PRESS CONFERENCE BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOMALIA

Welcoming the recent findings of the independent Panel of Experts on persistent violations of the arms embargo on Somalia, fragmented by more than
12 years of conflict, Somalia’s permanent representative to the United Nations said today that the experts had identified a clear pattern of destabilizing violations, particularly by Ethiopia, under which no government, including his own, could adequately function.

Speaking at a Headquarters’ press conference, Ahmed Abdi Hashi stressed that the report of 25 March (document S/2003/223) was the first time that an independent expert panel had documented the arms flow from Ethiopia to Somalia, particularly to the warlords who were obstructing peace and stability in Somalia.  The civil war there, formally begun in 1989, had impelled the
Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Somalia on 23 January 1992 and, eventually, to authorize a United Nations peace enforcement operation from 1993 to 1995.

According to the report, the Panel found a clear violation of that embargo, with weapons, equipment, training of militia and financial support to Somali factions flowing regularly from neighbouring States and others since the adoption of the Security Council’s resolution 733 (1992).  Somali factions have also purchased arms on the international market.  These flagrant violations of the embargo continue today, even as the Somali factions and their neighbours are participating in the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 

The Panel believes, as stated in its report, that the sanctions regime should be enhanced and implemented with “increased determination”.  The Somali faction leaders are today convinced that their business can go on as usual, as they have not seen any “real” enforcement of the embargo by the United Nations or its Member States over the past 12 years.  The dismissive attitude towards Security Council resolutions will continue if the international community does not show resolve in implementing a strict embargo regime or remain vigilant in investigating new violations of the embargo, it says.

Mr. Hashi further welcomed the report for identifying Ethiopia as the main source of instability, owing to its military presence in Somalia.  He drew attention to paragraph 49 of the report, which stated that Ethiopia had played an overt military role in Somalia.  Not only had that country been a major source of weapons for a number of Somali groups, Ethiopia had also invaded and occupied parts of Somalia.  Since Ethiopia’s incursions in 1996 and 1997, which crushed the Somali Islamic militant group al-Ittihad al-Islami’s military capacity, that Government had used the threat of al-Ittihad as an excuse for Ethiopian involvement in Somali internal affairs.

Citing references contained in paragraph 52 of the report, he emphasized that Ethiopia’s military presence in western Somalia was significant and that Ethiopia continued to provide military assistance to various factions of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council.  One international observer who visited Baidoa, Somalia, in July 2002 saw ammunition boxes with Amharic writing

on them.  Other international observers reported seeing and even meeting Ethiopian military officers.

Continuing to refer to the report, he noted the Panel’s finding that Ethiopia had, several times, conducted fairly large-scale operations in Somalia.  The first large-scale attack reportedly occurred in August and December 1996, when Ethiopian units attacked al-Ittihad camps in the Gedo region of the country.  According to Colonel Bihi, Ethiopian forces returned in June 1997 and established permanent bases in the Dolow, Luuq and Beledhawa districts of the Gedo region, where they remained until February 2001. 

Even worse than Ethiopia establishing permanent bases along the
Ethiopian-Somali border was, as the report indicated in paragraph 55, Ethiopian forces remaining and continuing to engage militarily in Somali affairs.
The latest incidence of that occurred when Ethiopian military personnel seized two international aid officials, he said.  One was an officer working for
Save the Children (United Kingdom) and the other was an officer of the Somalia Food Security Assessment Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 

Cleary, he continued, the arms flow from Ethiopia to Somalia, particularly to the warlords who continued to impede peace and stability in Somalia, was documented “chapter and verse” in the report.  One warlord even boasted that he received four times the amount shown in table 2 of page 21 of the report, and that was a lot of ammunition and weapons.  And, one of Ethiopia’s “favourite warlords” admitted to the Panel that Ethiopia had indeed supplied arms and munitions to Somali warlords.

Regarding international terrorism, he said that there had been allegations by some quarters, and especially propagated by Ethiopia, that there was a very strong presence of terrorist links in Somalia.  His Government had stated on numerous occasions that those charges were not true.  The report found that,
“at present, those fears appear unfounded”.  It also underlined the fact that drawing such a connection was a ruse to disrupting Somalia’s internal affairs.

He said his delegation had stated repeatedly that Ethiopia had formed groups of warlords aimed at undermining the Transitional National Government of Somalia, but those statements had been met with cynicism.  Now, an independent panel showed that Ethiopia was the principle violator of the arms embargo in Somalia.  He, therefore, called on the Security Council to take appropriate action against Ethiopia for violating, with impunity, the arms embargo.  He also called on the Council to take appropriate measures, in the form of censure, and also to list those individuals who benefited from the arms flow into Somalia and impose targeted sanctions against them. 

