CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT PRESIDENT, SPEAKING TO FIRST COMMITTEE, DESCRIBES 'DISAPPOINTING' OUTCOME TO 1999 CONFERENCE SESSION

Press Release
GA/DIS/3147

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT PRESIDENT, SPEAKING TO FIRST COMMITTEE, DESCRIBES 'DISAPPOINTING' OUTCOME TO 1999 CONFERENCE SESSION

Yet, Says Conference Remains 'Robust' with 'Impressive Track Record'; Other Speakers Address Threat of Small Arms, Changing Security Concepts

In a disappointing outcome, differences among Member States on how to deal with the issues of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space had ultimately and regrettably prevented agreement on a comprehensive programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) was told this afternoon, as it continued its disarmament and security debate.

The President of the Conference, Les Luck (Australia) said that clearly, further consultations were required to bridge the difference on those two important subjects and the 1999 session of the Conference, which is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, had not been productive, if measured in terms of progress made in tackling items on its agenda. Despite the lack of substantive negotiations, however, the Conference was a “robust institution” with “an impressive track record” in negotiating important arms control and disarmament treaties. It had continued to serve as a vital and unique forum for an exchange of views on evolving positions -- a necessary step in defining new priorities and forging the requisite consensus to launch negotiations. On another positive note, it had decided, on 5 August, to admit five new members -– Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia -– thus bringing the membership to 66 States.

The representative of Nicaragua said the basic objective of the global community must be the elimination of nuclear weapons, but the threat posed by small arms and light weapons had become more urgent since the end of the cold war. Those weapons had become a feature of domestic warfare -- deadly, easy to hide, ideal for internal conflicts and the weapon of choice for rebels and terrorists. Their uncontrolled and excessive accumulation had landed them in the hands of former combatants and their circulation had impeded the social and economic development of the affected States. At the end of Nicaragua’s civil war, a tremendous quantity of small arms had remained with the former combatants on both sides, which had resulted in increased violence and criminality. To be truly effective, regional and international measures needed to be coupled with domestic controls on the production, sale and transfer of those weapons.

First Committee - 1a - Press Release GA/DIS/3147 10th Meeting (PM) 18 October 1999

On the same issue, the representative of Kyrgyzstan said his Government fully supported steps to restrain the illicit traffic in small arms. Similarly, another issue not bounded by national borders -- terrorism -- was a grave concern for his country. Militants trained in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, who had encroached into the southern region of his country, had been ejected in a cooperative effort with neighbouring countries. His Government, therefore, called for stronger measures against international terrorism. Also, his Government supported efforts towards the creation of a Central Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone.

International terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, arms trading and the predatory exploitation of natural resources were among the elements that had challenged the security of States in the last decade, the representative of the Dominican Republic told the Committee. In the changed international panorama, the basis on which security concepts had been established had changed. The greatest security risks to many nations were non-traditional and non-military. For example, since the fragile ecosystems of small island States were a key factor in their development, the transport of nuclear waste posed a tremendous threat, requiring strengthened control mechanisms to protect against any unexpected shipping-related occurrences.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Ethiopia, Armenia, Tunisia, Moldova, Zimbabwe and the United Republic of Tanzania. The representative of Sri Lanka addressed the Committee in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Tuesday, 19 October, to continue its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its general debate on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

One such multilateral agreement -- the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- still requires the ratification of 18 countries critical to the Treaty's success. The United States Senate rejected the Treaty last week. Ratification by the other nuclear-weapon States, Russian Federation and China, is pending and may be in question because of the rejection of the United States. Other States whose ratification is required under article 14 of the Treaty, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan, still have not signed the Treaty, which opened for signature in 1996.

A conference to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force concluded last Friday, 8 October, in Vienna. In a Final Declaration, the participating States parties and signatories to the CTBT called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose.

On non-proliferation, the lack of positive results from the three preparatory committee sessions leading up to the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be discussed. The Treaty, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, is considered by many experts to be the bedrock of the non-proliferation regime. With 188 States parties, it is the most universal of all disarmament agreements.

