PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDP ADMINISTRATOR ON AFGHANISTAN

PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDP ADMINISTRATOR ON AFGHANISTAN

Reporting on a meeting held Tuesday in Washington, D.C. of donors and international organizations on the recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), told correspondents this afternoon that yesterday was "pay-off" day -– the recognition that it would be possible to get the humanitarian agencies, UNDP, World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the "same tent" planning a single, seamless operation covering the first five years of recovery for Afghanistan.

Speaking at a Headquarters press briefing, Mr. Malloch Brown said there was a feeling at that meeting, co-hosted by the United States and Japan, that "we had to capture this moment at this perverse curve" where donor interest was at its high point.  There was a coming together of minds around the absolute urgency of moving to recovery and reconstruction planning, while acknowledging the continued security difficulties on the ground, and indeed the absence of a national government at this stage in Afghanistan

[Mr. Malloch Brown was recently asked by the Secretary-General to take on responsibility for leading the early recovery effort in Afghanistan.  The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Kenzo Oshima, also participated in yesterday's meeting.]

A second message of the meeting, Mr. Malloch Brown said, was that the recovery effort must not be at the expense of consultations with Afghans, themselves.  There was a great enthusiasm for the meeting next week in Islamabad, Pakistan, hosted by the UNDP, World Bank and the Asia Development Bank on the various key sectors for recovery and reconstruction.  More than 50 per cent of the participation in that meeting would be Afghans.  That was a very important consultative moment to make sure the planning for recovery and reconstruction "fit" with the needs of Afghans, themselves. 

Much attention had been paid yesterday to the fact that there were some 2,200 United Nations funds and programmes national staff in Afghanistan.  True, the circumstances of the Taliban Government had made them work through direct execution, and there was much less reliance on partnerships with government ministries than in most situations.  But, there was a very good United Nations national capacity and a very good non-governmental organization national capacity, with some estimates indicating that as many as 17,000 Afghans worked for them.  That was "human capital" for the early reconstruction efforts of a new Afghan national government.  That group should be built up and deployed as the "embryonic" ministries of a new government.   

The final point about which there was complete agreement had been the indispensable role of Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, and the political process, he said.  Without a broad-based government, it was inconceivable that there could be sustained recovery and reconstruction.  The donors had been there before -- partial governments unable to sustain power and, therefore, the investment in recovery and reconstruction wasted, as a country "tipped back into conflict".  Mr. Brahimi was the "threshold" requirement for success.  At the same time, recovery efforts also provided the incentives for his success, since early recovery activities creating a peace dividend would help his process.

Yesterday's meeting would be followed by the Islamabad meeting and then by a meeting of the Afghan support group, which was the old donor grouping for Afghanistan, he said.  That would be held from 5 to 7 December in Berlin.  A Japanese-hosted donor meeting at the ministerial level would follow in the second half of January.  The goal was to have a first five-year plan for Afghanistan structured in a way that allowed full participation of the donors, the European Commission, the Islamic Development Bank, and others.  That was the basis for a very coherent approach in that fragmented country.  "I think we have the possibility of an institutional win here and at least one problem which so often trips us over could be avoided this time," he said. 

To a series of questions about the recovery costs, Mr. Malloch Brown said that in the meeting, itself, he had not even used the $6.5 billion figure because he had not wanted to fix a benchmark.  The World Bank had been quoted in the press today with a $30 billion figure, based on its per capita estimates of reconstruction costs, drawing on the obvious fact that Afghanistan was a lot bigger than Mozambique.  It did not do justice to the process to fix too strongly on figures now.  He had to ride the wave of interest, but also show some programmatic integrity and come up with a figure that would work for the five years, and not be constantly revised.

He added that he wanted the figure out as soon as possible, but it was not even possible yet to move people around Afghanistan.  American newspapers might have declared victory, but he did not think he would be making news if he said "it ain't over yet".  Circumstances on the ground were extremely uncertain.  Mr. Brahimi had not yet been able to form a transitional administration.  It would not be respectful of an interim administration to rush a figure out ahead of those processes.  So, he was caught between all those sensible reasons for prudence and the fact that, if he provided a figure now, he could have headlines tomorrow.  At least today, his more cautious side prevailed.

Continuing, he said that the $6.5 billion was a comparison with Mozambique.  That country was at a similar stage of development and had had a similar devastation of its infrastructure from many years of war.  Similarly, it had needed a strong peace-building dimension to the reconstruction, to try and draw warring sides together around a common sense of a country "growing in front of their eyes".  That cost of rebuilding the country was very modest.  One also had to weigh it against the fact that total annual official development assistance, at the moment, was approximately $50 to $55 billion a year. 

Afghanistan was a very significant country in terms of population size –- mid-20 million -– but it was a small fragment of the 3 billion people in the world living on less than $2 per day, he said.  All kinds of factors needed to be balanced, and it was too soon to take the speculation further.  He would provide correspondents with the figure as soon as he had it.

A correspondent asked if Mr. Malloch Brown expected a lot of that reconstruction work to be done by the major international construction companies, or was he envisaging bringing bags of cement?

He said that, in the first couple of years, he was talking about more modest recovery activities managed and led by Afghans, themselves.  He doubted that the security situation would make it easy for international construction companies to deploy early on.  Some "showcase" projects in safe areas important to a sense of national pride would evolve, however, such as major infrastructure in Kabul or one or two other major cities, and those would involve international construction companies.  Overall, however, it would be an Afghan-led and managed process.

What the Afghans had shown every step of the way was that, whatever the internal capacity constraints, there was a huge political and cultural preference to do it themselves, he went on.  That was going to look very different from the operations everyone was used to, such as in East Timor or Cambodia.  There were going to be far fewer expatriate workers in white four-wheel drive vehicles, whether United Nations, non-governmental organizations or international construction teams.

"We must do nothing to undermine" an effort by Afghans, themselves, to lead their own country, he added.  Support must be modest and carefully quantified, in terms of the personnel deployed, to reinforce, rather than undermine that Afghan leadership. 

So, the reason that there would be fewer expatriates riding around in four-wheel drive vehicles was to keep that an Afghan mission? A correspondent asked.

He responded that there were several reasons:  the security factor, in the short-term; and in the longer-term, the clearly expressed desire of Afghans to lead the way for themselves.  That should be supported and not undermined in the way the effort was structured.  In having invested in building up that huge complement of Afghan staff over the years, the last thing anybody wanted to do was "suck up more than we have to in international staff costs".  There was a real opportunity to maximize the Afghan component. 

At the same time, he added, he had not wished to sound naïve.  There was not yet a national government that enjoyed the trust of all Afghans and there was no existing Afghan capacity, except what was in organizations, such as the UNDP.  There were no functioning national Afghan ministries of health or education.  So, that had to be managed in a way that respected that Afghan leadership, but which was not naïve to the need for strong reinforcement through United Nations support.  "We're not going to write a check and walk away," he said.  What would be initiated was a development support model, which was "very Afghan", with key managerial interventions and support, and financial controls. 

His working assumption, he said, was that the more Afghan involvement in his programmes, the better, because of that deep resentment of foreign interference.  An Afghan-led vision meant all Afghans –- not just 50 per cent and not just Afghan men.  Significant participation of women would be indispensable to United Nations support of the effort.  It would be difficult at times and appear to be in conflict with the principle of national ownership, but all Afghans should be involved.

* *** *