DESPITE TEST-BAN REJECTION, COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL 'UNWAVERING', UNITED STATES TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE, AS GENERAL DEBATE CONCLUDES

Press Release
GA/DIS/3149

DESPITE TEST-BAN REJECTION, COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL 'UNWAVERING', UNITED STATES TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE, AS GENERAL DEBATE CONCLUDES

Canada Says Test-Ban Failure Would Be 'Serious Blow' to Disarmament; Outer Space Arms Race, ABM Treaty, Security Doctrines Also Addressed

As the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) concluded its disarmament and security debate this morning, the representative of the United States told the Committee that, despite the recent Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), his country’s commitment to arms control and non-proliferation was “unwavering”, adding that “we will complete the task of bringing the Treaty into force”.

The United States representative said that, moreover, the Senate vote on the CTBT ratification was not reason for anyone else to “stand back” from the cause of non-proliferation and arms control. He also explained to the Committee that in light of the growing and increasing unpredictability of threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems, his country was considering “a limited capability” to defend against the long-range missile threats of rogue States. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems -- the ABM Treaty -- had been amended before and it should be possible to deploy a limited national-missile defence in a way that preserved the Treaty’s essential purposes –- namely, strategic stability and strategic offensive weapon reductions -- while providing limited defence against such threats.

Also addressing the CTBT, the representative of Canada said it was deeply disturbing that the country that had championed the cause of disarmament had now “retreated from the battle” to bring the landmark CTBT into force. His country very much regretted the United States Senate’s failure to ratify the CTBT and he hoped that decision would be reconsidered at an early date. The CTBT represented a formidable international consensus against nuclear test explosions. A treaty that had entered into force, however, would better serve the international community. Failure to bring that about would be a “serious blow” to the global non- proliferation and disarmament regime, and reflect a rejection of multilateralism in favour of a strategy of “narrow self-reliance”.

The representative of Pakistan said that now, more than ever, it was essential to open multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on preventing an arms race in outer space. Today, there were not five, but at least

First Committee - 1a - Press Release GA/DIS/3149 12th Meeting (AM) 20 October 1999

eight nuclear Powers and at least a dozen other States that could quickly develop nuclear weapons if they felt compelled to do so. The exploitation of outer space -- to support the creation of defensive shields against missile attacks or used for the deployment of weapons aimed at ground targets –- would provoke a new strategic rivalry among the major Powers and erode nuclear stability. In that connection, the ABM Treaty, so far effective in restraining an irrational nuclear arms race between the two nuclear super-Powers, now faced an uncertain future. Any revision of that Treaty would erode global confidence in the permanence of solemn commitments for nuclear and arms restraint.

Iran's representative said he was gravely concerned by the development of missiles beyond national defence. Such development could destabilize regional and international security. But, given the complexity of the missile issue, a comprehensive examination of the question of missiles in all its aspects should be undertaken by a competent body. The end of the cold war and the super-Power rivalry demanded the formulation of a new security architecture based on the new military doctrines. A different agenda based on the new realities could be drafted at a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Thailand, Czech Republic, Sudan, Nepal, Iraq, Haiti, Andorra and Mexico (introducing the report of the Disarmament Commission) as well as a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Thursday, 21 October, to begin its thematic debate on all disarmament and security items and consideration of all draft resolutions.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to conclude its general debate on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

One such multilateral agreement -- the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) --still requires the ratification of 18 countries critical to its success. The United States Senate rejected the Treaty last week. Ratification by the other two nuclear-weapon States, Russian Federation and China, might be in question because of the rejection by the United States. Other States whose ratification is required under article 14 of the Treaty, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan, still have not signed the Treaty, which opened for signature in 1996.

A conference to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force concluded on 8 October, in Vienna. In a Final Declaration, the participating States parties and signatories to the CTBT called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose.

The nuclear disarmament debate is expected to take into account bilateral arrangements, including the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems -- the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to limit the deployment and development of anti- ballistic missiles.

Attempts to revise that cornerstone treaty of strategic balance could have other ramifications, such as the further delay in ratification by the Russian Duma of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which is the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

The original treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START I, was signed in 1991 and called for a 30 per cent reduction in strategic weapons over seven years, with stringent verification. In 1993, START II provided for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. Negotiation on further reductions under START III can commence only upon entry into force of START II.

On non-proliferation, the lack of positive results from the three preparatory committee sessions leading up to the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be discussed. The Treaty, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, is considered by many experts to be the bedrock of the non-proliferation regime. With 188 States parties, it is the most universal of all disarmament agreements.

