RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UNITED STATES CALLED ON TO STRENGTHEN ABM TREATY UNDER DRAFT RESOLUTION APPROVED BY FIRST COMMITTEE
Press Release GA/DIS/3216 |
Fifty-sixth General Assembly
First Committee
21st Meeting (PM)
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UNITED STATES CALLED ON TO STRENGTHEN ABM TREATY
UNDER DRAFT RESOLUTION APPROVED BY FIRST COMMITTEE
Also Approves Texts on Space Arms Race, Nuclear-Free Africa,
Middle East, Nuclear-Free Southern Hemisphere; Regional Centres
The States parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) –- the Russian Federation and the United States -- are called upon to exert renewed efforts to preserve and strengthen the Treaty through full and strict compliance, under the terms of a draft resolution approved today in the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security).
The draft text, one of six recommended by the Committee for adoption by the General Assembly, was approved by a recorded vote of 80 in favour to 3 against (Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States), with 63 abstentions. (For details of the vote see Annex I).
Other texts were approved on: prevention of an arms race in outer space; risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere; the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; and the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament.
The revised text on the ABM Treaty, submitted to the Committee on 31 October by the Russian Federation, would also have the Assembly welcome the ongoing dialogue between the Russian Federation and the United States on a new strategic framework premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, which was of paramount importance, especially in a changing security environment.
Speaking in explanation before the vote, the United States representative said that many had asked him whether the additions to the draft had changed his attitude towards it. His answer was still "no". The issues surrounding the ABM Treaty remained a matter for the Treaty parties. Upon introducing the revised text, the Russian representative, himself, had said that the new language had done nothing to change the basic thrust of the resolution.
Under terms of another text, the Assembly, recognizing that prevention of an outer space arms race would avert a grave danger for international peace and security, would call upon all States, in particular those with major space
capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race there. The draft resolution was approved by a recorded vote of 145 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States)(Annex VII).
Under the text on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere, the Assembly, convinced of the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free, would call on all States to support the nuclear disarmament process and work for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.
That draft resolution was approved by a recorded vote of 141 in favour to
4 against (France, Monaco, United Kingdom, United States), with 5 abstentions (India, Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, Russian Federation, Spain)
(Annex IV).
Prior to action on the draft as a whole, two separate votes were taken. In the first, the Committee voted to retain the words "and South Asia" in operative paragraph 3 by 132 in favour to 3 against (France, India, Pakistan), with
8 abstentions (Bhutan, Cuba, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, United Kingdom)(Annex II).
Operative paragraph 3, by which the Assembly would welcome the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and call upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of such zones in the Middle East and South Asia, was approved by a vote of 136 in favour to 2 against (France, India), with
8 abstentions (Bhutan, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, United Kingdom, United States)(Annex III).
A draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", was approved by a recorded vote of 139 in favour, to 3 against (Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States), with 7 abstentions (Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Rwanda, Marshall Islands)(Annex VI).
Among its terms, Israel would be called on to enounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
Prior to approval of the draft as a whole, the Committee took a separate vote on the sixth preambular paragraph, which presses for all remaining States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to accede to it and accept IAEA safeguards. That provision was approved by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to 2 against (India, Israel), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, Cuba, Marshall islands, Pakistan, Rwanda, Ethiopia)(Annex V).
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Acting without a vote, the Committee also approved texts by which the Assembly would:
-- Call upon all African States that had not yet done so to sign the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) as soon as possible, so that it may enter into force without delay; and
-- Reiterate the importance of United Nations activities at the regional level
to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament.
Also today, the representative of Japan introduced a revised draft resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which would have the Assembly stress the central importance of several "practical steps" for "systematic and progressive" efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
The Mexican delegation, citing insufficient support for the convening of a United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament, withdrew the first-ever draft resolution on the subject, and submitted, instead, a draft decision seeking only for the item to be included in the provisional agenda of the Assembly's next session.
Statements were made by the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Tajikistan, Pakistan, France, India, Iran, Chile, Philippines, Germany, Ukraine, Sweden, Nepal, Algeria, Spain, Cuba, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Canada, Belgium, on behalf of the European Union, South Africa and Côte d'Ivoire.
The Secretariat announced that Lebanon had joined as a co-sponsor to the draft on a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Monday, 5 November, to continue taking action on all security- and disarmament-related draft resolutions and decisions.
Background
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its third phase of work, namely decisions on all security- and disarmament-related items.
