CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY CALLS FOR PROTECTION OF COASTAL STATES AGAINST ACCIDENTS INCURRED DURING HIGH-SEAS TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WASTES

Press Release
DC/2704

CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY CALLS FOR PROTECTION OF COASTAL STATES AGAINST ACCIDENTS INCURRED DURING HIGH-SEAS TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WASTES

NPT Parties Conclude General Debate; 24 Ministerial-Level Statements among 93 States Parties Addressing Conference

The international community must prepare a comprehensive legal regime to strictly regulate shipments of nuclear material and provide full protection for coastal States in the event of accidents, the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was told this morning as it concluded its general debate.

Speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the representative of Jamaica went on to say that the Review Conference should squarely address the need for such protection. En route coastal States currently had no legal recourse for compensation in the case of accidents. The high risk to which they were exposed was unacceptable, and a single accident would be a disaster for the entire Caribbean region.

The representative of Haiti said that, while improvements to the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be acknowledged, differences of opinion between nuclear and non-nuclear States formed a new iron curtain that divided the world. The security argument put forward by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) States, in their bid to expand their already highly developed arsenal, was not convincing.

The Philippines representative said recent events highlighted how truly fragile the rule of law was. In the face of competing partisan interests and a propensity for misunderstanding, established legal norms had been ignored, disregarded or misapplied. This Review Conference must strengthen the rule of law by ensuring that all States parties fulfilled their legal commitments. The proposal to achieve that goal by establishing an institutional framework for the Treaty merited further study.

The non-proliferation process established the obligations and rights of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear States, the representative of Chile told the Conference. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 did not mean that any State had the right to permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, the non- proliferation regime was only legitimate to the extent that it was accompanied by serious action to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Conference of Parties to NPT - 1a - Press Release DC/2704 11th Meeting (AM) 2 May 2000

The representatives of Ecuador, Uruguay, Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic, Nepal and Zimbabwe also addressed the meeting. In addition, it was announced that the statement by the Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, whose schedule prevented him from attending the meeting, would be included in the official records of the Conference.

Abdallah Baali of Algeria, President of the Review Conference, announced that 93 States parties, including 24 represented at ministerial level, had addressed the review in its general debate, which he formally closed at the end of the meeting. Four intergovernmental organizations had also made statements, he added, and tomorrow, for the first time, States parties would hear from representatives of non-governmental organizations.

The meeting also elected Vice-Chairmen for two of the Conference's main committees.

The next formal meeting of the Review Conference will be at 10 a.m. on Friday, 5 May, when it will hear interim reports from the Chairmen of its Committees.

Conference of Parties to NPT - 3 - Press Release DC/2704 11th Meeting (AM) 2 May 2000

Conference Work Programme

The 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) met this morning to conclude its general debate. The purpose of the four-week Conference is to provide appraisal of the progress achieved in the field of nuclear non-proliferation since the 1995 Review Conference, and to identify the areas where future efforts should be made. (For background information, see Press Release DC/2691.)

Statements

MARIO ALEMAN (Ecuador) said disarmament efforts also required the participation of non-governmental organizations and civil society. While tenacious efforts over the last 55 years had eliminated colonialism, the search for nuclear disarmament had only gone halfway along the road. There were many discouraging signs, which hampered efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free world. The security systems invented by one country to protect itself often appeared elsewhere as a threat to another. It was not conceivable that States with proven nuclear capacities should remain outside the NPT.

He said it was regrettable that four countries had decided not to subscribe to the Treaty. The nuclear tests in South Asia had further undermined efforts by the international community to achieve non-proliferation. Non-accession to the Treaty by one State in the Middle East had also created distrust and tension in that region. Moreover, the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review Conference had not legitimized the present status quo, with certain countries still possessing nuclear weapons. Article VI of the Treaty said that nuclear- weapon States must negotiate in good faith for disarmament under strict and international control. That was an inescapable legal obligation.

JORGE PEREZ-OTERMIN (Uruguay) said the current status of non-proliferation was far from the ideals that many States cherished in 1985. However, more than ever, it was clear that accumulation of instruments of mass destruction would have to give way to development projects, if the needs and expectations of humankind were to be met. Nuclear arsenals were being reduced, but very slowly, and nuclear weapons still existed at alarming levels.

Uruguay agreed that commitments to reducing nuclear capacities must be made without conditions, he said. Three decades from the Treaty’s coming into effect, he could not say people were living in a more secure or stable world. Decisions by States to give up the option of use of nuclear weapons were therefore worthy of praise. Peaceful coexistence, as reflected by the efforts of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) towards the declaration of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, proved societies could be united by grand objectives. The world could not afford a new arms race, which would contradict the spirit of the Treaty. All must accept the paramount objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The Lima appeal from Latin American and Caribbean States should be heard and its proposals followed, he said. Uruguay would support any efforts aimed at ensuring that this Review Conference proposed specific measures to eliminate the state of insecurity generated by nuclear weapons. Negotiations on verification and on the peaceful use of nuclear energy would also be fully supported. Nuclear Powers must meet those challenges dispassionately, with a view to the future of humanity as a whole.