Treaties banning the production and stockpiling of other weapons of mass destruction were also expected to dominate the debate, among them the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). The call has intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification of, and compliance with, that 1978 Treaty.

The entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) triggered the operation of a complex verification mechanism, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has completed 503 inspections and has witnessed the destruction of more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. So far, 126 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention.

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. The zones already in existence are governed by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and entered into force on 1 March 1999.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3139 issued 8 October.)

Statements

ASDA JAYANAMA (Thailand) said the world community needed to embrace a more comprehensive notion of security, one that placed the welfare of people as the highest priority. Disarmament and international security must be approached from the perspective of providing “human security”.

He said his Government attached high importance to the problem of landmines. Removal of mines was an important first step, but only part of the answer. It had to be accompanied with increased attention to mine awareness, victim assistance and long-term rehabilitation. Strong political will alone would not resolve the issue of landmines. It needed to be reinforced through adequate resources, financial assistance and technical support. Donor countries, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should provide the necessary support and assistance.

His Government also supported all forms of international cooperation to redress the problem of illicit transborder trafficking in guns, small arms and other light weapons, including the convening of an international conference on the issue in the year 2001, he continued. The conference should be held in a venue that would ensure the broadest participation at the highest level possible.

Nuclear disarmament remained one of the top priority issues of international security, he said. He associated his country with the earlier Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) statement. He hoped that the States parties to the NPT would make use of the upcoming Review Conference to revitalize the process, in order to fulfil the principles and objectives set out by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

ALEXANDRE SLABY (Czech Republic) said that prompt steps were needed to overcome stagnation in the negotiations on treaties promoting nuclear non- proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States must resume a constructive approach to those talks. Efforts should focus on achieving clear, practical and realistic measures in nuclear disarmament in the next millennium.

His Government hoped for a push forward on the START series. Also, fissile material cut-off negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament would greatly contribute to speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament in all its fields. The ad hoc group on the fissile material treaty should be re-established during a very early stage of the 2000 session of the Conference.

He said there were still many countries that had not yet signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and efforts aimed at the universality of the Convention must be supported. His Government attached great importance to an early and successful result of negotiations on the verification protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention. The seventeenth session of the ad hoc group of experts should progress with compliance measures, investigations, definitions, criteria and objectives. Also, his Government welcomed the enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament by another five countries, but was of the opinion that the membership of the Conference could not be denied to other countries sincerely wishing and able to participate in its work. The interest of countries striving for active involvement in the process of disarmament, including the Czech Republic, should be met.

JOHN D. HOLUM (United States) said the events of last year had posed significant challenges to the global arms control and non-proliferation regime, highlighting the need to redouble efforts. An honest assessment of the past year was that, despite some real and disappointing setbacks, the world did move ahead in reinforcing the consensus against proliferation. The United States had continued to reduce its nuclear-weapon stockpile and work with the Russian Federation and others to ensure that nuclear materials were safe and secure, to enhance transparency, to place excess fissile material stocks under international safeguards, and to transform –- irreversibly –- excess plutonium into forms unusable in nuclear weapons.

He said the United States had worked with others to strengthen the OPCW and to complete the process for United States industry declarations to that organization. In September, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had announced it was suspending its long-range missile programme, in the context of a broad initiative developed by the former United States Secretary of Defense, William Perry. Worldwide, exports of destabilizing missiles and related technologies had intensified. Likewise, the reach and breadth of efforts to discourage proliferation had been expanding. Progress had also been made in efforts to address the regional dimension of non-proliferation. In South Asia, the United States and other countries had sustained efforts to promote strategic restraint. Recent political developments in the region had made further progress even more essential. In the Middle East, an emerging climate of cooperation had opened opportunities on regional security issues. The United States had worked to cultivate that atmosphere and discourage actions in multilateral forums that could undermine it.

On 13 October, the United States Senate had voted against ratification of the CTBT –- a “deep disappointment” to him personally, as well as to others who had laboured in support of it. The outcome was clearly a setback, but efforts to bring it into force were not over. United States President William Clinton had made clear that his efforts to secure ratification would continue, and he would continue to urge others to ratify the Treaty, particularly among those 44 countries required for its entry into force. President Clinton had also made clear that as he had pursued ratification, there would be no return to nuclear explosions. The United States would sustain the testing moratorium it had observed since 1992. Concerns had been raised about stockpile stewardship and verification. The United States’ programme was strong on the first and the Treaty was fully adequate on the second. Given time, those concerns could be resolved. The Conference in Vienna had demonstrated, once again, that support for the CTBT in the international community had remained a powerful force, one that would be sustained and could not be ignored. “We will complete the task of bringing the Treaty into force”, he said.