Action was expected today on texts concerning the following issues: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas; the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; and the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament.
Also expected today was the introduction by Japan of a revised draft resolution on the path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
By the terms of a text sponsored the Sudan on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (document A/C.1/56/L.9/Rev.1), the Assembly would call upon all African States that had not yet done so to sign the Treaty, as soon as possible, so that it may enter into force without delay. The Assembly would call upon States contemplated in Protocol III of the Treaty to take all necessary measures to ensure its speedy application to territories for which they were internationally responsible and which lay within the geographical zone established in the Treaty.
It would call upon the African States parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to the Treaty, and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997.
According to a draft decision sponsored by New Zealand on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (document A/C.1/56/ L.10/Rev.1), the Assembly, noting the forthcoming Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT to be held in New York from 11 to 13 November, decide to include the item in the provisional agenda of its next session.
According to a text on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/56/L.24), the Assembly, convinced of the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free, and with particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, would call upon all States to support the process of nuclear disarmament and work for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.
It would welcome the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and call upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of such zones in the Middle East and South Asia.
In a related provision, the Assembly would call upon the States parties and signatories to the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, in order to pursue the common goals those envisaged and promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and their treaty agencies.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CÔte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.
According to a draft resolution sponsored by Egypt on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/56/L.25) the Assembly would call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) without delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Israel would also be called upon to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security.
The Assembly would reaffirm the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. It would request the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its next session on the implementation of the present resolution.
A draft resolution on prevention of an arms race in outer space (document A/C.1/56/L.7), recognizing that prevention of an outer space arms race would avert a grave danger for international peace and security, would have the Assembly call upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race, there, and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation.
By a further term of the text, the Assembly would urge States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of the progress of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the matter, if any, so as to facilitate its work.
At the same time, it would reaffirm the importance and urgency of preventing such an arms race and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
It would also reaffirm its recognition that the legal regime applicable to outer space, by itself, does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and that it is important to comply strictly with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. In that connection, the Assembly would emphasize the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an outer space arms race.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Algeria, Chile, China, CÔte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Fiji, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka and the Sudan.
A draft text on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (document A/C.1/56/L.47) would have the Assembly decide to convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the date and venue to be decided at its fifty-eighth session.
The Assembly would also decide to convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis, commencing in 2003, to consider national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action. It would call upon all States to implement it and encourage the United Nations and other appropriate international and regional organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Action Programme.
In a related term, it would encourage States to take appropriate national measures to destroy surplus, confiscated or collected small arms and light weapons, subject to any legal restraint associated with the preparation of criminal prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use had been official authorized and provided that such weapons had been duly marked and registers, and to submit, on a voluntary basis, information to the Secretary-General on types and quantities destroyed, as well as the methods of their destruction or disposition.
The Assembly would decide to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in those weapons at its next session, and it would request the Secretary-General to undertake a United Nations study, commencing at the current session, to examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons and to submit the study to the fifty-eighth session.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
A draft resolution sponsored by South Africa, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, on the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament (document A/C.1/56/L.18) would have the Assembly reiterate the importance of United Nations activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three Regional Centres.
The Assembly would reaffirm that it was useful for the three Centres to carry out dissemination and educational programmes that promoted regional peace and security aimed at changing basic attitudes with respect to peace and security and disarmament. It would appeal to Member States, as well as to international and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to voluntarily contribute to the Centres in their respective regions.
According to a draft resolution sponsored by Belarus, CÔte d’Ivoire, China, Fiji, Haiti and the Russian Federation on the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) (document A/C.1/56/L.1 Rev.1), the General Assembly would call for continued efforts to strengthen the Treaty and preserve its integrity and validity, so that it remains a cornerstone in maintaining global strategic stability and promoting further strategic nuclear arms reductions. It would also call for renewed efforts by each of the States parties to preserve and strengthen the Treaty through full and strict compliance.
Further, the Assembly would call upon parties to the Treaty, in accordance with their Treaty obligations, to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, refrain from the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for the defence of the territory of their country, not provide a base for such defence and not to transfer to other States or deploy outside their national territory anti-ballistic missile systems or their components limited by the Treaty.
By further terms of the text, the Assembly would urge all Member States to support efforts aimed at stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It would support further efforts by the international community, in light of emerging developments, towards safeguarding the inviolability and integrity of the Treaty, which is in the strongest interest of the international community.
