NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT GIVEN ‘LIP SERVICE’, WHILE POSSESSION, DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTINUES, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD

Fifty-eighth General Assembly

First Committee

6^th Meeting (AM)

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT GIVEN ‘LIP SERVICE’, WHILE POSSESSION, DEVELOPMENT

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTINUES, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD

Nuclear disarmament was being given lip service, while nuclear-weapon States had displayed no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons, instead retaining thousands and even developing new “war-fighting nukes”, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) was told today, as it continued its general debate.

Pakistan’s representative said that the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons had become an urgent goal, but it was pursued selectively.  Some States were prohibited from pursuing peaceful nuclear cooperation, while others were helped in promoting unsafeguarded nuclear programmes and allowed to accelerate vertical nuclear proliferation, even in areas of tension.

Further, he added, a huge legal and political dichotomy had emerged in non-proliferation.  The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) recognized only five nuclear-weapon States, but there were actually eight, if not nine.  Pakistan was prepared to work as a partner in halting proliferation, but unreasonable demands for implementing Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) while the existing nuclear-weapon States retained their nuclear weapons, were unreasonable, unacceptable and unrealistic. 

(By that resolution, the Council condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 and called on them to stop their nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development programmes.)

Speaking on behalf of the 109 subscribing States to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, also known as The Hague Code of Conduct, the Chilean speaker said the subscribing States had pledged to confront security challenges that were leading to the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.  While the Code was not an international treaty, its obligations were politically binding.

Drawing the Committee’s attention to the small arms scourge, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said his country was bandaging the wounds of a five-year war, which had been fostered and fuelled by the proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons.  With more than 100,000 of those weapons in circulation in his country, his Government had established a national commission to, among other things, mobilize assistance and expertise, codify legislative texts, and evaluate the Nairobi Declaration on the proliferation problem in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

Small arms proliferation, which was directly linked to organized crime and terrorism, was also plaguing South-East Europe, the speaker from Serbia and Montenegro said.  Insisting that only full integration of all countries of the region would effectively address those security challenges, she called for full implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to combat the trade in small arms, and for strengthened export controls.  She appealed for funds to address the threat of landmines, which contaminated 10 million square metres of land in her country.

The Government of Mozambique was committed to concluding the destruction of all of its landmine stockpiles by the end of 2003, under the terms of the 1999 Ottawa Convention.  That process, which had begun two years ago, already had resulted in the elimination of nearly 38,000 mines.

Highlighting the successes of the fifth meeting of States parties to the Ottawa Convention, the speaker from the International Committee of the Red Cross recalled that 30 million mines had already been destroyed worldwide.  That meeting had also underscored that stockpile destruction deadlines had been met by all States parties and that the number of mine-related casualties had decreased significantly wherever the Convention was being implemented. 

Statements were also made by the representatives of Senegal, Guatemala, Egypt, and Philippines.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. Monday to continue its general debate.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general debate on all disarmament and related international security items.

Expected to be under consideration is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).  Opened for signature in 1996, 169 States have signed it, and 105 have ratified it.  Of the States whose ratification is needed for its entry into force (the 44 Annex 2 States), 32 have ratified it.  Two nuclear Powers -– the United States and China -– have signed but not ratified the Treaty, and the United States no longer supports it.  The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan have not signed it.

Also up for discussion is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  With 188 States parties, it is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the most widely subscribed to disarmament treaty, yet some believe it cemented the divide between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ because it classified States according to their nuclear weapons status and ascribed different obligations to each.  The perception that it perpetuates the status quo has been expressed often in the Committee and will likely underpin its debate.

Attention will also be focused on the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization in the United Nations family that serves as a focal point for nuclear cooperation.  Among its tasks is verifying, through its inspection system, that States comply with their commitments under the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes.

The Agency's safeguards system comprises extensive technical measures for independently verifying the correctness and completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities.  Since 1992 -- in the aftermath of the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme -- the Board of Governors of the Agency has adopted or endorsed measures to strengthen the safeguards system.  Under a Model Additional Protocol adopted in 1997 that includes short notice inspector access to any place on a nuclear site, the IAEA has continued to negotiate Additional Protocols with States to strengthen that system by verifying not only declared nuclear material and activities, but also the absence of undeclared material and activities.

Delegates are also expected to refer to the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.  The Conference met in Geneva from 20 January to 28 March, 12 May to 27 June, and 28 July to 10 September.  It was unable to agree on the programme of work and did not establish or re-establish any mechanism on any of its specific agenda items, which included cessation of the nuclear arms race.

The creation and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones will also be considered.  Existing zones include the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok), and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba).

