POSSIBLE TREATY BANNING PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES DEBATED IN FIRST COMMITTEE

Fifty-ninth General Assembly

First Committee

10^th Meeting (AM)

POSSIBLE TREATY BANNING PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL

FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES DEBATED IN FIRST COMMITTEE

The international community needed to rethink the nature of the often-called for fissile material cut-off treaty, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) was told this afternoon, as it began its thematic debate.

Fundamentally in support of such an instrument, the representative of the United States, nevertheless, said that she had come to the conclusion that the treaty would not be able to be effectively verified.  After all, it would ban production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but allow production for other activities.  Some might say that merely finding fissile material would be sufficient for declaring non-compliance with the treaty.  However, that was problematic, since the date and purpose of production would first need to be proven.

Telling delegates that her country had maintained a moratorium on production for over 15 years, she noted with concern that the moratorium was far from universal.  At the same time, however, fruitlessly negotiating verification procedures would not be helpful.  She stressed that verification should not be the objective.  Rather, what was important was to establish an observed norm regarding fissile material for weapons.

On the other hand, the speaker from Sweden, who spoke on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition -- which includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden –- said that negotiations on a verifiable international treaty banning the production of fissile material were long overdue. Noting that such a treaty would not affect the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, she pointed out that it would also serve to impose restraints on India, Israel and Pakistan, the three States that remained outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

A number of delegations expressed dissatisfaction with the rate of global nuclear disarmament.  For example, the representative of Indonesia said that nuclear-weapon States were not taking their disarmament obligations seriously. That was why non-nuclear-weapon States were wary, and why countries that had given up their nuclear programmes were especially frustrated.  Lamenting that some States were developing new types of nuclear weapons, he said that such action was contrary to the spirit of the NPT.

In response, a second speaker from the United States said that any accusation that his country was not respecting its disarmament obligations was unfair and untrue.  After all, the United States had dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988, and had withdrawn over 3,000 tactical warheads from around the world.  In short, his country had already eliminated 90 per cent of its non-strategic nuclear weapons.  Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, more than 1,000 missiles had been eliminated, and that number would continue to increase in line with the Moscow Treaty.  By 2012, 80 per cent of his country’s nuclear warheads would be destroyed, making its nuclear stockpile the smallest it had been in several decades.

Acknowledging that some countries had criticized the United States for acting in a non-transparent manner, he told delegates that, since 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had conducted visits to his country.  He could not imagine a more meaningful or transparent disarmament measure.  He also declared that he was proud of his country’s arms control achievements, which had been taken in line with the Russian Federation.

Also speaking in the thematic debate were the representatives of:  the Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union; Italy; Japan; Nigeria; Republic of Korea; Canada; Australia; Russian Federation; Brazil, on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR); Switzerland; Cuba; South Africa; Norway; and Germany. The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Tuesday, 19 October, to continue its thematic debate and hear introductions of draft resolutions and decisions.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to begin its thematic debate.  (For background, see Press Releases GA/DIS/3271 and 3272.)

Statements

CHRIS SANDERS (the Netherlands), on behalf of the European Union, reiterated that the Union regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under article VI, and said that the integrity of the NPT must be preserved and strengthened.  The possession of nuclear weapons by States outside the Treaty and non-compliance with its provisions by States parties risked undermining non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.  The Union continued to attach special importance to achieving adherence to the NPT and called on the three states who were not at present parties to the NPT to accede unconditionally as non-nuclear weapons states.  It also called on all States parties to comply fully with the Treaty.

He said that in order to preserve the integrity of the NPT, the Union considered a positive outcome of the upcoming 2005 Review Conference of crucial importance.  It attached great importance to the issue of universality and compliance, and underlined the importance of all three pillars:  non-proliferation; nuclear disarmament; and the issue of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

He announced that the Union considered the universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, and the additional protocols to them, a prerequisite to an effective and credible safeguards system. Together, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol constituted the verification standard.  The Union strongly supported the strengthening of the IAEA’s safeguards system and considered that additional protocols were an integral part of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system.  Adherence to them was an essential means of demonstrating fulfilment of States parties obligations under article III of the NPT.  Union member states were working towards making the Additional Protocol a “condition of supply” of nuclear exports.

