PRESS CONFERENCE ON SUDAN, CÔTE D’IVOIRE VISITS BY SPECIAL ADVISER ON PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE

PRESS CONFERENCE ON SUDAN , CÔTE D’IVOIRE VISITS

BY SPECIAL ADVISER ON PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE

There was a significant disconnect between the official Sudanese evaluation of conditions in Darfur and Government actions to address the problem there, and the accounts given by Darfurians, Juan E. Méndez, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, said at a Headquarters press conference today.

Briefing correspondents on his recent visits to the Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire, Mr. Méndez said that information drawn from a number of reports had led him to expect a more stable Darfur during his September visit than he had found a year ago, when visiting with the High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Unfortunately, the present situation was of great concern, and his report to the Security Council contained recommendations in four key areas:  protection of populations at risk; ensuring accountability for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; humanitarian assistance; and steps towards a political solution to the conflict in Darfur.

However, Sudanese officials had suggested earlier this week that the Government would not cooperate with the investigation conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, he said, pointing out that the Sudan’s cooperation with the Court was an obligation under Security Council resolution 1593 (2005).  He added that he had consistently stressed that ensuring accountability was essential to preventing genocide.

Turning to Cote d’Ivoire, he said that during his visit earlier this month, several officials, including the High Commissioner for Human Rights, had expressed the need to monitor the situation with a view to preventing massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.  While the parties to the conflict were showing restraint at present, significant tensions remained, presenting a risk of massive and serious human rights violations based on ethnicity, national origin or religion.

He said that given the stakes in Côte d’Ivoire, he had stressed the urgent need to advance the national reconciliation process and implement existing agreements in good faith.  The disarmament process should begin, as agreed in the various accords, and identification in particular must be addressed in a fair and transparent manner.  That would allow for legitimate and representative elections that would provide a basis for resolving the root causes of the Ivorian conflict.  There was also a need to strengthen the presence on the ground of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).

In opening remarks earlier, Mr. Méndez reminded correspondents of the Special Adviser’s functions, as outlined to the Security Council in a letter from the Secretary-General, dated 12 July 2004, as follows:  collecting information, mainly from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law arising from ethnic and racial origin, which, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; acting as an early warning mechanism to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to the latter’s attention potential situations that could result in genocide; making recommendations to the Security Council on actions to prevent or halt genocide; and liaising with the United Nations system on activities to prevent genocide, as well as enhancing the Organization’s capacity to analyze and manage information relating to genocide.

The purpose of the Special Adviser was not to determine whether genocide had occurred or was occurring, he said.  That limitation was not so much a reflection of existing political sensitivities, but a practical one deriving from the preventive character of the mandate, the role of which was to provide early warning before all the elements constituting a definition of genocide, under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, were present, as well as to suggest appropriate action.  All too often, the debate over whether genocide was occurring had become more important than taking action to reverse the situation and prevent further violations.

Asked whether he “sits up and listens” when Human Rights Watch called for the investigation and prosecution of officials in the Sudan, including the President, Mr. Méndez said he did, but the responsibility to identify potential perpetrators for prosecution lay with International Criminal Court Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo.

Responding to a follow-up question on the situation in the Sudan, he said he had looked into whether the Government was living up to its responsibility to break the cycle of impunity, and his impression was that nothing had been done for months about the hundreds of killings and the destruction of villages.  Lately, the Government had established a special court, but it dealt with marginal cases from 2003 and 2004.  It was up to the International Criminal Court itself to determine whether or not the activities of the Sudanese Government amounted to a willingness to deal with the problem.

Another correspondent asked what concrete actions Mr. Méndez had recommended to the Secretary-General.  With so many people dying and the Court process taking its time, what was he doing about it all?

Mr. Méndez replied that he had argued strenuously that the Sudanese Government should be told in no uncertain terms that it had no choice but to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, including by identifying culprits.  The Security Council’s decision referring the Government of the Sudan to the Court was a binding Chapter VII action, and if it refused to cooperate, the Council should take appropriate action.

Asked whether he had been disappointed not to have been able to brief the Security Council yesterday, he said he had been disappointed, but he stood ready to brief the Council whenever it decided it wanted to hear him.

Had the fact that he had not been heard by the Council sent a wrong message to the Sudan? a correspondent asked.

He described that as a setback more generally for the functions of his office, which had been created at the Council’s behest.  However, when he had something important to say, the Council would listen.

In response to questions about Cote d’Ivoire, he said the situation there was “very, very tense”, especially owing to the attitude of the print media in Abidjan, which fuelled hatred between ethnic groups.  The press also openly fabricated stories, which generated uncertainty among the population.  In addition, the Government had taken the position that it did not have to disarm its militia until the new Prime Minister was appointed.  That appointment had been a welcome step, but there was also the question of access to education in the north of the country, and a negative potential for the many children not “sitting at their benches”, even from a security perspective.  That misguided policy could only contribute to people getting ready to fight.

Asked about the extent of human rights violations in Cote d’Ivoire, he said they had been very severe until about July or August.  Fortunately, the ceasefire seemed to be holding since then.  However, the high tensions were palpable and “anything could happen at any moment”.

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For information media • not an official record