FIRST COMMITTEE DRAFT TEXT, INTRODUCED BY NEW ZEALAND, CALLS FOR "NEW AGENDA" IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Press Release
GA/DIS/3153
FIRST COMMITTEE DRAFT TEXT, INTRODUCED BY NEW ZEALAND, CALLS FOR NEW AGENDA IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
19991026Texts Also Introduced on CTBT, Outer Space, Middle East, Military Information, Latin America, Information Security
The representative of New Zealand told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this morning, as he introduced a draft resolution on a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world, that complacency has crept into the nuclear agenda, the retention of nuclear weapons was being "re-rationalized for potential use against biological and chemical weapons attack, and both missile proliferation and defence were being pursued.
One of seven draft resolutions introduced today, the text, entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda, would have the General Assembly call upon the nuclear-weapon States to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations. It would also call for the three nuclear-weapon-capable States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to reverse, clearly and urgently, the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development and deployment.
The other texts introduced dealt with: the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); prevention of an arms race in outer space; the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; objective information on military matters; the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); and information and telecommunications in the context of international security.
The General Assembly would urge States to maintain their nuclear testing moratoriums and remain seized of the issue of the entry into force of the CTBT at the highest political level, according to the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Mexico. The Assembly would call upon all States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, particularly those countries whose ratification was needed for its entry into force, to do so as soon as possible.
By the terms of a draft text on the prevention of an outer space arms, introduced by the representative of Sri Lanka, the Assembly would call upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute
First Committee - 1a - Press Release GA/DIS/3153 16th Meeting (AM) 26 October 1999
actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties.
A draft resolution introduced by the representative of Egypt, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, would have the Assembly call upon the only State in the region that was not Party to the NPT to accede to the Treaty without further delay. Further, it would call on that State to: not develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; renounce possession of nuclear weapons; and place all its unsafeguarded nuclear materials and nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
The Assembly would call on Member States to further promote, at multilateral levels, the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, under a text introduced by the Russian Federation on information and telecommunications in the context of international security. Member States would be invited to inform the Secretary-General of their views on such questions as the advisability of developing international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunications systems and help combat information terrorism and criminality.
By the terms of a draft resolution, also introduced by the representative of Mexico, on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the Assembly would urge the countries of the region that had not yet done so to ratify the amendments to the Treaty approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions of 3 July 1990, 10 May 1991, and 26 August 1992.
Under a draft text on objective information on military matters, introduced by the representative of Germany, the Assembly would call upon all Member States to report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General their military expenditures for the fiscal year. It would recommend the guidelines and recommendations for objective information to all Member States for implementation, fully taking into account specific political military and other conditions prevailing in a region, on the basis of initiatives with the agreement of the States of the region concerned.
Taking strong exception to the introduction last week of a draft resolution sponsored by the Russian Federation, Belarus and China on preserving the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems - the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- the representative of the United States said his country had not made a decision to deploy a limited national missile defence, nor would such a decision change the basic strategic calculus underlying the ABM Treaty. Consequently, his Government would strongly urge refraining from proceeding with the draft.
Regrettably, he said his country had decided not to pursue its two traditional resolutions, namely, one on Compliance with Arms Limitation and
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Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agreements, and on Bilateral Nuclear Arms Negotiations and Nuclear Disarmament. Both texts had addressed important and relevant issues and would have been particularly timely, but it had appeared that they risked being subjected to a campaign of amendments designed to introduce contention over the ABM Treaty in every possible context.
Statements were also made by the representatives of Uruguay, Chile, Romania, Japan and Nigeria.
The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. Wednesday, 27 October, to continue its thematic discuss on all disarmament and security-related items, as well as its introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions.
Committee Work Programme
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its thematic discussion and consideration of all disarmament- and security-related draft resolutions. It is expected to hear the introduction of draft resolutions concerning: the need for an agenda towards a nuclear-weapon-free world; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); prevention of an arms race in outer space; risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; objective information on military matters; the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); and information and telecommunications in the context of international security.
The current phase will extend through Friday, 29 October. It combines the thematic discussion with consideration of drafts, as part of a reform to streamline the Committee's work. The third and final stage of its work, which is scheduled to begin on Monday, 1 November, will be action on all disarmament draft resolutions.
