PRESS CONFERENCE BY UNITED KINGDOM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRESS CONFERENCE BY UNITED KINGDOM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

“The one and only certain thing we know is that Iraq has not complied fully, actively and immediately on substance, and there is overwhelming evidence that it has made no attempt to do so”, said the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Jack Straw, today at a Headquarters press conference.

He said that, when Sir Jeremy Greenstock tabled the second Security Council resolution, he had made clear that Iraq had missed its final opportunity.  He was holding firm to that principle, but was ready to discuss the wording of the text and take on board any constructive suggestions as to how the process could be improved, including the possibility of an amendment.

Tomorrow, the Security Council would hear reports on the extent of Iraq’s compliance with Security Council resolution 1441 and a host of others dating back to 1991, he said.  It was worth recalling that 1441 asked for full, active and immediate compliance.  It asked the Iraqi regime to account for all aspects of its chemical and biological weapons, its ballistic missiles and other delivery systems, the holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents and related material, and the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities.

He said he had seen the familiar pattern –- conceal, deny, delay, make the minimum concessions to buy time, and then conclude you’ve succeeded, once again, in keeping your weapons of mass destruction.

The process was currently at stage 4, with respect to some, but by all means not all, of Iraq’s holdings and capabilities.  Saddam had been destroying some missiles, reluctantly and at the last moment, but why not all?  Saddam must be close to concluding that he is near to reaching stage 5, that the international community would believe had had succeeded.  But, in the coming days, if the pressure was taken off Saddam, he would never disarm, and other dictators with similar ambition would get the message that they could defy the Security Council if they prevaricated and procrastinated endlessly.

If the international community were to allow Saddam to draw it any further into the maze, once he concluded there was some slackening, the concessions would stop and “we will be back to where we were at end of 1998, with the inspectors frozen out”, he said.  Then, the Council could pass as many further resolutions as it wanted, and he would refuse compliance.

And, then, he stressed, the Iraqis would never have to account for up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; 8,500 litres –- at least -– of anthrax; at least 2,160 kilogrammes of growth media for biological agent production; 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including one and one-half tonnes of

VX-nerve agent; 6,500 chemical bombs; 1,000 litres of chemical agent for those bombs; and 30,000 missing munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

Nor would Saddam have to explain why he was developing prohibited missile systems, or why he refurbished the prohibited rocket motor casting chambers

(Al-Mamoun) and the chemical processes at Falluja, which had been destroyed by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) as prohibited facilities.  Or, why Iraq built the missile test stand at Al-Rafah, capable of testing engines with more than four times the thrust of the prohibited Al-Samoud 2 missile. 

Week after week, particularly in Dr. Blix’s reports, Mr. Straw said he had seen some attempt at compliance on process, but no serious attempt on active and immediate compliance on substance.  At end of the latest report was further chapter and verse on Iraq’s failure to meet its obligations under the Security Council resolutions. 

He said it was because of that failure that he had put down a second Council resolution, saying that Iraq had relinquished its final opportunity to comply with the obligations, which were imposed three months ago by 1441 (2002).  The phrase “final opportunity” was originally used over 12 years ago, when Iraq was given until 18 April 1991, and not 18 April 2003, to make a full, final declaration of all its weapons of mass destruction and start the process of their removal. 

It was the Security Council which unanimously said on 8 November 2002 that Iraq’s holdings and its mass destruction weapons and missile systems, as well as its failure to comply with repeated obligations set down by the Council, posed a threat to international peace and security.  If words meant what they said, the Council would have to meet its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, which was fundamental to the United Nations.

Replying to a comment that perhaps the United Kingdom had not done its job well in the past as the mapmaker in the region and why it thought it could do a better job today, he said that, without being drawn down that historical path, his country had had to accept its responsibility as a Member of the League of Nations and as a country with particular responsibility for that part of the Middle East.  And, it was responsible for drawing the boundaries some 80 years ago.  Since then, Iraq had had an interesting and differentiated history, including a period of strong economic growth.

It was because of Saddam’s regime, and not British boundaries, that Iraq had been drawn backwards and into a flagrant breach of United Nations resolutions.  As a permanent member of the Security Council, his country had a fundamental responsibility for ensuring peace and security.

Regarding the 167-page report of the weapons inspectors, did that weaken or strengthen his position and would he like to see it published? another correspondent asked.

Yes, he replied, he would like to see it published.  That was a “shocking indictment of Saddam’s record of deception and deceit and, above all, the danger he posed to the region and the world”.  If Iraq took up, even at the present stage, the opportunity afforded it by resolution 1441 (2002) and fully met its obligations, then the kind of work list described in that report could come into play.  That would resemble the situation of South Africa, which was disarmed in three years with the help of nine inspectors and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because South Africa had wanted to be in compliance.

He added that what the report showed was a country that did not want to be in compliance, but wanted to deceive inspectors and the international community, and improve upon the threat that it posed.

To a related question on whether Dr. Blix’s information that Iraq had been cooperating proactively had made his life more difficult, he said that nothing would please him more than to see Iraq fully, actively and immediately cooperate. 

“We do not want military action”, he said, adding “let us be quite clear, even at this late stage, we want to strain every nerve to avoid that and see Iraq come into full, active and immediate cooperation.”

He wondered whether the inspectors would have been allowed to do any work at all without the presence of a credible threat of force by the United States, the United Kingdom, and others.  “Getting at the truth” was not happening in Iraq, as only a very few interviews were being conducted without recording equipment, and none were being held outside Iraq.

Replying to a further question, he said that the Canadian proposal was very constructive and he had had talked to the Canadian Foreign Minister.  He had to look at all the constructive suggestions and see how they could be distilled, but he also had to take into account the realities.

Asked specifically if he would consider amending the resolution to include a new deadline and whether there was any “wiggle room”, he said that “wiggle room” was not the appropriate phrase for the Iraqis, which had been wiggling for the last 12 years and had mocked the international community, particularly the permanent five members. 

At present, he said the situation was very serious.  Those meetings would not be taking place now in early March if Saddam had recognized the seriousness of the resolution of 8 November 2002, instead of telling fibs and recycling old documents.

Asked to comment on the possibility that his resolution had only four confirmed votes, he said, “let us see”.  The situation was very similar in the run-up to the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), when there were all sorts of reports that the text would not attract more than three or four votes.  In the end, unanimity was achieved.  Now he was inviting members to confirm what they had supported on 8 November.  There was a very serious choice here about “what we do about a tyrant running a rogue State with the capability to produce and use nerve agents and send them to neighbouring countries”, he said.

The choice, he added, was about the future authority of the United Nations.  It was in the interest of every single member of the Security Council to take the choice he had suggested.

Some of his recent suggestions had found reasonably fertile ground, he replied to another question.  But, the principle of the second resolution stood.  On a regime change, his Government’s position was straightforward:  yes, in a different world, it would like to see a different government running Iraq.  The purpose of resolution 1441 (2002) had been to secure the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction -- that and that alone.  Tony Blair had made it clear repeatedly that if Iraq complied with resolution 1441 and disarmed of its mass destruction weapons, Mr. Blair accepted that the Government of Iraq stayed in place.  That had always been clear, he emphasized.

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