On conventional weapons, in 2001, a Group of Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons was established by the General Assembly.  It concludes, in its July report to the Secretary-General, that the development of an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons is feasible.  It recommends that the Assembly take a decision at the current session on the negotiation of such an instrument.

The 2003 Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General to review the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which adopted its report by consensus on 1 August, recommended that Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) be included within the scope of the Register, particularly in light of recent reports of attempts by groups to acquire them and use them against commercial airliners.  The Register is a voluntary reporting instrument on the international transfers of major conventional arms, namely battle tanks, large-calibre artillery systems, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and their launchers.

So far, 164 Member States have participated at least once in this voluntary reporting instrument, while a record number of 126 States submitted reports on arms transfers in 2001.  To date, 117 countries have participated in 2003.

Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use:  Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process", which entered into force on 1 March 1999.

For additional background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3247 issued

3 October.

CHEIKH NIANG (Senegal) said the world was a dangerous place, with the proliferation of weapons of all kinds reaching worrisome levels, and terrorism threatening humankind.  Unfortunately, however, such disturbing trends were exacerbated by several failures in the field of disarmament, such as the dismal performances of the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.  Calling States’ approaches to weapons of mass destruction egotistical and narrow, he added that, if security was not global, it simply could not exist.  In that regard, he called for the establishment of a frank international dialogue on disarmament.

Given the increase in arms-related dangers throughout the world, he said it was necessary to examine current methods in the field of disarmament.  In the context of the First Committee, he recommended that it only focus on essential items and consider certain resolutions every two or three years, instead of annually.  With respect to treaties and conventions, he declared that the universality of the NPT must remain a priority, expressed support for the CTBT, and stated that the Biological Weapons Convention must be strengthened.

Turning to his own continent, he told delegates that it was being plagued by small arms, light weapons, and landmines.  Regarding mines, he welcomed the initiatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to manage the socio-economic impact of that scourge.  On small arms and light weapons, he also focused on their adverse social and economic impacts in his subregion, and declared that the West African Heads of State had adopted a comprehensive code of conduct dealing with such weapons.  He added that the UNDP was also helping to set up national commissions to help local communities combat arms-related destruction.

LUISA FERNANDA BONILLA GALVAO DE QUEIROZ (Guatemala) said that everyone shared the same concern, namely to respond to new challenges to international security.  As the Secretary-General had observed, those might not be new threats, but rather old threats that combined in new and dangerous ways.  Although new ideas had emerged about the ways to confront those threats, it could not be denied that the final objective of combating them was unchanged.  The Committee should not be changed, inasmuch as it was the most representative international forum in the area of disarmament and international security.  It could be strengthened, however. 

She said that everyone should do their best not to become mired in interminable discussions on procedure; the main focus should be the quest for the best way to breathe new life into the resolutions and begin to revive the international mechanism for disarmament, bearing in mind the benefits from collective and efficient action.  Only true and effective multilateralism, characterized by strict observance of international instruments, was the way forward.  Of special concern was the implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms and of the Ottawa Convention, for which her Government was adopting subregional initiatives to complement its national efforts.  Her Government had adopted a comprehensive programme aimed at limiting armaments and promoting stability and mutual confidence to complement the Agreement for Regional Security, adopted last month by the Central American Security Commission. 

ALFREDO LABBE (Chile) spoke on behalf of the 109 subscribing States to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, also known as The Hague Code of Conduct.  He said the subscribing States had pledged to confront security challenges that were leading to the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.  While the Code was not an international treaty, the obligations it demanded were politically binding and designed to contribute to the universalization of all multilateral instruments and mechanisms related to disarmament.

He said the fact that the subscribing States came from every continent and regional group, with 47 of them Members of the Non-Aligned Movement, showed the depth of concern throughout the world.  Such concern was spurring the subscribers to seek maximum restrictions on the development, testing, and use of ballistic missiles, as well as significant reductions in national holdings.  Having pledged to exercise the necessary vigilance to ensure that technical assistance and cooperation did not lead to the development of missile programs, the States had, at the same time, recognized that no country should be excluded from using resources from outer space for peaceful purposes.  In addition, the subscribing States had also resolved to promote transparency and confidence-building measures.

Before concluding, he told delegates that the Code, less than one year after its birth, was concrete and growing.  Nevertheless, it was not the only viable response to the problem of ballistic missiles, and he, therefore, welcomed other multilateral initiatives and mechanisms with which it could co-exist. He also reassured delegations that their governments, if committed to international peace and security, would be welcomed into the fold by the subscribing States.