The Iranian nuclear programme continued to be a matter of grave concern for the Union, he went on.  It welcomed the fact that, with regard to the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran, the IAEA seems to have an increasingly clear understanding of the nature and extent of Iran’s nuclear programme.  However, it was a matter of serious concern that a number of issues, after two years, still awaited clarification.  Iran should assist the IAEA to understand the full extent and nature of its enrichment programme and to take steps within its power to clarify the outstanding issues before the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

He added that the Union continued to deplore the announcement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in January 2003 of its intention to withdraw from the NPT and urged that country to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any clandestine nuclear weapons programme.  The Union further welcomed Libya’s decision to eliminate all materials, equipment and programmes which lead to the productions of weapons of mass destruction and its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its decision to implement an Additional Protocol.  It urged Libya to continue its good cooperation with the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in implementing its decision.

ELISABET BORSIIN BONNIER (Sweden) spoke on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, which includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.  Declaring that the NPT needed to be “upheld in its entirety”, she reminded delegates that the Treaty required that non-nuclear-weapon States refrain from developing nuclear weapons, and that nuclear-weapon States reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals.  She also said that the international community needed to enhance its efforts to make the NPT universal.

Turning to the CTBT, she called for its early entry into force.  Welcoming the fact that three nuclear-weapon States had already ratified the Treaty, she called upon the remaining two, as well as the other key States, to follow suit.  In the meantime, the moratoria on nuclear testing and explosions needed to be maintained.  Regarding a verifiable international treaty banning the production of fissile material, she said negotiations were overdue.  Noting that such a treaty would not affect the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, she pointed out that it would impose restraints on India, Israel and Pakistan, the three States that remained outside the NPT.

Voicing support for further reductions of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic ones, she said that, as an interim measure, the operational status of such arms should be reduced.  In that regard, she said that the Moscow Treaty, signed by the United States and Russian Federation, was a “step in the right direction”.  Unfortunately, however, that instrument did not require destruction or verification.  Before concluding, she suggested that the Conference on Disarmament should establish subsidiary bodies to deal with nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and she expressed her support for nuclear-weapon-free zones.

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) said that on 28 September, his Government sponsored a seminar on an initiative aimed at increasing attention within the international disarmament process.  It was a follow-up to a statement on the same subject made by Italy at the Conference on Disarmament on January 20 and a presentation last April at the NPT Preparatory Committee on the relevance of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) for the nuclear non-proliferation process.  The CTR was one of the most significant developments that had taken place in the past few years in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.  It involved a growing number of countries and had been widely debated in the Group of Eight and the European Union and had received wide attention from disarmament scholars.

The initiative was originally developed in the early 1990s and was inspired by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar of the United States.  It referred to the process of international cooperation and assistance through which large numbers of warheads and carriers had been destroyed or deactivated and weapons of mass destruction materials had been placed in safe storage.  Belarus, Canada, Kazakhstan, Japan, the European Union and many of its member states on a national level, the Russian Federation, the United States, Uzbekistan and other countries had worked together under the CTR initiative to secure, dismantle and safeguard weapons of mass destruction, carriers and infrastructure.  Italy believed that the time had come to present that concept to the First Committee of the General Assembly.  The CTR concept needed to be represented in some relevant General Assembly First Committee resolutions.

YOSHIKI MINE (Japan) said recent challenges to the NPT regime, such as non-compliance and the proliferation of nuclear technology through clandestine networks, had highlighted the urgency of maintaining and strengthening the Treaty. Addressing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in particular, he noted that the early resolution of the crisis surrounding that country was essential for a stronger global non-proliferation regime and greater stability in the region. Declaring that he could not accept the use, development or transfer of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, he called on it to subject its facilities to international supervision.  For its part, Japan was ready to solve the problem through diplomatic means, such as the six-party talks.