He added that his Government had been called on to assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.  Further enforcement of the embargo regime in Somalia was the first step towards disarmament because, if the flow of arms from Ethiopia was stopped, then the pipeline closed and concomitantly the fighting in Somalia would cease.  So, it was critical for the international community to reinforce the arms embargo and punish the violators.

Asked about the finding in the report that Djibouti officials appeared to have provided false end-user certificates and helped to organize transportation for arms destined to Somalia, he said that nowhere in the report did it say that Djibouti had provided arms to Somalia.  There was a reference to the end-user certificates, but nowhere in that portion of the report did it explicitly say that Djibouti provided arms. 

As the report indicated, the Transitional National Government had received funds from friendly countries as a contribution to peacemaking and
peace-building, he added.  The transitional Government’s policy continued to be about dialogue.  Nowhere had it ever been reported that Government forces were fighting; it was always the warlords who were fighting the Government and each other, in violation of the commitment they undertook at the peace conference in Kenya to cease hostilities. 

Recalling presidential statements of the Security Council from
October 2001 and March 2002, he noted that the Council had asked the
Secretary-General and the United Nations to prepare proposals on how the
United Nations could further assist in the demobilization of militias and the training of police personnel for the Transitional National Government.
The Transitional National Government had to provide security and have a working police, without which it could not function.  It was indeed the role of the Government to train its militias, either through the United Nations or bilaterally.  No one could expect it to function without security forces.

Another correspondent, noting that the embargo also covered Somalis, asked about the source of the Transitional National Government’s weapons.

Mr. Hashi said that, as the report indicated, the Government, when it came to that issue, had no police force and no army; businessmen were looking after their own interests and had their own militias, which had provided the initial security forces.  Now, those were integrated and formed the police force in Mogadishu.  But, nowhere in the report had it stated that the Government had gotten any weapons from this country or that.  It had only stated that other countries had provided training, police uniforms, and so forth.  Until
Security Council resolution 1425 (2002) was adopted, there was no prohibition.

Replying to a question about links to terrorism, specifically to the Panel’s suggestion that while Somalia had not become a haven for terrorists and only a transit point for them, but that that role could increase, he said that the report had referred to the attack in Mombasa, Kenya, where it appeared that non-Somali terrorists, and their weapons, had been easily able to transit through Somali territory on the way to their intended target.

He added that the Kenyan Government had, on several occasions in Nairobi, refuted that claim.  Somali men had been arrested on possible immigration violations at the time of that attack and the Kenyan Government had exonerated those men.  Whether the materials and explosives used were transported through Somalia, the Kenyan Government had denied that that had happened.  Of course, without any effective disarmament programme for Somalia, no government could function properly there.  For both internal reasons and the fight against international terrorism, it was incumbent upon the international community to

assist in building capacities, so that any Somali government would be able to control its borders. 

No final peace agreement had yet been reached in the peace negotiations in Kenya, which had been ongoing for six months with the participation of representatives of the Transitional National government, the warlords, and civil society, he replied to another question.  The Government’s position was very clear –- it sought the establishment of an all-inclusive Somali Government of national unity.  One of the main obstacles to reaching that goal were the
so-called “front line States”, which could not agree on anything, particularly Ethiopia, which had a different agenda and a different vision for Somalia. 

Ethiopia’s best-case scenario, he added, was to have a Government of its own choosing in Somalia.  Can you imagine a foreign government, a neighbour, wanting to impose a government of its own choosing on another people? he asked.  And, if Ethiopia could not get that –- “and it definitely will not” -- then it did not want the emergence of a Somali Government from that Conference.  Period.

Asked about the status of Al-Barakaat, he said that was no longer functioning as an institution.  Somalis had used that as a savings bank and as a money-transfer mechanism from relatives outside the country to families inside.  All of those funds had been frozen.  His Government had asked the United States Administration how it could release the funds of individual depositors because it was absolutely unfair to freeze and hold the assets belonging to individual depositors.  If the bank was “up to something”, about which he had no evidence, it had already been closed.  But, he wanted the funds to be released to their legitimate owners, for which a credible mechanism should be established. 

To a follow-up question, he said that cooperation was continuing with the United States Government about what should be done.  He was trying to convince those officials, together with those of his Government, to devise a mechanism to identify whether those were legitimate owners or whether there had been some money laundering or assisting in some sort of “fishy business”.  It was one thing to fight terrorism; it was another to unlawfully hold individuals’ deposits.  If the United States did not release the funds, he would take them to court. 

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