Press briefing on Iraq electoral process

Briefing correspondents today on the United Nations’ role in the Iraqi electoral process, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast said that the United Nations was going to increase the number of staff in Iraq in support of the January elections for a constituent assembly, while Carine Perelli, Director of the Electoral Assistance Division, announced that out-of-country votes, involving as many as four million Iraqis, would be counted.

Mr. Prendergast explained that the briefing had been planned for a couple of weeks as an opportunity to talk about the facts of the election, much more than the politics of it.  He had just come from a meeting with the Secretary-General, where, again, Mr. Annan confirmed his determination that, within the well-known constraints within which the United Nations was operating in Iraq, that there would be available in Baghdad the resources needed to support the role being played by the United Nations with the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq.

Sometimes, Mr. Prendergast said, he had heard suggestions which implied a very direct correlation between numbers and commitment.  That was too simple a view and too crude a connection.  Size did not always matter.  Actually, efforts were under way to concentrate on the quality of the United Nations’ input.  Correspondents should think of the United Nations’ role as similar to that of yeast -– dough could not rise without yeast; it had to be deployed at the right time, and not much was needed.  For operational reasons, he would not cite numbers or dates today.  The main point was that the Secretary-General had accepted that more people had to be deployed to fulfil the United Nations’ role in the electoral process, and he would do so as circumstances permitted.

Asserting that the registration process was under way in Iraq, Ms. Perelli said there would be some 542 registration centres, of which 85 per cent had opened on the first day without any problems.  Registration forms would be distributed by the food agencies at the same time as the food rations, and all forms had arrived in the places that had opened.  Some problems had been encountered, owing to the overall security situation and a military blockage.  Those centres were being relocated.  Meanwhile, the majority of the important regulations had been approved, and others were being finalized.  The Commission had announced that it would engage in out-of-country voting, which would have to be dealt with from a technical point of view.  Registration of lists had also already begun.

As the floor opened to a lengthy series of questions, a correspondent asked whether the out-of-country voting was outside the United Nations’ mandate, or whether the United Nations’ needed additional assistance or resources for that.  Ms. Perelli replied that the United Nations’ mandate was to assist and support the Electoral Commission and the electoral process, as circumstances permitted.  Obviously, it would provide technical assistance for the out-of-country elections, for which both the United Nations and the Commission would need extra resources.  The cost of each out-of-country vote was enormous -- $90 -- which the Commission had not budgeted.  It had gone to the Interim Government, where the authorities were trying to make available the necessary resources.  The feasibility of that exercise had been questioned, but once the Commission had taken that position, the United Nations would assist it technically, to the extent possible.

Mr. Prendergast added that the United Nations’ role was to advise; the Commission’s role was to decide.  It should be possible to distinguish between what was desirable and what was feasible.  Given the tight time constraints, he said the question was less whether it was desirable, than whether it was feasible, while sticking to the January deadline.  For many, many people in Iraq, it was extremely important to stick to the existing timetable.

Asked about the nature of the United Nations’ concern about an all-out offensive about to begin in Falluja and the effect that would have on organizing the ballot, Mr. Prendergast said that if the question was a reference to a story in The Los Angeles Times this morning, “I am not going to comment on that because the, well, then how do you know that we’re concerned?”.

Was there a concern? the correspondent asked.

Mr. Prendergast repeated that he had wanted to give a factual briefing this morning.  Regarding context, he thought it was important to understand that elections were not a stand-alone event; the context in which they were held was extremely important.  He hoped the elections would have the effect of promoting stability in Iraq.  One should look at what the elections were intended to achieve, and then work backwards.

He said that the most important function of the elected body would be to act as a constituent assembly, which would draw up a constitution for Iraq.  The drawing up of a definitive constitution would determine the future and the stability of the country for a long time to come.  Constitutions were best designed with a very broad base of input into the process and a wide range of consultations.  His assumption had been that the elections should produce the broadest possible range of inclusion of Iraqi constituencies into the constituent assembly.  Thus, everything possible should be done to broaden the base of support and range of participation in the elections.  He had been encouraged by the manifesto issued a few days ago by relatively radical Arab nationalist groups that had indicated interest in participating, but had laid down conditions.  The idea was to create a context in which there was the broadest possible ‘buy-in’ and the broadest participation of parties and other political entities.

So, was he saying that, should the Falluja offensive proceed, that would undermine the party that he was afraid would not be included? another correspondent asked.  And what would happen if there was a military approach to Falluja which led to circumstances that would delay or compromise the elections?  Mr. Prendergast said he was drawing the dots and allowing the correspondent to connect the dots.  Today’s briefing was a factual one about election preparations and not intended to be a discussion about Falluja.

Pressed about whether he felt that the January elections would be incomplete under prevailing circumstances and whether incomplete elections were better than no elections, he said that that was a highly hypothetical question.  The thrust of the United Nations’ effort was to make sure that the elections in January were as inclusive as possible and that the whole spectrum of Iraqi opinion and political thought was represented in the constituent assembly, which enjoyed the support of the Iraqi electorate.  That was one of the major reasons why he had recommended, and the Governing Council had accepted, that the whole of Iraq should be a single constituency.  Only somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 votes were needed, assuming a full turn-out of voters, in order to be elected to the constituent assembly.  That allowed the possibility of independence to stand.  He did not want to speculate about what would happen if the process failed, but rather to give the process every chance of succeeding.