He said his country’s dedication to non-proliferation and arms control had not flagged. Moreover, the Senate vote on the CTBT ratification was not reason for anyone else to “stand back” from that cause. After all, non-proliferation and arms control steps were matters of vital self-interest. For that reason, one of the most important priorities for the United States next year would be to ensure that the NPT Review Conference would reaffirm the Treaty as an essential part of the non-proliferation regime. His country was looking forward to a constructive Review Conference, which would produce a balanced and thorough assessment of the NPT. There would be differences on key issues, such as on article VI of the Treaty, but let there be no doubt about the United States’ continued strong commitment to its article VI obligations. The NPT had served all of its parties well.

Another key priority was the conclusion of negotiations for the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention -– a “linchpin” of the global non-proliferation regime, he said. The parties had been labouring in the ad hoc group in Geneva for four years, the parameters of the protocol were well established and countries had made clear their bottom lines or “red lines”. Now was the time to settle the remaining core issues. The multilateral arms control calendar was full, but strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention was far too important. The world must not let that effort falter, especially when the work was not near completion. The fissile material cut-off treaty was another issue that had languished far too long. The world was marking time because the Conference on Disarmament could not agree on a work programme. He hoped such agreement could be reached in January. Failure to do so would not only threaten a fissile material cut-off treaty, but call into question the credibility of the Conference itself.

The START process had remained at the top of the arms control agenda, he went on. His country had been strongly committed to furthering systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. At the June Summit between the Russian Federation and the United States, the two Governments had agreed to begin discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty in late summer. He had conducted the first such meeting with Russian officials in August, and further meetings were planned shortly. His country looked forward to Russia’s ratification of START II, even as they continued discussions of START III to reach aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads by December 2007, a cumulative reduction of 80 per cent from cold-war peaks.

Concerning the ABM Treaty –- a cornerstone of strategic stability -– it remained critical to preserving confidence on both sides in the stability of their respective strategic deterrent forces, he said. The ABM Treaty had remained fundamental to achieving the shared objectives for START II and START III, and for maintaining nuclear cooperation efforts. The international environment had changed dramatically since 1972. The threat of weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems was real, it was growing, and it was increasingly unpredictable. Accordingly, the United States was considering “a limited capability” to defend against the long-missile threats of rogue States. The ABM Treaty had been amended before. It should be possible to prevent the deployment of a limited national missile defence in a way that preserved the Treaty’s essential purposes –- namely, strategic stability and strategic offensive-weapon reductions, while providing limited defence against the missile threats from rogue States. A decision as to whether to proceed with deployment would be made next summer, consistent with considerations of feasibility, threat, cost and arms control.

He said a number of States had urged a “new agenda” in arms control -– towards a world free from nuclear weapons. His country had recognized the frustration that some felt about the pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament. The United States had made a sincere and conscious effort to approach that process in the best way forward, and it would continue to record the many steps taken to support that process. Indeed, the United States was part of the international consensus on nuclear disarmament, but there had been no consensus on how best to attain that goal and no agreement that the answer was to forge a new agenda. The situation did not reflect a failure on the part of the international community or a deficient commitment to disarmament, but rather the essence of the disarmament process.

Disarmament was best achieved through practical, discreet, incremental steps -– each building on its predecessors and each calibrated to the realities of the international security environment, he said. Disarmament was built on tangible factors: the commitment of States to the process; a stable security environment; effective verification regimes; and agreements that could be enforced. “The way forward was not through a 'new agenda', but a renewed agenda.” The problem was not too few items on the agenda, or insufficiently lofty goals, but insufficient collective willingness to grasp the attainable ones. Efforts must be redoubled to complete the agenda. There was one road forward, and the key milestones along the way should not be bypassed in the world’s haste to reach a shared destination.

He said that some had questioned the commitment and credibility of the United States in the area of arms control and non-proliferation, in the wake of the Senate action on the CTBT. “Don’t let this delay in CTBT ratification mislead you about United States intentions”, he said. Its commitment to arms control and non- proliferation was “unwavering”. The United States would continue to lead the fight against weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation, and to work seriously and steadily to support effective and necessary arms control and non- proliferation agreements.

TARIG ALI BAKHIT (Sudan) said he was concerned over the current environment in international relations and the limitations of international armament. Nuclear disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction should be the highest priority, and practical steps should be taken towards that end.