ALBERT SIMABATU MEMY (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that the illicit trafficking and trade in small arms was of great concern to the people of his country, which was bandaging the wounds of a war of more than five years.  That armed conflict had produced roughly 4 million victims.  Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared on 7 September that the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had experienced one of the bloodiest conflicts in modern history, and one that had affected the entire region.  Millions had been killed or brutalized, and in certain parts of the country, millions could only see a precarious existence on the horizon.  That bloody war, he said, had been fostered and fuelled by the proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons. 

He said his Government had bitterly noted that situation in its statement to the biennial meeting in New York to follow-up the 2001 United Nations Conference on small arms.  He supported the appeal made during that meeting for practical measures relating to collection and destruction, marking and tracing, and the preparation of a joint strategy on the norms and criteria to combat terrorism and organized crime.  The approach so far adopted by his country was based on the fact that the recurring armed conflict had been the result of the uncontrolled presence of small weapons -– more than 100,000 in circulation on the territory.  In order to better coordinate the fight against that scourge, his Government had established a national commission to coordinate all related issues.

Among the commission’s other tasks was the strengthening of partnerships, on the national and international levels, in the framework of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation programme, he said.  It also sought to mobilize assistance and expertise, codify legislative texts, and evaluate the Nairobi Declaration on the proliferation problem in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.  Bearing in mind the new integrated structure of the army, the commission would organize a seminar to raise awareness about the circulation of small weapons and the way in which countries needed to respond to the objective of the biennial meeting, namely to accelerate implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action.  The conference should also allow countries to mobilize non-governmental organizations and other concerned actors.

ALAA ISSA (Egypt) said that in 2000 all States parties to the NPT had accepted the 13 steps leading to nuclear disarmament.  Those steps extracted a commitment from the five nuclear-weapon States to pursue the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.  In order to build upon that commitment, his Government, along with its partners in the New Agenda Coalition, would present two draft resolutions, which would address the need to counter the lethargy that had crept into global non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts.  The second of the two would stress the need to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons.

[The New Agenda Coalition comprises Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.  Those States first submitted a draft resolution (1998)entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda".]

Declaring that since last year Middle East violence and instability had spiralled out of control, he lamented the fact that no serious effort had been put forth to address the risks of nuclear proliferation in the region.  In that context, he called upon Israel, the only State in the region that had not acceded to the NPT, to join that treaty.  He also welcomed Iran’s stated willingness to cooperate with the IAEA.

Turning to the debate regarding the reform of the First Committee, he stressed that any conclusions must fully respect the role of the General Assembly in the areas of disarmament and international security.  He also declared that maintaining a balance in the General Assembly between the issues in the field of disarmament was essential.

FILIPE CHIDUMO (Mozambique) said that, despite 2003 marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the convening of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, there was little cause for celebration.  After all, the Conference on Disarmament remained mired in a deadlock and that development was especially disturbing, given increased concerns of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists.  In that context, he called for a stronger multilateral system to promote disarmament and non-proliferation.  And, in order to strengthen multilateralism, he said it was necessary to make existing agreements, such as the NPT, CTBT, and Chemical Weapons Convention, universal.

Turning to landmines, he said that, in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of the Ottawa Convention, his Government was committed to destroying all of its stockpiled mines by 2003.  So far, that process, which began two years ago, had already resulted in the elimination of 37,818 mines.  Noting the success of the fifth meeting of the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, held in Thailand last month, he expressed hope that international commitment would lead to a world free of those weapons.

Regarding small arms and light weapons, he stated that their illicit trade and proliferation continued to constitute a serious threat to peace, stability, and social development in Africa.  However, he was encouraged by the positive results of this year’s first biennial meeting to monitor implementation of the Programme of Action to combat the illicit trade in small arms.  That meeting had allowed States to share experiences and learn from each other.

TAMARA RASTOVAC (Serbia and Montenegro) said that the “9/11” attack, followed by other terrorist attacks around the world, including the strike against United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, directly challenged peace and security, particularly the strength of the disarmament framework.  The international community had at its disposal the means with which to counter those threats, but their effectiveness would be shaped by its ability to improve existing agreements on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.  Their effectiveness depended on their universalization and full implementation, coupled with a strong verification regime.  Furthering strengthening the NPT should be at the centre of attention. 

Concerning the safety of nuclear waste, she said that individual Member States should be supported in their efforts, through the provision of adequate funds, to deal with that problem.  She also supported the early entry into force of the CTBT.  Her country would complete its ratification process soon.  She also sought full universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, given the great threat that chemical substances might find their way into the hands of terrorists.  In 2003, her country received five inspection teams of the Convention, and, in cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), chemical weapons production equipment stored in the Trayal Corporation in Krusevac was destroyed. 

