PRESS BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF UNITED NATIONS MONITORING, VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION COMMISSION

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF UNITED NATIONS MONITORING, VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION COMMISSION

His first task as Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) would be to work out the organizational plan for the recently created Commission, Dr. Hans Blix told correspondents at a Headquarters press briefing this afternoon.

Using the Security Council resolution that had established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq as his roadmap, Dr. Blix said that he would complete the organizational structure within 45 days, as specified in that resolution. The work for setting up the organizational structure had, in fact, already been set in motion.

[The Security Council established the new UNMOVIC to replace the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) by adopting resolution 1284 in December 1999.]

Dr. Blix introduced the members of the team that would assist him in drafting the organizational plan for UNMOVIC. Members of the team included: Torkel Stiernlof, the Deputy Director of the Global Security Department at Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had been stationed in Baghdad and who had represented Sweden in the Security Council on Iraqi issues; Ake Sellstroem, a former biological weapons inspector for UNSCOM; Dimitri Perrikos, who had been a chief UNSCOM inspector in its early days and who was currently with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and, John Scott, a former legal advisor for UNSCOM.

One of his first actions upon assuming the Chairmanship of UNMOVIC that morning was to visit the Secretary-General. He had also met with former UNSCOM staff, with the intention of drawing upon their institutional memory and experience. As UNMOVIC was a subsidiary body of the Security Council, Dr. Blix had also visited the President of the Security Council.

Although he had not visited any governments before assuming his functions, many governments had sent advisers to him before leaving Sweden, he said. Their advice had been useful, but not necessarily identical. In the last two days, his team had spoken with UNSCOM staff to draw upon their memory to determine what had been effective in the old regime. It would be the role of that team to draft UNMOVIC's organizational plan under his guidance.

Contrary to what he had read in some newspaper articles before arriving in New York, he was not planning to travel anywhere before 15 April. He had, however, travelled to Vienna to meet with the head of the IAEA Action Team, which was responsible for inspections in the nuclear sector. He had also travelled to The Hague to meet with the leadership of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which had been mentioned in the Security Council resolution.

A correspondent asked Dr. Blix to react to informal comments of some Security Council members that UNMOVIC should start with a clean slate and not rely on any former UNSCOM staff, regardless of their institutional memory, including those that where on the United Nations payroll.

Blix Briefing - 2 - 1 March 2000

Dr. Blix said that he would respect United Nations rules regarding contracts. Staffing was one of the areas in which there was a significant difference between the set-up contemplated by the Security Council in resolution 1284 and the old system. The UNSCOM regime, which had been established by Security Council resolution 687, was expected to have been for a short period. Governments had started by seconding people to UNSCOM and that practice had continued. After one year without a Chairman, many UNSCOM staff with government contracts had left.

Continuing, he said that for the short term he would draw upon the expertise of those remaining staff members. The longer-term staff would be on United Nations contracts and, as envisaged by resolution 1284, they would be under Article 100 of the United Nations Charter. They would be responsible soley to the United Nations as their employer. Governments would not provide them with instructions.

In the transitional phase, it would be practical to draw upon the remaining UNSCOM staff, Dr. Blix added. Staff who would like to stay should indicate their wish to do so. He would also ask governments to suggest names to him, so that those who were interested in working for UNMOVIC could present themselves. That would foster competition among potential applicants. The process would take time, however, and the transfer would not be automatic. He was aware that there was a wealth of experience in the staff that had worked with UNSCOM. The total termination of UNSCOM staff would delay the possibility of achieving positive results with the new mechanism.

In response to a question on safeguarding UNSCOM's archive of information, Dr. Blix said that an assessment of UNSCOM's information had been made last year. It would up to UNMOVIC to "exploit" that material and make new assessments. The information was secure where it was, but had not been fully exploited. There was information, for example, from the "chicken farm" that might not have been translated in detail. It was not only a question of having new inspections, but also of using the wealth of information that already existed.

