TEST-BAN TREATY CROWNED 40-YEAR EFFORT TO HALT TEST EXPLOSIONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE TOLD

Press Release
GA/DIS/3148

TEST-BAN TREATY CROWNED 40-YEAR EFFORT TO HALT TEST EXPLOSIONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE TOLD

Compliance Regime for Treaty Described as ‘Stable and Durable’; US Test-Ban Rejection, Israel's Nuclear Capability Also Addressed

In order for the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to fulfil its promise of enhancing international peace and security, as many States as possible must sign and ratify it without delay, thereby pledging their trust in the Treaty’s ability to detect clandestine nuclear testing and deter possible violations, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Bean Treaty Organization (CTBTO) -- the Treaty’s verification system -– told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), as it continued its general debate.

Wolfgang Hoffman said the CTBT had crowned more than 40 years of negotiations aimed at stopping all nuclear-test explosions in all environments. A milestone in disarmament history, the Treaty’s adoption had shown a determination to put an end to more than 50 years of nuclear-test explosions, during which time there had been more than 2,000 nuclear tests. Even before its entry into force, the Treaty and the global monitoring system were capable of contributing to an international norm, but its existence -– and the high price of violating it –- could not replace the legally binding commitment of the signature and ratification of the Treaty. The United Nations Secretariat was creating a stable and durable compliance regime. Now, the States signatories should take the necessary political steps to ensure the Treaty served the purpose for which it was intended.

The representative of the Philippines said that the sorry situation in the area of disarmament had turned sorrier still with the rejection last week of the CTBT by the United States Senate. One thing was clear from the Senate debates: the United States was determined to keep not only a viable nuclear option, but, above all, a clear and overwhelming nuclear advantage. Even those who had fought nobly and valiantly for ratification had conceded that point. The CTBT was far from entirely satisfactory, but it had held the promise of providing a legal regime and a viable investment towards nuclear disarmament. Last week’s defeat, though a major one, should not weaken the resolve to fight for disarmament, but should instead challenge the world to move forward with greater conviction.

First Committee - 1a - Press Release GA/DIS/3148 11th Meeting (AM) 19 October 1999

Several delegations from the Middle East reiterated their call on Israel to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and place its nuclear installations under the global safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Saudi Arabian representative said he blamed the existence of nuclear weapons in the region on Israel’s persistent linkage of disarmament with the Middle East peace process.

The Syrian representative said the nuclear Powers had provided Israel with its nuclear capability, rendering it sixth in the world in the possession of plutonium for military purposes. Israel had been supplied with the most modern technology and advanced weapons systems, while others had been denied access to the most simple technology, which they needed for peaceful purposes, especially development.

The representative of Israel said the failure of the global security and arms control regimes to meet the challenge of proliferation in the Middle East had been alarming. Israel had been confronted with heavily armed States professing varying degrees of hostility towards it and possessing conventional and non-conventional arsenals. Indeed, some of its neighbours had even contemplated the use of poison against it. In that geo-strategic setting, his Government had devised an approach to regional security that consisted of, among others, the primacy and eventual resolution of the peace process and the entitlement of every State to an equally high level of overall security.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Bahrain, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Benin, Ukraine and Japan. A statement by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was distributed to Committee members.

The representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria and Egypt spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Wednesday, 20 October, to conclude its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general debate on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

One such multilateral agreement -- the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- still requires the ratification of 18 countries critical to the Treaty's success. The United States Senate rejected the Treaty last week. Ratification by the other nuclear-weapon States, Russian Federation and China, is pending and may be in question because of the rejection of the United States. Other States whose ratification is required under article 14 of the Treaty, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan, still have not signed the Treaty, which opened for signature in 1996.

A conference to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force concluded last Friday, 8 October, in Vienna. In a Final Declaration, the participating States parties and signatories to the CTBT called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is to be responsible for the global verification regime envisaged in the Treaty. In order that the verification system might be operational by the time the Treaty enters into force, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO held its first technical training programme to familiarize operators with a specific verification technology and the use of instruments in Vienna in October 1998, followed by in-depth training at facilities in Argentina, Norway and the United States.

The operation of another complex verification mechanism, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was triggered upon the entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). The OPCW has completed 503 inspections and has witnessed the destruction of more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. So far, 126 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention.

In a related activity, the call has intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification of, and compliance with, the 1978 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).