One reason for the imbalance in international relations, he said, was unilateral hegemony and a “double yardstick”, which had a negative impact on stability. American aggression against the medical factory in the Sudan last August under pretext that the factory was producing chemical weapons, was flagrant proof of that hegemony. Those claims were not based on scientific logic. The factory produced 70 per cent of the medicine needed by the Sudan. His Government had transmitted information to the Security Council that confirmed the erroneous nature of United States claims. The United States continued to hinder the role of the Council after the Sudan requested the Council to send an inquiry. The United States failed to submit any proof to the Council giving validity to its claims. The best known chemical weapons experts examined the results of bombing and the evidence showed that the factory only produced medicines.

The Sudan, he said, attached special importance to the issue of conventional weapons. It supported the principle of limiting the trafficking of conventional weapons, but reaffirmed its right to make use of such weapons to defend its borders. It appealed to other States not to provide rebel movements with conventional weapons, and for States exporting small arms to take the steps necessary to keep them from falling into the wrong hands. It welcomed efforts to hold a conference on small arms, and believed the focus should be on illicit trafficking of such arms. The transparency of arms was one important step towards increasing security. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms needed to be extended to cover information on arms of mass destruction. He called on Israel, the only State in the region not a party to the NPT, to heed international appeals and submit its nuclear installations to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

GHANEDRA BASNET (Nepal) said that recent events were offering a formal challenge to disarmament. Last year’s events of testing and the development of long-range missiles and development of missile defences have become worrisome. The strategic balance between the two States parties maintained by the current ABM Treaty of 1972 should be preserved. Disarmament agreements needed to be concluded more urgently at a time of increased military expenditures. Multilaterally negotiated norms should be observed.

He said that the recent joint statement issued by the five permanent members of the Security Council reiterating their commitment to article VI of the NPT was noteworthy. That commitment needed to be translated into action for salvaging the Treaty, at a time when it was under the pressure of ongoing tests of ballistic missiles. The issue of conventional weapons was no less important, he added. He hoped that organizational matters related to the convening of an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all aspects would be decided at this year’s session.

CHRISTOPHER WESTDAL (Canada) said that States might survive nuclear war, in a manner of speaking, but many human beings would not. The roots of human security, civilian protection and arms control and disarmament policies were that closely entwined. Security mandates needed careful defining now. The Committee’s job was about survival itself, from which “we can’t duck”. Many were too young to remember what it was like before the stakes got that high, before the stopwatch started. Beware of banalities like “nuclear science cannot be unlearned” and “nuclear weapons cannot be un-invented”. There was passive abdication in them.

He said the most important bilateral negotiations were those between the United States and the Russian Federation. In that context, his country had welcomed the joint statement made by their leaders in June that they had remained dedicated to strengthening strategic stability and international security; that they had recognized the fundamental importance of the ABM Treaty; that they were getting START III talks going even before START II ratifications; and that the agreed START I reductions would be achieved earlier than scheduled. Strategic nuclear weapons, however, were not by any means the only nuclear threat. There were many thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in the combined arsenals of Russia and the United States. Russia’s reliance on those weapons, deepened by deteriorating conventional forces, was of particular concern.

Another step forward was the CTBT, which was a more effective obstacle to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons than all previous disarmament treaties, he said. With 154 States signatories and 51 ratifications, including Canada’s, the CTBT represented a formidable international consensus against nuclear-test explosions. The international community would be better served by a Treaty that had entered into force, however. Failure to bring that about would be a “serious blow” to the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It was up to everyone to advance the gains of the last 30 years, and it was deeply disturbing to see that the country that had spearheaded many of those gains by championing the cause had now “retreated from the battle” to bring the landmark CTBT into force. His country very much regretted the United States Senate’s failure to ratify the CTBT. He hoped that that decision would be reconsidered at an early date.

In some respects, he said the debate over the CTBT had reflected the opposing visions of how security could best be achieved in the post-cold-war era. The CTBT had embodied the principle that multilateral cooperation was the best way to block proliferation, and that concerted action by the international community would most effectively serve the national interests of its constituent parts. The contrary view was to reject multilateral undertakings and rely on one’s own national means, in a “go it alone” strategy. An important part of the Committee’s work towards the early entry into force of the CTBT would demonstrate the superiority of cooperation over “narrow self-reliance”.

He said the next obvious step was to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Pending the conclusion of those negotiations, his Government had promoted an immediate and universal moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. His Government had remained deeply worried about the implications of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan last year. Those tests had been a great setback and had remained deeply disturbing. The tests had violated the norm against nuclear proliferation agreed to by the vast majority of States. They had raised the spectre of an arms race in South Asia -– a race that would reduce the security of both Indians and Pakistanis and their neighbours, while consuming vast resources desperately needed to ease the social and economic pain of so many in the region. Further, the tests might lead some nuclear-weapon-capable countries that had renounced weapons to question that decision. Clearly, an arms race could retard further progress towards global disarmament.

