PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ FACT-FINDING MISSION

PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ FACT-FINDING MISSION

Once the basic legal framework had been completed, it would take at least eight months to hold credible and well organized elections with results that would be accepted by the Iraqis, Carina Perelli, Director of the Electoral Assistance Division, Department of Political Affairs, told correspondents at Headquarters this morning.

Ms. Perelli was briefing the press on the electoral issues of the report of the Secretary-General’s fact-finding mission to Iraq, which was released today.  It will be available under the document symbol S/2004/140, and constitute the basis of a meeting of the Security Council tomorrow.

Following a request from the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Secretary-General deployed the fact-finding mission to Iraq from 6 to 13 February, under the leadership of his Special Adviser, Lakhdar Brahimi.  Among other things, the mission was to assess the feasibility of holding direct elections before the 30 June 2004 deadline for the transfer of sovereignty to a provisional government.

As indicated in the detailed technical report contained in appendix II to the report, credible elections could not take place by 30 June 2004, as substantial preparations were needed.  If work was started immediately and the required political consensus was reached fairly rapidly, it would be possible to hold elections by the end of 2004.

There was also consensus among the Iraqis, states the report, that the 30 June 2004 deadline for the transfer of sovereignty to a provisional government should be maintained.  In addition, the resolution of the timing of the election provided an opportunity for Iraqis and the Coalition Provisional Authority to engage in more focused dialogue on the mechanism to which sovereignty would be transferred.

Ms. Perelli said that certain steps needed to be taken for the elections to be in compliance with accepted practices.  First, a public administration infrastructure needed to be created to organize the elections.  In doing so, agreement needed to be reached on what type of electoral authorities would be organizing and conducting the elections, as well as the budget for the electoral authorities.

Also important, she continued, was the need to conclude basic agreements establishing the regulatory framework for elections, including who was entitled to vote, the territorial basis for the vote, the electoral system through which those votes would be turned into seats, how to register voters, and how to count the votes.  An electoral commission could not start working unless such a framework was in place.

She was now waiting to hear from the Iraqis and the Coalition Provisional Authority on whether they accepted the report and its recommendations.  The United Nations stood ready to assist them in the process if the Iraqis and the Authority considered that help necessary.

Elaborating on the electoral commission, she said that the optimal model of such a body worked according to the history of the country and the structure of its public administration.  An electoral commission was a structure that was independent from political pressure and constituted the backbone for the conduct of elections.  Prior to starting work it was necessary to determine what the structure of the elections would be and what safeguards would be established to ensure that they operated free of political pressure and intimidation.  Among other things, the electoral commission was responsible for the registration of candidates and political parties, as well as for overseeing the conduct of campaigns.

In the past in Iraq, it was the Ministry of the Interior which organized elections, she noted.  A completely new and independent electoral commission set up for the interim elections would be the most credible for Iraqi voters, rather than just a division of the Ministry, due to distrust.

As to who would be identified to represent an independent force within Iraq to carry out the electoral work, she said that was among the first agreements that needed to be reached among the Iraqis.  How to constitute the commission and how to staff it would be the first agreement that needed to be reached.  Secondly the agreements on the basic electoral framework needed to be achieved with Iraqis from all sectors.  Therefore, it was necessary for the Iraqis to read the report and determine whether they accepted it.  If they did accept it, they would need to organize a process of broad consultations to determine precisely how to reach consensus on the basics of the election.

Asked how the United Nations would function without knowing what the transitional government would be like, she noted that the Organization had worked previously in situations of transition.

On security, she said that the situation was not very good.  If the United Nations were to provide help, it needed to find a way to operate in the country that did not necessarily require a team of bodyguards.  It was also important to create an environment that minimized intimidation of both candidates and voters.  Otherwise, the elections were merely a mechanical exercise without any real freedom.  If people really trusted the process, she noted, they would be the first to defend their right to vote.  She added that, in the countries in which she was worked, having a national security force tended to favour the creation of an environment of trust.

Asked if she could envision holding elections in Iraq in the current security climate, she noted that she had conducted elections in situations where security was just as bad, such as in East Timor in 1999 during which poll workers were being killed.  It was difficult to determine what the security situation would be like once the process was actually launched.

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