On nuclear non-proliferation, the lack of positive results from the three preparatory committee sessions leading up to the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be discussed. The Treaty, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, is considered by many experts to be the bedrock of the non- proliferation regime. With 188 States parties, it is the most universal of all disarmament agreements. The nuclear disarmament debate was expected to take into account bilateral arrangements, including the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems -- the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to limit the deployment and development of anti-ballistic missiles.

Attempts to revise that cornerstone treaty of strategic balance could have other ramifications, such as the further delay in ratification by the Russian Duma of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which is the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

The original treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START I, was signed in 1991 and called for a 30 per cent reduction in strategic weapons over seven years, with stringent verification. In 1993, START II provided for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. Negotiation on further reductions under START III can commence only upon entry into force of START II.

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. The zones already in existence are governed by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and entered into force on 1 March 1999.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3139 issued 8 October.)

Statements

BIBI AL-ALOUI (Bahrain) said that it was essential to put an end to the nuclear nightmare and that negotiations to put an end to weapons of mass destruction should have the full priority of the international community.

Continuing, she said that since the proliferation of light weapons and small arms played such an important role in destabilizing States, her Government called for the establishment of rules and regulations for the circulation of small arms and fully supported all international efforts to curb the flow of such weapons. The report of the Panel of Experts contained recommendations that would support the conference on the issue, to be held no later than 2001.

She said that her country regretted that no consensus had been reached on the objectives and agenda of a fourth special session on disarmament. Such a session was the appropriate framework for disarmament issues. Her country also viewed the building of nuclear-weapon-free zones as important steps in disarmament. They aided in confidence-building and helped to safeguard the stability of a region, enabling the financing of many development projects. Israel was the only country in the region not to support the building of a zone of peace in the Middle East. It had refused to put its facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. That was an important step towards establishing a nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East, and necessary for a just peace in region.

S. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka) said that a meaningful agenda for deliberations and negotiations on disarmament would be indispensable in the next century if the international community were to envision a regime of peace and security based on the force of rule, rather than the rule of force. A multilateral disarmament agenda was an integral part of that regime. The set of resolutions and decisions the First Committee produce should provide inputs for the formulation of the agenda.

The nexus between the illicit arms trade and international criminal organizations, he added, clearly pointed to the need to address the problem as a matter requiring specific international cooperative measures. The issue could no longer be treated as a law and order problem relegated to the limited capabilities and authority of national law enforcement bodies. The forces and technologies that drove the globalization process might be unwittingly supporting the activities of criminal groups. He was pleased to note the growing support garnered by the initiative to convene an international conference on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. He expected the conference to adopt a specific action programme for international cooperation on a broad range of measures to combat the phenomenon of illicit arms. The Expert Group on Small Arms had provided useful inputs to the work of the conference, and those inputs, together with the views received from Member States, should be brought into the preparatory process, to ensure a representative agenda and scope.

He also expressed concern regarding the possibility of new weapon developments undermining the peaceful uses of outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space had enjoyed broad-based support in the Conference on Disarmament. Any developments that could lead to the weaponization of outer space would undermine the security regime on earth and the peaceful uses of outer space. If the international community did not foreclose opportunities for the weaponization of space now, it might have to grapple with non-proliferation measures in outer space later.

FRANCISCO S. TATAD (Philippines) said that as the offspring of the nuclear age, the disarmament record was somewhat mixed. In the area of nuclear weapons, the record was replete with compromises that had always stopped short of the ultimate objectives. The disarmament community had sought to put a positive spin on those compromises by referring to them as “small steps” towards the eventual and total elimination of nuclear weapons. Last week, the sorry situation had turned sorrier still. The rejection by the United States Senate of the CTBT was a major setback, even to the existing regime of compromise agreements. Far from being at a crossroads, the world might now be moving away from the road of nuclear disarmament. One thing was clear from the Senate debates: the United States was determined to keep not only a viable nuclear option, but above all a clear and overwhelming nuclear advantage. Even those who had fought nobly and valiantly for ratification had conceded that point. That was not the best way to pursue disarmament, or play a leading role in the process.

He said that most political and security analysts had agreed that five of the more critical flashpoints in the world today were in Asia -- the South China Sea, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, Indonesia and East Timor. Four of them had involved countries with nuclear weapons. His country was deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in his region and had reiterated its support of the call by the Non-Aligned Movement for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the aim of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to provide for their destruction.

