PRESS BRIEFING ON MISSION TO DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA BY SECRETARY-GENERAL’S SPECIAL ADVISER

PRESS BRIEFING ON MISSION TO DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

BY SECRETARY-GENERAL’S SPECIAL ADVISER

Briefing correspondents on his recent mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at a Headquarters press conference today, the
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Maurice Strong, said that while the current conflict in Iraq had been the world’s primary focus, his attention had been focused on a “major piece of unfinished business” by the United Nations.

Mr. Strong said he was referring to the suspension by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its energy programme resulting from the 1994 Framework Agreement, and actions to reactivate its nuclear programme.  While the “unfinished business” of a conflict fought some 50 years ago under the
United Nations flag could threaten regional peace and security, it could also provide a great opportunity.

Having worked quietly on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea file for several years, he said the issue was not new to him.  Asked by the Secretary-General to “activate” the issue, he had focused on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since the beginning of the year with two trips to Pyongyang and visits with the Chinese, South Koreans, Russians, Americans, Japanese and others.  He had been responding to requests for briefings by a number of interested countries.

Introducing Mr. Strong, the Deputy Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Jiang Hua, reminded correspondents that the Security Council was scheduled to discuss the issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tomorrow. 

Three aspects of the issue had been the focus of his mission, Mr. Strong said.  The first and most urgent was the humanitarian issue.  The United Nations had, since 1995, been responsible for coordinating humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  The pipeline was running dry, however.  The Secretary-General had made a special appeal following Mr. Strong’s visit to the country in January.  The response to that appeal in the short term had been very encouraging in that humanitarian supplies were now moving again.  The longer-term prospects, however, remained somewhat tenuous. 

On the issue of longer-term development, the second issue, he said it was impossible to divorce peace and security from the country’s economic security.  The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been undertaking some reform and had been trying to prepare itself by seeking the international community’s cooperation in terms of economic development.  Under the Secretary-General’s decision, the United Nations had decided to prepare itself to assist the country, as requested, with the preparation of its longer-term development programme and the mobilization of international support, once the political issue was settled.

“The cloud that hangs over all this is, of course, the controversies arising from the nuclear issue”, Mr. Strong said.  It was paradoxical that while both sides seemed willing to move in the required direction, the parties had not been able to agree on the modalities for a meeting.  The Secretary-General’s good offices could not be a substitute for negotiations by the parties.

Only the parties concerned could negotiate the issues.  The Secretary-General had simply offered to help bridge the gap now separating the two in terms of modalities.  He had done useful work in that respect.  While agreement had not yet been reached, the question of modalities for a meeting was now close enough that it should no longer be a basis for delay.

While peace was both necessary and possible, escalation into conflict would be both unthinkable and horrendous, he said.  “I am satisfied that none of the parties want this, but all are prepared for it”, he said.  The situation in Iraq should provide a special incentive for ensuring that a conflict that had been simmering for some 50 years could be avoided.  One good thing that could come out of the Iraq crisis was that it prepared the way for a comprehensive permanent settlement of the North Korean issue. 

A correspondent noted that Mr. Strong had been quoted as having said that war was a “real prospect”.  Was that an overstatement?  Also, what valid contribution could the Security Council make, given the sensitivity surrounding the issue?

While a few headlines had indicated that war was inevitable, that was not what he had said or meant, Mr. Strong said.  He had simply said that there was a risk of war.  Both of the parties were armed and had been prepared for a long time.  Given the current tension, there was a higher degree of preparing the minds of the people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for a possible conflict.  The longer it took for the parties to return to the table, the greater the risk of incidents or a hardening of attitudes.  While he did not think war was inevitable, or even likely, it was certainly possible.

On the second question, he said the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had referred the issue, under its constitutional process, to the Council.  He would not speak for the Council.  It would be an important meeting, however.  He hoped and expected that the countries with divided views on the issue would carefully orchestrate the reconciliation of those views in such a way that contributed to a peaceful resolution rather than an escalation of tension.

