PRESS CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY UNITED STATES MISSION

Press Briefing

PRESS CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY UNITED STATES MISSION

The likelihood that the United States would be able to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) was slipping away, and if its citizens came under the jurisdiction of the Court when it became operational, the United States would consider further protective legislation, Mark Thiessen, the spokesman for the Majority Leader of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told correspondents this afternoon at Headquarters.

He also announced, at the press conference sponsored by the United States Mission, that the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, would visit the United Nations in January.

Concerning the ICC, he said that Senator Helms had sent a delegation of Committee staff, as he had to the previous meeting of the Preparatory Commission, to observe the discussions. The delegation had sat in on a number of sessions in the past two weeks and had also had a number of bilateral meetings with governments attending the Commission, as well as with Commission officials, with whom very productive discussions had been held about the progress of the ICC negotiations.

He said there seemed to be a much improved attitude compared to previous negotiations, especially in Rome where anti-American sentiment had been strong. It had been hoped that the new attitude would translate into some concrete actions to facilitate the signing by the United States. The positive attitude still existed and some progress had been made on smaller issues, such as the transfer issue with the occupied territories, but it had not been translated into any steps that would make it possible for the United States to join the Court.

When the United States had offered proposals last Friday to tighten the Court’s complementarity regime -- which could have served to tighten the restrictions on the ability to prosecute American citizens -- they had been met with “very stiff resistance”. The atmosphere had been cooperative and his country had been participating on the rules and the elements, but that had not been translated into any concrete actions making it possible for the United States to sign the Treaty.

If the United States remained outside the Court, he said, there was still the major issue of its exposure as a non-State party and how it would deal with a Court of which it was not a member. That was a “very, very big issue” that had to be resolved next year in some manner satisfactory to the interests of the United States, which could not allow its citizens to be under the jurisdiction of the Court as a non-State party. Thus, that good will was going to have to translate into some concrete actions.

He drew attention to the availability of copies of United States legislation, which had been signed into law by United States President William Clinton last November. The legislation, introduced by senator Rod Grams, the Chairman of the Senate International Operations Subcommittee, had restricted “any and all funding” for the Court or any of its activities until it was ratified by the United States Senate. That meant that the United States would not contribute one cent –- by law, it could not contribute one cent -– to the operations of the Court, pending its ratification.

He said that if the United States remained a non-State party, and if its citizens were still subject to the Court because that door had not been closed in some way by next year, then Congress would have to consider further action concerning how to deal with a Court that sought to impose jurisdiction on the country without the consent of its elected representatives. The new legislation should be seen as a first indicator of congressional concern that the Court was continuing to go forward without United States’ ratification and without its fundamental concerns truly being taken into account.

He then noted that the Senate in November had passed the so-called Helms-Biden law, by which the United States would pay $926 million in arrears in exchange for a series of reform benchmarks. Following three years of intensive negotiations, the law had been passed and then signed by the President and the check had been written. Hopefully, as the United Nations now took up the conditions in the Helms-Biden legislation, everyone could get on with the process of setting right the “US-UN” relationship. In furtherance of that goal, Senator Helms had accepted an invitation from the Secretary-General to come to the United Nations in January.

The Senator’s visit to the United Nations was scheduled for 20 to 21 January, he went on. Mr. Helms was going to lead a delegation of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, including Senators Grams, Joseph Biden and others. Senator Helms would address a United Nations body and meet with United Nations officials, and the Foreign Relations Committee would hold “field hearings” on the reform effort under way at the United Nations. So, there would be a broad exchange of views between United States and United Nations officials. The Senator was also expected to meet with the Secretary-General and address the Security Council.

Asked if Senator Helms would bring the check with him, Mr. Thiessen said that it was now in the President’s hands and up to the Administration and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, working with his fellow representatives at the United Nations, as well as the Secretariat to implement the reforms. Then, the money would flow, with $100 million being paid in the next week or so. The rest would be paid out over three years, as certain reform benchmarks were met each year.

It had not yet been decided whether Senator Helms would brief the press during his visit to the United Nations, but he would address a United Nations body and would participate in a meeting of the Security Council, he said in response to another question. He believed it would be the first time a United States Senator engaged in a discussion with the Security Council in the Council Chamber.

To a question about the key conditions linked to United States payment, he said that those concerned sovereignty issues, in the first year, particularly that the United Nations dropped all proposals made during the previous Secretary-General’s term to impose United Nations taxes and establish a standing army, among others. The United States Government was certifying that those had been met, then the first payment would be made. Over the next two years, the conditions for payment related to the scale of assessments issue, which, in the second year, had to be reduced to 22 per cent of the United States’ general assessment. Also in that year, the peacekeeping assessment had to be reduced to 25 per cent from approximately 31 per cent.