According to a draft resolution on information and telecommunications in the context of international security (document A/C.1/54/L.4), sponsored by the Russian Federation, the General Assembly would call Member States to further promote, at multilateral levels, the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security.
The Assembly would invite all Member States to inform the Secretary- General of their views on the following questions: general appreciation of the issues of information security; definition of basic notions related to information security, including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources; and the advisability of developing international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunications systems and help to combat information terrorism and criminality.
A draft resolution sponsored by Egypt on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/54/L.8) would have the Assembly call upon the only State in the region that was not party to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to accede to the Treaty without further delay. It would further call on that State to: not develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; renounce possession of nuclear weapons; and place all its unsafeguarded nuclear materials and nuclear facilities under full- scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security.
By the terms of a draft resolution entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda (document A/C.1/54/L.18), the Assembly would call for the examination of ways and means to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies so as to enhance strategic stability, facilitate the process of the elimination of those weapons and contribute to international confidence and security.
It would call upon the nuclear-weapon States to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus achieving nuclear disarmament, to which they were committed under article VI of the NPT.
The Assembly would also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to take early steps to: reduce tactical nuclear weapons with a view to the elimination as an integral part of nuclear arms reductions; examine the possibilities for and proceed to the de-alerting and the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles; demonstrate transparency on their nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories; and place all fissile materials for nuclear weapons declared to be in excess of military requirements under IAEA safeguards, in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place.
In a related provision, the Assembly would call upon those three States that were nuclear-weapon capable and that had not yet acceded to the NPT to reverse, clearly and urgently, the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment, and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.
It would also call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to bring the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) into force without further delay and to commence negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion. It would further call upon those States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
The Assembly would further call upon those States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the CTBT and, pending its entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests. It would call upon those States that had not yet done so to: adhere unconditionally and without delay to the NPT and to take all the necessary measures which flowed from adherence to that instrument as non-nuclear-weapon States; and to conclude full- scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements, on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte dIvoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Under the terms of a draft resolution on the prevention of an outer space arms race (document A/C.1/54/L.22), the Assembly would call upon all States, in particular, those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties. Reiterating that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, had the primary role in negotiating a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an outer space arms race in all its aspects, would urge States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of the progress of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the matter. It would invite the Conference to complete examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992 and establish an ad hoc committee during its 2000 session.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, China, Cuba, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Egypt, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka and the Sudan.
According to a draft resolution on the CTBT (document A/C.1/54/L.23), the Assembly would endorse the Final Declaration of the Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT, held in Vienna from 6 to 8 October. In particular, the Assembly would call upon all States that had not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and refrain from acts which could defeat its object and purpose, in the meanwhile. It would call upon all States that had signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force, to accelerate ratification with a view to their early successful conclusion.
The Assembly would urge States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear- weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. It would urge all States to sustain the momentum generated by the Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT by remaining seized of the issue at the highest political level. It would welcome the contributions of States signatories to the work of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), in particular to its efforts to ensure that the Treatys verification regime would be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty upon its entry into force, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Togo, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia.
By the terms of a draft resolution on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (document A/C.1/54/L.24), the Assembly would urge the countries of the region that had not yet done so to ratify the amendments to the Treaty approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions of 3 July 1990, 10 May 1991, and 26 August 1992. The Assembly would welcome the concrete steps taken by some countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Under a draft text on objective information on military matters (document A/C.1/54/L.27), the Assembly would call upon all Member States to report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year. It would recommend the guidelines and recommendations for objective information to all Member States for implementation, fully taking into account specific political military and other conditions prevailing in a region, on the basis of initiatives with the agreement of the States of the region concerned.
The Assembly would request the Secretary-General to continue consultations with relevant international bodies, within existing resources, with a view to ascertaining the requirements for adjusting the present instrument to encourage wider participation, with emphasis on examining possibilities for enhancing complementarity among international and regional reporting systems and to exchange related information with those bodies. It would further request him to make recommendations on necessary changes to the content and structure of the standardized reporting system in order to strengthen and broaden participation, and to submit a report on the subject to the Assembly as its fifty-sixth session.
