PRESS CONFERENCE BY AUSTRALIA’S FOREIGN MINISTER

Australia wants the United Nations to have a significant role in the
post-conflict environment in Iraq, that country’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, told correspondents this afternoon at a Headquarters press conference.

That was the message he delivered to the Secretary-General today and to the United States administration in Washington earlier, Mr. Downer said.  It was important that false debates be set aside.  The United Nations was not saying it wanted to take over the whole of Iraq using the “East-Timor model”.  Equally, the United States was not saying it did not want to see any United Nations role in the post-conflict environment.  The United Nations could be involved in many important and constructive ways, including in areas of humanitarian assistance and human rights.  The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could provide formal structure to financial institutions in Iraq.

There would be significant discussions in the Security Council about those issues, including the role of a United Nations special coordinator, he continued.  In time, that was a position that would be essential, he thought, so that United Nations operations would be effectively coordinated and there would be appropriate and effective links between the Organization and an
interim-administration, as well as dealings among the United Nations, the interim-administration and coalition partners over the form of the final Iraqi administration.  Ultimately, that would be a matter for the Iraqis themselves, but it would need the support of the international community.

As the activities of the United Nations would be dependant on Council resolutions, he said that after the discord there, the opportunity for reconciliation and healing existed.  All members of the Council recognized that, “after 30 years of dictatorial and barbarous law”, Iraqis needed to be given a chance.  They had an enormous stock of mineral resources and a promising future.  The international community must get together to help the country.  Continuation of Council divisions would not be helpful.

On East Timor, he endorsed a Council resolution slowing the pace of downsizing of peacekeeping operations, because of the security situation there and the need to train East Timorese police.

Asked about what assurance he had gotten from Washington on the importance of the role the United Nations would have to play, he said that nobody was suggesting the special coordinator would work for the United States, or for the Iraqi interim-administration, or that the United Nations would adopt the
East-Timor model.  East Timor, after all, had no government at all when the United Nations operation started, while Iraq had a sophisticated government structure.  The administration that ultimately would emerge in Iraq after the conflict must be seen as legitimate by the Iraqi people and of the international community.  There was no question that the United Nations would have to play an important role in all that.  There were areas in which nobody but the
United Nations could play a significant role, and the work of United Nations agencies would be crucial.  That meant there would have to be a major effort made to build bridges in the Council, leading to resolutions articulating a

“growing role” of the United Nations -- and that was understood by the United States.

As to a question about who would select the Iraqi partner for the
United Nations to deal with, he said at the “moment of victory”, defined as the overthrow of the Hussein regime, the coalition would be the power in situ, followed by an interim-administration to ensure that “the wheels of government continue to turn”.  After that, there would have to be a process, in which the United Nations certainly would have to play a role, on establishing a government.  The mechanism for that had not been decided upon.  The war had to be completed first.  In the end, there had to be an administration that, first and foremost, was seen as legitimate by the Iraqi people, and had the confidence of the international community.

He did not think that Australia’s alignment with the United States and the United Kingdom indicated an Anglo-Saxon alliance, he answered to another question.  There was indeed a common heritage and common values.  The alliance, however, was founded on the common analysis of the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states, and that was shared by other countries, as well.  Moreover, Australia valued the alliance-relationship with the United States, as Australia was situated in an “unstable part of the world” and was deeply concerned about the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Reacting to a question about reconstruction contracts for Iraq, he said he would certainly advocate for corporate Australia, but that his country did not have the equivalent of a United States law that prescribed preference for American companies for United States-funded contracts.  Nor had Australia entered into the coalition for Iraq’s oil.  The oil resources were for the Iraqi people, and any post-conflict arrangement would have to protect that fact.

Australia would emphasize humanitarian assistance in its role in post-war Iraq.  That assistance would consist of food aid -- his country had sent two ships containing 100,000 tonnes of wheat, for instance -– and assistance in agriculture.

Asked whether the travel advisory to Australian citizens not to travel to Toronto, Canada, because of the Sever Active Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus was an overreaction, he said the SARS situation was more serious than previously thought and even the World Health Organization had issued travel advisories.  Australia had issued travel advisories regarding Hong Kong, China, Singapore, as well as Toronto, as there had been some 100 SARS cases in that city.  To say that that advisory had damaged relations was too strong.  It had caused an irritation, but one had to live with that, as Australian citizens had to be protected.

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