PRESS BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE

Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock of the United Kingdom, Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee established under Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), explained to correspondents at a Headquarters press conference this morning that the work of the Committee was "concerned with the medium- to long-term end of the fight against terrorism”, and the intention was to establish the broadest possible legislative and executive defence against terrorism in every Member State of the United Nations.

He said the Committee's work was not to get into short-term political interests, or to do the work of the General Assembly in defining terrorism or passing a resolution against terrorism.  It was there to help the world system to upgrade its capability to deny space, money, support, or haven to terrorism, and to establish a network of information sharing and cooperative executive action to make an effective global mechanism to deny space for terrorism anywhere.  Mr Greenstock explained that Security Council Resolution 1373 was unusual, perhaps unique, in that it obliged all Member States under Chapter VII of the Charter to take specific actions to counter terrorism.

Mr. Greenstock explained that by the end of October the Counter-Terrorism Committee will have agreed to three things:  first, Permanent Representatives from all States would get letters containing guidelines indicating how best to fill out reports they were required to make explaining what they had done to implement Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) in quite specific terms; second, all States would be asked to name "contact points" for counter-terrorism both in New York and at their home capitals, this serving the dual purposes of making the work itself more efficient and to send the signal that the Committee felt every State should have its own person to coordinate its anti-terror activities, and finally, by the end of November he hoped they would have appointed experts who would help prepare for the flood of reports expected at the end of the year and to explain what anti-terrorism measure already existed. The Committee would also cooperate with, among others, the United Nations Drug Control Programme, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Council of Europe.

Asked when it would be reasonable to expect States to have adopted the legislation called for under Security Council Resolution 1373, Mr. Greenstock explained that States were being asked to adopt that legislation as soon as possible.  All States must report by 27 December, but then the "pack would string out" as in a marathon race.  The Committee would certainly discuss those States that did not appear to be taking action as quickly as possible.  Less developed States would not, however, be expected to have achieved as much as a more developed country like Germany or the United States in the same time scale.

A correspondent asked if the Committee would be looking at the legislation States had adopted, and passing judgement on the laws that countries adopted.  Mr. Greenstock explained that the Committee would not get into scrutinizing legislation.  States were being asked to give summary descriptions of measures they had adopted, executive machinery that was in place and actions taken to fill the gap between their own legislation and requirements of Security Council

Resolution 1373 (2001).  They would be asked when that would be done, and whether they would need assistance.

Mr. Greenstock said the Committee would, with the help of experts, be able to develop a "keen nose" for any Member State telling the Committee something was happening when it really was not.  A number of States would not have been able to do much before the 27 December reporting date but, to ease this problem, the Committee was already disseminating information regarding model legislation. There were already models for the establishing police networks and counter-terrorism mechanisms.  The Group of 8 in 1996, for example, had set up 40 areas for executive action to be taken against terrorism.

Mr. Greenstock said providing assistance to States that were willing, but less able, to combat terrorism was another area where the Counter-Terrorism Committee would be active.  It would hear from States what they wanted, then seek on their behalf the resources they needed, in the form of financial and technical assistance.  The Security Council itself would not provide the assistance, but rather serve as an intermediary between those looking for and those offering such assistance.  Mr. Greenstock reiterated that the entire point of the Committee's work was to establish the highest common denominator of action against terrorism in the territory of every Member of the United Nations in the long-term.

Mr. Greenstock said that even the most sophisticated systems on

terrorism, which the United Kingdom certainly had, would need to develop new measures to cover all actions called for in Security Council Resolution 1373. The financial front was one on which every State would need to take serious legislative action.  By 27 December, States would be required to make their first reports describing what measures they had taken and which actions needed to be completed.

A correspondent asked what would other States be required to do to fill in their own gaps, if even the United Kingdom had to close gaps in its own anti-terrorism measures.  Mr. Greenstock explained that the United Kingdom was advanced in this regard because it was one of only two States that had ratified all 12 of the international conventions against terrorism.  More specifically, States would have to take steps to create mechanisms to scrutinize financial flows, following up on particular people, and the right to arrest and question people suspected of terrorism.  Questions about the relation of liberty and security would be raised and must be examined as the world's perceptions changed and the pendulum shifted in the direction of favouring security.  The people of the United States, clearly one of the world's freest, were quite happy for some freedoms to be qualified in exchange for improved security, but were not willing to have security concerns take over their lives.