She said South-East Europe was facing serious challenges and threats caused by terrorism and organized crime.  Only full integration of all countries of the region into European and Euro-Atlantic integrations, and the further strengthening of regional cooperation, would create the prerequisites to deal with those security challenges effectively.  Small arms proliferation, which was directly linked to organized crime and terrorism, was also plaguing her region.  She, therefore, called for full implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action on small arms, particularly the strengthening of export controls and regional and international cooperation in that regard.  Financial assistance was needed to address the threat of landmines, which contaminated an estimated 10 million square metres of her country.

LAURO BAJA (Philippines) began by expressing several concerns related to disarmament.  First, the fact that, three years after the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nuclear-weapon States had still not provided for the transparent, accountable, and verifiable elimination of their nuclear arsenals, was disappointing, and he noted with concern, the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty.  Second, he expressed regret over the fact that the CTBT had still not entered into force.  In that context, he called on States, particularly those whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible.  Finally, expressing dismay at the unsuccessful attempts of the Conference on Disarmament to agree upon a programme of work, he also lamented the continued lack of consensus regarding the convening of the fourth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Despite such setbacks, his Government was continuing to display steadfast commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation.  For example, in close cooperation with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), it had contributed three facilities to the International Monitoring System, a global network of stations designed to detect nuclear explosions.  Additionally, it had subscribed last year to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, begun the process of enacting and implementing national legislation that complemented the Chemical Weapons Convention, and continued to work with its neighbours to make the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone more effective, through negotiations with the nuclear-weapon States.

Declaring that weapons of mass destruction were not the only threats to international peace and security, he drew attention to the problem of small arms and light weapons.  In that context, he called for closer links between national implementation strategies, regional initiatives, and global action with regards to combating such weapons.  He also told delegates that his Government was attempting to protect children from the adverse effects of armed conflict by implementing a long-term strategy, which addressed the humanitarian consequences of small arms proliferation.

MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said that general and complete disarmament was dismissed as utopian -- nuclear disarmament had been given lip service and the nuclear-weapon States had displayed no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons.  Thousands had been retained and new “war-fighting” nuclear weapons were being developed.  The non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons had become a primary and urgent goal, but that was pursued selectively.  Some States could not pursue peaceful nuclear cooperation, while others were helped in promoting unsafeguarded nuclear programmes to build and refine missile and anti-missile systems, and allowed to accelerate vertical nuclear proliferation, including in regions of tension.

Further, a huge legal and political dichotomy had emerged in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, he said.  While the NPT recognized only five nuclear-weapon States, there were, today, actually eight, if not nine, nuclear-weapon States.  Imperative resolution of that dichotomy could only be done in the context of a nuclear disarmament process involving all nuclear-weapon States.

He said that non-proliferation could only succeed if the underlying security concerns of States were effectively addressed.  Unilateral and selective efforts to impose nuclear non-proliferation had exacerbated the proliferation threat, heightened tensions and increased the danger of the use of force.  The presumption that Iraq possessed mass destruction weapons, based on questionable intelligence, had proved to be unfounded so far, demonstrating the danger of the doctrine of pre-emptive and coercive non-proliferation.  Unfortunately, those realities were not reflected in the prescription proposed by the major Powers, by the New Agenda Coalition, or even by the United Nations.

He said his country had reluctantly acquired nuclear weapons and missile capability to deter aggression from its traditional adversary, India, and only after India had acquired and tested its nuclear weapons and declared itself a nuclear weapon State.  It was not in Pakistan’s strategic interest to allow the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.  He shared the concern that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could destabilize the global security environment.  Pakistan was prepared to work as a partner in halting proliferation, but unreasonable demands for implementing Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) while the existing nuclear-weapon States retained their nuclear weapons, were unreasonable, unacceptable and unrealistic.  Pakistan’s special strategic concerns needed to be accommodated.

Pakistan had committed itself not to erode the basic goals of the NPT, he said.  It would be prepared to give an explicit commitment that it would continue to act in conformity with the obligations undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States, under articles I, II and III of the NPT to prevent any further nuclear proliferation.  (Article I refers to each nuclear-weapon State undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons material or assist or induce a non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture it.  Article II commits each non-nuclear-weapon State not to receive such transfers, and Article III commits those States to accept IAEA safeguards.)