In a related provision, the Assembly would call upon all Member States, in time for the fifty-sixth session of the Assembly, to provide the Secretary- General with their views on the analysis and recommendations contained in his report, with further suggestions to strengthen and broaden participation in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, including necessary changes to its content and structure.
The draft resolution is sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.
Statements
H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka) introduced the draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (document A/C.1/54/L.22). Thanking the delegation of Egypt for its advice and support in coming up with the text, he said the resolution had broad support, a measure of the importance the international community attached to the subject. The substance and text, which had been updated after wide-ranging consultations, had been crafted in a careful manner. The draft had been formulated in a forward-looking manner, with the objective of reaffirming the principles of the resolution. He hoped the present wording would enable all delegations to achieve a consensus. CLIVE WALLACE PEARSON (New Zealand), on behalf of the co-sponsors, introduced the draft resolution entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda (document A/C.1/54/L.18). He said the purpose of the text was simple and transparent: to reinvigorate the way to approach the nuclear disarmament agenda. Its intention was to galvanize the international community in a concerted push to move forward - in realistic and achievable steps - in order to eradicate nuclear weapons, once and for all. It was the duty of all Members of the United Nations to address that crucial imperative. The draft had outlined the contours for moving forward. It did not presume to supplant other resolutions on nuclear disarmament. Rather, its purpose was to offer a comprehensive way forward, contingent on an unequivocal undertaking to speed up the pace of engagement.
He said the draft text had addressed the task in the round; it was not discriminatory in its approach, as had been claimed. It had called for steps to be taken, appropriately, by the five nuclear-weapon States who possessed the largest arsenals. It had called upon the nuclear-capable States that were not States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to renounce the nuclear weapons option and adhere to the non-proliferation regime unconditionally and without delay. It also contained calls upon the non- nuclear-weapon States to take a considerable number of steps. The text had offered an all-inclusive approach. Its goal was to engage the international community as a whole in underpinning the steps along the way that, collectively, needed to be part of the exercise of its obligations and responsibilities. It had importantly addressed the considerable inventory of unfinished business in disarmament. In that context, it was both inclusive and comprehensive.
The text had focused on the need to use existing mechanisms and approaches, he said. It had provided a balance between bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral approaches, each of which, undeniably, must be pursued to achieve nuclear disarmament. It had not attempted to multilateralize the ongoing bilateral process, but it had recognized, as that process had evolved further, that others would need to be engaged along the way. The new agenda co- sponsors had believed that the approach set out in the draft had offered a decisive way to proceed, in order to achieve consensus on eliminating nuclear weapons. An overriding concern in tabling the text was the reality that the nuclear disarmament process was faltering, if not stalled, he said. It needed a kick start. The perceived promise that had accompanied the end of the cold war had been elusive. As a consequence, the international community was not delivering, as fast as it should, on nuclear disarmament.
He said the nuclear tests in South Asia and the subsequent talk of developing a nuclear deterrent had changed the nuclear architecture. The text had addressed that development, as well as the need for universal adherence to the NPT. Concepts of nuclear deterrence were being expanded or, at least, becoming more ambiguous. The retention of nuclear weapons was being "re- rationalized for potential use against biological and chemical weapons attack. In addition, there were other challenges being pursued in missile proliferation and missile defence. Complacency had crept into the nuclear agenda, he said. The political agenda, more often than not, had followed rather than led public expectations on disarmament. That complacency might have permeated civil society thinking, as well as the political process itself. It was that sense of real frustration that had driven the new agenda process. The approach had been underwritten by the provisions of the NPT and, in particular, its basic bargain to forego the nuclear weapons option in return for the undertaking to work for the elimination of those weapons.
The NPT had contained an explicit obligation to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it had called for the cooperation of all States in the attainment of that objective, he went on. It had followed, therefore, that non- nuclear-weapon States had both the right and the responsibility to pursue that obligation. When the NPT had been indefinitely extended in 1995, that agreement had not sanctioned the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the NPT had made another important distinction, namely, that progress on nuclear disarmament was not contingent on progress on conventional disarmament. Finally, it was inherent in a treaty based on mutual obligations that no single group of States could determine independently the pace with which the obligations of that treaty were implemented. Those were the legal imperatives before the global community.