Asked to comment on the concern that the new mission would focus primarily on monitoring and not on aggressive inspections, Dr. Blix said that resolution 1284 showed no difference with regard to the right for unrestricted inspections. The Security Council confirmed UNMOVIC's right to unrestricted access to both sites and information and he intended to exercise that right. Such inspections were indispensable for gathering credible evidence. Although the Iraqis tended to see inspections as a penalty to be minimized, they should see inspections as an opportunity to be maximized. While Government statements might be viewed as suspicious, statements by international, impartial inspectors would be beneficial for Iraq and would perhaps lead to the suspension of sanctions.

Inspections, however, were only one way to gather information, Dr. Blix continued. Intelligence from different sources, from overhead imagry to defectors, was another source to be tapped. Intelligence was an important source of information, and he had experience with that kind of information in his work at the IAEA. From his experience, he knew that there was not only a lot of information, but also disinformation. In that regard, it was desirable to have intelligence from as many sources as possible. Information must also be analysed and assessed in a critical way, and it must be received and handled in a secure manner. A lack of confidence would mean that the best information would not be given. Information from several sources, including intelligence, would be welcomed. It would, however, be critically analysed before being used as a basis for an assessment or inspection.

When and how would you plan to tackle the thorny issue of Iraqi cooperation? a correspondent asked. The first step for cooperation would be for Iraq to accept the resolution, Dr. Blix said. The Security Council had designed the resolution so that it had positive elements for Iraq, namely the possible suspension of sanctions. It would also alleviate the conditions under which Iraq could receive products under the “oil-for-food” programme. A number of features would be attractive to Iraq. His working assumption would be that Iraq would accept the resolution and he would welcome the opportunity to meet with any Iraqi representative at any time.

Asked whether the nature of his previous mission would be different from his current role, Dr. Blix said that IAEA inspections were different from the early- UNSCOM inspections. The difference was mainly due to staff. Whereas IAEA staff had been long-term, international staff, UNSCOM staff had to develop their own style quickly. That style gave rich rewards at first.

The perception that IAEA inspections had not been aggressive was not accurate, Dr. Blix continued. Some IAEA inspections had been very dramatic, and had seized a great deal of documents in the early phases. It must be remembered, however, that Iraq was not a country under occupation, but under the control of the Government. One could not go on forever taking the authorities by surprise. Inspectors were not an army that could leap in and shoot their way to the target. There were also many other elements in putting together the "jig-saw" puzzle. Inspections were a vital way to put the puzzle together, but not the only way. If someone were to criticize the IAEA for their inspections, they should ponder the fact that, after nine years, the nuclear sector was the only sector with the fewest question marks remaining. IAEA inspections could not have been such a weak operation.

Given the criticism of past inspections, what assurances could be given to the Iraqi people that would tempt them to cooperate, and pending cooperation, how long would it take to complete the disarmament task of UNMOVIC? a correspondent asked. Dr. Blix said that he shouldn't have to "tempt" the Iraqis to cooperate. Elements of the resolution should be attractive to Iraq and would point to an avenue for the suspension of sanctions. Before that resolution, there had been no mention of that.

As to criticism of past inspections, there would be enough problems in the future to consider, Dr. Blix said. He was determined to exercise the right to unrestricted access. However, UNMOVIC's role was not to humiliate the Iraqis. He was aware of the hardship that the Iraqi people had suffered. The best thing for them to do would be to cooperate. It was up to the Iraqi people whether they would agree to cooperate. The first step would be to accept the resolution. As to a possible time-frame, the sooner the better. A delay in cooperation meant a delay in seeing light at the end of the tunnel. Likewise, if UNMOVIC were to lose all remaining staff, it would delay moving forward with all deliberate speed.

