its active support to the establishment of the verification regime.  In that regard, Israel had completed construction of two seismic stations in Meron and Eilat and signed a Facility Agreement with the CTBTO.  It also took part in most of the activities, especially those related to training and field exercises.  Further, it had contributed financially to the full CTBTO’s operations, despite austere national budgets.

Pending the Treaty’s entry into force, which was not presently in sight, great emphasis should be placed on a series of practical interim measures designed both to serve the broader cause of security and stability, even in the current setting, he said.  Those included:  sustaining the commitment not to carry out any nuclear-test explosion; redoubling efforts to complete the CTBT verification regime; operating, maintaining and testing the completed seismological stations and data centre, in order to gain experience and provide early detection capabilities; providing sufficient funds to the CTBTO; and using the Treaty’s technical capabilities, in a cost effective manner and without diverting from its primary objective of verification of the Treaty, to support tsunami warning systems, in order to alert threatened populations in time. 

He said that Israel’s ratification of the CTBT would be influenced by three factors:  the readiness of the Treaty’s verification regime and its immunity to abuse; Israeli’s sovereign equality status in the policymaking organs of the Treaty, including those related to the geographical regions of the Middle East and South Asia and in the Executive Council of the future CTBTO; and adherence to and compliance with the CTBT by States in the Middle East.  He highlighted the fact that efforts to function within the Treaty-defined Middle East and South Asia geographic region had been consistently blocked by one delegation for reasons completely alien to the purposes of the Treaty.  Efforts to include a sentence in the draft final declaration highlighting the importance of that issue had been further stymied, and the sentence was consequently not included.  That outcome signalled, not only to Israel, but to all, that the proper functioning of all geographical regions of the Treaty, essential for Israel’s ratification and for the Treaty itself, remained far from resolved. 

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For information media • not an official record