The United States and the Russian Federation had rejected categorically any multilateralization of the START process, he went on. The international community had not disputed that, nor was the current initiative calling for multilateralism of that important engagement. It had now, however, seen the process evolving into plurilateral engagement, and, in turn, eventually becoming multilateral and universal. The draft resolution was also balanced, in that it had acknowledged and welcomed the disarmament measures already being pursued by some nuclear-weapon States. Most important in that context was the trilateral initiative between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Russian Federation. Hopefully, that initiative could be broadened in the future. Unilateral measures, such as those undertaken by the United Kingdom and France, were also welcomed in the text.
He stressed that nuclear weapons must not, in the new millennium, become an inevitable feature of society. The fact that those had not been used for 50 years did not mean that the risks they had posed had been lessened. The longer those were retained, the greater the temptation for others to acquire them. Increasingly, nuclear weapons would become an even greater liability as inventories aged and exceeded their design life. Was the world already seeing a new race for technology replacement? he asked. Nuclear weapons were multilateral in their reach and devastation. The pernicious capacity of the current inventory of those weapons was beyond comprehension. It seemed, as others had noted, that we have weapons chasing targets rather than targets requiring weapons. It was not new agenda thinking to engage in a debate over what might or might not be lower levels at which a deterrent might be maintained in the future. The goal, consistent with international obligations, was to work determinedly for their elimination altogether. No more, no less, he added.
In taking the new agenda forward, the co-sponsors had been conscious that for too long it had been all too easy to dismiss calls for action as being premature, unrealistic, counter-productive or impossible to achieve, he went on. It had been said that there was no need for a new agenda. That was disingenuous talk. The only agreed agenda that had currency were the elements set down in the NPTs principles and objectives. The draft resolution had incorporated and endorsed that agenda. The new agenda approach, however, had been qualitatively different. It had called for the implementation of some practical measures that could be taken now and measures that could be taken in the future. It had advocated a step-by-step, progressive approach, and it had argued for mutually reinforcing steps. It had not attempted to put down deadlines. It had confirmed the call made in the Committee last week that disarmament was best achieved through practical, discreet, incremental steps. The calls made in the text were realistic and achievable.
The new agenda co-sponsors were seeking to move the debate along a measured path, he said, where the requisite confidence, productive engagement and outcomes could be delivered. It might not be a comfortable scenario for action -- disarmament rarely was for those who possessed the weapons. The text had been updated to take into account developments over the past year. A number of refinements had been made to the preambular and operative paragraphs, which had taken into account the constructive dialogue of the past year with those countries keen to engage on substance. The draft had explicitly and deliberately not questioned the commitments to article VI of the NPT. It sought only to accelerate the process leading to the fulfilment of those obligations. That was a very important distinction. The new agenda had also endorsed the need for the full implementation of the decisions and the resolution that had emerged from the 1995 NPT Review Conference.
He said the draft resolution had endorsed and welcomed the disarmament measures being undertaken, in addition to the START process. Central to the new agenda approach had been a determination of the need for an unequivocal undertaking to speed up the process leading to elimination. The new agenda had sought to have that undertaking articulated at the highest political levels. All delegations were urged to consider the text carefully and to join the sponsors in supporting it. It should be assessed for what it said, rather than for what it did not. The sponsors had not claimed that the text was a novel or exhaustive agenda, nor was it a hidden or confrontational one. It was acceptable if some delegations wished to call it a renewed agenda.
ALBERTO GUANI (Uruguay), speaking on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), referred to the agenda item as the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes. He said he was concerned about the risks and dangers such transport posed to the health and security of the people in his region, particularly coastal and island States. Regulation of the transport of contaminated and radioactive material needed to be strengthened to include such obligations as communication with coastal States regarding the scheduled transport of those materials, as well as contingency plans in case of accident and compensation in case of damages. Strengthened regulations would also include such preventive measures as training courses in the transportation of radioactive material, with a view to obtaining higher levels of safety and security.
He said there should be guarantees provided to promote the strictest measures of safety, with a view to protecting security and health of the populations in regions where such transportation occurred. Such internationally agreed rules would be mutually beneficial for all States and make it possible to establish the coordination and necessary protection for preventing accidents.