The nuclear disarmament debate was expected to take into account bilateral arrangements, including the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems -- the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to limit the deployment and development of anti- ballistic missiles.

Attempts to revise that cornerstone treaty of strategic balance could have other ramifications, such as the further delay in ratification by the Russian Duma of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which is the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

The original treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START I, was signed in 1991 and called for a 30 per cent reduction in strategic weapons over seven years, with stringent verification. In 1993, START II provided for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. Negotiation on further reductions under START III can commence only upon entry into force of START II.

Treaties banning the production and stockpiling of other weapons of mass destruction were also expected to dominate the debate, among them the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). The call has intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification of and compliance with that 1978 Treaty.

The entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) triggered the operation of a complex verification mechanism, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has completed 503 inspections and has witnessed the destruction of more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. So far, 126 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention.

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. The zones already in existence are governed by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and entered into force on 1 March 1999.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3139 issued 8 October.)

Statements

DURI MOHAMMED (Ethiopia) said that since the First Committee had met last year, the United Nations disarmament machinery had not been fully utilized. No consensus had been reached on the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which could set goals for the future. Nuclear disarmament was one of the most important of the disarmament issues facing the international community, though some States continued to refuse to recognize it as such.

The NPT, he said, committed nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and to a treaty on general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective international control. That commitment had to be realized in order to check undesired developments that appeared in the non-proliferation regime, and to guarantee the irreversibility of the process. Another area of great concern for his country was the destabilizing accumulation and illicit spread of small arms and light weapons. Notwithstanding the legitimate right of States to acquire such weapons for national defence, their proliferation and illicit trafficking posed a significant threat to regional peace and security. The magnitude of those problems was particularly evident in Ethiopia’s subregion, the Horn of Africa.

His nation was pleased with the ongoing efforts of the international community to ban and eliminate landmines, which was a matter of great concern in the Horn of Africa, due to the irresponsible actions of those who had no respect for international norms. At present, more than 1 million landmines were planted by those forces in different parts of Ethiopia and the task of clearing them remained arduous and expensive. Substantial international assistance would be required. Mine clearance efforts should also encompass research and development in mine detection technology, as well as transfer of such technology to developing countries to make mine clearance activities safer and more efficient.

MOVSES ABELIAN (Armenia) said that, as a non-nuclear-weapon State developing nuclear energy, Armenia attached great importance to the issues of international compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and obligations. It reaffirmed its commitment to full implementation of the NPT to assure the international community that Armenia would continue to use its nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes only.

It was imperative that, to ensure the implementation of the NPT objectives, all countries abide by the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His Government supported strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the safeguards regime by introducing the protocol additional to existing safeguards agreements. In order to fully prevent the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it was necessary to focus on the issue of enhancing the implementation and verification regimes. Successful conclusion of the negotiations by the ad hoc group on strengthening the verification and compliance provisions of the Biological Weapons Conventions was one step towards that end.

He said his country welcomed adoption of the Ottawa Convention. However, only one of four of its neighbours had signed the Convention, while the other three did not seem ready to do so. That reality left his country without an option, impeding unilateral accession to the Convention, although his Government had no doubts that the ban on landmines must become universal. His Government would welcome the assistance of international organizations and individual States in training Armenian experts, who would then disseminate information among the population of mined areas. Such activities would help to significantly decrease the number of accidents among the civilian population. He said the Conference on Disarmament was a central forum for negotiation of global disarmament instruments and hoped Members States would support Armenia's intention to become a member of the Conference.

ALI HACHANI (Tunisia) said the current Committee session had provided a new opportunity to assess the progress made and consider goals to be undertaken in the disarmament field. There had been certain positive developments, such as the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention. However, the CTBT and START II had not entered into force and negotiations for START III or a fissile material cut-off treaty had not begun. Further, the Conference on Disarmament -- the sole forum responsible for negotiating disarmament treaties -- had been unable to reach agreement on a programme of work for 1999. Thus, Committee members must redouble their efforts to achieve progress in other significant areas. Nuclear disarmament should be a priority. In that context, the five nuclear Powers had specific obligations under article VI of the NPT. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was an opportunity to motivate nuclear disarmament.

