PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ SECURITY ACCOUNTABILITY

PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ SECURITY ACCOUNTABILITY

United Nations Spokesman Fred Eckhard today announced Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s administrative decisions, including calls for the resignation of senior United Nations officials, in reaction to the findings of the report of the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel.

The Panel, established on 10 November 2003 and chaired by former Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Gerald Walzer, identified institutional and individual failures in assessing the security situation in Baghdad prior to the terrorist attack on 19 August that killed 22 people, including the United Nations top envoy in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Last fall, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who was asked by the Secretary-General to investigate the attack, found that the United Nations security systems in Baghdad were “dysfunctional and sloppy”.  The security breaches were so serious that a separate and independent accountability study should be carried out.  The question following the attack, Mr. Eckhard said today, was, had the United Nations done everything possible to protect its staff in an increasingly dangerous environment? 

While the Panel had reached the conclusion that there was no blurring in the relevant chains of command, stated Mr. Eckhard, it had identified several principal failures.  First, contrary to the established practices and procedures of the Organization, no prior security assessment mission was sent to Iraq before the first humanitarian staff returned to Baghdad on 1 May 2003. 

Also, at the executive level in Headquarters in New York, the Steering Group on Iraq (SGI), lacked due care or diligence in the manner in which it dealt with the circumstances of the return to Baghdad.  Among other things, it endorsed a flawed concept of operations paper received from the Humanitarian Coordinator Designated Official and endorsed by the United Nations Security Coordinator; failed to insist on clarifying the extent of the risk the staff would be running; and failed to insist on respect by all entities involved regarding staff ceilings and security clearances, in contravention of the established practice and procedures of the Organization.

In addition, no comprehensive, documented review was undertaken of the security requirements at the Canal Hotel (where the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was located), following the return of United Nations staff on 1 May 2003.  Furthermore, the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Designated Official, and the Security Management Team in Baghdad, appeared to be blinded by the conviction that United Nations personnel and installations would not become a target of attack, despite the clear warnings to the contrary.

Meanwhile, security updates compiled and disseminated between 23 May and 19 August gave a picture of how the security situation had deteriorated during that period of time.  There was a conflict between information received from the United Nations and from United States military sources as to whether requests were made by senior United Nations staff in Baghdad to vacate United States military personnel and equipment from critical positions around the Canal Hotel before the attack on 19 August.

The standard of security management regarding the Canal Hotel was seriously deficient and lacking cohesion, the report added.  That deficiency was exacerbated by the inadequate support that the Field Security Coordinator received from senior security management in New York, and from the Designated Official.  The United Nations Security Coordinator failed to take remedial action concerning difficulties being encountered by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) staff in Baghdad to cope with increasing demands on their services and rising stress levels.

Also, the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI) and the Building Manager of that Office did not demonstrate any serious intention to procure and instal blast-resistant film for the entire Canal Hotel.  Those two officers displayed “profound lack of responsibility and ineptitude” in the manner they sought to implement the request for installation of the film.  “Their combined response to the issue indicates a lethargy that is bordering on gross negligence.”

Given the security community’s awareness of the deteriorating security circumstances in Baghdad, there was a failure on the part of the Designated Official, the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Steering Group to take appropriate remedial action, either by reducing staff numbers or by a concerted effort to improve security measures.

In light of the above failures, continued Mr. Eckhard, the Secretary-General had requested the resignation of the United Nations Security Coordinator -– Mr. Tun Myat -- from the United Nations.  He had also requested the immediate resignation of the Humanitarian Coordinator/Designated Official –- Ramiro Lopez da Silva -- from his current Assistant Secretary-General post in the United Nations to return to his D-2 post in the World Food Programme (WFP).

In addition, the Secretary-General had referred the matter of the Chief Administrative Officer and the Building Manager of UNOCHI to the Office of Human Resources Management to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the two staff members, who are being charged with misconduct.

The other decisions taken by the Secretary-General included:  a letter to each head of a United Nations Fund or Programme who had staff in Iraq during the period 1 May to 19 August 2003, critical of their management and lack of respect for staff ceilings and security clearances, applicable in Iraq; the immediate reassignment of the Field Security Coordination Officer from UNSECOORD to an appropriate post not involving any functions related to security matters; and a letter of reprimand to the Security Management Team in Iraq.

