PRESS BRIEFING BY HEAD OF MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY HEAD OF MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan's two warring sides had agreed in writing to a "process of dialogue" under the auspices of the United Nations, Francesc Vendrell, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Special Mission to Afghanistan, told correspondents this afternoon at a Headquarters press briefing.

Following a series of meetings held over the last month, Mr. Vendrell said that he had just received separate letters from both sides agreeing to open a dialogue. One letter was from the Islamic State of Afghanistan and signed by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Abdullah. The other was from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and signed by the Minister of Education, Mulla Amir Khan Muttaqi. Both letters along with the attached agreement were signed on 30 October.

Reading directly from the agreement, Mr. Vendrell said "the two sides hereby agree to a process of dialogue under the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations aimed at bringing about, in the shortest possible time, an end to the armed conflict in Afghanistan through political means”.

"The two sides agree that this process will be conducted, either by means of direct meetings between their respective negotiating commissions with the active participation of the Secretary-General or his Personal Representative, or indirectly through the intermediary of the Secretary-General or his Personal Representative. Each side undertakes to be represented in the dialogue by a high- level, duly authorized commission."

He said he wished to draw most attention to the last point of the agreement. "The two sides undertake in the dialogue with serious intent and in good faith and not to abandon the process unilaterally but rather to pursue it without interruption until the negotiating agenda, to be agreed by the two sides, is exhausted."

Asked where and when the dialogue would be taking place, Mr. Vendrell said that he wanted to emphasize that this was a process of dialogue and not a dialogue geared to one specific meeting or event. In practical terms, the process would begin next week, when he would begin shuttling between the two sides either in their respective capitals or in an arranged place. Only if he thought there were grounds for the two sides to meet face to face would there be such a meeting.

Continuing, he said that in the weeks preceding Ramadan, which begins in late November, he would try to push the two sides to agree on a substantive agenda. He had already started tentatively broaching an agenda but had not had a reaction yet. He hoped that there would be a meeting before the end of the month. It would be up to the parties to decide whether to continue negotiating through Ramadan.

Did he anticipate that something concrete would be implemented? a correspondent asked. He said that he did anticipate that something might happen but skepticism was warranted. In the last few years there had been attempts at talks, and they had not produced results. The difference this time was that it was a written commitment and that commitment was to a process of negotiations to

Vendrell Briefing - 2 - 3 November 2000

achieve a settlement by political means. There was also a commitment not to abandon the process.

He said the process would be very difficult. It was important that the members of the international community support the process and encourage the two parties. The support of the Security Council and the "Six plus Two" was very important. ["Six plus Two" consists of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan plus the Russian Federation and the United States].

Would he use his meeting with the "Six plus Two" to draw attention to the outside suppliers of arms, since many of the culprits would be there? a correspondent asked.

Mr. Vendrell said he thought all of the outside parties were aware of the problem of outside interference. It was important to build slowly a consensus among the "Six plus Two". It would be a slow process that should clarify what were the legitimate interests of all the countries within Afghanistan. Mutual trust had to be established between all the sides.

Asked if there were any sort of time-frame for the process, Mr. Vendrell replied that if the process were to achieve results, it would have to be long. He hoped results would be achieved in the shortest time possible, but it would not be in a matter of weeks.

Had these been any discussion during his meeting earlier in the day with the Security Council on the question of stepping up sanctions against the Taliban? a correspondent asked.

Mr. Vendrell said that sanctions had not been the focus of the discussion but they had permeated the atmosphere. There had been hints by some members that it still might be necessary to impose sanctions, while other members remained sceptical. Ultimately, it was up to the Council to decide on sanctions.

Asked what changes had occurred on the ground that allowed for this agreement to come about, he said this was a question for the two parties to answer. All of the members of the "Six plus Two" had been extremely supportive and had encouraged the two sides to agree to this process. It was important to develop a dynamic inside this process that made it clear that something was happening, especially for the people of Afghanistan.

At the moment, he said, both sides trusted the Secretary-General and the United Nations to be objective. The major issue was to reach a substantive agreement. Those agreements had to be on the issues that lay at the core of the conflict in Afghanistan.

Was negotiating a ceasefire a priority? a correspondent asked. He said that a ceasefire was a major element of the process, and it ought to be in the agenda. The question was whether the ceasefire should come at the beginning of the process or the end. From a humanitarian point of view, a ceasefire at the beginning made more sense. From a political point of view, it did not always make sense. He was not sure the parties were ready to reach a ceasefire.

In response to a follow-up question, he said a major offensive was unlikely at the moment because of the oncoming winter. A ceasefire was less helpful if in the middle of the talks one side were to break it. That would be a recipe for problems in the talks. He did not want to minimize the importance of ceasefire but there need not be a rush to get there if the parties were not ready.

Asked to comment on the key elements of an agenda, he said there needed to be means to legitimize any authority that would rule Afghanistan. There also needed to be an understanding between any government in Afghanistan and its neighbours. The issue of the rights of Afghans and the treatment of women would also have to be tackled.

There had to be a distinction, he continued, between what was to be discussed between the two warring sides and what needed to be discussed between the Taliban and the international community. In any case, all of those issues would have to be addressed before the conflict in Afghanistan was solved.

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