A revised draft resolution introduced by Japan entitled, "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (document A/C.1/56/ L.35/Rev.1), would have the Assembly stress the central importance of several "practical steps" for "systematic and progressive" efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Those include further deep reductions by Russia and the United States in their strategic offensive arsenals and steps by all nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament, the early entry into force of the CTBT, and an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish their total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.
Among its other provisions, the text would have the Assembly call upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, among others, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.
According to a resolution sponsored by Mexico convening a United Nations conference to eliminate nuclear dangers (document A/C.1/56.L.16), the Assembly, expressing its concern at the threat to humanity represented by the existence of nuclear weapons, would decide to convene a United nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament not later than 2006 in New York as a follow-up of the resolve expressed by Member States in the Millennium Declaration.
It would further decide to establish a preparatory committee open to participation by all States, which will hold no fewer than three sessions, the first session to be held in New York not later than July 2003, the dates of which will be decided at its fifty-seventh session.
The Assembly would request the Committee to recommend the dates for the holding of the conference at its fifty-eighth session and to make recommendations to the conference on all relevant matters, including a draft agenda, draft rules of procedure and draft final documents and to decide on background documents to be made available in advance.
By the terms of a draft decision sponsored by Mexico on convening a United Nations conference to eliminate nuclear dangers (document A/C.1/56.L.60) the Assembly would include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session an item entitled “United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament.”
Introduction of Texts
GUSTAVO ALBIN (Mexico) spoke about the draft resolution on a United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/56/L.16). He wanted to ensure that the follow-up to the Millennium Declaration was given sufficient attention. Mexico had conducted extensive, difficult consultations concerning the draft resolution on eliminating nuclear dangers. There were doubts about the resolution, perhaps because time had not been sufficient to persuade delegations of the need to convene a conference. There had not been enough time to inncrease support for the initiative. For that reason, he would not insist that the General Assembly take action on the resolution at this session.
His Government saw the need to make progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and had, therefore, introduced a draft decision on the same topic, a United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/56/L.60). He was sure the First Committee would take a favourable view of this decision, which asks only for the item to be included on the agenda of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly.
The Committee CHAIRMAN read out a change in language for operative
paragraph 9 of the text submitted by Japan on a path to the elimination of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/56/L.35/Rev.1). At the end of line 2, the words "including their means of delivery" would be deleted, so that the paragraph now read:
"Calls upon States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons;"
SEIICHIRO NOBORU (Japan) introduced the revision to the text, which had been based on suggestions and some concerns received. His delegation had conducted intensive consultations and believed that the revisions had accommodated most of those comments and concerns. He would point out the four salient changes, together with their rationales:
With regard to the IAEA safeguards, he said, some delegations had preferred a more balanced presentation of the agreements and their additional protocols. In the ninth preambular paragraph he had, therefore, introduced a phrase, so that the new paragraph now read as follows:
"Also welcoming the successful convening of the International Symposium for Further Reinforcement of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Towards Universalization of Additional Protocol, recently held in Tokyo, and sharing the hope for continued efforts to hold similar symposiums in other regions for strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, including the universalization of its safeguards agreements, and their additional protocols,"
He said he had combined operative paragraphs 11 and 12 to make a new paragraph 11, which now read:
"Welcomes the adoption and stresses the importance of resolution GC(45)/RES/13 adopted at the IAEA General Conference, which recommends that the Director-General of the IAEA, its Board of Governors and member States continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted on 22 September 2000 at the General Conference of the IAEA, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of the safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;"
With regard to operative paragraph 3, he said, some delegations had expressed concern that the significance of the unequivocal undertaking for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons had been weakened somehow, and the original text had undermined the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That had not been his intention, so he had changed the language in operative
paragraph 3 (e), so that it now read:
"An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed in the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the NPT are committed under article VI of the Treaty;"
He said that revision had reaffirmed Japan's firm belief that all States parties to the NPT had already decided upon an unequivocal undertaking in the 2000 NPT Review. He had also believed it necessary to keep stressing the importance of that undertaking. Last year's resolution, which had only welcomed the unequivocal undertaking in the preamble, had not been strong enough. In the present text, it was placed in the operative part to stress its central importance. With respect to the relationship between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, his text used the same formulation as the Final Document of that Review Conference. The draft, therefore, had not, in any way, undermined the achievements made at the Review Conference, but had significantly strengthened them.