With the new College of Commissioners, would UNMOVIC be more of a joint effort, or would it be an independent agency that reported to the Security Council, but did not rely on the Council politic to shape its reports and its actions on the ground? a correspondent asked. Dr. Blix said the College would meet at least four times a year. UNMOVIC had been asked to submit reports every three months, and the College would vet those reports. UNMOVIC was not, however, a body that took decisions. He would chair that body, and would listen to the advice the College would give. Hopefully, the College, a group of experts, would be united. If the College was not in agreement, however, he would have to synthesize information and form his own views. Similarly, with staff, he would listen to them, but as a last resort he would make his own judgement.

After such long service, what had tempted Dr. Blix to take on such a challenging task? another correspondent asked. He replied that he had spent many years working on the questions of non-proliferation and Iraq. He was also dedicated to the issue of disarmament. It was a great challenge. Because the Security Council appeared to have had difficulty in agreeing on a candidate, and because they had reached agreement on his candidature, it would have been difficult to say no to the offer. Although his decision had been made with a great deal of hesitation, he would do his best with full enthusiasm.

Regarding the post of Deputy Chairman, would the post remain in the new structure and would an American fill the post? a correspondent asked. Dr. Blix said that he was not sure whether there would be a Deputy Chairman and how it would play out in the future. UNSCOM's Deputy Chairman, Charles Duelfer had handed in his resignation and the Secretary-General had accepted it. While it was good that he and Mr. Duelfer had agreed to be in contact for transitional purposes, it was also good, given the change in leadership, for a clean break.

In response to a question on the status of the nuclear file, Dr. Blix said that no one had said that the file was closed. He had himself presented a report to the Security Council in the fall of 1997 and, at that time, there were still some questions. In 1998 there had also been some unopened questions. The Council never decided that the nuclear file was closed. Since 15 months had passed without inspections, the baselines would have to be re-established, but it was not up to him. All were agreed, however, outside the Council that there had been the fewest questions in that area. There had been a coherent picture of the nuclear file. The nuclear file differed in that there was an enormous amount of documentation on it and nuclear activities were easily traced. Compared to the biological and chemical files, the nuclear file was, perhaps, the least difficult.

Asked to assess what programmes Iraq might have, Dr. Blix said that it would be premature to say. He would not mention any percentages on how far Iraq was from being cleared, but would first assess documentation with the experts.

As teams were being organized and hired, what was Dr. Blix doing to make sure that the allegations that plagued UNSCOM would not reoccur? Dr. Blix said that staff would for the most part be on United Nations contracts, with an allegiance to the Organization under Article 100 of the Charter. An organization could not completely guarantee that it would not be infiltrated from some side. The promise could be made, however, that any discovery of staff not being loyal would lead to their being fired. It was not in the interest of individual governments to seek an infiltration. The acceptability of the operation would be greater if it were genuinely an international operation.

Regarding chemical and biological programmes in Iraq, Dr. Blix said that it was still too early to say. UNSCOM had considered the biological file to be the most open one, but there were also questions on the chemical and missile files. There were probably some remaining questions on the nuclear file. No file was closed.

Was there any way to say that there were no biological weapons in Iraq? a correspondent asked. Biological weapons were more difficult to verify, Dr. Blix said. The Iraqis themselves should have a strong interest in clarifying all parts of that programme. Through that cooperation, there would be a better chance of assessing whether or not there was a coherent picture. With any programme, a

residue of uncertainty would remain. In the case of Iraq, however, the questions were not at the level of "residue". In the end, the Security Council would have to decide whether that residue was tolerable or not.

Given the "political reality" that, when push came to shove, the Security Council had not reached total agreement on the question of Iraq, how could the political landscape be interpreted? a correspondent asked. Dr. Blix said that it was not for him to interpret. He was not asked to do a political job. He was asked to do a technical job in a political minefield. Dr. Blix would take his orders from the Security Council. After long negotiations, the Security Council had reached agreement on that text, and he would do his best to interpret it. "They are in command, and I am their servant", he said.

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