PRESS BRIEFING ON SECRETARY-GENERAL’S IRAQ REPORT

PRESS BRIEFING ON SECRETARY-GENERAL’S IRAQ REPORT

Briefing correspondents today on the Secretary-General’s latest report on Iraq, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast said it was impossible now to forecast if and when circumstances would permit full deployment of the United Nations Assistance mission there.

He added that, for now, the United Nations mission would be built up incrementally outside of Iraq -– in Nicosia, Cyprus and Amman, Jordan –- so it would be ready “if and when the time came”.  In taking the difficult decisions that lay ahead, the Secretary-General would ask himself whether substance of tasks allocated to the United Nations was proportionate to the risks, he said.

Security was a major constraint and the report had made clear that United Nations activities would be constrained because of that, he continued.  The Secretary-General could not compromise the safety of United Nations and international staff.  The report set forth some protective measures that could reduce, but not eliminate, risk to the United Nations.  It also stated that the Secretary-General had designated Ross Mountain to serve as acting Special Representative.

Informing correspondents that the Secretary-General would be giving a press conference in Geneva at 6 p.m. Geneva time, he said that meant journalists in New York were a bit ahead.  The report (document S/2003/1149) presented a complex picture of a complex situation and was not very easily summarized, and even less easily categorized.

It set forth the following: United Nations activities and key developments in Iraq from 17 July to 19 August; the events of 19 August, when the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was attacked “with devastating consequences and implications”; and the actions taken by the United Nations in the aftermath, including the relocation of most international staff; the United Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction planning activities; key political developments; and an action plan with regard to security; the deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI); and the conduct of United Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Iraq.

One of the most interesting parts was the observation section at the end, in which the Secretary-General stresses that the rebuilding of Iraq must succeed, he said.  The Secretary-General suggests that the foundations for such success were essentially fourfold:  recognition that mounting security problems could not be solved by military means alone and that it required a truly representative and fully inclusive political process; a need for articulation of a national agenda and for the politics of national unity; intensified efforts by the Coalition forces to demonstrate that they were adhering strictly to international humanitarian law and human rights instruments; and a broader international and regional engagement in an Iraqi agenda.

Regarding humanitarian and reconstruction activities, he said that the report set out that the United Nations had an important role to play and it had continued to play a critical role, even after 19 August, in the area of relief and reconstruction.  Specifically, a substantial amount of planned United Nations activities had continued.  The reconstruction needs assessment process had made progress and, with the termination of the “oil-for-food” programme, many of those activities had been carried out by national staff, and international staff deployed in neighbouring countries.  He added that those activities could help create favourable conditions for the political process.

On the political process, he said that the 15 November agreement on transition was an important step in the right direction.  Regarding possible United Nations involvement in the political transition process, the Secretary-General had indicated very clearly the importance of clarity, both regarding what might be expected of the United Nations and its respective responsibilities not spelled out in the 15 November agreement.  The Secretary-General needed to know what emerging political Iraqi institutions and the Coalition Provisional Authority think, so he could take a decision on the feasibility, scope and timing of his involvement.

He emphasized that, to play an effective political role, the United Nations also needed the support of the Governing Council and of key Iraqi figures outside the present process, the occupying Powers, a united Security Council, and support also from regional countries and major donors.  The Secretary-General had indicated that “we stood ready in principle if asked and as circumstances permit” to provide assistance to the elected provisional government, and he had encouraged further regional and international engagement to help ensure that a viable political process emerged in Iraq.

Meanwhile, he said, the United Nations would continue to do its utmost to implement the mandate given to it under resolutions 1484, 1500 and 1511, and he expected there would be a first opportunity for the Security Council to discuss the report when it met on 16 December.

Asked if the decision, reported today in the New York Times, by United States Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz to bar French, German and Russian companies from competing for billions in contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq was “particularly unhelpful”, Mr. Prendergast said he had not seen the actual decision, only the newspaper reports, but it looked like it was confined to contracts for money that was being provided by the United States.

He added that the Secretary-General’s report contained a section on the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq, whose primary purpose was to ensure that the development fund was used in a transparent manner, as set out in resolution 1483, and that the exports of petroleum and natural gas products were made consistent with best market practices.  The next meeting of the Board was on 22 December in Washington, D.C.