WALDEMAR COUTTS (Chile) spoke in support of Uruguays statement on the maritime transport of nuclear waste and other toxic waste. He said that his countrys long coastline increased the risks to health and environment involved in such transport. It was necessary to sensitize the international community on the issue, and to continue progress towards strengthening safety and security measures. The concerns of such island States as the Dominican Republic, which largely depended on fishing, farming and tourism, needed to be carefully considered. The transport of radioactive materials, which continued to increase, was a real threat to safety and could affect small developing countries that lacked the resources to cope with a disaster. He supported strengthening implementation of the highest international standards, including the exchange of advance information on the route of such transport and contingency plans in the event of an accident.
ANGELICA ARCE (Mexico) introduced the draft on the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (document A/C.1/54/L.23). She said she hoped it would be adopted by consensus.
GUNTHER SEIBERT (Germany), on behalf of the 50 co-sponsors, introduced the draft resolution on objective information on military matters (document A/C.1/54/L.27). He said the growing number of co- sponsors had been encouraging and would hopefully translate into further participation in the reporting instrument. While most concepts on transparency had been developed in the regional context, progress on the global level had been modest and much remained to be done by the international community. Two global transparency measures had been adopted by Member States: the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; and the United Nations standardized reporting system on military expenditures. While the Register had reflected national data on arms imports and exports in seven categories of conventional weapons, the standardized reporting instrument had provided a more general overview of national defence policies, in particular, on national spending, procurement, operating costs and development, among others.
He said he wished to underline the importance of universal adherence to both instruments. His country had remained committed to promoting transparency and confidence-building, both globally and in the regional contexts. He was grateful to the Government of the Netherlands for submitting a transparency text (document A/C.1/54/L.39), which had particularly dealt with the Register. His country had co-sponsored that text and would welcome its broad support. The full potential of confidence-building could be developed only in conjunction with further political steps, which sometimes required the painstaking efforts of the international community. The United Nations standardized reporting instrument had fully taken into account the different political conditions of each region. Previous resolutions under the same title had been repeatedly adopted by the General Assembly without a vote.
ION GORITA (Romania) spoke on behalf of the draft resolution entitled objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures (document A/C.1/54/L.27). He said that the issue of transparency in armaments was a small but necessary part of global confidence-building. Increasing transparency in the military field could lead to greater confidence among States, particularly those belonging to the same region. Recent experience, including the one in south-eastern Europe, had underlined the fact that confidence remained essential to the maintenance of regional and international stability. Transparency had also played an important role in preventing and reducing the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of armaments, an issue widely recognized as having a negative impact on emerging crises, he said. A better flow of objective military information could help to relieve regional and international tension and prevent miscalculations that might lead to irreversible confrontation. The United Nations standardized reporting system was an important instrument that could reduce the risk of military confrontation.
Regrettably, only a small number of countries provided information to be included in the reporting system, he added. That was why he attached great importance to the call contained in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, which called upon all Member States to report their military expenditures annually by 30 April. Participation to the reporting system should also be expanded. He welcomed the resumption of consultations aimed at ascertaining requirements for adjusting the present reporting instrument.
AKIRA HAYASHI (Japan) said he supported the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Mexico on the CTBT. His Government had attached importance to the ratification of the CTBT by all States, as well as the cessation of nuclear tests, pending the Treatys entry into force. It was also important to sustain the momentum generated by the Vienna Conference last month to facilitate the Treatys entry into force. In accordance with the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed to in 1995, the international community had successfully completed negotiations on the CTBT in 1996. Now, the immediate task was to realize its entry into force as soon as possible, together with the commencement of a fissile material cut-off negotiations.
He noted that last week the United States Senate had taken a negative decision on the CTBT. He said his Government had deeply regretted that action. It was also seriously concerned that the decision might send a wrong message to the world on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in general, and on the significance of the Treaty, in particular. Thus, the Japanese Government, immediately following the Senate vote, had sent a State Secretary to Washington, D.C., to urge, at the highest level, that United States government and key congressional personalities continue their efforts to bring about the early ratification of the Treaty, despite the setback. In addition, the Foreign Minister of Japan had called upon the Foreign Ministers of a number of States to accelerate the ratification process of the CTBT.
