PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The overall peacekeeping capacities of the United Nations Secretariat had not developed as they should have because sufficient time, energy and resources had not been dedicated to planning for the future, Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, told correspondents this afternoon, echoing the words of the Secretary-General.  At a Headquarters preview of the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Brahimi Panel on Peace Operations, Mr. Guehenno added that most of the findings were not surprising at all:  they merely confirmed what many had feared would be the consequences of trying to make do with too little for too long.

Mr. Guehenno said that last October, he had arrived at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at a very unique moment -– a scant few weeks following the release of the Brahimi report on the Organization’s peace operations -– when it had become clear that it was time to move beyond the report’s strategic guidelines and on to the real “nuts and bolts” of peacekeeping.  “My mandate was very clear”, he added.  And, for the next eight months, Mr. Guehenno and his team -- including outside consultants and other officials from Member States -- had undertaken a critical study of the department to identify ways in which the Secretariat could ensure the implementation of much-needed reform measures.

[Last year, the Secretary-General asked the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and make realistic recommendations for change.  The report presenting the Panel’s subsequent frank and specific recommendations focused not only on politics and strategy but also emphasized where improvement was needed in operational and organizational aspects of the system.  It recommended numerous ways to strengthen those areas, including changes to the Peacekeeping Department’s structure and the institution of a “task team” style of management.  The report concluded, among other things, that while implementing many of the recommendations would require additional resources, no amount of money could substitute for the significant changes that were urgently needed in the culture of the Organization.]

When the Secretary-General’s follow-up report was officially released later this month, said Mr. Guehenno, it would comprise the first in-depth and comprehensive managerial examination of the way in which the Organization implemented one of the most important aspects of its mandate.  It would represent a distillation of recommendations and suggestions from individuals acquainted through various aspects of conflict prevention and peace-building with what the Peacekeeping Department was doing well, what it was doing reasonably well, and what might be done better.

Again quoting the report, Mr. Guehenno stated that the United Nations had had many peacekeeping successes, and the hard work and dedication of the staff in the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes were not in doubt.  But performance could significantly improve if certain changes were brought to structures, systems and procedures, and if additional resources were provided.  He hoped that the report would set the stage for a new era of more effective and reliable peacekeeping that would lead to more successes in the future. 

Mr. Guehenno said that the report would reiterate the notion that in this era of increased globalization, there was a real need for an effective United Nations.  Therefore, reform of the Organization’s peace operations would be essential to its overall future success.  The necessary changes could be most successfully carried out if and when Member States gave the appropriate means and opportunity.  The will of States, along with decisions of the Security Council and its willingness to do all that was required to ensure that peace operations did not fail, were determining factors.  Indeed, requisite political will, an effective Security Council and Secretariat, close coordination with troop-contributing and host countries, as well as affording the parties to conflict the opportunity to chose peace over war, were key elements in effecting the positive change that was so urgently needed.

A correspondent wondered why the report contained scaled-down requirements for an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat that had been initially proposed to address shortcomings within the Organization with respect to information flow and information fundamental to work in the field of peace and security.  Mr. Guehenno said while that initial proposal had been an interesting one, it had been revised after taking stock of some of the concerns of Member States.  The new proposal focused more on strengthening the capacity of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, which comprised representatives from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as well as other key players in the Organization's policy-making arena.  He believed that there was a need to create within the Executive Committee on Peace and Security a small structure that would bring together the available resources and ensure an integrated approach to that body’s work.

Another correspondent noted that the budget for the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat had been significantly cut, and the alternative proposal no longer included cartographic and media-monitoring capabilities.  Was he satisfied that what was left could do the job capably?  Mr. Guehenno said that it had been the decision of the Secretariat to eschew self—contained units in this area and work to build bridges.  Therefore, since the Department of Public Information already had those capabilities, it would be more efficient and cost effective for an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat to rely on those existing resources rather than to create a new entity within the Executive Committee on Peace and Security.