While it seemed impossible, some sought to extend nuclear weapons into the twenty-second century, he said. Among the concerns this sixth review must address were those on marine transportation of nuclear material from coastal States. A treaty addressing the transportation of radioactive waste on the high seas must be achieved, or such transportation suspended. The marine transport risk was unacceptable, and incompatible with article 4 of the NPT. The time had come for the international architecture to demonstrate that it could deliver specific outcomes for the betterment of mankind.

PATRICIA DURRANT (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member States, said countries in her region had repeatedly expressed their concern regarding the safety and environmental risks to which coastal States were exposed by the practice of shipping nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea. The current meeting was thus an appropriate forum in which to address that matter squarely, since previous efforts had been inadequate. While the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code of Practice had been made binding, it did not provide for the protection of en route coastal States. Those countries therefore bore the risk of accidents with no legal recourse for compensation. Moreover, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had yet to respond to the request of en- route States for the preparation of a separate convention on the trans-boundary movement of nuclear material that would provide for protection against the risks associated with maritime nuclear transport.

The time for tangential reference to that issue was past, she continued. Reports indicated that shipments of highly radioactive nuclear waste were expected to increase dramatically over the next several years. Recent reports of falsified quality control data for some of those shipments further illustrated the danger that such cargoes might pose. The high risk to which en route coastal States were exposed by that practice was simply unacceptable. A single accident could visit untold disaster on the entire Caribbean region. It was for that reason that CARICOM Heads of Government had repeatedly called for the cessation of such shipments through the Caribbean Sea. The time had come for the international community to address itself to the preparation of a comprehensive legal regime that would strictly regulate those shipments, and provide full protection and compensation for en route coastal States in the event of accident.

The CARICOM States proposed to introduce, for consideration in Committee III of the Conference, a working paper to be discussed under the question of the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as addressed by article IV of the Treaty. That paper would call for the early establishment of a consultative process, which would lead to the establishment of a comprehensive international regime for the protection of the population and marine environment of en route coastal States from shipments of nuclear material.

ALOUNKEO KITTIKHOUN (Lao People’s Democratic Republic) said that while in 1995 non-nuclear-weapon States had agreed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear States had agreed to pursue disarmament in good faith, today the implementation of those agreements left much to be desired. Nuclear arsenals had been modernized and some nuclear-weapon States had developed new rationales for the use of those weapons. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty had not yet entered into force. The situation was not bright. The NPT had not yielded the expected results, with negotiations on banning fissile material yet to begin.

He hoped that at this session the groundwork could be laid to assure non- nuclear-weapon States against the threat of nuclear weapons, through efforts to draft a legally binding instrument on security for non-nuclear States. He welcomed the increase in States parties to the Treaty since 1970, and also supported the aspirations of people in many States and regions towards creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Nuclear technology and equipment had contributed to scientific research for economic growth, he said, and the practice of restricting such technology and equipment to developed countries was inconsistent with the need for cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. This Conference provided an ideal opportunity to all States parties to consider new measures for ensuring that the NPT provisions adopted in 1995 were fully implemented.

PIERRE LELONG (Haiti) said that if the NPT was to emerge from its deadlock, then analyses of the regime must be frank. Non-nuclear-weapon States were questioning the good faith of the nuclear Powers. There had been, however, positive developments since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. He cited transparency by France and the United Kingdom and the substantive reductions in their nuclear armaments. The United States and the Russian Federation had also carried out a number of bilateral actions to reduce their own nuclear weapons. The decision of the Russian Parliament to ratify the CTBT was an event that would reassure this Conference at the dawn of the new millennium. The creation of various nuclear-weapon-free zones was also a positive development that would enhance the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament process.

While such gains should be acknowledged, he said, it was still true that differences of opinion formed a new iron curtain that divided the world as it had in the past. The actions of certain Powers did not conform to commitments made under article VI of the NPT. Despite the collapse of the iron curtain, its influence persisted and it continued to influence current negotiations. He also drew attention to the inherent inequalities in the current international regime. Adherence by the nuclear Powers to the NPT did not fuel the confidence of non- nuclear States. Preferential treatment in certain areas needed to be halted. The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan required the declaration of a state of emergency. Furthermore, the security argument put forward by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a bid to expand its already highly developed arsenal, was not a convincing one.

HIRA B. THAPA (Nepal) said that some 30 years after the Treaty’s implementation there was little to be proud of. However, the NPT should not be seen as a failure. The 1995 Review Conference had been a milestone success, but it should be recalled that the historic decisions it reached were part of a package deal. The international community must remain mindful of the bargain that was struck to give permanence to the non-proliferation agreement. Non-nuclear- weapon States had met their obligations, but the nuclear States had not met those outlined in article 6, which called on parties to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and to seek nuclear disarmament.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 did not confer legitimacy on permanent possession of nuclear weapons, he said. Also, as long as three States outside the NPT possessed nuclear capabilities, the Treaty still lacked credible universality. The South Asia nuclear tests had threatened the regime, the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) agreement was still not operational and the absence of the required ratifications meant the CTBT had still not come into effect. The reaffirmation of nuclear postures by certain States also undermined the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

However, encouraging limited progress on disarmament should be acknowledged. Much was at stake in the present review, so the world was watching the Conference closely. Everyone knew that success was dependent on the political will of nuclear Powers whose obligations remained unfulfilled. Nepal believed his review could be a success, and hoped it would mark the beginning of a new mutual trust among the planet’s cohabitants.