The Secretary-General’s decisions also included a letter addressed to Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Steering Group, expressing his disappointment and regret with regard to the failures identified by the Panel which are attributable to the Group.  In the light of the above findings and conclusions of the Panel, Ms. Fréchette had tendered her resignation to the Secretary-General.  The Secretary-General, taking into account the collective nature of the failures attributable to the Steering Group as a whole, declined to accept the resignation.

The Secretary-General, stated Mr. Eckhard, regretted the failures identified by the Panel and expressed his determination to take all corrective measures, within his authority, to enhance the safety and security of all United Nations staff, especially those deployed in dangerous conflict areas.

Responding to questions about Ms. Fréchette’s offer of resignation, Mr. Eckhard replied, “that matter is closed”.  She offered her resignation, in writing, and the Secretary-General did not accept it because the failures of the Steering Group were collective and not the responsibility of any one individual, except the Security Coordinator, who also sat on that Group but whose specific responsibility it was to advise on security matters.

Therefore, he continued, in the case of the Security Coordinator, there was individual responsibility, and he was asked for his resignation, which he had submitted.  The Security Coordinator was the one with overall responsibility for security matters in the United Nations system, not just the Secretariat, but the system as a whole.  All the agencies, funds and programmes operating in the field agree to follow the directives of the Security Coordinator.  “So, the buck stops there.”

The Designated Official was the senior person responsible for security of all United Nations staff in the mission area, he added.  So, the Designated Official was following the recommendations of the Security Coordinator in New York who was setting the policy and the standards.  Those were two separate levels of responsibility.  The Security Coordinator was asked for his resignation and the Designated Official was allowed to go back to his previous job with the WFP in Rome, going back to his previous level, with the directive that he would never have security responsibilities in the United Nations system again.

Legally speaking, Mr. Eckhard said that as all the officials identified in the report were carrying out their official responsibilities, they were covered by immunity from prosecution.  The two individuals whose cases were being sent to the Human Resources Department would be subjected to a well defined, standard procedure.

Asked what had been the late Mr. Vieira de Mello’s assessment of the security risk, Mr. Eckhard said that the report indicated that Mr. Vieira de Mello, like other managers in Baghdad, did not have an adequate grasp of the rising threat to them of the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad.  The report specifically stated that they were living under the delusion that the United Nations would not be attacked.

Concerning reports that Mr. Vieira de Mello’s plane was shot at, Mr. Walzer said that from what he could establish, there was shooting in the area as the plane was about to land in Baghdad.  While the plane was alerted to the fact that there was shooting taking place and a risk to all aircraft, there was no indication that Mr. Vieira de Mello’s plane was targeted.

Responding to questions regarding the Secretary-General’s own responsibility for what happened, Mr. Eckhard said that the Secretary-General took the decision to send United Nations staff back to Iraq last summer on the basis of the recommendation of his senior most officials, those sitting on the Steering Group for Iraq, and on the specific recommendations of the Security Coordinator.  The Accountability Panel found that that was a correct way to make a decision.  There were no dissenting voices in that recommendation to send United Nations staff back to Iraq.

Asked if the Secretary-General was also living under the delusion that the United Nations would not be attacked, Mr. Eckhard said that, according to the report, the Secretary-General had a phone conversation with Mr. Vieira de Mello after the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy, asking whether that was a sign that the situation was getting more dangerous.  Mr. Vieira de Mello’s response was that it was too early to say that it was a sign of a deteriorating security situation.  So, there were indications that the Secretary-General was concerned, raised questions with Mr. Vieira de Mello, but was reassured that the situation was still manageable.

As to whether it was clear to Mr. Walzer that the buck stopped with the Security Coordinator and did not go further up the chain, Mr. Walzer replied that there were certain decisions that rested with the Secretary-General on security issues, such as declaring a Phase V (a designation calling for evacuation of staff).  The Security Coordinator had direct reporting responsibility to the Secretary-General.  The Panel concluded that the Secretary-General got recommendations on the return to Baghdad, which did not indicate to him that what was standard practice to that point was not being observed in that recommendation.  So, the Panel concluded that the Secretary-General acted properly.

