PRESS BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF PANEL ON SECURITY OF UN STAFF IN IRAQ

Martti Ahtisaari, Chair of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel in Iraq, addressed correspondents at a Headquarters briefing today on the 19 August bomb attack at the United Nations in Baghdad, in which 22 persons lost their lives.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that, in addition to the shock and pain of such a loss, many questions had been raised regarding the security of United Nations personnel.  The Secretary-General had felt that it was important to establish an independent panel consisting of experts, to complement the internal investigation.

He said the objectives of the Panel were to examine all relevant factors of the security situation in Iraq before the attack, the United Nations security mechanisms and procedures already in place, the circumstances of the attack itself, and the action taken by different parties in the immediate aftermath.  The Panel was also asked to give an account of responsibilities within the United Nations relating to staff security relations between the United Nations and the Coalition Provisional Authority, and to identify key lessons for future security management arrangements with a view to preventing further such tragedies in high-risk missions.

There was no place without risk in Iraq, he continued.  The United Nations had become the target of armed elements that were ready to use terror tactics to inflict damage upon it.  A new security strategy must be developed to face this and other high-risk environments, as the United Nations had failed to provide adequate security to its staff in Iraq.  In particular, the United Nations management staff had failed to comply with standard security regulations and directives, leaving the United Nations open and vulnerable to attacks.  Furthermore, the security system failed to adequately analyse and utilize information that had been made available on threats against United Nations staff and premises, and the security awareness within the country team did not match the hostile environment.

Adequate security arrangements may not have been able to prevent the attack but would certainly have minimized the vulnerability of staff and, perhaps, would have reduced the number of casualties, he said.

The main conclusions of the Panel, therefore, were that the United Nations Security Management System was dysfunctional and provided little guarantee of security to United Nations staff in Iraq or other high-risk environments.  This necessitated comprehensive reform, and there was a need for professional expertise from outside the system to assist in carrying out these reforms.  The main issues to be addressed were the information management capabilities; chain of command for security of staff; coordination and cooperation between various components of the United Nations security system; and accountability of management.

The United Nations must make serious efforts to develop a coherent pragmatic vision prior to entering high-risk environments with clearly achievable goals, he continued.  The United Nations system should then decide the number of staff required and the type of security arrangements for its operations.  The life and integrity of United Nations staff must be recognized by all as the most precious asset of the Organization.

Asked why the report, while citing many deficiencies and recommendations, did not appear to hold anyone accountable for the security lapses that had occurred on 19 August, he replied that it was not the Panel’s duty to investigate what had gone wrong in individual decision-making.  They were conducting a general investigation of the United Nations system, and the report was not a name-calling exercise.

Responding to a question about the difficulties the United Nations had in coping with a large military presence on the ground, such as that of the United States in Iraq, he said that the history of United Nations involvement in Iraq was unique, as the actions of the Coalition had not been authorized by United Nations bodies.  This had created an even more complicated situation than under normal circumstances.

A correspondent asked for a description of Sergio Vieira de Mello’s feelings about security arrangements for this specific zone.  Mr. Ahtisaari replied that, without referring to a specific person, it was felt that the security situation in Iraq represented a dramatic shift, even for those who had gone through many difficult United Nations operations.  In the past, it had always been believed that the United Nations flag would serve as protection.  The realization that Iraq was so very different was perhaps only recognized by a few.

Asked to elaborate on the rumours about Sergio Vieira de Mello’s plane coming under attack in Iraq, he said that there were between 20 and 30 attacks on planes and there was no way for the Panel to verify the matter.

Replying to a correspondent who asked if delegating authority to the steering committee to deal with the security coordinator had been a flawed decision, he said that he was in favour of a strict chain of command, accountability and responsibility.  No matter how well meaning these steering groups may be, they often blurred the chain of command, he said, and perhaps they should exist only for information exchange.

A correspondent suggested that the only way to protect a United Nations mission in a country like Iraq was to block off the surrounding streets, as is the practice at Headquarters when heads of State are visiting during the General Debate.  Mr. Ahtisaari responded that there was much logic in this suggestion.  If the United Nations protected heads of State, it should also protect its staff members, and Member States should be prepared to pay for this.

Asked if the United Nations should be in Iraq at all at present, he said that it was not his decision to make.  Investigating security was the Panel’s task.  Before such a call was made, thorough assessments should be conducted, by whomever the decision maker may be.

Questioned on whether there had been a misreading of the security situation on the ground in Iraq, he said that “the ship had to be tightened dramatically”, and he did not believe that any “first-time” staff members should go into a situation like Iraq.

A correspondent asked if, at the time of the bombing, there had been a sense of naivety on the part of the United Nations, and if it had believed it would be more accepted than the United States because it was a multinational force.  He replied that the situation in Iraq had proved to be more difficult than anyone had thought.  It was a wake-up call and demonstrated that security arrangements had to be examined before decisions were made.

Addressing a question about the motives of the bombers, he said that a section on motives had been included in the report, but it had been removed because there were no solid facts.  The image of the United Nations in Iraq had been tarnished as a result of sanctions, the “oil-for-food” programme and arms inspections, so there were many possible motives, he remarked.  It would have been sheer speculation to include such a section in the report.

Asked if the Panel had examined the relationship between the United States and the United Nations in Iraq, he said that the whole situation was unique in that sense, since the host government, which was traditionally responsible for the security of the United Nations presence, was not there to do so.  Furthermore, the United Nations mission in Iraq did not have a traditional understanding with the Coalition.

After the incident, there had been a report that the United States had offered protection, but the United Nations had declined.  Was there any truth in this? a correspondent asked.  Mr. Ahtisaari replied that some answers to this question could be found in the report.

Responding to a question about the potential for “copycat attacks”, he said there had been earlier cases of attacks against the United Nations.  This sort of attack could happen elsewhere; therefore, security had to be sharpened and made more robust in the future.

Asked if security had been improved in other at-risk missions since the bombing in Iraq, he responded that the Panel had been privy to an evaluation that had been undertaken by outside police officers very soon after the bombing.  It was not the Panel’s mandate to examine this question, however, and the question should be put to United Nations management.

In terms of accountability, was there some system that the United Nations could introduce to help focus on the people who were taking security decisions? a correspondent asked.  Mr. Ahtisaari replied that he expected the United Nations management to deal with this.

Asked if any of the mistakes came about because the United Nations felt pressure to appear more open to the Iraqis, he said that, traditionally, the United Nations did not want to create a “bunker” mentality, and it wanted to mix with the people it was helping.  This was a huge problem, and in the future United Nations staff would have to compromise and accept stricter security measures.

Asked if the security failings had been self-evident to those on the ground, he replied that there were always individuals that had felt uneasy about the situation, and who had a critical opinion.

Responding to a question regarding feedback from the Secretary-General, he said there had been none so far.  The report had been handed to the Secretary-General for his consideration on Monday afternoon.

A correspondent asked if it had been Mr. Ahtisaari’s decision to make this report public.  He said that he had understood from the beginning that this report would be made public in its entirety.

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