He said his country was one of 16 non-nuclear-weapon States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was currently adapting to the current, altered and dynamic security needs of its members. As part of that adaptation, the Summit of NATO leaders in Washington, D.C. last April had taken two vital steps forward. First, they had recognized that international arms control and disarmament arrangements had contributed to alliance security and that alliance members should work together to further advance those arrangements. Second, they had also acknowledged the diminished salience of nuclear weapons and agreed that the alliance would consider options for confidence- and security-building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

Although adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention was widespread, he said problem areas remained. Of greatest concern was the Middle East, where Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were not yet States parties. He recognized the complexities of Middle East security challenges, but strongly believed that ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention would enhance regional stability. The Biological Weapons Convention had not yet included verification provisions, and as the experience with Iraq had shown, advances in biotechnology and the spread of knowledge made biological weapons capability more readily achievable by an increasing number of countries. Many technologies were used legitimately in peaceful research. Clearly, new measures to verify the prohibition of those weapons were urgently required. It was odd that those who had been most vocal on the need for all conventions to be verifiable had been blocking efforts to bring that about.

Five years ago, he continued, the landmines issue had languished in the Conference on Disarmament; now 135 countries had foresworn the use of anti- personnel mines, including all but two of the countries of the Americas, most of Europe and Africa, and much of Asia. Eighty-seven countries had ratified the Ottawa Convention, and the number of mine victims in some of the world’s most severely affected countries had been declining. The once-flourishing trade in anti-personnel mines had all but vanished. There were fewer than 10 mine-producing countries in the world that did not support a comprehensive moratorium, or a de facto ban, on the export of those weapons. Further, since 1996, when the Ottawa process had begun, 20 countries had destroyed more than 14 million stockpiled mines, which would never claim a life or limb again. Despite such encouraging achievements, since the Convention’s entry into force in March 1999, anti-personnel landmines had been used in Kosovo and Angola, and major Powers -– the United States, Russia and China -– had yet to sign the Convention. Those were urged to do so, and the international community was encouraged to devote more resources to demining efforts.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of all casualties in current armed conflict were civilians, there was still a huge and eagerly supplied market for small arms and light weapons, he said. Protecting civilians was literally impossible without stemming the flow of such arms. That required comprehensive and systematic efforts to find new ways to contend with that growing threat. The small arms conference in 2001 must take a comprehensive approach, tackling the issue of proliferation in all its aspects -- arms control, law enforcement and peace- building. Also, his country had shared the international community’s desire to protect current economic and security benefits from the use of outer space, but it wanted to void its weaponization and the new, costly arms race that would result. It had actively promoted the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the Conference on Disarmament to address those issues, and it had proposed that negotiations for a convention for the non-weaponization of outer space be the objective. It was time to preserve outer space as a sanctuary, an environment that was weapon-free.

SAEED HASAN (Iraq) said that what had been achieved in disarmament was far less than what had been aspired to. Nuclear disarmament still eluded the world. The collapse of the socialist camp had given the United States a feeling of hegemony over the whole world. Among examples of the brute-force policy of the United States, aided by Britain, was the imposition of no-fly zones and the bombing of civilian targets in Iraq. Such use of force contradicted the United Nations Charter and posed a serious threat to international security.

He said that the United States and the United Kingdom had used more than 300 tons of depleted uranium bombs against both Iraq and Yugoslavia. In Iraq, that had led to an increase of cancer and genetic deformations in the civilian population. Studies had shown that the use of depleted uranium in bombs had caused serious problems for American soldiers years after the Gulf War. The catastrophic dimensions of the use of such weapons would continue for generations to come. His Government called upon all competent international organizations and countries to give the issue the necessary attention and to take appropriate action to help clean Iraq’s environment of the radioactive effects of those weapons. Further, he called for a ban on the use of depleted uranium in weapons.

His Government was extremely concerned at the news of American intentions to deploy a new missile defence system that included the use of satellites for military purposes. That plan to militarize space contradicted United Nations resolutions and conventions and was additional evidence of the arrogance that would lead to the escalation of the arms race. Further, the field of verification had been dealt a strong blow in the current decade. Statements by United States officials and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) showed that the Commission had been used by the United States and Israel to spy on Iraq, and that became a pretext to resume air attacks against Iraq. The United Nations had not yet investigated that issue or taken any action to hold accountable those who used its name to undertake spying and undermine its reputation.

