PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The inauguration of a new government in Croatia was a dramatic step for the region, Jacques Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina, told correspondents at a Headquarters press briefing this afternoon.

"We've always said in all our briefings that until Zagreb and Belgrade have democratic governments much of what we do in Bosnia and Herzegovina is problematic", Mr. Klein said. Having just returned from the inauguration of President Stipe Mesic in Croatia, Mr. Klein said that by electing the new President the Croat people had taken their future into their own hands. By emphasizing in such election issues as education, health care and pensions, Croatia had demonstrated its eagerness to become part of Europe.

The message that the new Government of Croatia was sending to the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina was important for the work of the United Nations, Mr. Klein continued. Although Croatia was not "cutting the umbilical cord" with the Croat population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and would still support them, the relationship would now be a constructive one, based on such issues as culture, religion, and education, and not "sub rosa, intelligence, money under the table" issues. The new Government, led by President Stipe Mesic and Foreign Minister Tonino Picula, had so far said and done the right things.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia had a symbiotic relationship, Mr. Klein said. As Croatia moved into Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina moved with it. The "problem" with the previous regime was that it had had a negative impact within Bosnia and Herzegovina. "There was obfuscation, delay, avoidance, fantasies of partition. Hopefully, that is behind us", he continued. The Croatian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina had received the message to work with the international community. "Your future is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not in Zagreb", Mr. Klein said.

Given Turkey's involvement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, how did Mr. Klein justify Bosnia and Herzegovina's plan to open an embassy in Cyprus? a correspondent asked.

Mr. Klein said that, while he could not answer why the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina had made that decision, it had indeed caught him by surprise. The Government of Turkey had been extremely helpful in Bosnia and Herzegovina and had played a constructive role, not only in the stationing of troops within the Stabilization Force (SFOR), but also politically. Turkey, as a secular State, could play a model role for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having been away for a week, he did not know the current developments. When he returned, however, he would look into who the prime movers had been to make that happen. He did not know whether the decision had been made by consensus on the part of the three Presidents, or if it had been done unilaterally by someone without authority. He could not give an honest answer because he really did not know.

Klein Briefing - 2 - 29 February 2000

Asked to define the effect of Croatia's new Government on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Klein said that it had had a very positive impact. For the first time, the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina had two choices, two democrats for President of Croatia. The new Government's message had been "refugee return" across the spectrum. It was the time for people to go back to where they came from, to rebuild their lives in the region. The Foreign Minister, on his first visit abroad, came to Bosnia and Herzegovina to extend a friendly hand and a desire to have a new relationship.

In Belgrade, however, Mr. Klein saw the opposite effect. Belgrade, with certain assistance, was rebuilding its infrastructure. President Milosevic would be more difficult than ever because he saw himself as "wounded and trapped". With the foreign assistance Mr. Milosevic had received, he was actually becoming stronger by the day. Until democratic Serbia was reintegrated into Europe, the region would remain unstable.

One part of the equation had come into place, but it had taken a long time, Mr. Klein added. Credit must be given to the people of Croatia who had rejected nationalism and had embraced such concerns as the economy, health care and education. "In all candor, the new Croatian Government will have difficulties", he said. The economy was in poor shape, and it would take time to turn it around. Croatia did, however, have much wealth. The Adriatic coast was a gold mine and the people were hard-working. What was now needed was foreign assistance, political and economic support, and movement into Europe and partnership for peace -- very quickly. That was important because Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be far behind.

Asked to elaborate on Belgrade's role in the region, Mr. Klein said that it was his personal assessment that, based on the foreign assistance President Milosevic was receiving, he was rebuilding the infrastructure. The refugees in Serbia -- the 600,000 -- who should not be forgotten, were dispersed and not an effective force for change. The Serb people themselves disliked Milosevic for giving up Kosovo, but did not know how to articulate it in any clear way. They also disliked the West because of the bombing. In Serbia, there was a combination of paranoia, claustrophobia, isolation, victimization, and "why did this happen". The answer was "Milosovic", that's why it happened, Mr. Klein said. All the work that had been done to build Serbia had been destroyed by one individual.

The whole region would not be stable until there was a democratic government in Belgrade and Serbia reintegrated into European structures, Mr. Klein said. There was no indication that that was happening. There was no opposition to speak of, and Mr. Milosevic was restructuring the army and police forces. Efforts by the European Union and the United States to encourage the democratization process in Serbia had run into a brick wall.

In response to a question about the internally displaced peoples and refugees, Mr. Klein said that the issues of security, employment and the need to rebuild homes must be addressed. International organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the SFOR had worked hard in that regard.

There had also been spontaneous return of refugees, he added. The 2.5 million people who had left the region had had connections in Europe and the financial means to relocate. The people who had been left behind were trapped and did not necessarily believe in the war. They were simply caught in the vortex of history. The remaining population had been polarized and driven apart. While there were some people who wanted reconciliation to work, others still had fantasies of partition.

A correspondent asked whether it was conceivable that some of the SFOR troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina be diverted for KFOR duty in Kosovo. Mr. Klein said that he had not heard that at all. The NATO draw down had hopefully plateaued for a while. An election season was ensuing, as was a refugee return season. A further draw down would not be helpful at that juncture. The plateau had been reached for at least a year. SFOR's role in providing a security umbrella should not be underestimated. That umbrella needed to be in place, so that the building of State institutions could continue.

In response to the issue of diplomatic intervention in foreign assistance to Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Klein said that Belgrade was not his portfolio. His office primarily had a monitoring-reporting role.

Serb-Croat relations would improve, Mr. Klein added. Banja Luka had traditionally gravitated to Zagreb. The largest displaced groups of people were the Croats. They had to get the Croats back. "For Bosnia and Herzegovina to work, we need all three peoples back, but we need them in a conciliatory fashion", Mr. Klein said.

Regarding Zagreb-Belgrade relations, a correspondent said there was talk that Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman had always had secret deals. What about the new President? Mr. Klein said that he didn't know about secret deals, but they had certainly had more conversations than their ministers did. Mesic's message to come back was clear to the Serbs in Yugoslavia. If they were willing to accept the idea that they were Croatian citizens, even though they were of Serb ethnic origin, they had every right to be there.

Asked to respond to the possible arrests of remaining indictees by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Klein said that Radovan Karadzic was, symbolically, the "war criminal issue". If he were arrested and taken to The Hague, there could be real forward movement and reconciliation.

Did Mr. Klein agree with Carl Bildt's statement in the Security Council that the international community had to start discussing core issues, particularly a Kosovo settlement? Mr. Klein said that there were two issues. The South-Eastern Europe Stability Pact sent a message that it was costlier to keep that region out of Europe than to bring it in. But, they had to put "meat on the bone" of the Stability Pact and not just recycle old money. Real money had to be brought in. The more difficult problem was that the policy planning staff of the governments concerned lacked a vision for a restructured Balkans. A country that lacked its own agenda would inevitably become the victim of another person or country's agenda.

Asked whether he agreed with the view that the Dayton Peace Agreement should be revised, Mr. Klein said that authors of that Dayton Agreement must be given great credit. The Dayton Agreement, however, while it had stopped the violence,

had not necessarily stopped the war. He saw the Dayton Agreement as a "constitution", the best that could be hoped for at that period in history. It should not be reopened. However, new demands meant that the Dayton Agreement should evolve to meet current realities.

Mr. Bildt, in his briefing to the Security Council, had raised certain flashpoints, particularly in Montenegro. Was there any place in Bosnia that should concern the international community? a correspondent asked. Mr. Klein responded that the major problem was how Kosovo would play out and how it would affect the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

* *** *