Regarding Iran, he said that country had to comply with all requests made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and address the serious concerns of the international community.  He hoped the issue would be resolved as soon as possible.  Welcoming Libya’s decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programme, he expressed hope that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other countries would follow suit.  Stating that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing, he added that, in order to achieve universality for the NPT, States outside the regime should join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, without conditions or delay.  Nuclear-weapon States, for their part, carried a heavy responsibility to maintain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

Declaring that it was imperative to set clear objectives for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, he also stressed the importance of starting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and considering effective measures to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction.  Attaching great importance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, he welcomed the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s recent ratification, especially since it was one of the countries whose ratification was required.  Calling on the other 11 States whose ratification was required to follow suit, he said that, until entry into force, the moratorium on nuclear testing and explosions should be maintained.  Before concluding, he called for the IAEA’s additional protocol to be made universal, and for the Moscow Treaty to be fully implemented.  He also urged all nuclear-weapon States to institute concrete nuclear disarmament measures and keep other States informed of their progress.

J.U AYALOGU (Nigeria) said that the nuclear reality today was that there were 16,500 nuclear weapons and more than 36,000 nuclear warheads in the hands of five nuclear powers, excluding other nuclear states.  Two new states had acquired nuclear weapons each decade since the end of the Second World War.  If that nuclear arsenal, or a fraction it, were to be unleashed, human civilization as we know it today would be annihilated.  Disarmament provisions must, therefore, be implemented.  The challenge before the international community was one that could only be tackled with political will.  That involved on the part of nuclear-weapon States to immediately stop qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems.  Once that was assured, the next step should be the commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and on their total elimination.  A resolution to that effect should be adopted by the Committee.

Pending total elimination, Member States should agree on the establishment of a legally binding international instrument under which nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, he continued.  Nuclear non-proliferation could only be meaningfully sustained if non-nuclear-weapons States that had renounced the development or possession of such weapons were themselves assured, under legally-binding agreements, against the use or threat of use of such weapons.  By transforming disparate assurances declared by nuclear powers into a unified, legally binding obligation, the nuclear powers would not only be fulfilling part of their commitments towards those States but also reinforcing the non-proliferation regime against possible future attacks.

He stressed the importance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT by all nuclear-weapons States, which, among other steps, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.  All States whose ratification was necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty should do so as soon as possible, so that the Treaty could enter into force without further delay.  Pending its entry into force, it was important to maintain the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions, he added.

KWANG-CHUL LEW (Republic of Korea) said the importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime could not be overemphasized.  Unfortunately, however, the Treaty was facing “multiple daunting challenges”, due to inherent structural shortfalls and cases of non-compliance. Only serious and creative discussions could rectify the situation, he said. Turning to the CTBT, he called it an “indispensable pillar” and, in that context, he urged those States that had not yet ratified it to do so as soon as possible. Regarding a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty on fissile material, he voiced support for the corresponding draft resolution, which would be introduced later, and hoped that it would lead to early negotiations on such an instrument.

ANN POLLACK (Canada) said that her country advocated overcoming the NPT’s institutional deficit, through annual meetings, a standing bureau and provision for extraordinary meetings, should the need occur.  That arrangement would give the NPT States parties greater ownership of their Treaty and provide the international community with a key tool in overseeing its implementation and more effectively addressing challenges to its authority.  Canada looked forward to the adoption of that idea at next May’s Review Conference.  If progress could not be marked in implementing the promised steps to disarmament, the international community risked weakening the NPT’s ability to ensure that all its pillars –- including non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology -- were not undermined.

On the CTBT, she urged the 11 States whose ratification was needed for its entry into force to find the political will to work within the CTBT to ensure its effectiveness and implementation.  The integrity of and the viability of the NPT depended on continuing strong momentum in nuclear weapons reduction.  There could be no going back to the nuclear arms race of the twentieth century.  Canada encouraged the nuclear-weapons States to securely reduce and dismantle their nuclear weapons arsenals in an irreversible and verifiable manner.