He said that he had decided to use a stronger language with respect to the language on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), namely from the NPT Final Document. It was of paramount importance to firmly preserve the language agreed to one year ago, despite the difficult circumstances surrounding the CTBT's entry into force.
A new operative paragraph 3 (a) now read:
"The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accord with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty;"
He noted that, in operative paragraph 9, the phrase "the means of delivery", had been deleted, as the Chairman had just mentioned. He had deleted that particular phrase because the concept of means of delivery was already included in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to specify that might prejudge ongoing negotiations on missile proliferation.
Action on Texts
The representative of Syria, speaking before the vote on the draft on the ABM Treaty (document A/C.1/56/L.1/Rev.1), said that the Treaty had promoted global strategic balance and was an integral part of the bilateral and multilateral system of disarmament treaties and agreements. He called for full and strict compliance with its provisions, adding that the language used in the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5 had not served the main thrust of the draft and diverted it from its main objective. In fact, the language used in those two paragraphs would encourage violation of the objectives of the ABM Treaty and, therefore, ran counter to the draft’s purpose.
He said he had wished to enter his strong reservation regarding the provisions of those two paragraphs. But, despite that, his delegation, in the interest of global strategic balance and stability and the importance of compliance with international treaties, would vote in favour of the draft.
[The seventh preambular paragraph recalls the widespread concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Operative paragraph 5 urges all Member States to support efforts aimed at stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.]
The representative of the United States said that his position on the draft and its predecessors had been consistent. Recently, however, the principal
co-sponsor had introduced a revised text. He had been asked whether that had changed his attitude towards the resolution. The answer was "no". The United States firmly believed that the issues surrounding the ABM Treaty remained a matter for the Treaty parties. Discussions had intensified in recent months between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic framework, including a revised approach to the ABM Treaty.
He said that, under those circumstances, it was even more appropriate that the body not take up the subject. When the Russian Federation representative introduced the revised text he, himself, had said that the new language had done nothing to change the basic thrust of the resolution. Thus, the United States would vote no on L.1/Rev.1, and urged others to do the same.
The representative of Tajikistan said that he could not take part in the vote, under the relevant provision of the United Nations Charter, but if he had had the right to vote, he would vote in favour of the draft. The ABM Treaty was the basis for strategic stability and had continued to effectively play its role as one cornerstone of the entire international legal system in disarmament and non-proliferation. Despite the Treaty's restricted number of participants, it had involved every nation, small and large, and compliance with it should not be treated as something only in the purview of the parties to the Treaty.
The representative of Pakistan said that the international community should evolve a consensus on the relationship between offensive and defensive missile systems, so as to preserve and sustain strategic stability at both the global and regional levels. The ABM Treaty was widely regarded as a pillar of strategic stability and any change in it, if at all required, should be part of a cooperative approach among all concerned States. An abrogation of the Treaty could well result in a strategic arms race between the major Powers. He supported the draft's broad thrust and would vote in its favour.
He said he was concerned, however, that the draft had not addressed the important issue of regional stability. He urged the principal sponsors of the draft to exercise self-restraint in supplying ABM systems to his eastern neighbour, as that could be a factor in destabilizing the situation of mutual deterrence that currently existed in South Asia.
The representative of France said that the world had changed and the conditions, in terms of international balance, should be redefined. That redefinition was under way and he was pleased to note discussions going on at the highest levels on that item between the United States and Russia. The text, almost identical to that of preceding years, had not reflected the changes or offered any indication of the key to the new international system, so he had decided, this year, to abstain in the vote.
Nevertheless, he said he hoped that the international legal system was not moved aside for a non-binding one, which could give rise to new competition. Strategic international balances following the cold war should be safeguarded and deliberations should be intensified -- in which his country would take part.
The representative of India said that, like last year, he would vote in favour of the draft, as he had wished to reaffirm the importance of full implementation, in good faith, of all existing bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties, including the ABM Treaty. As he awaited the outcome of efforts under way towards commonly agreed approaches germane to the Treaty, the points stressed in the text had remained valid.
The representative of Iran said that the ABM Treaty was a cornerstone of strategic stability and all efforts should be made to preserve it. It was beyond the arrangement of two countries to decide the fate of such an essential foundation. Any change would affect the international security environment, destabilize the whole strategic balance, and stimulate a new arms race, particularly in the nuclear area. The adoption of such a resolution was totally relevant to the General Assembly's objectives, and he highly supported it.