On the other hand, he said he had been encouraged by the position of the United States Government to continue efforts to secure ratification. He had welcomed the statement to that effect in the Committee by the United States. The delayed ratification in one State, although very regrettable, should not be used as a pretext to postpone the ratification process in other States. Taking the lead in the right direction would be strongly called for and deeply appreciated. As a ban on nuclear testing had won global consensus, the text would hopefully be adopted by consensus.
SOLA OGUNBANWO (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the new agenda resolution (document A/C.1/54/L.18), said he wanted to clarify what was meant by new agenda. It must be comprehensive and not selective, and it had two broad elements -- renewed items and new items. Renewed items related to the long list of unresolved issues, while new items took note that disarmament was not a static subject, but rather constantly evolving, either because of new technologies or other developments.
If there were problems with the choice of the words new agenda, he said he had no difficulty calling it future agenda. Whatever it was called, it could not be based on complacency or business as usual. Methods for dealing with disarmament and security needed to be reviewed to meet the challenges of the next century. Goals needed to be both precise and realistic, bearing in mind that progress, however modest or incremental, was still good. He supported convening a fourth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which could set universal goals and principles. He also said the final session of the First Committee could generate ideas that would greatly benefit the Millenium Summit, scheduled to open on 6 September 2000.
ISMAIL KHAIRAT (Egypt) introduced a draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/54/L.8) He said the resolution had been the subject of intensive consultations and used neutral language, which simply stated facts. The reality was that the only State in the region not to have acceded to the NPT was Israel. It was also the only State in the region suspected of possessing a large nuclear arsenal. Israels refusal to discuss the nuclear issue, or put its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, produced a dangerous and provocative situation.
Achievement of universal adherence to the NPT was a priority, and Israels refusal to join or even to declare its intention to join the Treaty impeded such universality, he said. Continuation of that imbalance could only further aggravate security concerns in the region and undermine efforts to establish confidence-building measures, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East. Non-nuclear-weapon States in the region had no choice but to question their own security needs, in light of the threat from Israel. The tone of the text had changed from one of confrontation to cooperation and it was now Israel's turn to make a gesture by acceding to the NPT.
ROBERT T. GREY (United States) said he was taking the floor for two purposes: to address the resolution on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, tabled by the Russian Federation, Belarus and China (document A/C.1/54/L.1) and to provide clarification on his Governments intentions with regard to its own traditional resolutions. In particular, he wished to respond to the statement made on 21 October by the Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation regarding that draft resolution, about which his country was deeply concerned. There were certain areas of agreement, however, including: the United States had firmly believed that the ABM Treaty remained a cornerstone of strategic stability and that it continued to provide the essential foundation for achieving further reductions in strategic offensive arms; and that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM Treaty and to continued efforts to strengthen it.
He said, however, that his Government takes strong exception to the representatives statement that the draft resolution follows the mainstream of agreements between the Presidents of Russia and the United States reached in Cologne in June. In the view of the United States, the draft resolution was inconsistent with the commitments made by them in Cologne. The representative had also stated that the Cologne Joint Statement had not contained any agreement to review the ABM Treaty. He then had gone on to quote the Joint Statement language, which had said that both sides affirm their existing obligations under article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty, and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. What did that obligation in the ABM Treaty mean if it was not a commitment by the parties to review the Treaty in light of changes in the strategic situation? he asked.
The Cologne Joint Statement went on to note that discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty would begin later in the summer, he said. Those discussions had, in fact, already begun. Several meetings with his countrys Russian counterparts had already been held on START III and the ABM Treaty. In fact, Under-Secretary of State (designate) John Holum had departed New York to travel to Moscow to continue discussions on the ABM Treaty and START III. His Government had also taken strong exception to the characterizations in the representatives statement that the United States was seeking to undermine or liquidate the Treaty or that any changes to its provisions would deprive the Treaty of any sense.