The international community was currently faced with a number of disarmament and non-proliferation challenges, she went on. Her country expected the First Committee to discuss how States could fully implement universal disarmament and non-proliferation norms and to propose practical options so that states’ obligations and undertakings could be carried out. The Committee needed to seriously reflect on how to better address challenges, such as non-compliance, and how to strengthen NPT implementation in a comprehensive manner. One such option was the resumption of work in the Conference on Disarmament. Canada looked forward to returning to work on the Conference and strongly urged member states to adopt a program of work based on the balanced proposal that had been before that body for over one year.

GEOFFREY SHAW (Australia) said a strong and effective NPT was essential to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, making further progress towards nuclear disarmament, and creating the climate of confidence necessary for the continued peaceful use of nuclear energy.  Declaring there was some risk of the NPT parties wrongly using the Treaty’s peaceful nuclear energy provisions to acquire nuclear weapons, he noted that events over the past year proved that existing verification procedures were not strong enough to stop determined proliferators.  Limiting the spread of sensitive nuclear technology did not entail reinterpreting the NPT, he stated.  It merely ensured that parties were remaining true to the Treaty’s intent.

Stating that it was not possible to conceive of a world free of nuclear weapons in the absence of complete and permanent nuclear non-proliferation, he told delegates that, once again, his country would be co-sponsoring Japan’s resolution on a path to the total elimination of such arms.  His country would also be co-sponsoring a draft resolution on the CTBT, along with Mexico and New Zealand, in light of its strong support of that treaty.  He also emphasized that a fissile material cut-off treaty would do much to advance global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

ANTON V. VASILIEV (Russian Federation) reaffirmed his country’s commitment to the objective of complete nuclear disarmament.  That objective must be attained on a state-by-state basis.  Over the last two years, significant progress had been achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament.  Russia reaffirmed its dedication to non-proliferation and was committed to the implementation to decisions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  His country had made important progress in the destruction of its nuclear weapons in accordance with relevant treaties.  The destruction of those weapons were laborious and complex operations, but the process had been carried out in a systematic and consistent fashion.

The Russian Federation had also adopted important additional measures for preventing unauthorized access to its nuclear weapons stockpile, he went on.  An example was a special exercise carried out this year which was observed by representatives of 49 States.  Russia had also ratified the CTBT.  It, however, continued to have serious concerns about future of that treaty and called on all States do something immediately to ensure that it came into force.

He noted that nuclear disarmament was impossible to carry out without taking into account other factors, such as the security situation and the situation in nearby States.  His country was ready, in accordance with its obligations, to go ahead with its disarmament obligations.  It, however, did not think that an arbitrary timetable would be the best way for achieving that goal.

JACKIE SANDERS (United States) said she fundamentally supported negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty.  However, based on a review conducted by experts from her country, she had come to the conclusion that such an instrument could not be effectively verified. After all, the treaty would ban production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but allow production for other activities.  Some might say that merely finding fissile material would be sufficient for declaring non-compliance with the treaty, she said.  However, that was problematic, since the date and purpose of production would first need to be proven.  Telling delegates that her country had maintained a moratorium on production for over 15 years, she noted with concern that the moratorium was far from universal.  At the same time, however, fruitlessly negotiating verification procedures would not be helpful.  She stressed that verification should not be the objective.  Rather, what was important was to establish an observed norm regarding fissile material for weapons.  She concluded by declaring that the international community needed to rethink the nature of the fissile material cut-off treaty.

CARLOS PARANHOS (Brazil), speaking on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), said the NPT was the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.  By that treaty, non-nuclear States had pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons in return for promises by the nuclear Powers to disarm. Currently, however, signals were being sent by some countries that the NPT was open to reinterpretation.  In that context, he reaffirmed the need for the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament to be taken.  Reminding delegates that he came from a country that had given up its nuclear option, he stressed that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were “two sides of the same coin”.  After all, without transparent and verifiable disarmament, it would not be possible to avoid proliferation.  Stating that eliminating nuclear weapons was the only way to guarantee that they would never fall into the hands of terrorists, he stressed that the NPT’s balance of rights and obligations had to be maintained.