Ms. Perelli, replying to another question about registration, specifically whether one-third of Iraqis would be unable to vote, she said that the good news had been that there had been no problems in some places where the Commission had expected some.  Basically, it was too early to say how many Iraqis would not be voting.  Her job was to support the Commission in ensuring that all technical processes necessary to conduct an election had been deployed.  All the best efforts would be made to ensure that all of the centres were open, and not just 85 per cent.  What had been missing until now had been the unmediated voice of the Iraqi people.  Opening all of the centres would ensure that they had the means to participate.  In an electoral process in a country in transition, the people were the main actors.  To what degree Iraqis would participate, she did not know, but she did not expect that that would be a partial election.  A good election was inclusive, but it was too early to make those predictions.

In terms of which centres had had problems, she cited those in Mosul, Falluja, and Ramadi, owing to threats against electoral staff, a military blockade, and so forth.

In response to another question, Mr. Prendergast said that the Secretary-General had a wide-ranging correspondence with a large number of world leaders and he regarded that as privileged.  He and the United Nations would not comment on any individual item in it, or alleged item in it.  If they did comment, leaders would not be willing to engage in any meaningful correspondence with the Secretary-General, because then that would be a public correspondence.

Asked if food rationing cards would be used as voter identification, especially given that, at one point, that had been flatly rejected, Ms. Perelli said that that system would enable the Commission to gather the names of all household members covered by a ration card, and then it would check to see if the information was correct.  It would seek proof of a second form of identification.

But no, the ration cards were not valid voting cards.

Returning to the issue of out-of-country voting, she said that that was always a complicated process, -- complicated and very, very expensive.  There must be a “very strong chain of custody” of those votes and the massive participation of observers.

Replying to another question, Mr. Prendergast said that everyone had been less than enthusiastic about having the elections too early in the process after the war.  He had thought that time was needed to allow parties to develop after such a long period of rule by Saddam, and to allow alliances to develop across sectarian and ethnic lines.  He was beginning to see that in Iraq.  The Kurds and the Suni Arabs were on the same list now.  If the elections had been held very rapidly, there was a fear that that would have crystallized things in an unhelpful way.  Time was needed to for a greater Iraqi identity to reassert itself.

Asked, in light of the facts in Iraq, whether the United Nations was considering a large increase or a small one of United Nations staff in that country, he said he would not want to answer a question that had not yet arisen.  A look at the polls indicated that there was a very broad wish by the great majority of Iraqis to have an election.  It was important to keep the important communities in Iraq stable and within the system.

Ms. Perelli added that, from the start, the operation had been planned with a restricted number of people.  The operation had been planned so as to have a component inside Iraq, as well as outside the country.  So, there was a lot more staff than met the eye, outside the central base in Iraq.  The latter was only the tip of the iceberg.  As to whether a lot more staff was needed, she said, “I’m a bureaucrat.  We always need more staff.”  She would be a lot more comfortable with an increase in numbers.  The Secretary-General had approved an increase for Baghdad, and a team comprised of the “best and the brightest” in electoral work, had been sent there.  She was confident that the kind of assistance the United Nations was providing until now was the assistance the Commission required.

She said, in response to another question that she had heard several different estimates of the number of Iraqis living abroad, but she thought that was somewhere between three and four million.  Right now, there were at least three streams of education campaigns about to be launched on a massive scale, she replied to a question about educating the voters.

Another correspondent pressed Mr. Prendergast on what he called the United Nations’ unwillingness to comment on something as important as an action in Falluja, which would undermine an election seen as crucial to Iraq’s future.  With President Bush re-elected now, a comment by the United Nations could not be construed as commenting on the United States election.  What was the United Nations so scared of, that it was not going to stand up and share its analysis of this thing? the correspondent asked.

Mr. Prendergast said he had always admired the correspondent’s technique, which was to imply, with a certain element of scorn, that he was not being given information that was interesting or worthwhile, at the expense of the unfortunate individual sitting up here.  He had said a lot about context, and he thought the journalist was quite capable of joining the dots himself.  There was also a question about whether or not it was useful to engage in “megaphone diplomacy” or not.  Today’s briefing had been scheduled for some time, after he was told that the correspondents had been short on information about the technical aspects.  They now had a story to write, which was to say that the United Nations was going to increase the number of people in Iraq.

To a question about contingents from Fiji and Georgia, he said that the contribution by Fiji would be in the “inner ring”, or protection of United Nations’ staff, while the possible contribution by Georgians would be in relation to the “middle ring”, or slightly more outside the immediate premises in which the United Nations would be located.  So, the Georgians would be part of, but a distinct entity within, the multinational force.  That would be very welcome, but that did not make a fundamental difference in terms of the United Nations’ presence in Baghdad.  He added that the middle ring was within the green zone.

How steadfast was the position that the members of the Interim Government should not run for office? a correspondent asked.  Mr. Prendergast said that had never been an absolute requirement, and Lakhdar (Brahimi) himself had been quite conscious that that posed a dilemma, namely that the candidates for the Interim Government had ability and would probably not want to rule out any substantive role in the future government.  They would probably not be inhibited from the next set of elections, or in the one following that, due to take place at the end of 2005.  He had not seen any criticism of that, but that was a question for the Iraqis. 

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