It had become practice before deploying staff into a conflict area, into a Phase V area, to first send a security assessment team, he explained.  In the case of Baghdad, there was a decision to merge a security assessment team with an advance humanitarian team with representatives of the heads of United Nations agencies, and that joint team was sent in.  The Panel felt that it was indeed a flawed proposal not to do a full security assessment before putting staff on the ground.

The recommendation to go back in a joint team was a departure from, at least in security circles, what was accepted as standard practice, he continued.  That was not pointed out to the Steering Group or to the Secretary-General.  The Secretary-General had acted on the assumption that the recommendation he received was in line with accepted procedures and took into account staff security issues.

It was clear from the findings, he said, that management had grown increasingly concerned about the deteriorating security situation.  While the risk of being in the wrong place at the wrong time had increased dramatically and had to be addressed, senior management was certain that the United Nations was not in imminent danger of being a target. “By mid-August, anyone contributing to a new Iraq was a target.” 

Asked about warnings about the attack, he said there was no clear indication that what happened on 19 August would happen.  Even those who had grown most concerned never expected anything of that magnitude.  But among the security community in Baghdad, there had been growing concern that the Canal compound, in particular, could come under attack.  That concern grew following the attack on the Jordanian Embassy.

There was no doubt, he said, that the adoption of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), which gave the United Nations an enormous task and only weeks to achieve it, changed the situation considerably and was the major reason for the need to deploy more staff to Baghdad.  The security team in Baghdad, with the rising number of staff, particularly after the adoption of that resolution, was inadequate.  Part of the reason for that was lack of resources.

[Among other things, the provisions of resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003 lifted trade and financial sanctions on Iraq, and extend the “oil-for-food” programme for a further six months.]

Mr. Eckhard added that there was concern at the time that, with the end of hostilities in Iraq, a grave humanitarian situation could develop rapidly.  So, the impulse of the humanitarian side of the United Nations was to “jump in with both feet”.  The report indicated that the people responsible for security were trying to keep track of how many internationals were going in.  They were constantly reassessing the ceiling and despite the fact that there was a ceiling specified, there were many more international staff going in than the ceiling would allow.  That was why the Secretary-General had sent letters to the heads of the United Nations funds, agencies and programmes.

Regarding the security of other United Nations missions, Mr. Eckhard said that the Secretary-General already had in place a worldwide review of security in United Nations missions and other headquarters locations, which was very close to wrapping up around 19 August.  Headquarters had recognized that the global security environment was changing, that there could be threats to United Nations staff or installations almost anywhere in the world, and had been “beefing up” security.

On offers for security before the attack, Mr. Walzer said he had not been able to meet with officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority.  He had asked for meetings with those officers in charge of outer perimeter security at the Canal Compound.  That, however, could not be arranged.  He had then submitted a number of questions to which the first replies were received on the day that the Panel submitted its report to the Secretary-General.  The Secretariat was pursuing further answers with the United States Government.  He was not aware that further protection was offered than was on the ground.

The question that was raised in the Ahtisaari report, he added, was whether the United Nations had asked whether the presence on the ground should be reduced, such as the removal of certain hardware around the Compound and reducing the visibility of the Coalition forces.  Those were issues for which he had conflicting information and which needed to be clarified.

Asked if the findings of the Panel would influence the decision to return to Baghdad, Mr. Eckhard said that that decision would be taken with all the lessons of 19 August in mind.

As the Panel concluded its work, Mr. Walzer said that it felt strongly about the need for the United Nations to manage its activities with security concerns as an integral part, as well as the need for a change in culture.  A lot of work needed to be done to look at security not as impeding action, but rather as helping to advance action.

As to the current state of the Steering Group on Iraq, Mr. Eckhard replied that the Group was “coming to the end of its natural life”.

The other members of the Panel, which submitted its report to the Secretary-General on 3 March 2004, were Mr. Sinha Basnayake, former Director of the General Legal Division of the Office of Legal Affairs in the United Nations; Mr. Kevin Carty, Assistant Commissioner of National Police of Ireland; and Mr. Stuart Groves, Senior Security Manager and Security Focal Point in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.  The Panel was assisted in its work by Mr. Bryan Deschamp, Senior Special Adviser, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

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