The START process was a meaningful contribution to disarmament and he encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States to promote the entry into force of START II. Nuclear disarmament should also be promoted within a multilateral framework, namely the Conference on Disarmament. His country had signed the CTBT in 1996, and urged ratification of the Treaty by the 44 States required for its entry into force. A ban on fissile material for weapons purposes would strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and contribute to nuclear disarmament. The outcome of the 1995 Review Conference had planned for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty following the conclusion of the CTBT. Such a treaty was not even being negotiated. That step should be expedited.

Pending the attainment of nuclear disarmament, he said, the non-nuclear- weapon States were entitled to negative security assurances. The majority of the Member States of the Organization had voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons. The creation and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones had promoted non- proliferation at both the regional and international levels. As a State party to the CTBT, and a signatory to the Pelindaba Treaty, his country had always supported efforts to establish new zones. In the Middle East, that commitment continued to be blocked by Israel, which refused to accede to the NPT, despite the many appeals by States of the region and the General Assembly. A resolution on that issue was first adopted in 1974, and then adopted by consensus since 1980.

Concerning conventional weapons, he said he welcomed the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention, an important event which had attested to the will of the international community to end the suffering of so many. Mindful of the importance of the Convention and of its effects on international peace and security, his country had been quick to ratify it, as it had supported the elimination of that category of destructive weapons. It had also destroyed its mines stocks. He hoped all States parties would participate in that process, so that the objectives of the Convention could be attained. Concerning the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, his country had supported regional and international efforts, and had stressed the importance of the measures adopted at the recent summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

He said his country also welcomed the moratorium on the export of light weapons to West Africa. All efforts to halt the trade in those weapons should be encouraged. He hoped the international community and the United Nations would support that regional initiative, so that it could be expanded to other countries. The success of the conference on the illicit arms trade, to be convened by 2001, required decisive coordination, under the aegis of the United Nations. His Government attached great priority to strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, in order to promote regional development and prosperity. His country had resolutely played an active role in seeking a multidimensional approach, in light of the challenges in the region, which included terrorism, international crime and illicit drug trafficking.

LES LUCK (Australia), speaking in his capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that the 1999 session had not been productive if measured in terms of progress made in tackling items on its agenda. The Conference had given serious and substantive consideration, however, to important security and disarmament questions. Despite the concerted efforts of successive presidents throughout the session, consensus on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work had been elusive. The Conference, therefore, had not re-established or established any mechanism on its specific agenda items during the 1999 session, a disappointing outcome.

In the course of intensive consultations on the work programme, however, a number of proposals had been submitted by delegations, as well as by successive conference presidents, he said. The proposals contained several common elements relating to the agenda items, which had included the re-establishment of two ad hoc committees: on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and on an agenda item entitled, “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament”. The second ad hoc committee was to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. There was also common ground on the reappointment of special coordinators on the issues of anti-personnel landmines, transparency in armaments, the view of the Conference’s agenda, expansion of its membership and its improved and effective functioning.

He said that despite broad agreement on those aspects of its work, differences among Member States on how to deal with the two issues of nuclear disarmament and prevention of an outer space arms race had ultimately and regrettably prevented agreement on a comprehensive programme of work. Proposals had offered a basis for possible agreement, including by the representative of Algeria. It was broadly felt that his work had brought the Conference closer to agreement on a work programme, although it had become clear that further consultations would be required in order to bridge the difference on those two important subjects. Evidently, there had existed a “strong collective interest” in commencing substantive work, as soon as possible, during the 2000 session. Towards that goal, he and the next Conference President would conduct consultations during the intervening months.