Continuing, he said there were also a number of reform issues, such as zero-growth budget and contested arrears. As far as the American Congress was concerned, $926 million represented full payment. Other issues concerned the establishment of Inspector-Generals for the specialized agencies and such basic reforms as anti-nepotism provisions. Withholding arrears, originally done by a democratically-controlled Congress in the late 1980s, was meant to apply pressure for reform. “Tough love” was how he would describe achieving the goal of making the United Nations a better, and more efficient and effective place. Each of the payment-reform conditions had been written with that intent.

What would it take for the United States to “sign on” to the International Criminal Court? another correspondent asked.

He said that it was growing increasingly unlikely that the United States could actually join the Court. Many of its European allies had expressed the desire for his country to join, but a lot of them were probably quite comfortable with the United States remaining outside -– they would be happy for the United States to join the Court on their terms, but were not really willing to make the adjustments to the Treaty necessary for United States participation. Unlike any other State party to the Treaty, his country had unique responsibilities in the world. It was always the country called upon to project force and take the lead in international peacekeeping, and so forth, and that made it a target for “politicized prosecutions”.

The concerns of the United States had so far not been addressed in a way that would make the Treaty ratifiable, he went on. Another, more fundamental issue was the nature of his country’s relationship with the Treaty: was it going to be one of simple coexistence or was the Court going to pose a threat to the United States? It very well could, especially if American citizens were considered under the Court’s jurisdiction even though the United States had not signed and the Senate had not ratified the Treaty.

That was an issue of enormous concern for his Government, as that would affect its ability to be engaged in the world, he said. It would not be able to project force and it would be limited in its ability to participate in peacekeeping operations. If that issue was not addressed by the States parties in the Preparatory Commission in some way, then Congress would have to really consider the kinds of policies it would have to implement, by law, to protect American citizens from the jurisdiction of the Court.

Was it possible to have an international court without United States’ participation? the correspondent asked.

The League of Nations had gone into effect and had not lasted very long without the United States, he replied. The Court’s supporters really needed to take a very hard look at the kind of future the Court would have without the United States, especially if that country was forced to take a hostile position towards it. Presently, under law, the United States could not fund any actions of the Court, even through a Security Council referral. Further steps might have to be taken to isolate the Court if it exposed Americans to any danger.

Asked if any of the reform conditions had touched on the internal workings of the United Nations, he said that, yes, there were provisions dealing with, among other things, nepotism, “sunsetting” or projected termination, of new programmes, strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and of the Inspector-General, specifically by requiring the establishment of independent Inspector-Generals of the specialized agencies.

How much “daylight” was there between Mr. Helms and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the rest of the Senate and the Congress on the issue of the Court? another correspondent asked.

He said they were largely united in terms of the issue of the country’s exposure as a non-State party. There was absolutely no “daylight” between the Administration and Senator Helms and the Congress on that issue. The difference between the Administration and Senator Helms concerned the fact that, even with all the protections of American citizens in place, the Senator thought the Court was fundamentally a bad idea. It would be unable to achieve its goals and it closed off an exit for dictators to leave the scene. Without any hope of exile or safe departure, a dictator would be less likely to leave a country and more likely to use violence to retain power.

If General Augusto Pinochet was still President of Chile he would not now be under lock-and-key in London. That would be a dangerous precedent to set. Every peaceful transition to democracy in the last half-century had happened with some sort of safety-in-exile, or face-saving way out for the dictators to leave power. Senator Helms’ fundamental concern was that the Court closed off the possibility of peaceful transitions to democracy because it closed the exit door for dictators to leave power.

So, in terms of “tightening up” the Court and ensuring 100 per cent protection for United States citizens, there was no “daylight” between the Senator and the Administration or between the Congress. The evidence was the passage of the new legislation by the unanimous consent of the Congress. The law –- no funding without ratification -- was the unanimous statement of both the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and the President.

To a series of follow-up questions, he said the Administration had said that it was not in a position to sign the Treaty because the exposure of American servicemen functioning under the Court was “way too big” right now. The Government did not want another Court of any kind, besides its own Supreme Court, to judge the foreign policy actions of the United States or the actions of American servicemen. Those were issues for the United States court system.

Asked about the response of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the new concept of humanitarian intervention advanced by the Secretary-General, he said he had not yet discussed that speech with the Chairman and thus it would be premature for him to provide a detailed commentary. Nevertheless, the Senator looked at those situations on a case-by- case basis and they should be handled accordingly. Setting up a doctrine was problematic and complicated.

Was it a big breakthrough for the Chairman’s supporters that they were now “in the driver’s seat” in terms of establishing foreign policy, another correspondent asked?

He said he tried not to look at it that way. The Helms-Biden conditions had been negotiated over a long period of time and had the full support of Secretary of State Albright. Ambassador Holbrooke had also been involved in getting the legislation passed. There was absolutely no “daylight” between Senator Helms and the Clinton Administration in terms of those conditions and that package, which was a down payment on a good faith effort to start a new relationship with the United Nations based on reform.