Despite its recent setback, the CTBT remained one of the cornerstones of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, he said. It was a compromise agreement and was far from entirely satisfactory, but it held the promise of providing a legal regime and a viable investment towards nuclear disarmament. For that reason, the Philippines had remained firmly committed to the Treaty and joined all others who had called for its universality. It was encouraging that, despite the rejection on Capitol Hill, the President of the United States had vowed to continue to fight for its ratification. Last week’s defeat, though a major one, did not and should not represent the end or a weakening of resolve to fight for disarmament. To the contrary, it should challenge the world to move on with greater resolve, remembering that the cause of nuclear disarmament had suffered setbacks before. Currently, however, the START process was at a standstill, the NPT review process had been inconclusive, problems remained in relation to the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, and tensions had remained high in South Asia.

He said the Conference on Disarmament had chosen to ignore nuclear disarmament. Even discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty had bogged down. Indeed, the Conference had not done anything substantive in three years. That body could still make a serious contribution to disarmament, despite of that impasse, and he remained committed to it and joined others in calling for its universal membership. On nuclear disarmament, the world must not give in to complacency or defeat. The initiative of Brazil, Egypt, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa and Mexico towards a nuclear-weapon-free world and the need for a new agenda was timely and worthy of everyone’s support, as it had broadened the choices and included countries from almost all the regional groups.

He said his country’s concerns were not limited to weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of small arms and the use of landmines continued to be a high priority. For decades, his country had had to deal with illegal armed groups dedicated to violence and terror. It had seen first hand the death and destruction arising from the unrestricted availability of small arms and light weapons. Women and children were never spared in those conflicts and were often the primary victims. Many of those weapons came to the Philippines after being used in conflicts halfway around the world. Those arms had travelled the globe, driven by profit, sowing destruction and death, and threatening his country’s democratic way of life. Sincere efforts at finding peace in areas plagued by armed conflict continued to be undermined by the easy availability of small arms. Post-conflict situations did not automatically translate into the disarmament of armed groups. In addition, terrorists, pirates, drug dealers and international criminal syndicates had also taken advantage of the large number of easily available small arms.

Landmines were insidious instruments of death, he said. They lurked in the ground with no regard for the identify of their victims. They killed even after the conflict had ended, the guns had been silenced, and humanitarian concerns had become the priority of governments, civil society and the global order. International dialogue and the active role played by the non- governmental organizations had proven very effective in the area of anti- personnel landmines. His country had signed and was now ratifying the Ottawa Convention. It was also preparing draft legislation to criminalize the possession, use, transfer, sale and production of anti-personnel landmines. The legislation would also penalize parties that transshipped landmines through the Philippines, and it would cover not only landmines, but also components that were clearly intended for that use.

NASTE CALOVSKI (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that the repercussions of the Kosovo conflict had been huge on his country, and what was now important was the future development of the region. His country had been assured that the political commitments and promises would be honoured. Full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) was essential, as was the implementation of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe adopted in Cologne, Germany. The Pact was the main vehicle for the reconstruction, stability, development and democracy of the region.

For non-nuclear States like his, he added, the production, stockpiling and trade of conventional weapons were the priority preoccupations. There was a need for an international instrument that would regulate the production, stockpiling and trade of those weapons. An international conference on the matter should be well-prepared in advance. His country also supported all efforts towards the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. His Government was in favour of full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the reinforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention. The elimination of those weapons was an important part of the struggle against destructive forces, such as terrorists.

He said that his Government shared dissatisfaction with the results of the Conference on Disarmament. It was clear that nuclear States had no interest in negotiating with non-nuclear States. Realistically, that difference could not be breached at present. The Conference should deliberate on nuclear disarmament, but only on aspects where both nuclear and non-nuclear States agreed. The Conference should democratize its work and should abandon consensus. A qualified majority and procedural decisions should adopt negotiated legal instruments by a simple majority. The Conference should also abandon the practice of establishing too many committees and the nomination of so many rapportuers. Each agenda item should be examined at the meetings of the plenary. Expertise should be provided by the secretariat of the Conference, not by the member States of the Conference. A serious review of all aspects of the work of the Conference was necessary.

ABDULRAHMAN AL-AHMED (Saudi Arabia) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a result of the cooperation among countries towards creating a world free from weapons of mass destruction. Regrettably, the Middle East was not free from nuclear weapons because of Israel’s refusal to create such a zone. Israel still linked nuclear weapons to the peace process and the participation of all parties concerned. Israel still refused to adhere to the invitations of the United Nations and the IAEA, among others, to desist from developing and testing nuclear weapons. Israel also refused to join the NPT or to subject its nuclear facilities to the IAEA. Thus, Israel remained the only country in the region that possessed nuclear and chemical weapons that were not subject to international supervision.

