PRESS CONFERENCE BY INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The events of 11 September called attention to the fact that nuclear terrorism was both possible and a serious threat, Gustavo Zlauvinen, the representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations told correspondents at a Headquarters press conference today.

There were no limits to terrorists’ willingness to deliver destruction and death, he continued.  Member States and the IAEA needed to work together to implement better nuclear safety and security measures.  The IAEA, which for

45 years had been working with States to make sure nuclear programmes were used for peaceful purposes, was reviewing all of its programmes to see how it could better prevent, intercept and react to acts of nuclear terrorism, he said.

There were several scenarios in which nuclear materials or radioactive sources could be used as implements of terror, he said.  The most devastating, but least likely, scenario would be the use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists.  It would be unlikely because it would require advanced industrial facilities and scientific knowledge to produce such a weapon.  Unlikely as it was, he could not rule out such a possibility.

A more likely form would be an attack on a nuclear facility, he continued.  Built with reinforced steel and concrete structures, nuclear facilities were among the most robust industrial buildings.  They had been designed to withstand hurricanes, earthquakes, and the accidental crash of small aircraft.  Although there had not yet been a technical evaluation of what would happen if a large jet laden with fuel were to hit such a facility, it could not automatically be assumed that such an incident would result in a release of radioactive materials into the environment.

The third scenario, he said, was the use of a so-called “dirty bomb” -- a bomb made of a combination of conventional explosives and radioactive sources.  Such radioactive sources, used frequently in medicine and industry, were totally different from nuclear materials, which were enriched uranium and enriched plutonium.  If a “dirty bomb” were to be detonated, there would be a release of radioactive matter, but that would most probably not result in a large number of deaths.  Such a bomb would have a tremendous psychological impact and would have serious economic repercussions stemming from clean-up activity, he said.

The IAEA was trying to help governments improve safety and security measures to cope with those awful scenarios, he said.  Plans were being considered to provide special training and equipment to customs officials, to help them identify cases of trafficking in radiological materials.  The agency was re-evaluating all its work programmes to take the new threats into account.  Those additional efforts would require funding of an additional $30 million to $50 million.

Tomorrow in Vienna, the IAEA would be hosting the first special session on nuclear terrorism, he said.  More than 400 experts would be getting together in a symposium to discuss the technical and legal aspects of nuclear terrorism.  He hoped the session would be helpful to States wishing to plan future actions to cope with the new threat.

A correspondent asked how the “schizophrenic” role of the IAEA -- working for nuclear non-proliferation, on the one hand, and promoting nuclear power on the other -- affected their efforts in protecting nuclear facilities from terrorist attack.  Mr. Zlauvinen said that nuclear facilities were not the only sort of facilities vulnerable to terrorism.  Any technology could be used for terrorism.  If Member States, the United Nations and the IAEA could work together to improve safety for nuclear facilities, it could be proven to the public that nuclear energy could be clean, safe and have great benefit for humankind.

A correspondent asked what the expected outcome of the special session on nuclear terrorism was and if the experts would be making recommendations.

Mr. Zlauvinen said that the session would be useful for developing a common understanding of the threat being faced and to prompt thinking about practical steps.  It was too early to be making recommendations, because tomorrow’s meeting would be the first of its kind.  In the next couple of months, the IAEA would be putting together a list of recommendations to be presented to its own Board of Directors next March.

When asked about the rumoured acquisition of nuclear materials by non-State actors in Pakistan, Mr. Zlauvinen told correspondents that it would not be appropriate to comment on such a matter.  He did, however, explain that Pakistan was not a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and had not signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  The Agency, he went on, did not inspect military nuclear facilities anywhere in the world.

What would the main message of the special session be? a correspondent asked.  The main message, Mr. Zlauvinen said, was that after 11 September the international community had to be aware that a possible nuclear terrorist attack could be planned, and attention must be paid to that threat.  He called upon Member States to help the IAEA help them in implementing better safety and security measures in nuclear facilities.

Asked to describe the magnitude of the problem with radioactive sources that could fall into the hands of terrorists, Mr. Zlauvinen said that there were, for example, tens of thousands of such sources in the former Soviet Union.  Worldwide, there were thousands more “orphaned sources” -- radioactive sources whose whereabouts were unknown to governments —- that could fall into the wrong hands.  The IAEA was assisting States in locating those sources.

A correspondent wanted to know how feasible it would be for terrorists to make a “dirty bomb”, and what sort of expertise was needed.  Mr. Zlauvinen said that was the most likely scenario for nuclear terrorism, because those sources would be the easiest for terrorists to acquire.  Civilian uses of radiation, such as in radiology laboratories, took place in a much more relaxed security environment, not in secure facilities or under guard.  Terrorists had shown that they were ready to commit suicide and might decide to gather such materials without regard to their own safety.  Aside from knowing where to get the radioactive matter, not much expertise would be needed to use such a device.

A correspondent wanted to know if the IAEA’s call for increased funding to combat threats to nuclear facilities implied that the threats that had existed before 11 September had not been given much attention.  Mr. Zlauvinen said that,

while the IAEA had paid attention to the possibility of sabotage before

11 September, its main activities had focused on non-proliferation and preventing States from diverting nuclear materials from civilian to military use.  The Agency had been constrained by a zero-growth budget for 10 years.

A correspondent asked for clarification of the volume of “orphan sources” that existed and whether there was any evidence of terrorists attempting to acquire or traffic nuclear materials.  Mr. Zlauvinen said that the number of “orphan sources” was unknown, because governments had lost track of those sources and could not, therefore, know how many there were.  In the majority of known cases of acquisition of nuclear materials by non-State actors, the identities of the buyers were known either only to the relevant law enforcement agencies, or not at all.  In some cases law enforcement agencies had cooperated with the IAEA, and in others they had not.  For that reason, he could only answer that he simply did not know whether terrorists had acquired, or been interested in acquiring, nuclear materials.

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