He said that the Arab region suffered an imbalance in strategic weapons. The Israeli entity acquired all sorts of weapons, including nuclear, and had the capacity to produce at least 250 nuclear warheads. That was a serious threat to the region. Security and stability in the Middle East required the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and turning the region into a zone free of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The Israeli nuclear programme should be put under the safeguards of the IAEA. Perpetuation of the status quo represented a serious imbalance that threatened peace in the region. The Security Council should ensure the implementation of the NPT without any double standards, and take the necessary action to ensure effective guarantees for non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

BERTRAND FILS-AIME (Haiti) said that the mentality of the cold war still existed. Policies of nuclear deterrence and nuclear superiority maintained a “balance of terror”. Authority was above all moral. How could States like India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be encouraged to ban nuclear testing under a non-proliferation regime that was so unequal? he asked. The nuclear Powers were attached to their policies of deterrence. Treaties were being used only to keep new nations from acquiring arms, not towards creating a world where no city had to suffer the fate of Hiroshima.

His Government fully subscribed to the statement of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), expressing concerns over the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. In Haiti, security had been severely compromised by heavily armed bandits. Organized crime destabilized the structures of a young democracy and chased away foreign investment. The weapons were light, but the damage they caused was heavy. He was encouraged by Canadian and Swiss efforts towards “marking” small weapons, and fully supported the convening of an international conference on small arms planned for 2001. He hoped everything would be done to make the conference successful in terms of concrete measures to be implemented. He also endorsed the recommendations of the group of governmental experts on the issue.

JOAN FORNER-ROVIRA (Andorra) said that Andorra was one of the first examples of a demilitarized territory in Europe, formed in 1278 out of a pact of peace that required all castles to be destroyed. That measure might seem simple now, but the philosophy it carried could still be applied in the current situation, where many countries were still spending large amounts to build up their arsenals. The destruction of weapons of all kinds would be perhaps the best way to contribute to international peace and stability.

Andorra had been striving to adhere to some multilateral treaties on disarmament, he said. It had deposited the instruments of adhesion to the NPT, as well as signed the CTBT, which was due for ratification during the parliamentary session. It urged all countries to follow the same path. In spite of the large amount of resources that the adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention entailed for Andorra, priority had been given to it, as a matter of principle.

MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said people had hoped that, with the end of the cold war, genuine progress would be made towards the agreed goals of nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the control and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. Despite the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the indefinite extension of the NPT and the adoption of the CTBT, the window of opportunity to achieve global disarmament and to strengthen international peace and security might be rapidly closing.

He said that during the current decade wars and conflicts had proliferated. The progress made towards disarmament had been partial and was now in danger of being reversed. The reasons for that reversal were complex, but the increasing concentration of power following the cold war, as well as the inevitable resistance to that asymmetry in strength, were major factors in the regression. In the past year, several negative developments had taken place. Mutual trust between some of the major Powers in the context of the Kosovo conflict had eroded. A “new strategic doctrine” by the western alliance had been adopted, which had envisaged “out of area” actions and the threat of nuclear weapons use, including against non- nuclear-weapon States.

Continuing, he said that one party to the START II Treaty had failed to ratify it and another had sought the amendment or abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which could revive the nuclear arms race between the major Powers. The announcement of a “draft nuclear doctrine” by a “new” nuclear Power, envisaging the operational deployment of a huge arsenal of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons could generate further nuclear and conventional arms escalation in South Asia and beyond. In addition, the CTBT had been rejected by the legislature of the Treaty’s main sponsor. Concern about the demise of disarmament was, therefore, legitimate. The quest for a “monopoly on security” and the application of double standards in arms control were unacceptable.

Now, more than ever, it was essential to open multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on preventing an arms race in outer space, he said. The present grossly discriminatory situation must be reversed, if human survival was to be ensured. Today, there were not five, but at least eight nuclear Powers and at least a dozen other States that could quickly develop nuclear weapons if they felt compelled to do so. The resistance of some nuclear Powers to allow negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament had compromised their political and moral credentials to promote non-proliferation. The Conference could undertake negotiations on several important aspects of nuclear disarmament, including a convention committing States to the early abolition of nuclear weapons and a programme for the progressive reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

He said it was equally important for the Conference on Disarmament to open negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 1967 Treaty had declared that outer space “shall be the province of all mankind”. That “province” was now under threat of being transformed into yet another area for military competition. The ABM Treaty, which until now had had a crucial restraining effect on the otherwise “irrational nuclear arms race” between the two nuclear super-Powers, now faced an uncertain future. Moreover, national missile defences and theater missile defences were planned in several sensitive regions of the world. The militarization of outer space would likely be perceived as aimed at global domination and, thus, could provoke new strategic rivalry among the major Powers. The emplacement of theater missile defence systems could provide one side with a quantum military advantage over potential adversaries. Those adversaries, in response, would likely enlarge and improve their nuclear delivery systems. Nuclear stability would be seriously eroded.