CHRISTIAN FAESSLER (Switzerland) said that for his country disarmament and non-proliferation were irrevocably linked.  The increased risk of nuclear proliferation was linked to the fact that some countries continued to work to improve their nuclear weapons or were not willing to become part of the non-proliferation regime.

The existence of an illegal market for nuclear weapons was troubling because it had the potential to lead to access by terrorists groups to such weapons, he went on.  In order to make specific progress in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the international community needed to preserve and strengthen the gains that had been achieved.  In that regard, there was the need for the universalization of the NPT.  That treaty remained the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.  There was also the need to begin negotiations immediately on a fissile material cut-off treaty.  Switzerland was not convinced by the arguments that such a treaty would not be verifiable.  The verification process should be part of the negotiations.  The international community needed to work for implementation of the CTBT, which was urgent for international peace and security.

He added that the Moscow Treaty was very important.  Nuclear-weapons States needed to implement the commitments to reduce and eliminate their nuclear weapons. They must also agree to halt their research and development of new weapons.

DESRA PERCAYA (Indonesia) said the nuclear-weapon States were not taking their disarmament obligations seriously.  That was why non-nuclear-weapon States were wary, and why countries that had given up their nuclear programmes were especially frustrated.  In that context, he noted that nuclear-weapon States would bring greater leverage to their non-proliferation efforts if they respected their own duties.  Lamenting that some States were developing new types of nuclear weapons, he said that such action was contrary to the spirit of the NPT, which required States to eliminate their nuclear weapons altogether.

YURI GALA (Cuba) said there was a close nexus between nuclear disarmament and international security.  After all, nuclear disarmament was directly linked to the very survival of mankind. Nevertheless, some States were seeking to impose a viewpoint that named non-proliferation as an end in itself, rather than a contribution to the ultimate objective of disarmament.  Criticizing the fact that the world was currently experiencing an “alarming backsliding”, which was reinforced by efforts to develop new types of nuclear weapons, he rejected selective implementation of the NPT.  He also stressed that countries should not only focus on horizontal proliferation while ignoring the vertical.

As long as nuclear disarmament was not achieved, it was impossible to guarantee security for those States that did not have such weapons, he said. Unilateral declarations issued by the nuclear Powers in 1995 were clearly inadequate, particularly in light of developments that had occurred since then.  Voicing support for the creation of a subsidiary body at the 2005 NPT Review Conference to deal with security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, he called for a legally binding instrument on that theme.  Expressing concern over links between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, he said he fully supported legitimate international efforts to combat such bonds, as long as they were carried out in a multilateral, non-discriminatory fashion.

LESLIE GUMBI (South Africa) said that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons was their complete elimination and the assurance that they would never be produced again.  However, the onus to effect nuclear disarmament primarily rested on those States that possessed such weapons.  Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing processes and required continued and irreversible progress on both fronts.  In addition, it had been agreed that nuclear disarmament was not part of some ultimate objective, but a milestone to be reached on the way to the real objective of disarmament process, namely general and complete disarmament.  The NPT remained the foundation of nuclear disarmament.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference consensus agreement on the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to accomplish total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed” was only intended to be a first step in that process, he went on.  To fulfil their obligations under the Treaty, both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon States were to implement practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.  If the international community failed to ensure that agreements reached were implemented and fulfilled, the danger existed that the Treaty would continue to follow a circular path of continuous attempts to again and again reach agreement on issues that had been agreed to and dealt with previously.

Multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances needed to be given by nuclear weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties, he stated.  That would be pursued at the NPT Review Conference.  South Africa strongly supported the establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2005 Review Conference to give particular attention to that issue.  Pending conclusion of negotiations on security assurances, the nuclear weapon states should fully respect their existing commitments in that regard.  The NPT must be implemented in all its aspects without favour or prejudice.  It was not prudent to hold onto any privilege or favoured right to the detriment of the Treaty as a whole.

