PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL IN EAST TIMOR

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL IN EAST TIMOR

The time had come for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to share responsibility and political power with the Timorese people, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of UNTAET told correspondents at a Headquarters press briefing this afternoon.

Sergio Vieira de Mello said UNTAET would soon expand the 15-member National Consultative Council, which would be exclusively Timorese in future. The body would be much more representative and function more like a legislature. Cabinet portfolios would be offered to Timorese political figures who would share responsibility for running the transitional administration until independence. Elections and independence were likely to take place in the second half of 2001.

The UNTAET now had a consolidated budget for the fiscal year July 2000 to June 2001, he said. However, the administration's capacity to raise its own income domestically was very limited and it had exercised maximum restraint. The administration was largely relying on the generosity of donors, to whom it was important to demonstrate its minimalist approach to the budget.

Mr. Vieira de Mello said the $59 million budget, which included recurrent and capital costs, was very tight. The administration also had a salary scale for the civil service. The recruitment of about 10,000 civil servants would begin in July, giving priority to education, health, infrastructure, police and agriculture.

Regarding reconstruction, he said the recent Lisbon donor conference had been very important. The donors had reconfirmed the pledges they had made at the Tokyo donor conference held last December. Never before had the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank worked as fast as they had in East Timor to prepare the ground for rebuilding the sectors of health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, community empowerment, and for loans to small and medium enterprises.

In the second phase of East Timor's transition, the territory still faced security concerns, the Special Representative said. While internal security was satisfactory, there were still occasional cross-border incursions by extremists in West Timor, including two incidents in which hand grenades had been lobbed at United Nations soldiers.

He said UNTAET was maintaining a high state of alert along the border and in the enclave of Oecussi. It was hoped that stern measures would be taken to eradicate the source of such problems from West Timor once and for all. The incursions were a threat not only to security, but also to the policies of President Wahid of Indonesia. The extremists were working against the interests of the Indonesian Government and people.

On the humanitarian front, Mr. Vieira de Mello said 120,000 East Timorese refugees remained in West Timor. Repatriation figures had plunged recently due to disinformation, intimidation of those who wished to return home, lack of clarity

UNTAET Briefing - 2 - 29 June 2000

about whether former Indonesian civil servants returning to the territory would be entitled to pensions, and compensation for their service, and the perception from West Timor of an unstable and unsafe security situation in East Timor.

Internally, the humanitarian situation had improved significantly, he said. The UNTAET had abandoned the emergency phase, but much still had to be done in terms of providing the East Timorese the means to rebuild their homes. The shelter programme was underfunded and an appeal had been made to the Lisbon conference for continued donor backing of agencies working in that sector.

A correspondent asked to what extent was the failure to take control of the refugee camps in West Timor, separate extremist militias from the refugees and completely disarm them be blamed on Indonesia's inability to control its own military by imposing its political will.

The Special Representative clarified that not all refugees wished to return to East Timor and the Indonesian Government needed help to settle former civil servants, former members of the Indonesian armed forces and police.

He said the Indonesian military had taken measures including arresting militia members, confiscating their weapons and preventing them from training in and around the camps. The UNTAET would repeat its request that the regional military commander complete disarming of the militias and their removal from the camps.

Referring to the Special Representative's earlier reference to "stern measures", another journalist asked whether it meant hot pursuit into West Timor.

Mr. Vieira de Mello said he had mentioned stern measures in reference to action by the Indonesian military. The UNTAET certainly would not launch hot pursuit operations inside Indonesian territory.

Would the National Consultative Council draw up a constitution and how long that would take? another journalist asked.

Theoretically, the Special Representative said, a broad, grass-roots consultative process would be launched following the congress of the National Commission for East Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in August to explain the main elements of a constitution and available options for each essential element.

He said that a committee comprising Timorese and reputed international constitutionalists would then elaborate a preliminary draft which would either be subjected to a referendum or submitted to a constitutional assembly after elections. However, there were other models.

What kind of structure suited the East Timorese? a correspondent asked.

Mr. Vieira de Mello said his opinion was irrelevant. That was a decision for the East Timorese to decide. They should say whether they wanted a presidential or parliamentary system -- those were not issues for foreigners to decide.

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