The Israeli position concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East contradicted its declared pronouncements for peace, he added. Real peace should be founded on trust and good intentions, not the possession of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. Such policies would only create instability.

Saudi Arabia, he said, supported transparency in armaments as one of the means that consolidated international peace and security. It believed that, for such transparency to succeed, there needed to be definite and clear principles that were balanced, total and non-discriminatory. The United Nations Register for Conventional Arms represented a first attempt by the international community to deal with transparency at such a level. However, more than half the Member States had declined to offer information to the Register. The fears of those States should be dealt within an effective manner that made the participation in the Register more international. An enlarged Register, which would include information on advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, might represent a more balanced and complete means to attract a larger number of participants.

MIKHAIL WEHBE (Syria) said history had been filled with dramas which had stricken generation after generation and prompted the world to seek ways of eliminating those tragedies and to free humankind from any future cataclysm. People throughout the world had seen destructive wars with catastrophic consequences. Those had provided some States with the opportunity to test the quality of their weaponry and devise a pretext for developing them and enlarging their stockpiles. Nuclear weapons had come into existence and eliminated whatever little hope had remained, with their threat of continual terror.

He said the NPT had revived hopes of controlling that danger. Nevertheless, those hopes, once again, had been dimmed. The gaps in the NPT had been highlighted in 1995 when it was made possible for some countries not to adhere to the Treaty, thus, violating one of its most important principles -- universality. That, in turn, had paved the way for a new nuclear arms race, and the resulting unstable and unfair world order. The relaunched nuclear arms race was irrefutable proof of the drawbacks inherent in the CTBT. That Treaty had not banned all types of nuclear testing, nor ended the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. It had been unable to prevent nuclear-weapon States from updating their weapons, through simulations and tests which had not reached the critical level. The Convention, therefore, had opened the way for the further development of nuclear weapons.

Despite the creation around the world of many nuclear-weapon-free zones, in the key strategic area of the Middle East, only Israel had refused to adhere to the NPT, he said. In addition, Israel had refused to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Indeed, it had benefited from the support of the nuclear Powers that had sold them those weapons, thereby making them nuclear-capable. Israel was sixth in the world, behind the five nuclear Powers, in plutonium possession for military purposes, of which it had approximately 500 kilogrammes. That had not included a count of the nuclear missiles, which were well known to all. It was unacceptable to promote a nuclear policy by using two yardsticks, and for one country to benefit from all types of support and protection. That State had been provided with the most modern technology and advanced weapons systems, whereas other States had not been given access to the most simple technology, which they needed for peaceful purposes, especially development.

He said the international community should, more than ever, pressure Israel to adhere to the NPT, as well as to place its installations under IAEA safeguards. The international community, therefore, should renounce its warlike policy of nuclear armaments in that region of the world and discourage the occupation of Arab territories, which had threatened regional and international peace and security. The priorities of the international community in the area of disarmament had been clearly defined in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. Moreover, the International Court of Justice had deemed it illegal to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The convening of a fourth special session on disarmament was an urgent matter, as it would allow the world community to cope with the latest disarmament developments.

During the current session, the General Assembly would consider a draft resolution dealing with preparations for the international conference on the illicit trafficking of small arms, he said. In that regard, the conference must be limited exclusively to the trafficking of small-calibre arms. From one century to another, people throughout history had taken with them their tragedies, as well as their hopes. Among them was the elimination of nuclear weapons, the most destructive arms of all time.

NIMROD BARKAN (Israel) said the last decade in the Middle East had been “the best of times and the worst of times”. Positive developments included the peace process, which had begun between Israel and Egypt and then expanded to an agreement between Israel and Palestinians through the Oslo process to the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. New ties had been established with other States in the region. Some progress had also been made on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. His Government was willing to resume those negotiations vigorously, aware that those might lead it to assume calculated security risks as part of an agreement. On 13 September, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization had restarted negotiations. The way was now paved for the resumption of a vigorous peace process, reflecting his Government's determination to reach peace, stability and security on a bilateral, as well as regional, level.

The last decade had also been the worst of times, he said. The increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, along with the inability of the international security and arms control regimes to meet the challenge of proliferation in the Middle East, had been alarming. Moreover, the last decade had seen the increased danger posed by terrorists, both to the peace process and to the internal stability of various countries. In addition, it would soon witness the rising threat of non-conventional terrorism. Nor had the last decade been good for arms control agreements. Nuclear testing, the discovery of weapons of mass destruction capabilities in Iraq after the Gulf War, the secret nuclear plan of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as the missile tests conducted by Iran and North Korea, had raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the global arms control agreements.