The CHAIRMAN announced the addition of Côte d'Ivoire as a co-sponsor to the draft.
The Committee then approved the draft resolution on the ABM Treaty (document A/C.1/56/L.1/Rev.1) by a recorded vote of 80 in favour to 3 against (Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States), with 63 abstentions. (For details of the vote, see Annex I).
Speaking after the vote, the representative of Chile said that the Treaty was important for the purpose of reducing strategic nuclear weapons and had played an important role in strategic peace and security. He was concerned at the danger involved in the development of installations of anti-ballistic missile and military systems, which could be used in outer space, and which, among other things, would help to erode a world climate favourable to international disarmament and security. He had abstained in the vote on the ABM Treaty text, however, in the hope that the Treaty parties could eventually reach an agreement on that very important topic.
The representative of the Philippines said she wished to put her vote of abstention in perspective. She shared the view that the ABM Treaty played a vital role in maintaining global security, in general, and restraining missile proliferation, in particular, but dialogue on the issue should be kept open, primary among the Treaty parties. She noted the recent bilateral talks and awaited with keen interest the result of the Russian President's visit to the United States to discuss that in full. She also welcomed the spirit of dialogue and mutual understanding present in those talks.
She said she continued to support the ABM Treaty and shared the international community's anticipation that an agreement on its status could be reached between the parties, mindful that those would continue to dialogue and arrive at a mutually acceptable arrangement that would redound to the global cause for peace and security.
The representative of Germany spoke on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. He said those countries had abstained in the vote, because the Committee’s consideration of the ABM Treaty should have the support of both Treaty parties. Since that had not been the case, they had decided to abstain.
He said they recognized the key importance of the Treaty in contributing to strategic stability over the past decades. The Russian Federation and the United States had been engaged in intensive consultations on a new strategic framework, with a view to strengthening strategic stability and continuing reductions in offensive arsenals of both sides. They were looking forward to the forthcoming summit between those Presidents in the United States and supported that continuing dialogue, which they hoped would lead to an agreement that would serve as a basis for further reductions and strategic stability. Meanwhile, the NPT remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
The representative of Ukraine said he abstained in the vote. His country had consistently advocated ensuring an effective system of international security and had recognized the key role over the past decades of that Treaty in a system of international legal instruments in the area of nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Hopefully, the intensive "US-Russian dialogue" would prove effective towards producing agreements in support of strategic stability worldwide.
The representative of Sweden said he had also abstained in the vote. He was satisfied with the ongoing consultations on a new strategic framework, which had been reflected in new operative paragraph 7 of the text, and he welcomed the indication that both sides were prepared to make deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals. A decision on such reductions should take the shape of formalized agreements that were verifiable, transparent and irreversible. The way in which the ABM Treaty was dealt with in the Assembly should have the support of both Treaty parties, and he underlined the need for consensus on that resolution.
Regrettably, however, despite recent positive developments, there was still disagreement in the Committee about how to address that issue, he said. He was concerned about unilateral actions related to the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, but he had not shared the draft's overriding preoccupation with strategic stability. That concern had been closely linked with cold war doctrines, which, while those formed an important part of traditional arms control negotiations, should not be the sole basis for disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in the post-cold war era. That should, to a greater extent, be based on agreements, such as the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
The representative of Nepal said that the reasons he had voted in favour of the draft for the past two years were still valid. Undermining the ABM Treaty would have negative consequences on global strategic stability. He, therefore, supported the draft's objectives.
The representative of Haiti said that he wished to remind the Committee that his delegation was a sponsor of that draft resolution.
The First Committee took up the draft text on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone (document A/C.1/56/L.9/Rev.1).
The representative of Algeria said that, in the future, the text should contain a reference to an important event and its consequent results. He was referring to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the importance of which nobody doubted. He hoped the draft would include paragraphs quoting the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which were closely linked to the treaties and protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones. Achieving the aims of this resolution would not be easy. The resolution should not impose the surrender of language agreed to at the NPT Review Conference.
The representative of Egypt said the Treaty of Pelindaba reflected the culmination of efforts of African leaders to declare Africa a denuclearized zone. He recognized the importance of the Cairo Declaration in building peace in the region. A nuclear-weapon-freem zone in the Middle East would ensure stability in both the region itself, and help to enhance stability in all of Africa.
The Committee then adopted the resolution on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (document A/C.1/56/L.9/Rev.1) without a vote.