Consistent with its obligations as a nuclear capable State, he said his country had formally instituted an elaborate Nuclear Command and Control Mechanisms since February 2000 to bring in place ironclad custodial controls.  Those were aimed at ensuring total elimination of risks of leakages of either material or technology, and preventing accidental or unauthorized launch.  A Strategic Command Force ensured that the strategic weapons were never used unintentionally, accidentally or without due authorization.  Further, special security and safety measures had also been adopted, which made it impossible for the “wrong hands” to seize those assets. 

He said he understood the concerns regarding the threat of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups.  But, verification responsibilities for weapons of mass destruction should not be entrusted to the Security Council, because its functions related mainly to peace and security, and the rights and obligations in the Council would be unequal between the “Permanent 5” and other States.  Such an effort would undermine the credibility of existing treaty regimes.  Work should be undertaken, instead, to strengthen the disarmament treaties and, where necessary, improve their verification mechanisms, including compliance. 

Universal acceptance and implementation of the IAEA’s convention on Physical Safety was important, he said.  Programmes to ensure the protection of “loose nukes” and of inadequately protected fissile material were also useful.  Pakistan had taken all possible national measures to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear and missile assets.  It was prepared to participate in the elaboration of internationally agreed measures to prevent terrorists from gaining access to those weapons.  He, therefore, proposed the convening of a meeting of technical experts to evaluate the reality of that alleged threat.  Deliberations should focus on terrorist acquisition of chemical and biological weapons, since those, and not nuclear weapons, were more likely to be obtained. 

He recalled the proposal by his Government of a strategic restraint regime for South Asia, comprising three interlocking elements:  agreed and reciprocal measures for nuclear and missile restraint to prevent deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons; establishment of conventional arms balance as a confidence-building measure; and the establishment of a political mechanism for resolving bilateral conflicts, especially the core dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.  It should be a matter of grave concern to the international community that there was no “operational” understanding between India and Pakistan for the “management” of their nuclear relations. 

India had announced, and was steadily implementing, its dangerous nuclear doctrine, which envisaged the development and deployment of a “triad” of nuclear weapons on land, sea and air.  The Prithvi short-range missile was deployed and the Agni series was in the process of being deployed.  The Brahmos naval cruise missiles and nuclear-capable submarines being acquired by India would create a second strike capability.  While professing adherence to the “no first use” of nuclear weapons, India’s doctrine provided that, in the event of a major attack against it or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India would retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.  The acquisition of anti-ballistic missile systems and advanced early-warning systems –- such as the Israeli-supplied Phalcon –- would increase India’s first-strike options.

He said Pakistan did not wish to enter into a nuclear or strategic arms race with India.  But, it took all necessary measures to ensure the credibility of its strategic deterrence against any use or threat of use of force against it or its strategic assets or facilities.  To preserve the stability of strategic deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan’s proposals for reciprocal nuclear and missile restraint deserved urgent consideration.  Those proposals included a bilateral moratorium on further nuclear weapons testing, maintenance of nuclear weapons on de-alert status, non-deployment of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and formalization of the understanding to provide prior adequate notification of flight tests of missiles. 

Given his view that a conventional arms imbalance would increase the threat of Indian aggression against Pakistan, he proposed several reciprocal measures, including maintenance of an acceptable ratio in the armed forces of the two countries, restrictions on the induction of heavy weapons within certain border zones, further limits on the size and deployments of military exercises, assurances that neither country had the capacity to launch “surprise attacks”, and an eventual agreement on the non-use of force or a non-aggression pact.  Finally, for a durable peace in South Asia, it was imperative that a serious and sustained political dialogue should be conducted to resolve the underlying causes of conflict and confrontation. 

GEORGES PACLISANU, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), began by highlighting the successes of the fifth meeting of States parties to the Ottawa Convention.  Bringing together 136 States parties, including most mine-affected countries, and all major organizations involved in mine clearance and awareness, and victim assistance and advocacy, the Meeting reported that 30 million mines had already been destroyed worldwide.  It also underscored that stockpile destruction deadlines had been met by all States and that the number of mine-related casualties had decreased significantly wherever the Convention was being implemented.

Turning to biotechnology, he said his organization recognized its huge potential for good, yet had redoubled efforts to raise awareness of how it could be used to deliberately spread disease and poison.  In that context, he called for a high-level political declaration that would reaffirm existing norms, reinforce the Biological Weapons Convention, highlight the responsibilities of the science industry, and support a variety of preventive actions.  Telling delegates that the ICRC had already drafted a version of such a document, he invited all interested delegations to contact him about such efforts.

He also announced that, this December, the twenty-eighth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent would bring together all States parties to the Geneva Convention to consider, in part, arms and international humanitarian law.  Nevertheless, he stressed that success would only be evident in that field if participants looked at arms issues through the eyes of the victims, who were frequently civilians.

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