In the case of Iraq, that county had signed and ratified the NPT, signed a full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA, and during the last eight years, had been under a most intrusive arms control and disarmament regime, he said. Yet, that had not prevented Iraq from maintaining its clandestine programmes for developing chemical, nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had remained a major threat to international peace and security. Indeed, it had directly threatened Israel with annihilation by chemical weapons, and had actually attacked Israel’s civilian population with lethal missiles.

He said the present political process, which had reflected a growing recognition of the futility of the use of force as a means to advance political goals, had not yet fundamentally and irreversibly changed the basic strategic setting or the general threat under which Israel had existed. The willingness to renounce the threat or use of force, as well as the obligation to settle conflicts by peaceful means, was not yet shared by all of its neighbours. War and violence were still considered legitimate policy instruments. Limitations inherent in arms control regimes had been seen by some as marginal obstacles to be ignored, or, worse, as convenient loopholes to gain the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Israel had been confronted with heavily armed States professing varying degrees of hostility towards it and possessing conventional and non-conventional arsenals. It was a sobering thought that, some 50 years after the Holocaust, some of Israel’s neighbours had contemplated the use of poison against it.

In that geo-strategic setting, Israel found itself small in size with no strategic depth, he said. It was entirely dependent on outside sources of energy and was also poor in other natural resources, including water. The density of its population and industrial centres had made it especially vulnerable to attacks. In that context, massive quantities of bombs and missiles, capable of indiscriminate damage and injury to civilians, should be viewed on a par with weapons of mass destruction. International conventions alone could not prevent arms proliferation, especially of non-conventional weapons. Yet, there was really no better alternative. In addition to the technological and procedural improvements that could increase the effectiveness of those treaties, a regional approach was the only way to achieve stability and security both regionally and globally. Full confidence was attained only when States entered into legally binding regional arrangements, negotiated by the States in the region, incorporating mutually verifiable compliance.

He said his country's approach to regional security in the Middle East had consisted of the following components: the primacy and eventual resolution of the peace process, in which all security and arms control issues should be considered; the regional nature of the peace process, which must embrace every country in the region and within which confidence-building and security measures had to be developed; a step-by-step approach; that the progress achieved would set the pace and scope of arms control measures negotiated and effectively implemented in the region; the necessity of keeping the peace process free of terrorism and violence; ensuring that at no point would arms control and regional security and peace arrangements diminish the security of any State or allow any party to abuse those processes in order to acquire military advantage over the others; that every State was entitled to an equally high level of overall security, defined as freedom from threats to its existence and well- being; and that the agreements reached should consider not only the threats and capabilities of individual States, but also those emanating from coalitions and military alliances.

He said his country firmly believed in the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It also envisaged a zone free from chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic weapons. Such a zone should be established by direct negotiations between States after those had recognized each other and had established full peaceful relations between them. It could not be established by those other than the parties themselves, nor could it be established in a situation where some of the States had maintained that they were in a state of war with another, and had refused, in principle, to maintain peaceful relations. Unlike other regions where nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established, in the Middle East there was a continuing threat against the very existence of one State in the region, namely, Israel, and that had directly affected the region’s ability to establish such a zone.

The agenda item entitled “the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East” had been a blatant political manoeuvre, he said. Raising that biased resolution, once again, would be interpreted as a clear manifestation of the misguided way in which United Nations bodies had approached Middle East security dilemmas. In terms of substance, the text had no added value beyond other resolutions under discussion in the Committee. One might also wonder at the incongruity of singling out Israel, while simultaneously calling upon it to join the consensus for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The so-called “risk” resolution had focused entirely on one region, while ignoring nuclear proliferation in others. It had also ignored the fact that the real risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East had emanated from countries that, despite being members of the NPT, were presumably engaged in ongoing efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. In considering ratification of the CTBT, he said his Government would consider the realization of Israel’s sovereign equality in the work of the CTBTO and developments in the region, including the question of adherence by other States in the Middle East. His country had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but the open declaration by some other countries that they had no intention of doing so would be considered when making a decision. On the question of landmines, while his county had wholeheartedly supported the ultimate goal of the Ottawa Convention, it had remained uniquely unable, at present, to stand behind the immediate total ban on landmines, in light of ongoing defensive operations against terrorists who attacked civilians and infiltrated its borders. In 1994, Israel had enacted a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines, which it had renewed on a revolving three-year basis. It was also actively participating in the Mine Awareness Project launched by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Angola.