The representative of Spain, speaking after the vote, said that Spain had stated its support for the Pelindaba Treaty many times. Nuclear-weapon-free zones created by freely arrived at arrangements were important contributions to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and achieving nuclear disarmament. She still had serious concerns about operative paragraph 3 of the resolution and hoped that the records would show she disassociated herself from the consensus on that paragraph.
It was not appropriate for Spain to sign on to the Third Protocol of the Treaty of Pelindaba, because it would create a redundant control regime over a part of Spanish territory. Spanish territory was already regulated by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) nuclear agreements. That was the reason those parts of Spanish territory could not be put under the regulations of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. All Spanish territory was denuclearized since an agreement with the United States in 1976. In October 1981, in a referendum on Spain’s membership in NATO, a provision preventing the prohibition of the introduction of nuclear weapons into Spanish territory had been approved.
All Spanish territory was subject to double controls -- from the IAEA and from the European nuclear regulatory regime. Spain had ratified the CTBT, was party to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials and applied the recommendations on nuclear matters of the IAEA. When an agreement between the European States without nuclear weapons was completed, the regime Spain was under would exceed those of the Pelindaba Treaty’s Third Protocol. The inclusion of language that had not been agreed to in paragraph 3 obliged her to remove herself from the consensus.
The CHAIRMAN then announced that action to be a taken on document A/C.1/56/L.10 was being postponed.
The First Committee turned to the draft text on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/56/L.24).
The representative of Pakistan said he supported the creation of all nuclear-weapon-free zones and those that existed in regions throughout the world. In operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, there was a call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Pakistan had tried to do that, but its neighbour had detonated a nuclear weapon, obliging Pakistan to follow suit. He asked that “in South Asia” be removed from the text, because it flew in the face of reality. He would, however, vote in favour of the resolution.
The Committee first took a separate vote on the words “in South Asia” in operative paragraph 3. The words were retained by a vote of 132 in favour to 3 against (France, India, Pakistan) with 8 abstentions (Bhutan, Cuba, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Myanmar, United Kingdom and Federated States of Micronesia) (Annex II).
The Committee then voted on operative paragraph 3, and approved it by 136 in favour to 2 against (France, India) with 8 abstentions (Bhutan, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, United Kingdom and the United States) (Annex III).
The Committee then approved the draft resolution on the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/56/L.24) as a whole by
141 in favour to 4 against (France, United Kingdom, United States and Monaco) with 5 abstentions (India, Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, Russian Federation, Spain) (Annex IV).
Speaking after the vote, the representative of Spain said he fully supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the past, Spain had supported the content of the resolution, but at this stage, because of language in operative paragraph 6, Spain abstained. In that operative paragraph there was a new, qualitatively different idea -- the concept of an international conference. For that reason, Spain could not support that part of the text.
The representative of India took the floor next to explain his vote on operative paragraph 3. The proposal, he said, ran counter to the principles of nuclear-weapon-free zones; namely, that the zones must be created through agreements freely arrived at. Current realities meant a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was as realistic as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in East Asia, Europe or North Africa. He had voted against both the operative paragraph itself and the retention of the words “and South Asia” and had abstained from voting on the resolution as a whole.
The representative of France, speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States, said that the resolution would lay the groundwork for nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern hemisphere. The only area left uncovered under existing nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements was the open ocean. If the new zone created in the Treaty did not cover those areas, it would add nothing. A new area covering certain international waters must be added to make the resolution useful, but that would contradict international law of the sea. His vote against the measure did not imply any rejection of nuclear-weapon-free zones, existing or new.
The representative of Cuba, speaking on a point of order, said that the way in which the Secretariat had asked delegations to proceed in voting on the last three words of operative paragraph 3 had caused some confusion. One of the fundamental principles of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was that they be made through freely arrived at arrangements. The inclusion of the words “and South Asia” in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted was not consistent with that principle. The records should show that, in the vote on retention of the last three words of operative paragraph 3, Cuba had wished to abstain.
The First Committee then took up the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/56/L.25).
The representative of the United States, speaking before the vote, said he opposed the resolution, as the United States had every year since the one-sided initiative took shape. Everyone in the room knew that the overriding political fact of the Middle East was the regrettable lack of a peace settlement between Israel and its neighbours. The resolution did not meet the fundamental test of balance and fairness. The text confined itself to expressions of concern about the activities of one country, while omitting mention of other issues related to nuclear weapons proliferation in the region. Overall the resolution did not advance the cause of non-proliferation and might actually impair it. He would vote against the resolution and asked others to do so.
