PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND COORDINATOR OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND COORDINATOR OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Criticism that the United Nations was incapable of peacekeeping in failed States was uninformed and false, Jacques Klein, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina told correspondents at Headquarters this afternoon. The Special Representative’s press briefing followed his intervention in a Security Council meeting on extending the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), whose mandate is due to expire on 21 June.

Mr. Klein mentioned three successful missions: the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) -- which successfully reintegrated Eastern Slavonia into Croatia -- and UNMIBH itself.

The UNMIBH was dynamically on track, he said. The multi-ethnic border service was inaugurated last week with as head a Croat selected on the basis of professionalism, and not any ethnic balance. The Brcko region had been demilitarized and the multi-ethnic police force was functioning. The police academies were up and running, with 600 cadets. The mandate to demobilize from 40,000 to 20,000 policemen had been fulfilled. Some 10,300 of them had been certified.

An end-stage was in sight, he continued. Completion of the mandate would take about two-and-a-half years. By December 2002, the United Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be able to come to closure. To achieve that goal, however, he needed the necessary resources. For example, he was down to less than 1,600 International Police Task Force (IPTF) officers, because 270 officers had been sent to Kosovo.

The regional situation had improved dramatically. The electoral results in Zagreb (Croatia) had made a major difference. In Belgrade (Serbia) a democratic government was also needed in order for the region to function. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, there was a growing professionalism among the police. There had been major municipal elections without incident. A major war criminal had been apprehended without incident, he added.

However, there were still flawed, failed, central State institutions that did not work, he continued. A triumvirate presidency was holding things back. The international community had invested $5.1 billion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and enormous capital in lives, and looked to the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to make the same kind of commitment.

Integration into Europe was key. A refugee would have no reason to go back to a Balkan no-man's land. He would like to go back to his country as another part of Europe. The international community should be commended for its superb job of maintaining stability. The other United Nations organizations had all done very credible work of which they could be truly proud. He was optimistic that

Klein Briefing - 2 - 13 June 2000

everything was on the right track. There were clear goals, and he hoped to achieve them within a reasonable period of time.

There were three political priorities, Mr. Klein said in response to a correspondent's questions about a time limit on the United Nations presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina -- integration into Europe, apprehension of war criminals and support for democracy in Serbia. The goal of December 2002 was specifically meant for UNMIBH, which had a very precise, police-restructuring and judicial- assessment mandate. Other institutions would obviously be around for a longer time.

The Serbian problem was a difficult one, he said in response to another question. There was a President who felt threatened, indicted and had nowhere to go. The opposition was very fragmented. There were 700,000 Serbian refugees in Serbia. The Serbian people felt isolated and victimized. Until Serbia was democratic and integrated into Europe, the whole region would remain problematic. The democratic change in Serbia had to be brought about by the Serbian people themselves.

By Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration in Europe, he meant first the Council of Europe and then other institutions. The Bosnian and Herzegovina people needed a sense that they had a home somewhere, that they were not living in some kind of a peri-State floating in the Balkans.

The reason for not wanting the Judicial System Assessment Process to be transferred to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but to the Council of Europe, he said, was that the OSCE was not capable of that task. The Council of Europe had set up the Judicial System Assessment Process. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was another option. The OSCE was limited to European recruitment. The Judicial System Assessment Process had senior judges, not young people who were just starting their careers, which was what the OSCE generally had to offer.

The International Police Task Force was authorized for 2,200 personnel. He was now down to 1,600 people and during elections he had had to cancel all leaves. Some 1,800 to 1,900 people were needed to carry out the task, he told another correspondent. "To get out, we have to get in to finish the mission", he said, and in order to do that he needed the necessary resources.

As to a remedy for the leadership problem, he said that the Council of Ministers or the Presidency could work with the right personalities who believed in cooperation, reconciliation and working towards the future. The violence had been stopped, but the war continued administratively. The old Communist Party had split up into three ethnic parties with the old party discipline. People were still voting ethnically out of fear, not ideologically or economically. A truly multi-ethnic political party had not been created yet.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had three armies, he said, addressing another question about time limits for organizations other than UNMIBH. Until the issue of three armies was resolved, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) would be unable to disengage. Institutional problems depended on local cooperation and the region itself. Belgrade continued to meddle in politics. What impact developments in Montenegro would have on the region was unknown. When the organizations could leave was therefore unpredictable. * *** *