THOMAS CYNKIN (United States) noted that some delegations had been questioning the compliance of nuclear-weapon States with article VI of the NPT.  In response, he said that any accusation that his country was not respecting its disarmament obligations was unfair and untrue.  After all, the United States had dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988, and had withdrawn over 3,000 tactical warheads from around the world.  In short, his country had already eliminated 90 per cent of its non-strategic nuclear weapons.  Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, more than 1,000 missiles had been eliminated, and that number would continue to increase in line with the Moscow Treaty.  By 2012, 80 per cent of his country’s nuclear warheads would be destroyed, making its nuclear stockpile the smallest it had been in several decades.

Noting that the United States had not produced fissile material for 15 years, and that it would continue to maintain a moratorium on such production, he expressed the hope that other countries would follow suit until the entry into force of a legally binding fissile material cut-off treaty.  Acknowledging that some countries had criticized the United States for acting in a non-transparent manner, he told delegates that, since 1994, the IAEA had conducted visits in which they had seen 174 tons of such material.  In that regard, he stated that he could not imagine a more meaningful or transparent disarmament measure.  He also declared that he was proud of his country’s arms control achievements, which had been taken in line with the Russian Federation.

MERETE LUDEMO (Norway) said that credible verification was vital in order to ensure that all States parties were meeting their NPT commitments, and thus the Treaty’s credibility.  All the NPT States must fulfil their basic obligations by signing and implementing the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards.  All States parties should conclude and bring into force the Model Additional Protocol.  Norway expected the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT to take a decision that the Additional Protocol was mandatory under article III of the Treaty.

She added that lack of universality of the NPT continued to be of great concern to her country and called for renewed efforts by all States to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.  Norway considered it crucial to engage States that were not parties to the NPT in constructive non-proliferation efforts. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) reaffirmed that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a threat to international peace and security and instructed Member States to do more to halt the spread of such weapons.  Multilateral cooperation needed to be strengthened in order to support the implementation of that resolution.

The Moscow Treaty was an important contribution to that process and to strategic stability, she continued.  However, additional and irreversible cuts in nuclear arsenals, including stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons, were needed.  Norway regretted that the CTBT had not yet entered into force.  It appreciated that the nuclear-weapon States abided by the moratorium on nuclear-weapons tests. However, such unilateral steps could not substitute for the significance of the legally binding commitment provided by the CTBT.  All countries, and in particular the nuclear-weapons States, needed to ratify the CTBT without delay.  Negotiations on a verifiable multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (FMCT) was also long overdue.  A credible and verifiable FMCT was essential in closing loopholes in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

VOLKER HEINSBERG (Germany) said that the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which had become more apparent than ever, had underlined more than ever the need for safeguarding and strengthening the multilateral Treaty system, in particular the NPT.  The NPT had established a firm relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament and vice versa.  Those two goals could only be effectively pursued jointly and not at each others expense.  It was particularly important to recall those gaols in view of the rising concerns not only regarding continuing proliferation and non-compliance with the non-proliferation obligations but also regarding the slow progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and indications of a “renaissance” of nuclear weapons.

Germany held the view that a nuclear weapon free world –- the complete elimination of nuclear weapons -- could only be achieved by way of an incremental approach, he went on.  Such an approach also underlay the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI of the NPT adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  Those 13 steps remained the performance benchmark for the disarmament process.  A key element of that process was a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.  It would strengthen both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and thus international security.

Right of Reply

RI JANG-GON (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), in response to statements made earlier by the representatives of Japan and the Netherlands, said that he rejected those delegations’ biased and incorrect allegations, since they ignored the actual situation on the KoreanPeninsula.  His country’s nuclear programme was a product of the United States’ hostile policy towards his country.  Thus, the issue needed to be addressed in a bilateral fashion by the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  Stating that his country’s self-defence concerns were legitimate, he advised the Netherlands and Japan not to blindly follow the “superpower”, but instead to acknowledge the issue’s main source.  With respect to Japan specifically, he said that country had military bases that were armed with nuclear weapons.  He thus advised Japan to get rid of its own nuclear weapons and address its past crimes against humanity.

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