The representative of Pakistan took the floor to express support for the resolution. He had reservations on the sixth preambular paragraph, which concerns the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the universality of the NPT. He also had reservations on operative paragraph 3 which calls upon Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to place its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan was not party to the NPT because it had nuclear weapons.
The representative of Jordan said he had long advocated a just peace settlement in the Middle East. Like many others, he believed confidence-building measures had to be created. On top of that, the Middle East had to be freed from nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The only State in the Middle East with nuclear weapons did not adhere to the NPT or IAEA safeguards. If it were to do so, it would help build peace in the region.
The representative of Israel said that the Committee had, once again, been called upon to vote on a nuclear proliferation draft that was blatantly one-sided contentious and divisive, and undermined, rather than enhanced, confidence between the States of the region. Since the resolution was first introduced, many developments had occurred directly related to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, not the least of them the somber experience gained by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA action team. In addition, other efforts were under way to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities in the region.
He said the text's bias stemmed from its neglect of the fact that the real risk of proliferation in the Middle East had emanated from countries that, despite being parties to international treaties, did not comply with their relevant international obligations. Those countries were engaged in ongoing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles -- efforts that had destabilized both regionally and globally. he text had ignored the profound hostility of those countries towards Israel.
The text singled out Israel in a manner that no other United Nations Member State was being singled out in the Committee, he said. Indeed, singling out Israel was counterproductive to confidence-building and peace in the region and did not lend the Committee any credibility. Israel's supreme objective was to achieve peace and security and its non-proliferation and arms control policy was aimed at supporting that objective. The constructive approach it had adopted over the years towards arms control and non-proliferation efforts had been described during the general debate statement and was best demonstrated by its attitude towards the resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, despite its substantive reservation regarding its modalities.
That text, however, was strongly undermined by the introduction of the present biased text, he said. The new language introduced into the text last year was an unbalanced and selective representation of the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference, using that Treaty for yet another political assault against Israel. That unbalanced approach remained true despite the reference made to the need for compliance of countries with their international obligations, which had referred to Iraq. He called upon delegates to oppose the text.
The representative of Iraq said he wished to recall that the one who had spoken about compliance with international treaties and United Nations resolutions must be asked to name the international resolutions to which he had complied. He should also explain the nature of the nuclear arsenal and weapons of mass destruction possessed by his country. The Zionist entity was the only party in the Middle East region that possessed those destructive weapons. It was the only party against which Security Council resolution 487 (1981) had been adopted, and the only party in the Middle East that had not acceded to the NPT or to the IAEA safeguards system. It was also the only party that had been cited by the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
The Committee then voted on the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/56/L.25) and approved it by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to 2 against (India, Israel), with
6 abstentions (Bhutan, Cuba, Marshall Islands, Pakistan, Rwanda, Ethiopia) (see Annex V).
[The sixth preambular paragraph recognizes with satisfaction that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference made determined efforts towards achieving the universality of the treaty and called upon those remaining States not parties to it to accede to it and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.]
The draft as a whole was then approved by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to 3 against (Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States), with
7 abstentions (Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Rwanda, Marshall Islands) (see Annex VI).
Speaking after the vote, the representative of Canada said his country had maintained its position on the NPT -- all States were called upon to accede to and abide by the Treaty. He supported the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which called on all States not yet party to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The operational paragraphs of the text, however, failed to deal with his concerns respecting compliance with the NPT. He, therefore, abstained, as in the past, because the text had failed to deal appropriately with both adherence to and full compliance with the NPT.
The representative of India said that he had abstained in the vote on the draft as a whole and voted against the sixth preambular paragraph, which made a reference to the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, on which his position was well known. The focus of the resolution should be limited to the region it purported to address. The multifarious issues in the draft had received widespread consideration by the international community. He hoped it would be possible to make progress on the issues involved in the coming years through positive contributions by the concerned States of the region.
The representative of Ethiopia said that he had intended to vote in favour of the sixth preambular paragraph.