Asked to respond to a question on the modalities for a meeting between the two parties, Mr. Strong noted that he had not said that the modalities had been agreed upon.  The United States had been insisting on multilateral negotiations, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been insisting on bilateral negotiations on the basis of the Framework Agreement.  The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was primarily concerned with a threat to its security, which it believed had come from the United States.  While it had agreed that there was an important multilateral element, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea felt that the multilateral element could not be dealt with until it dialogued with the United States on the central issue, namely threats to its security.

That was the reason for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s response in activating its nuclear programme, he said.  It had assured the world community that it did not intend to build nuclear weapons and that it was willing to follow inspection procedures.  However, there had been some words out of the country recently indicating that they had been having some additional thoughts about that. 

A number of countries had offered their services to facilitate a meeting, Mr. Strong said.  The Secretary-General, in consultation –- not competition
-- with them, had said that if his good offices would be useful, he was available to the parties.  There had been sufficient progress in bridging the gap between the positions so that the positions of both parties could be accommodated allowing them to meet both multilaterally and bilaterally.  While the gap had not been bridged, it had been narrowed to the point that it should not present a reason for delay.

Responding to a question on the need for the Security Council to move on the issue, Mr. Strong said that depended on the movement.  Movement resulting in punitive measures or sanctions would be considered by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a hostile act, even an act of war. 

Asked whether he thought it was not the right time for the Council to act, Mr. Strong said he could not second-guess the Council, which was the paramount authority.  Taking a tack that would escalate the confrontational nature of the issue would be a problem.  The Security Council could not obviate the need for negotiation.  It was a question of timing and modalities.  While the Council could not substitute for direct negotiation, it could, perhaps, facilitate them.  The elements for discussion were there.  Following his recent visit to Pyongyang and subsequent discussions in Washington, the gap had come much closer and no longer needed to be the primary reason for coming to the table.

What had officials in Pyongyang said about the United States attack on Iraq? a correspondent asked.  Mr. Strong said that the attack had occurred while he was there.  Officials had told him that it was confirmation of the fact that the United States intended to act with pre-emptive attacks on those who threatened it, particularly the members of the so-called “axis of evil”.  It had confirmed the belief that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was the next on the list and that the threat was real.  The United States had insisted that it was not. 

Was he hopeful that the Council could get Washington and Pyongyang to talk directly or was the multilateral idea the only solution? a correspondent asked.  Mr. Strong said both direct and multilateral talks were feasible.

How worried should the United Nations be that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would view enforcement as a declaration of war? a correspondent asked.  Mr. Strong said his role was not to advocate for either party.  The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea felt that it was the
United States that had abrogated the Non-Proliferation Treaty because under that Treaty, the nuclear powers had promised not to threaten non-nuclear powers.
It considered that it had been threatened.  That was the logic of North Korea’s position.  The country had also shown that it wanted to move out into the international community.  Part of the United Nations role was to help facilitate that prospect.  Longer-term development required cooperation at the international level. 

Responding to another question, Mr. Strong said the war in Iraq had confirmed for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the United States was prepared to move against countries that it considered a threat without the international community’s sanction.  He had made clear that, having just come

from Washington, the United States did not intend to attack North Korea.  Trust had broken down, however, with neither side believing the other. 

Continuing, he said that while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea wanted security, they did not intend to tie it to any economic advantage.
The country wanted a security guarantee.  In turn, it was prepared not to “nuclear-weaponize”.  

Asked whether there had been a shift in thinking, Mr. Strong said that originally, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had contended that they should be compensated economically.  There had been some flexibility.
The United States had originally insisted that there would be no negotiations until the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had rolled back its nuclear programme.  The United States had indicated that as long as there was an acknowledgment that that was the goal, there was a basis for starting.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had insisted that it was willing to do what the United States wanted, but only simultaneously.

As a “United Nations man”, what did Mr. Strong think about the impact of Iraq on the United Nations? a correspondent said.  Mr. Strong said that while it had been a blow to the United Nations, it had also opened up new opportunities.  The world had changed more than the United Nations had.  For the United Nations to play an indispensable role, it had to play it in a different way.
Issue-related alliances were needed around particular issues.  The United Nations could provide a forum for legitimizing those issues.

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