He said his country had not made a decision to deploy a limited national missile defence, and that such a decision would not be made until 2000 or later. In any case, it did not believe the deployment of a limited national missile- defence system would change the basic strategic calculus underlying the ABM Treaty or be incompatible with its central purpose, namely, to maintain strategic stability and enable further reductions in strategic offensive arms. The draft resolution on the ABM Treaty had appeared to be based on the premise that adapting the Treaty to meet the emerging threat posed by long-range ballistic missiles under developing and testing by certain States had necessarily meant destroying the Treaty. Further, that had also ignored the strong view of the United States that the adaptation it had envisioned would not threaten the stability of mutual United States-Russian deterrence. In ongoing discussions with the Russian Federation, there were shared common views, including: the need for further reductions in offensive forces beyond START I and START II; the need for stability in that strategic relationship; and the need to preserve the ABM Treaty, which had provided stability and opened the way to further reductions.
The United States had made clear to the Russian side that it had wanted to work cooperatively on the issue of missile defence and the ABTM Treaty, as those also continued their discussions on START III, he went on. Such bilateral efforts were the only way to achieve success. Discussions were well under way and were continuing. The draft resolution on the ABT Treaty, however, had sought to prejudge that process and would undercut it. That was neither in the interest of the United States nor of the Russian Federation, nor of the world community, nor of anyone who wished to see real progress on nuclear disarmament. His country had recognized that the international community had an interest in the progress of bilateral arms control. At the same time, it did not believe that it was appropriate for the General Assembly to be placed in the position of having to take sides in ongoing bilateral negotiations, or that the Assembly could or should make judgements about specific substantive, negotiating issues in such talks. Consequently, his Government would strongly urge Russia, Belarus and China to refrain from proceeding with their draft.
He said that, regrettably, his country had decided not to pursue its two traditional resolutions, namely, one on Compliance with Arms Limitation and Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agreements, and on Bilateral Nuclear Arms Negotiations and Nuclear Disarmament. Both texts had addressed important and relevant issues and would have been particularly timely, but it had appeared that those two resolutions had risked being subjected to a campaign of amendments designed to introduce contention over the ABM Treaty in every possible context. Those resolutions had important points to make and deserved better treatment. As a result, his country would not pursue them this year. On compliance, it had instead tabled a draft decision (document A/C.1/54/L.13) to keep the issue on the agenda. Hopefully, the traditional consensus enjoyed by the compliance resolution would apply to the compliance decision.
SOCORRO ROBIROSA (Mexico) introduced the draft resolution on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (document A/C.1/54/L.24). She said the draft resolution contained a new preambular paragraph, which took note that in January of this year, Colombia and Costa Rica had deposited their instruments of ratification for the amendments to the Treaty. She welcomed resolutions by a number of States for strengthening the denuclearization regime in the region, and urged those countries that had not yet acceded to to do so. She hoped the resolution would enjoy the broadest possible support and would be approved without a vote.
ANATOLY ANTONOV (Russian Federation) introduced the draft resolution on information and telecommunications in the context of international security (document A/C.1/54/L.4). He said the question had become a topic of discussion in terms of a renewed stage of the scientific and technological revolution. At the fifty-third Assembly session, his delegation had submitted the initiative, which had appropriately won general support. The world was currently entering a qualitatively different environment, prompted by the speedy development and introduction of new information technologies. That had the potential for enhancing the creative potential of mankind and improving the circulation of information in the global community.
At the same time, he said, the information revolution entailed a certain threat that information could be used for purposes that were incompatible with the maintenance of international peace and stability, compliance with the non- use of force and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, among other things. That danger required the adoption of preventive measures. Development of a new area of confrontation, which might provoke a new arms race based on scientific and technological advances, would divert tremendous resources that could be earmarked for peace and development. Further, information and the information infrastructure were also vulnerable to terrorists and other criminals.
The issue of international information security was now ripe for a careful and objective discussion within the framework of the United Nations, he said. The new draft resolution had confirmed the significance of the problem and was aimed at continued consideration, at the multilateral level, of related existing and potential threats. The text was non-confrontational and had included the interests of a broad range of States. The operative portion had invited all States to continue to report to the Secretary-General their views on the general evaluation of the problem, in order to determine the advisability of developing international principles to enhance global information security and telecommunications systems and help to combat information terrorism and criminality. That broad approach should make it possible for all States to consider all aspects of the problem. He hoped the proposal, as last year, would be adopted by consensus.
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