When the Committee turned to the draft resolution on prevention of an outer space arms race (document A/C.1/56/L.7), the representative of Pakistan reiterated
his support for the draft. The rationale for his consistent support had been clearly spelled out in the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament. An essential element of strategic stability was not to allow the arms race to spread to outer space. After the end of the cold war, the world must promote nuclear disarmament, while avoiding any action that could erode strategic stability and lead to a renewal of the arms race in new and unpredictable directions. Keeping outer space free from weapons should be formalized in a manner that filled existing gaps in the arms regime.
He noted that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had reflected the agreement of the international community to keep outer space free from an arms race and said, "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and international negotiations held". With the advance in technology, in particular military technology, which sought new domains, the danger of the militarization of outer space was no longer a possibility in theory, but in reality.
Preventing an outer space arms race had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for a long time, he said. Much useful work had been done and it had generally been agreed that existing legal instruments on outer space had not precluded an arms race there. In the face of advancing technologies and the fact that a growing number of countries were developing capabilities to place weapons in space, it was imperative that action be taken now in the Conference to outlaw any kind of weaponization in outer space.
The CHAIRMAN said that that statement had been out of order since Pakistan was a sponsor of the draft resolution under discussion. He apologized and offered one on behalf of that delegation.
The representative of El Salvador asked that he be included on the list of sponsors of that draft resolution.
The Secretariat then read out the following additional co-sponsors: Brunei Darussalam, Bangladesh and El Salvador.
By a recorded vote of 145 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States), the Committee approved the draft resolution on prevention of an arms race in outer space (document A/C.1/56/L.7).
Speaking after the vote on behalf of the European Union and associated countries, the representative of Belgium said he had voted in favour of the draft resolution, but wished to make the meaning of that vote clear. The Conference on Disarmament was the only international body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and it was in that body that any decision should be taken on preventing an outer space arms race. He was ready to support the establishment of a subsidiary body on that topic and pressed for negotiations on a non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, which was a priority concern of the European community.
The Committee took up a draft on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (document A/C.1/56/L.47), but after some discussion decided to postpone action, to allow time for consideration of the programme budget implications (A/C.1/56/L.61).
The Committee then approved without a vote a text on United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament (document A/C.1/56/L.1).
(annexes follow)
ANNEX I
Vote on ABM Treaty
The draft resolution on the preservation of and compliance with the treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) (document A/C.1/56/L.1/Rev.1) was approved by a recorded vote of 80 in favour to 3 against, with 63 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia.
Against: Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States.
Abstaining: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Honduras, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.
(END OF ANNEX I)
ANNEX II
Vote on 'and South Asia'
The words "and South Asia" in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon free Southern hemisphere (document A/C.1/56/L.24) were retained by a recorded vote of 132 in favour to 3 against, with 8 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: France, India, Pakistan.
Abstaining: Bhutan, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, United Kingdom, United States.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Honduras, Jamaica, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mauritania, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.
(END OF ANNEX II)
ANNEX III
Vote on Operative Paragraph 3 of Southern Hemisphere
Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere (document A/C.1/56/L.24) was approved by a recorded vote of 136 in favour to 2 against, with 8 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: France, India.
Abstaining: Bhutan, Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Myanmar, United Kingdom, United States.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Honduras, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mauritania, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.
(END OF ANNEX III)
ANNEX IV
Vote on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere
The draft resolution on a nuclear weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/56/L.24) was approved by a recorded vote of 141 in favour to 4 against, with 5 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: France, Monaco, United Kingdom, United States.
Abstaining: Federated States of Micronesia, India, Israel, Russian Federation, Spain.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Grenada, Honduras, Kiribati, Malawi, Mauritania, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.
(END OF ANNEX IV)
ANNEXV
Vote on Sixth Preambular Paragraph/Middle East
The sixth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/56/L.25) was approved by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to 2 against, with 6 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: India, Israel.
Abstaining: Bhutan, Cuba, Ethiopia, Marshall Islands, Pakistan, Rwanda.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Honduras, Kiribati, Malawi, Mauritania, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.
(END OF ANNEX V)
ANNEX VI
Vote on Middle East Nuclear Proliferation
The draft resolution on the use of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/56/L.25) was approved by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to 3 against, with 7 abstentions, as follows.
In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States.
Abstaining: Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Marshall Islands, Rwanda.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Honduras, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mauritania, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.
(END OF ANNEX VI)
ANNEX VII
Vote on Outer Space Arms Race
The draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (document A/C.1/56/L.7) was approved by a recorded vote of 145 in favour to 0 against, with 3 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: None
Abstaining: Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United States.
Absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Grenada, Honduras, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mauritania, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.
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