SAMUEL AMEHOU (Benin) said the agenda before the First Committee was full of challenges and complexity. Despite years of concerted effort towards bringing about general and complete disarmament, the international community still faced growing threats from weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear Powers needed to take more responsibility towards bringing about the elimination of such weapons.

He said that the proliferation of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, took a heavy toll on development efforts, especially in regions like Africa. Such weapons posed a serious threat to the rule of law and democracy in developing countries, whose institutions were still weak. The international community needed assistance in collecting and destroying such weapons, as well as in security training and technical assistance. Only concerted international action would curb the proliferation of small weapons. His country supported the international conference to be held in Geneva no later than 2001, believing that it would serve as a fresh start to combating the small weapons threat. It attached great importance to the United Nations regional centres as cornerstones in the architecture of regional security.

VOLODYMYR YEL’CHENKO (Ukraine) said that his country, having become an independent State, had made the choice to give up its nuclear arsenal, among the most powerful in the world. It proceeded from the understanding that the national interests of Ukraine would be met through its participation in all treaties in the sphere of strategic stability. To date, 64 per cent of the total number of strategic arms that had been deployed on the territory of Ukraine had been eliminated.

His Government, he said, closely followed developments concerning the ABM Treaty. That Treaty stood as an effective instrument for promoting peace and strengthening world strategic stability. His Government, therefore, called upon all State participants to refrain from any unilateral actions that were inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and could negatively affect its viability or effectiveness. Ukraine, whose people suffered the terrible consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, was fully aware of the real threat to mankind posed by nuclear weapons. The continuation by some States of nuclear- missile-development programmes had become a source of deep concern. Those developments could create an extremely dangerous precedent, once the non-nuclear choice would be questioned and challenged by other States. It was necessary, therefore, to make all efforts to prevent possible enlargement of the “nuclear club”.

His country shared the concerns of the international community regarding the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and was prepared to participate in the elaboration of collective measures aimed at averting that crisis, he said. It supported the initiatives concerning the need to establish the regime of international control over light weapons and to commence negotiations on elaboration of a convention on preventing the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. Such an international legal document could become an effective element in the international arms control system.

MITSURO DONOWAKI (Japan) introducing the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, said the report contained significant and precedent-setting recommendations.

The Secretary-General’s 1997 report on small arms contained 24 recommendations, he continued. The Group was satisfied that significant progress had been made in implementing most of those, but noted that, with respect to some recommendations, there was a need to make more vigorous, sustained and coordinated efforts. The Group’s new report contained 27 recommendations for further action. Those were more detailed, specific and advanced, and the chances for a successful and meaningful international conference to be convened no later than 2001 were now greater than before.

He said that the new recommendations in the Group’s report said that all States should exercise “utmost restraint” in the transfer of small arms and light weapons to areas where there were ongoing conflicts, and that States in a position to do so should assist others in the collection, safeguarding and destruction of such weapons. The recommendations were far more detailed and specific on the domestic laws and regulations regarding small arms and light weapons. Not only the laws and regulations on the possession of such weapons, but also on the production, export, import and transit of such weapons were now addressed. The question of “brokering activities”, which was not mentioned in the previous recommendations, had received special attention.

In addition, he said, the Group’s report contained some new recommendations. For example, all States were recommended to ensure that the manufacturers of small arms indicated on the weapons the country of manufacture, the name of the manufacturer and a serial number. States were also encouraged to explore the modalities for sharing the information on the markings. The Group recommended that the conference should consider not only all types of illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons, but also the illicit manufacture, acquisition, possession, use and storage of such weapons, because those were closely linked with illicit transfers. Also, since the conference was to address the question “in all its aspects”, the issue of legal transfer needed to be considered. Through the report, he said, the Group noted the need for the United Nations, regional organizations and all States to cooperate with civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in combating the problems of small arms and light weapons. WOLFGANG HOFFMAN, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, said that the opening for signature of the CTBT three years ago had crowned more than 40 years of negotiations aimed at stopping all nuclear-test explosions in all environments. The Treaty’s adoption was a milestone in the history of efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and had shown a determination to put an end to more than 50 years of nuclear-test explosions, during which time there had been more than 2,000 nuclear tests. The CTBT created an international norm prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions, for military, civilian or any other purpose. Even before its entry into force, the CTBT and the global monitoring system were capable of contributing to such an international norm, but its existence –- and the high price of violating it –- could not replace a legally binding commitment, by signature and ratification of the Treaty.