Although the Conference had not undertaken any substantive negotiations in 1999, he said it had continued to serve as a vital and unique forum for an exchange of views on evolving positions on, and attitudes towards, arms control and disarmament. That was a necessary step in defining new priorities and forging the requisite consensus to launch negotiations. On a positive note, the Conference, on 5 August, had decided to admit five new members -– Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia -– thus bringing the membership to 66 States. That decision, along with the participation of 42 countries as observers, had testified to the continued relevance of that body as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Indeed, the Conference was a “robust institution” with “an impressive track record” in negotiating important arms control and disarmament treaties. The challenging year was a further incentive for the Conference to take a lead in reaffirming the capacity of the multilateral system to address the collective security and disarmament objectives.

ION BOTNARU (Moldova) said that the principles and objectives set out in the NPT process had to be honoured. A priority task would be to carry out the forthcoming Review Conference of the NPT to be held in 2000, and to overcome the stagnation in negotiations of the relevant treaties.

He said that while emphasizing the importance of ensuring universal adherence to all agreements related to eliminating weapons of mass destruction, it was also necessary to take into account the concerns expressed by a number of States with respect to the financial aspects implied by the ratification act. Full implementation of treaties was a costly endeavour and could constitute a heavy burden for some developing countries, as well as for a series of newly independent States confronted with difficult financial problems. It was necessary to analyse appropriate approaches to addressing those concerns, while not discouraging such States and not endangering the implementation process.

The excessive accumulation and illicit transfer of small arms had exacerbated internal conflicts, he continued, complicating peace building and undermining peace agreements in many countries, including his own. In countries affected by separatist movements, stocks were stolen by paramilitaries or sold off in other zones of conflict. In the Transnistrian region of Moldova there were huge quantities of armaments belonging to foreign troops still stationed there, and registered cases of the leaking of armaments from those stocks to the separatist movements. It was very important, therefore, to take measures aimed at destroying non-transportable weapons and withdrawing foreign military arsenals.

ELMIRA IBRAIMOVA (Kyrgyzstan) said that events of the past year had highlighted the importance of the work of the First Committee. The 1996 opening for signature of the CTBT was one of the most striking steps forward in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Regretfully, however, the high expectations of three years ago had remained only partially fulfilled, and last week’s rejection of the Treaty by the United States Senate had cast into doubt its future entry into force. In addition, his country was greatly concerned that the development of a missile defence system by some States could lead to the advent of a new arms race.

Another grave issue of concern for his country, terrorism, was also not confined by national borders, he said. Militants trained in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, who had encroached into the southern region of his country, had been ejected in a cooperative effort with neighbouring countries. His Government called for stronger measures against international terrorism, and fully supported steps taken to restrain the illicit traffic in small arms. Also, his Government supported efforts towards the creation of a Central Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone.

CRISTINA AGUIAR (Dominican Republic) said the end of the cold war had shifted the approach to international security and disarmament. Indeed, in the changed international panorama of the 1990s, the basis on which security proposals had been established were no longer in keeping with today’s realities. The greatest security risks of many nations were non-traditional and non-military. Many elements challenged the security of States, including international terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, arms trading, and the illicit predatory exploitation of natural resources. Among the Caribbean and other States, natural disasters had also threatened survival.

She said that each region’s uniqueness defined the threats to its security. Thus, a genuine risk to some might be quite insignificant to others. Those non- military concerns and threats, therefore, required a different approach from the one contained in traditional security doctrines. Among the challenges faced today were those emanating from the production and distribution of every type of weapons which would not be used in the absence of the tension and distrust that arose from extreme poverty. Undoubtedly, island States felt more vulnerable than others to negative factors, such as transnational crime, natural disasters or environmental change. With the economies of many Caribbean countries based on one or two basic commodities, any change in the price of an export product or the suspension of some tariff could produce a considerable economic imbalance.

