In progress at UNHQ

PRESS CONFERENCE BY UK SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

13/11/2001
Press Briefing


PRESS CONFERENCE BY UK SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS


The liberation of Kabul would not have taken place without military action by the coalition of States and the determination of world leaders like President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw told journalists at a Headquarters press conference this afternoon,


Touching reports were being received from Kabul that testified to small, but profoundly important changes in daily life, he said.  He gave the example of children now able to fly kites; and of music being played in the city.  “Those things,” Mr. Straw added, “were not as important as the fact that -- as one resident was heard to say in broken English –- 'just you want freedom'".


However, he was under no illusions, he continued.  There was a long road to travel, with many difficulties and uncertainties on the way.  For that reason, both the Security Council and individual Member States were seriously considering what action must be taken to ensure that civil administration was in place in a country where no effective public institutions had existed for many years. Humanitarian aid was also urgently required.  Discussions were taking place, initially outside of Afghanistan, on what kind of new political coalition could provide the foundations for a broad-based government.  The international community and the Security Council possessed a real determination to press ahead, and he particularly welcomed the decision by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to send his Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell, to Kabul as soon as the necessary security arrangements could be made. 


Asked to comment on the fact that the Northern Alliance had gone into Kabul in apparent defiance of what the United States and the United Kingdom had asked them to do, Mr. Straw said that there had been concern about the possibility of “bloody fighting” for Kabul.  Discussions had been held with the Northern Alliance.  “We did not want to see Kabul being fought for street-by-street, because that would have led to huge numbers of civilian casualties and very great political instability,” he said. 


The Northern Alliance had made it clear that they were not interested in that kind of bloody street fighting, he said.


Asked if Francesc Vendrell would become some kind of a “political czar” once he arrived in Kabul, Mr. Straw replied that he would not use that phrase, which was particularly inappropriate in the context of Afghanistan.  Mr. Vendrell was going to Afghanistan on behalf of the Secretary-General.  He was going to provide an independent picture of what the circumstances in Kabul were, and Mr. Straw would like to see more United Nations observers going.


Asked if there had been any progress in the creation of a multinational force in Afghanistan, he said that there were some international coalition forces already providing assistance in Afghanistan.  The very rapid military progress made by the Northern Alliance could not have been achieved without that assistance.  There was an immediate need for security, and that was likely to be provided by the existing members of the military coalition.  It was necessary to


provide security  -- in a general sense -- in the liberated areas, and discussions were under way about what had been described as “a coalition of the willing”.  Speaking in the Security Council this morning, Mr. Brahimi had expressed doubt about the speed with which a formal United Nations peacekeeping force could be put together. 


Asked if the United Kingdom and the United States would provide security during the initial phase, Mr. Straw said that they would provide “some security in some areas, initially”.  The arrangements for that were still being developed.


On the role of the Northern Alliance in the security arrangements, and the willingness of coalition forces to go into the cities, Mr. Straw said that he did not want to discuss the nature of security arrangements until they were put into place.  However, at the moment, security within Kabul depended on those who had military power there.  Reiterating that the Northern Alliance could not have achieved its success without air forces and other support from the coalition, he added that there would be further discussions on the question of security.  The Northern Alliance had made it absolutely clear that it wished to see United Nations representatives in Kabul.


Asked whether he had discussed Iraq and smart sanctions with the Foreign Minister of Russia, Mr. Straw replied that he had discussed a revision to the draft resolution put before the Council in June.  That text had failed, “effectively, because of the Russian veto”.  Expressing dislike for the phrase “smart sanctions”, he said that what the United Kingdom was seeking was a revision of the sanctions regime, which would ensure that goods and services for the relief of the suffering of the Iraqi people could be imported into the country with greater ease.  At the same time, a tougher regime was envisioned for the collection of materials for the development of weapons of mass destruction and certain conventional weapons.  A number of revisions had been proposed for the draft presented in June, and discussions had taken place with Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov.  However, “we are not yet in a position where there is agreement between the five permanent members {of the Security Council],” he said.


In response to a question about the danger of the country “being split into two”, he said that, in a sense, there had been a greater danger of that prior to the taking of Kabul.  The liberation of Kabul -– the largest city in the country

-- had a huge historical and symbolic significance in Afghanistan, making the splitting of the country much less likely.  This rapid change in the situation would not have taken place without the defection of large numbers of people who had been tied to the Taliban, but could not be described as Taliban fanatics.  


In order to survive, many Pashtun people had been obliged to express support for the Taliban, he explained.  Glad to be liberated, they could now enjoy greater freedom.  In a new broad-based government, there was no space for people from the Taliban, but there was certainly space for representatives of the Pashtun community.


Replying to a question about the possible whereabouts of Mr. bin Laden and his associates, Mr. Straw said that it was “more probable than not” that they were in the key Taliban area around Kandahar.  “We remain absolutely determined to



break up the Al Qaeda network completely,” he said, also recalling President Bush’s phrase that either bin Laden would be brought to justice, or justice would be brought to bin Laden.


Asked if he expected supplies to be cut to the Kandahar region, Mr. Straw replied that over the last six weeks, he had been patiently trying to explain to people that the only certain thing about military action was that it produced unexpected twists and turns.  He was not going to speculate about details.  There was also no need to speculate about the coalition’s determination to follow through the key objectives of the military action.  Those included bringing to justice Mr. bin Laden and his associates, breaking up the Al Qaeda terrorist network and removing the Taliban. 


To a question about a proposed “all-Afghan force”, he said that Mr. Brahimi had mentioned three options for ensuring security in the country -- an all-Afghan force, a multilateral force and a formal United Nations peacekeeping force.  It was obviously desirable that, in due course, the security of an independent Afghan nation was ensured by its own security forces, which would guard its borders, keep the peace internally and follow the requirements of international law.  It would take some time to create that force, however.  In the meanwhile, security would be dependent on forces similar to those of the Northern Alliance, alongside forces from the international community.  For now, it would be the “coalition of the willing”, who could provide external support for Afghanistan.


Asked to present his views on the new administration in Afghanistan,

Mr. Straw said that he strongly supported Mr. Annan, who had pointed out the need to put an end to interference by other countries in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.  But along with an end to such interference, he also saw the beginning of sustained cooperative support from outside for the people of Afghanistan. 


Regarding the Afghan diaspora, he said there were large numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Iran and Western Europe.  Many of those people would like to return to their country, and it was necessary to provide them with assistance.  As Home Secretary of the United Kingdom, he had been in charge in similar efforts for Kosovo refugees. 


Referring to the reference to street fighting in Kabul, a correspondent asked why it was a concern when the Taliban had withdrawn from the city prior to the arrival of the Northern Alliance.  Mr. Straw said that information on the withdrawal had not been available prior to the Northern Alliance’s arrival.


In response to the suggestion that the international community had moved too slowly on Afghanistan, Mr. Straw replied that he did not think so.  The criticism would have been justified, had there been no discussion and no Security Council resolutions about the future of Afghanistan; no appointment of Ambassador Brahimi; no appointment of senior Foreign Office official Robert Cooper to develop the United Kingdom’s position; and no similar efforts by the United States.  From the start, it had been recognized that military action was only part of a long-term strategy to defeat international terrorism and secure a better future for the people of Afghanistan.  The coalition had planned ahead as far as it could, but, as was always the case, plans needed to be flexible to meet the uncertainties of the developments on the ground. 


For information media. Not an official record.