Yesterday, Mr. Greenstock continued, the Counter-Terrorism Committee had agreed to two things:  a work plan explaining what it would do in the first 90 days after the passing of Resolution 1373, and the terms by which the experts called for under paragraph 6 of that Resolution would be appointed.  The work plan would be sent in less than 24 hours to the President of the Security Council, Richard Ryan of Ireland, then made public in the form of a Security Council document.  A letter would be sent to the head of the Executive Committee that deals with the terrorism dossier, Kieran Prendergast, containing the terms of reference and directions to the Secretariat for the appointment of experts to advise the Committee.

A correspondent wanted to know what type of experts the Committee would be engaging.. Mr. Greenstock said that it wanted two experts to begin working immediately.  One would have to be an expert on counter-terrorism legislation and the other would have to be an expert on financial issues related to terrorism.  In the longer term, the Committee wanted the United Nations Secretariat to create a pool of experts in the following areas:  customs law; immigration law; extradition law; police and law enforcement; and illegal arms trafficking.  The possible need for additional expert could not be excluded, Mr. Greenstock said.

A correspondent asked whether the Committee would undertake any work regarding biological, chemical or nuclear terrorism.  Mr. Greenstock replied that the Security Council had decided not to include biological and chemical weapons under an operational paragraph.  However, in operational paragraph 4 of Resolution 1373, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons were mentioned in the list of criminal activities easily linked with terrorism.  The Committee would certainly liaise with international institutions that tried to prevent the proliferation of those kinds of materials and would have to examine its role as regards that issue, but was not yet ready to appoint experts to deal with it.  He said the Committee would not be getting involved in biological and chemical issues on account of the current Anthrax scare.

Mr. Greenstock said that there would inevitably be a handful of States that were not thrilled to implement Resolution 1373, and would try to “duck its provisions”.  Some States would be less willing to take the required measures, but the Counter-Terrorism Committee was not, at this point, a law enforcement mechanism, or even a political instrument.  Its functions were to monitor, to be analytical and to report facts to the Security Council for consideration.  The objective of Resolution 1373 and of the Committee was to ensure that gaps in implementation due to low capacity or low willingness would be identified and analyzed.  There would be no hurry; the urgent fight against terrorism was being taken forward in other areas.

Asked if it was inevitable that the Counter-Terrorism Committee would take on law enforcement functions, Mr. Greenstock explained that the Committee would not even get into enforcement like a Security Council Sanctions Committee ordinarily would, until after its first six-month review.  It would, instead, link with the relevant authorities that already existed.

To a question about the nature of concerns that States may have raised with him, in his capacity as Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Mr. Greenstock said that although there were some dissenting voices, he had been struck by the degree of support that existed for the Committee's work.  The concerns, he said, were about what exactly States would be required to include in their reports which were due on 27 December, whether the Committee was not taking on more than it could deal with, in terms of work, and what would be done about States that were less willing to take the steps required under Resolution 1373.  States' concerns usually "dried up", Mr. Greenstock continued, when he explained that detailed guidelines for the completion of the reports would soon be available, that the responsibility for examining legislation would fall back on the Member States, and that it was best to "wait and see" about actions the Committee would take in regards to the less willing States.  The Committee had to be careful not to send the message that it had "no teeth".

A question was asked about how the Committee would handle sensitive intelligence information, since some States on the Security Council would be less sympathetic to the aims of Resolution 1373.  Mr. Greenstock explained that there would be three categories of information:  public information that would be released in Security Council documents; information shared at informal meetings of the 15 members of the Counter-Terrorism Committee at which no records would be kept; and information that States would share with the designated expert, who could only use that information only in background or conclusions for reports without revealing the source.

Mr. Greenstock was asked how he saw the Counter-Terrorism Committee working against terrorism in a broader sense with the rest of the United Nations, in particular as pertained to Afghanistan.  Mr. Greenstock replied that the Committee was working on the medium and long-term aspects of the struggle against terrorism, and that the Security Council would be working on Afghanistan-related matters separately.  Resolution 1373 had advanced certain parts of General Assembly resolutions against terrorism, because they had been deemed to be urgent.  It was the Committee's job to make sure those measures were implemented.  There needed to be an overall framework resolution, he said, to cover the gaps between the 12 anti-terrorism resolutions.  The General Assembly, not the Counter-Terrorism Committee, would have to deal with the overarching issues outside of the purview of the Security Council and the Committee.

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