To a question about disbursement of pledges, he said that, since relief operations began in March, some $2 billion in assistance had been delivered, including $900 million in donor contributions and $1.1 million in resources available to United Nations agencies under the “oil-for-food” programme.  Also, two appeals had been launched, outlining total requirements of some $2.2 billion.  At the Madrid donor conference, it had been proposed that two trust funds be established by year’s end to coordinate and channel those monies.  The two committees overseeing the funds would work closely with relevant Iraqi authorities.  Julia Taft might have actual figures of what had been disbursed, and establishment of the trust funds was nearly finalized.

Asked whether he was convinced he could “get clarity”, particularly on the political side, given so much resistance in the Security Council to the war, he replied, “well, life is full of unclarity”.  He had not said that he would get clarity, only that there was a need for it.  “Let’s see whether that emerged or not”, he added.  There was a requirement for clarity, and the fact that that was clearly spelled out in the report might act as a catalyst.

The Secretary-General did see a role for the region, which was why he had convened a meeting recently with regional countries, he replied to another question.  There was a reference in the report to his intention for the United Nations to engage closely and continuously with the countries in the region.

Given that the Americans had responded to the increase in attacks by cracking down on the insurgents, the report’s analysis seemed to indicate that that response had worsened the situation.  Were the Americans getting too “heavy handed”? another correspondent asked.

He replied that the Secretary-General’s message in the report was that the Coalition forces needed to intensify efforts to demonstrate they were observing the requirements of international humanitarian law and human rights instruments, and that care should be taken to avoid inflicting civilian casualties and that the use of lethal force should not be disproportionate or indiscriminate.  He was drawing attention to what had been “very carefully drafted” in the report.

The United Nations was not involved in the political process inside Iraq right now, he responded to a further question.  The report was saying that it was very important that the political transition process should be fully transparent and fully inclusive.  The Secretary-General had made his view very clear over a considerable time period that an important opportunity now existed to broaden the political base of the Governing Council and the provisional government by bringing in elements not within the process right now, principally representatives of the Arab Sunni nationalism and a broader spectrum of Shiite opinion.

“We are not in a position to barge in from the side”, he said, adding “we have laid down over some time what we believe are the requirements if the United Nations is to play a real political role and everybody knew what those requirements were and they were spelled out again in the report”.  The United Nations did not have to be everywhere, but if it was to be involved in the political process in Iraq, then certain requirements had to be met, including a united Security Council, a united Governing Council, and the support of Iraqis not inside the process at the moment.

The fundamental point, he added, was that “we are not conducting the process and there are quite serious constraints on a physical presence inside Iraq”.  That did not make it impossible to “keep a finger on Iraqi pulse or pulses”, and the United Nations did that.  It also had a discreet advocacy role with those who were running the process to encourage them to take the opportunity to have a fully transparent and inclusive political process and to “bring inside the tent” as many legitimate elements as possible in Iraq.

The underlying thought, he said, in response to another question about security, was that “we need to minimize the risk to our own people and that was a correct and necessary objective and that would require a whole lot of changes to what we had before August 19”.

Another correspondent noted that the report asked:  Was the United Nations now indistinguishable from the United States-led Coalition in the minds of the Iraqis?  And might not Iraqis have unhappy memories of the United Nations because of its role in the sanctions?  Had any conclusion been reached on that essential point? he asked.

Mr. Prendergast said it was plain that many Iraqis felt pretty ambivalent about the United Nations because of past history, and that should be taken into account.  It was evident in Iraq that those carrying out the attacks were looking for soft targets and he was not sure that the absence of ambivalence would be an adequate safeguard, especially in light of the attack against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  The United Nations was a soft target.  An atmosphere should be created that was as “unconducive as possible” for the insurgents.

With United Nations staff outside of Iraq, how might it be a significant player? another correspondent asked.  Mr. Prendergast asked how someone from Reuters thought she had to be in the same room to interact.  Today, it was entirely possible to have very close relations with people whom one rarely meets in person.  Some United Nations staff had excellent contacts inside Iraq, and it was not necessary to be there to have a pretty good idea of what the opinions were.  At least half the Governing Council was outside the country.

He added that the primary point was that there was a series of requirements for a producing engagement in the political process.  There needed to be a certain symmetry between the degree of risk and the substance of the role being carried out.  For a cosmetic role, the risk threshold had to be much lower.  For a vital role, the risk threshold would be a bit higher, but either way, there had to be an acceptable risk.

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