He said that in order for the Treaty to fulfil its promise of enhancing international peace and security, it was essential that as many States as possible signed and ratified it without delay. By doing so, they would be pledging their trust in the Treaty’s verification regime to detect clandestine nuclear testing and, thus, to deter possible violations. The outcome of the Vienna Conference three weeks ago was the unanimous adoption of a Final Declaration that called for the early signing and ratification of the CTBT by all States that had not yet done so. It also called on the non-signatory nations to refrain from acts that could defeat the Treaty’s object and purpose before it entered into force. Many speakers had echoed the opinion that delay in the Treaty' entry into force had not only postponed much-needed progress in arms control, but also increased the risk that nuclear testing could resume.

Also in the Declaration, he said that the 92 ratifiers and signatories present had recalled the fact that two non-signatory States whose ratification was needed for the Treaty’s entry into force had expressed their willingness not to delay the entry into force, and called on them to fulfil those pledges. In addition, they had noted the ratification by two nuclear-weapon States last year and called on the remaining three to accelerate their ratification processes “with a view to their early successful conclusion”. Another important aspect of the Declaration was the agreement to select one ratifier to facilitate the Treaty’s early entry into force, through information consultations with all interested countries. The Declaration also reached out to a larger public, by appealing to all relevant sectors of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the Treaty’s objectives.

The CTBTO had continued to make tangible progress in developing the four components of the CTBT global verification regime, which had to be operational when the Treaty entered into force, he said. The verification regime -– unprecedented in the history of arms control -– had consisted of an International Monitoring System, a consultation and clarification process, on- site inspections and confidence-building measures. The International Monitoring System was the cost-effective global network of sensors capable of detecting, locating and identifying the signals generated by a nuclear explosion using four complementary technologies: seismology, infrasound, hydrocaustic, and radionuclide monitoring. The sensors were attached to 321 monitoring stations that were being established or upgraded in the 89 countries named in the Treaty. Those monitoring stations would transmit, in near real time, a constant stream of data, generated by the technologies, to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, where the data and IDC products would be processed and made available to the State signatories for analysis.

Currently, he said the CTBTO had completed approximately 55 per cent of the site surveys to select the most appropriate locations for the stations specified in the Treaty and to assess the equipment they needed. Devices were now being installed to authenticate and ensure the accuracy of the data generated at the stations and transmitted to the IDC. At 16 stations, the process of certification of the System’s stringent specifications had been initiated. Over the past year, the backbone of the Global Communications Infrastructure had been installed. It had consisted of a terrestrial frame- relay network, four land-based hubs in Germany, the United States and Italy, as well as independent sub-networks in Canada, France, Norway and the United States, all of which fed into the IDC. The System was now connected to nine destinations by terrestrial lines and to 12 remote sites by geostationary satellite.

He said the state-of-the art IDC in Vienna was the nerve centre of the Monitoring System. Its progressive commissioning was based on the operational experience of a prototype international data centre in Arlington, Virginia. Also, the automatic acquisition and processing of seismo-acoustic data was being conducted 24 hours a day to assess the capability and robustness of software received from Arlington. Training for operators and managers of monitoring stations had continued. The on-site aspect of the regime was unparalleled and new ground was being broken. While those challenge inspections could only be mandated once the CTBT entered into force, the CTBTO had been conducting preparatory activities that focused on compiling an operational manual. In December, it would have its first “tabletop” exercise -– a simulation of various phases of the on-site inspection process.

Confidence-building measures, which were also part of the global verification regime, were voluntary in nature, he went on. At its ninth session in August, the Preparatory Commission had agreed to establish a database on chemical explosions, thereby creating the basic technical conditions for the implementation of confidence-building measures after the Treaty entered into force. Two countries, Israel and Kazakhstan, were contributing to research to improve implementation of the CTBT. Last month, the organization had taken advantage of a calibration experiment involving a conventional explosion conducted jointly by Kazakhstan and the United States. That had provided valuable insights into the ways in which an on-site inspection could be conducted for the CTBT. Next month, a series of three controlled underwater explosions would be conducted in the Dead Sea, allowing the travel times of seismic waves across the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean to be calibrated. That would provide a point of reference for accurately locating future events in the region.

By entrusting the CTBTO with the resources needed to carry out its task, Member States had expressed their confidence that the verification regime could be delivered on time, he said. The question was when would the entry into force come about. Hopefully, it would come sooner rather than later. The United Nations Secretariat was implementing its mandate on the technical side, creating a stable and durable foundation to verify compliance with the Treaty. It was up to the States signatories to follow through and take the necessary political steps, in tandem with the technical tasks, to ensure the Treaty’s entry into force and that all the components of the regime could be brought to bear to make the world a safer place for generations to come. Only then would the Treaty truly meet the high and justified expectations placed in it by the world three years ago and serve the purpose for which it was intended.