He said the endeavour for 25 years to promote a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia had been sadly subverted last year by his neighbour’s nuclear tests and assumption of nuclear-weapon “status”. His country continued to support the creation of such a zone in various other parts of the world, and was prepared to extend appropriate assurances to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of various zones, such as in Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia. His country would support the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

Some difficult issues had remained in the negotiations to evolve a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, he said. Those could be addressed in focused deliberations and resolved through strict adherence to the rule of consensus. His country had been committed to act responsibly in relation to nuclear and other sensitive technologies and equipment, but it could not accept double standards of exclusive regimes that sought to apply rules without its participation or consent, or which sought to deny his country even the peaceful uses of the same technologies. The aim of preventing the spread of sensitive technologies should be promoted through transparent multilaterally agreed arrangements that conformed to international law.

A regional approach offered the most effective framework in which to successfully negotiate conventional arms control agreements, he said. The adoption of principles for conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels by the Conference on Disarmament could contribute to specific negotiations for conventional arms control in various regions of the world. In addition, the Conference could take up other important facets of conventional arms issues, such as the question of new military technologies and their impact on international security and the global imbalance in possession of conventional arms and technologies between different groups of States. Clearly, small arms should be better controlled, but that should not detract from the more important need to resolve the underlying causes of conflict. Further, such control should not compromise the right of countries, especially the smaller ones, to exercise the right to self-defence, or the right of peoples struggling against foreign occupation for their legitimate right to self-determination.

He said his country’s policies on disarmament were inevitably linked with its priority objective of promoting peace, security and stability in South Asia. It had not changed in its positive approach to the CTBT, but it had required an atmosphere “free of coercion”. Sanctions and pressure were not only unacceptable, they were counter-productive. Their continuation did not convey a sense of equity or inspire confidence of cooperation. His country sought a relationship of peace, justice and dignity with India, as well as the genuine resolution of outstanding differences, including the Kashmir dispute, on the basis of Security Council resolutions. It was prepared for a resumption, without preconditions, of the structured dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. On 17 October, his country had announced a unilateral military de-escalation of its international borders with India and the initiation of the return of all of its forces moved to the border in the recent past. He hoped that confidence-building measures would be reciprocated. Such measures could be complemented by additional steps to build mutual trust and confidence.

The summary judgement from the Canadian delegate about the internal situation in Pakistan had revealed a naiveté and ignorance, if not arrogance, he said. Far from being an element of instability, the peaceful change in Pakistan had been designed precisely to ensure stability. That change had been visibly and rightly welcomed by the people of Pakistan and had reflected the disappointment at past experience, as well as the desire for good governance and a “clean” administration -- essential for stability, economic revival, national integration and genuine democracy. At the very least, he hoped the new administration in Pakistan would be given the opportunity to establish its credentials, rather than be the victim of a rush to judgement.

He said that if the Canadian Government was genuinely concerned about instability in South Asia, it would not have blithely ignored the announced plans for the operational deployment of nuclear weapons by Pakistan’s neighbour. Historically, the Canadian Government could have prevented instability and proliferation in South Asia if it had heeded Pakistan’s warnings not to sell the CIRRUS nuclear reactor to India without any safeguards. It was that Canadian action that had initiated proliferation in South Asia. He had hoped to see some acknowledgement of responsibility by the Canadian Government, but that was perhaps too much to hope for, when democracies transformed themselves into hypocrisies.

He said his country had proposed a strategic restraint regime to India, covering mutual nuclear and conventional arms restraint, as well as the resolution of differences. It was deeply concerned by the announcement of the Indian “draft nuclear doctrine”, which had envisaged the operational deployment of a large arsenal of air, land and sea-based nuclear weapons, as well as the acquisition of massive and lethal conventional armaments. In order that Pakistan and other concerned States not act on the basis of worst-case assumptions, India should provide assurances that it had disavowed the draft nuclear doctrine -– that it would not operationally deploy nuclear weapons, and that it would refrain from acquiring anti-ballistic missile systems and other advanced and destabilizing conventional weapons.

MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET (Mexico) introduced the report of the Disarmament Commission (document A/54/42), in her capacity as Vice- Chairperson. She said the report reflected the results of deliberations on three substantive items for the 1999 session. The annexes included the two consensus texts: on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; and guidelines on conventional arms control, limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on the consolidation of peace. In addition, the report contained the document submitted by the Chairman of the working group in charge of considering the item on the fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Beginning next year, the Disarmament Commission would have two substantive items on its agenda, including one on nuclear disarmament, she said. The Commission might add a third item, provided a consensus had existed. Consideration of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones had been timely. Members were able to adopt a consensus text, despite very intense discussions on the relationship between those zones and other regional security agreements, the obligations of States outside the zones and the geographic definition and scope of the zones. That had underscored the readiness of States to display a high level of cooperation in strengthening existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and to establish new ones, as effective non-proliferation measures in the framework of the nuclear disarmament process.

She said that discussions on practical disarmament measures had also concluded successfully. The parties had agreed to a compromise solution, setting aside their different proposals. The adoption of a consensus text had provided the international community with a set of guidelines on practical disarmament measures in post-conflict situations. The successful achievement of those two working groups had not materialized in the working group on the convening of a fourth special session on disarmament. The delegations had shown flexibility with regard to the discussions and had worked with a view to arriving at an agreement to make it possible to adopt the Chairman’s paper as a compromise formula, but differing positions had held, rather than narrowed. After four years of deliberations on that item, the inability to reach agreement had also reflected the differences of opinion regarding the future of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament and the means to achieve it. The failure was also a symptom of the generally unfavourable international climate.

NEJAD HOSSEINIAN (Iran) said that the termination of the cold war and super- Power rivalry called for a new security posture based on new military doctrines. A different agenda should be drafted based on the new realities. He believed that convening the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was a real necessity for updating the only charter of disarmament, which had been adopted back in 1978, a year clearly different from 2000. The First Committee should address the issue and consider ways to reach such a worthy goal.

A legally-binding verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention was now well developed, he said. He hoped the protocol could be concluded in early 2000. Striking a balance between disarmament and technological cooperation aspects of the protocol was among the issues that deserved full consideration.

Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament should been seen as the real top priority on the agenda, he added. Disarmament should be pursued at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The Conference on Disarmament should be mandated to start at least some level of negotiations at its next session. Nuclear-weapon States should show more flexibility in allowing those negotiations to commence. The ad hoc committee on a fissile material cut-off treaty should not be entangled in procedural discussion, but rather should engage in substantive negotiations.

He said the NPT 2000 Review Conference should agree on an updated declaration of principles and objectives, in addition to a substantive document that evaluated implementation of the Treaty. He requested the President of the Conference to start his consultations on outstanding key points in the Preparatory Committee. In addition, despite the recent setback for the CTBT in the United States, the international community should spare no effort to overcome that challenge and make every possible effort to uphold the integrity of the Treaty.

Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, was one of the main elements for the success of nuclear non-proliferation, he went on. By pursuing a clandestine nuclear-weapon programme, Israel endangered peace and security in the region. Also, the development of missiles beyond necessary national defence could destabilize regional and international security. The missile issue was very complex and a comprehensive study needed to be carried out by a competent body. Such a study should sufficiently cover the question of missiles in all its aspects and identify the key issues for further consideration.

SYLVIE JUNOD, of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), said that their recently published study entitled Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict showed a strong link between high levels of arms availability and high levels of civilian casualties, both during and after periods of conflict. Among of the principal conclusions of the study was that suffering could go on for years after the end of a conflict, as the continued availability of arms undermined the rule of law and hampered efforts at reconciliation among former warring parties.

She said the report indicated that international arms transfers, particularly of small arms and light weapons, had become easier, outpacing efforts to ensure compliance with the basic rules of warfare. While recognizing that the primary responsibility for compliance with humanitarian law lied with users of weapons, the study stressed that States and enterprises involved in production and export had a degree of political, moral and in some cases legal responsibility towards the international community for the use that was made of their weapons and ammunition.

The ICRC called upon States to urgently review their policies concerning the production, availability and transfer of arms and ammunition, in light of their responsibility to respect and ensure respect for humanitarian law, she said. It also urged States to include criteria based on the likelihood of humanitarian law being respected, when devising their national policies and making decisions on arms transfers and related international codes of conduct.

In preparation for the upcoming review conference on the Convention on certain conventional weapons, the ICRC intended to host a meeting of governmental and other experts in the second quarter of next year to consider a comprehensive approach to the serious problem created by explosive remnants of war, including anti-vehicle mines, cluster bombs and other munitions that failed to detonate as intended. It will also promote an extension of the scope of the Convention, so that it applied in non-international armed conflicts as well.

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