Another correspondent asked Mr. Guehenno’s opinion of the recent discussions in the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) about increasing the pay of peacekeepers for the first time in nearly 10 years.  Would such an increase bring in better qualified or better prepared soldiers?  While he did not know the current status of those negotiations, Mr. Guehenno said that his visits to various United Nations peace missions had shown him that it was critical to employ the best people.  Further, at the end of the day, the success of peacekeeping depended on the men and women involved in peacekeeping.  Indeed, that had been one of the key findings of the report; that even if adequate structures were available, if the right people were not in place, failure was certain.  “Taking good care of our people in the field and compensating them adequately is very important”, he added.

In response to queries about the report’s proposal of "pre-commitment" of resources by the Security Council for possible future peace operations, Mr. Guehenno said that suggestion had come out the Brahimi Panel’s recommendation that peacekeeping should have a 30 to 90 day rapid deployment capacity.  Indeed, speed was of the essence in most situations, he added, as the sooner peacekeepers were deployed, the greater the chances for success.  Mr. Guehenno’s office had explored several options in that regard.  It had taken into account the expense of purchasing and maintaining large quantities of equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy -- over $350 million.  Another option considered had been to secure smaller amounts of equipment on contract with various companies that could be provided quickly on an “as-needed” basis.  While the start-up costs for that option would be less, it would require a significant outlay of resources to ensure that the companies had the equipment in place.

Mr. Guehenno said that an intermediate solution had been to have some equipment on hand, perhaps $170 million worth, and couple that with a commitment authority of some $50 million, so that resources could be allocated prior to the passing of a Security Council resolution.  That option would specifically negate the problem of procurement delays that might hamper the deployment of a peace mission.

A correspondent noted that in his experience, the major delay in the deployment of peace missions had been the failure of countries to provide troops.  How would adding staff to Department of Peacekeeping Operations solve that problem?  Was there political will among the Member States to provide the proposed pre-commitment authority?  Mr. Guehenno said that it was true that if the States did not have the requisite political will, the Organization’s peace efforts could not continue.  But at the same time, if States had confidence in an effective, well managed Department of Peacekeeping Operations, there was a much better chance that appropriate contributions would be made at the right time.  As the nature of peacekeeping had changed over the years, it was now very important for the Organization to ensure troop contributors that the support would be in place for the manpower they provide.

Another correspondent wondered if there had been any assessment made of the United Nations peace missions themselves during the compilation of the report.  Mr. Guehenno said that indeed the consultants who had participated in the comprehensive review of the Department had visited three missions:  in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and East Timor.  Their concerns, mainly on the issue of staffing, were expressed in detail in the report.  He added that during his own visits to various missions he had also taken note of that concern.  Unfortunately, there were immense challenges at the moment to ensure adequate well-trained staff in a timely manner, mainly because of changes in the scope of what peacekeeping entailed.  For example, he noted that the staff in Kosovo required specialized personnel well versed in taxation issues, customs officials and environmental specialists.  There was a movement within the Secretariat to ensure that field people were trained to handle a wider range of activities, as well as to ensure the hiring of more specialized staff.

A correspondent said all the changes proposed in the report sounded like “bureaucratic empire building”.  What had the Secretariat done to out-source some of its peacekeeping requirements?  Mr. Guehenno hoped the changes were not seen as “empire building”.  Moreover, he knew of no bureaucracy that could manage some 43,000 people with a staff of 650.  As for out-sourcing, he said that was an issue of balancing the core capacities needed to develop the Organization's peacekeeping operations and what could be drawn from outside contractors.  Overall, he believed that the United Nations needed to strengthen its contract capabilities.  He added, however, that it would not be healthy to merely delegate the non-military aspects of peacekeeping to outside companies.

There was also concern expressed by correspondents for the safety of peacekeepers in the field.  Mr. Guehenno said that, during the comprehensive

review, the Department had commissioned a study of field safety and security.  This was an issue of specific concern for him, and he added that over the years, the Organization had lost more than 1,600 peacekeepers.  One third of those were lost to hostile action, the rest, in accidents.  The study had focused on identifying ways in which the Department could cooperate more closely with and use the expertise of the United Nations Security Coordination.  Such cooperative efforts would include training in deployment and evacuation measures, as well as sensitizing mission leaders to their specific surroundings and situations. “If we want to have the best people in the field, we must take care of them”, he said. ”We must make sure they are not forgotten.”

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