The Committee Chairman, RAIMUNDO GONZALEZ (Chile), announced that the statement of Jose Bustani, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), would be circulated rather than read.

The statement outlined the progress made since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997. All the world’s largest known stockpiles of chemical weapons were now fully subject to the Convention’s verification and destruction, and the coverage now extended to almost all countries with important chemical industries.

The statement went on to say that, as of 18 October 1999, the OPCW had conducted 561 inspections in 31 States parties. All of the 60 chemical weapons production facilities that had been declared by the Member States had been inspected, and their inactivation confirmed. By the end of the year, three of the four States which had declared possession of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons would have operating destruction facilities, and have begun to actively destroy their chemical weapons. The OPCW inspectors had so far monitored the destruction of approximately 3,500 tons of chemical agents and almost 1 million munitions.

While those were major achievements for a young organization, the statement said, there was no room for complacency. All the work so far was just the tip of the iceberg as far as the destruction of chemical weapons was concerned. More than 8 million chemical munitions had been declared worldwide. The Convention required that they all be destroyed by April 2007. It was not clear that destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles in the Russian Federation would definitely require a considerable financial effort on a global scale. In addition, the continued support and commitment of the chemical industry for the implementation of the Convention was still under a cloud, due to the absence of an industry declaration from the United States. As that State party was the only major industrial country which had not yet made such a declaration, the chemical industries of the other major industrial States had, consequently, to bear the full brunt of the industry inspections. It was, therefore, incumbent on the United States to fulfil its obligations under the Convention and provide the OPCW with its industry declaration as soon as possible.

The Middle East continued to remain an area of particular concern for the Convention, the statement continued. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Syria continued to link their membership of the Chemical Weapons Convention to Israel’s adherence to the NPT. Continued inaction by those States might be seen by some as a means of enabling them to maintain a clandestine chemical weapons programme. The best way to counter such accusations was to join the Convention.

Rights of Reply

The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, speaking in exercise of reply, said that, during the general debate, some delegates had raised the issue of his country’s compliance with the safeguards agreement of the IAEA. The issue of its compliance was clearly addressed in the Agreed Framework concluded in 1994 between his country and the United States, which reads, as follows:

“When a significant portion of the LWR (Light Water Reactor) project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.”

He said the Agreed Framework had been welcomed by both the Security Council and the IAEA, as well as by member States of the European Union. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had sincerely implemented its obligations under the Agreed Framework. However, when one looked at the present realities with regard to light water reactors, construction had only symbolically begun and had not yet approached full scale, in the five years since the conclusion of the Agreed Framework. It was difficult to know when a significant portion of the project would be completed.

In view of the present reality, he said no one could deny that compliance could only be solved once the Agreed Framework was smoothly implemented. If there was true interest in the safeguards agreements, that should be duly expressed with connection to the agreement. It was unjustifiable that the behaviour of a bigger country, which was not implementing the Agreed Framework, was not questioned. Only impartiality could solve the issue. To the South Korean delegation, he would say they had no right to talk about the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

The representative of Syria, also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said he wished to address the contents of the statement relevant to his country, which had been issued by the Director-General of the OPCW, Jose Bustani. He said his delegation had noticed a highly selective approach on the part of Mr. Bustani, time and again, in his statement. As a Director-General, he should be neutral and objective in dealing with the questions on the prohibition of chemical weapons. He did not have to make value judgements and interfere in the affairs of other States, and overlook their sovereignty.

Mr. Bustani, he noted, had concluded that certain countries did not have the right to make their own decisions concerning their accession to certain conventions within the framework of the United Nations and other organizations. Furthermore, Mr. Bustani was biased, as evident in paragraph 8 of his text in English, concerning the elected Israeli administration. Everyone knew that Israel had neither ratified nor acceded to the NPT. He gave himself the right, as if he had a mandate from Israel, to call on other countries to adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Those were double standards which were untenable. The approach, itself, was untenable in dealing with the issue. The CHAIRMAN then said that, unfortunately, Director-General Bustani was not in the room.

The representative of Egypt, also speaking in the right of reply, said he had associated himself with the observations made by the Syrian representative concerning Mr. Bustani’s statement. His delegation had had the same observations. It, therefore, called on Mr. Bustani, indeed expected him, to be neutral and objective in dealing with such issues.

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