CRISTIAN MAQUIEIRA (Chile) said Chile had acceded to the NPT in 1995, immediately after the Review and Extension Conference. The non-proliferation process had envisaged both the obligations and rights of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear States. The review outcomes had been based on a delicate balance, which must be maintained. The concept of the “package” -- whereby all the review outcomes were interdependent -- must prevail in this and future Review Conferences.

Everyone was familiar with the conditions and the climate that currently presided over nuclear disarmament, he said. Most relevant was the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which had set forth the obligation of nuclear-weapon States to negotiate disarmament in good faith, in conformity with article 6 of the Treaty. In addition, it was important to recognize that the indefinite extension of the Treaty had not perpetuated the right to remain in permanent possession of those weapons. The regime was legitimate only to the extent that it was accompanied by the serious intention to eliminate such weapons.

There had been some progress since the last Review Conference, he said. However, that progress was not in keeping with the scope of the agreements reached. Many measures had yet to be put in place, and their achievement was particularly urgent in the light of efforts by some players to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. Apparently those players believed that the safety of some must be achieved at the cost of the safety of others. Chile fully supported the proposal for a “coalition for a new agenda” on nuclear disarmament. It further hoped that this Conference would start up negotiations on a fissile material ban.

Dialogue and open and positive exchanges were required, he said, and effective solutions to problems must be found. Thus, Chile supported the proposed fourth General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament. Universal and binding guarantees banning the use of nuclear weapons must be created. The peaceful use of nuclear energy must be safeguarded through guidelines. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was also an important goal, as was the establishment of regulations on transportation of nuclear material on the high seas.

FELIPE MABILANGAN (Philippines) said that the most volatile flashpoints today, all with nuclear dimensions, were in his region. He cited the Middle East conflict, nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the dispute over the South China Sea, tensions across the Taiwan Straits and the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Regional efforts must therefore continue to address the causes of conflict and the potential for war. “By addressing the root causes, we hope to remove any inclination for any State towards nuclear and missile proliferation”, he said. He also reiterated his country’s support for the call by the members of the Non-

Aligned Movement (NAM) for an international conference on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

He said emerging threats to peace and security must be weighed carefully against the already delicate balance in the non-proliferation and disarmament equations. The initiative of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa and Mexico, entitled “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda”, was also a timely one. The related working paper introduced during this Conference brought fresh perspectives and broadened the avenues and choices before the international community.

Recent events had highlighted how truly fragile the rule of law was. In the face of competing partisan interests and the propensity for misunderstanding, established legal norms had been ignored, disregarded or misapplied. The present review provided a crucial opportunity for all to strengthen the rule of law by ensuring that States parties to the NPT fulfilled their legal commitments. To that end, all proposals that sought to ensure the sanctity of the commitments under the Treaty must be considered, particularly the one seeking to establish an institutional framework for disarmament. That proposal merited further study, along with the larger question of the evolving institutional relationship between the various existing international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

T.J.B. JOKONYA (Zimbabwe) said that as long as there was an exclusive club which was reluctant to give up its nuclear option, there would always be an irresistible temptation on the part of threshold nuclear Powers to knock at the door and gain entry into that club. There was no doubt that the 2000 NPT Review Conference was being held against the backdrop of an adverse trend in disarmament, which he hoped would not trigger a fresh nuclear arms race. The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, recently reminded the international community that further reductions in strategic offensive weapons could only be considered in the context of the preservation of the ABM Treaty.

He said that according to Mr. Ivanov, one had to be fully aware of the fact that the prevailing system of arms control agreements was a complex and quite fragile structure. Once one of its key elements was weakened, the entire system would be destabilized. The Russian Foreign Minister had further noted that in the context of globalization, the interdependence of those elements had drastically increased. The collapse of the ABM Treaty would, therefore, undermine the entirety of disarmament agreements concluded over the last 30 years. The threat of the erosion of the non-proliferation regimes related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would therefore increase.

Zimbabwe's representative then drew attention to the futility of engaging in negotiations without the requisite political will. He said history had also shown that bilateral agreements could easily be held hostage to national interests. Turning to the CTBT, he noted that not only was it a non-proliferation treaty that raised political and technical hurdles for any country designing nuclear weapons for the first time, but it was also a cornerstone of efforts to achieve disarmament. It was disheartening that some of the five permanent members of the Security Council had chosen not to ratify that instrument –- one that made it possible for them to meet their disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT. He urged the five nuclear Powers to fulfil their Treaty obligations and to pursue and conclude negotiations aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons. * *** *