Although it might seem unorthodox to talk about economic or natural disasters in the First Committee, he said the occurrence of natural situations that threatened the survival of a people constituted a national security threat. For those nations, that type of threat was decisive in terms of their existence as independent States. A new paradigm of international security should be defined. Those countries, however, were not drifting away from the traditional concerns of the Committee, namely to bring about the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It was also important to control the very dangerous light or small weapons and anti-personnel mines. Since many small island States lived off agriculture, fisheries and tourism, their fragile ecosystems were a key factor in their development. They were, therefore, very concerned about the tremendous threat of the transport of nuclear waste in the Caribbean. Strengthening control mechanisms to protect against any unexpected occurrences related to shipping had become even more urgent.

MARIO H. CASTELLON DUARTE (Nicaragua) said his country was a signatory of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had guaranteed the denuclearization, for other than peaceful purposes, of Latin American States. On that basis, he was concerned that the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to achieve its objectives. Although the cold war had receded, the world had remained insecure and nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction continued to proliferate. The nuclear- weapon States had been very slow to dismantle their installations, although international tension had diminished. The lack of unanimity in ratifying the CTBT, as well as the weakening of the conventions on controlling other weapons of mass destruction, had increased insecurity. Nuclear weapons had indisputably shown no great power in increasing security or providing protection to any country. Only strong treaties prohibiting weapons had served as a basis for preserving international peace and security.

He said his country favoured binding measures to insure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also supported initiatives to establish international mechanisms for a phased reduction of nuclear weapons, with a view to their prompt and comprehensive elimination. Indeed, their elimination should be the basic objective of the global community. Negotiations must commence, in good faith, to bring about nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective control. He supported the creation of nuclear- weapon-free zones in all regions of the world. In that context, the recommendations of the Tokyo Forum were very positive.

In addition to the nuclear danger, he said the constant trade of other types of weapons had also threatened the domestic security of States. The threat might be smaller, but it had grown and had become more urgent since the end of the cold war. Small weapons were killing more people and causing more suffering than any other type of armaments. Indeed, those had become a feature of domestic warfare over the past decade. Since their excessive accumulation had remained uncontrolled in the hands of former combatants, they risked falling into criminal hands, as well. Those weapons were ideal for internal conflicts and used most often by terrorists, rebel forces and irregular troops. They were deadly, yet easy to carry and hide. In addition to threatening domestic security, the trafficking and circulation of those weapons had prevented the socio-economic development of the affected countries.

Regional or international measures to contain the small arms problem would not be truly effective unless States also designed domestic controls on the production, sale and transfer of those weapons, he said. Domestic and international security required the political will of every State. At the end of Nicaragua’s civil war, a tremendous number of small arms had remained with former combatants on both sides, causing much apprehension and provoking a great increase in the level of violence and criminality. With the help of the United Nations and other organizations, development projects were reintegrating most of the former combatants into civilian life.

He said his country was also aware of the suffering and death caused by anti- personnel mines. Many Nicaraguan farmers had wives and children who had either been killed or been disabled by the explosions of landmines. The entry into force of the Ottawa Convention was, thus, gratifying. Nicaragua had been the first country among the signatories to create a national demining commission and to implement a national plan to eliminate those weapons. Also, it had embarked on a programme to destroy its stockpiles and had eliminated a first batch of 5,000 units as part of a national demining programme to eliminate the mines buried throughout its territory during the armed conflict of the 1980s. The world movement towards disarmament had prompted his country to cut back its army. As a result, it had noted a substantial reduction in its military budget and had diverted those funds to social development projects

T. JOKONYA (Zimbabwe) said that, despite the adverse developments that had dominated the disarmament agenda in recent months, his country’s commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament remained unshaken. Zimbabwe had acceded to the CTBT in October of this year. It had also agreed to the installation of an auxiliary seismic station on its territory, as part of the International Monitoring System.

Nuclear testing and nuclear disarmament were interrelated and inseparable issues, he added. The non-existence of nuclear testing could not be an end in itself, but rather a step towards nuclear disarmament. His Government was opposed to nuclear testing, whether it was for the acquisition of nuclear weapons or for their qualitative improvement. The continued existence of a nuclear club of States bent on preserving their nuclear monopoly, while pontificating to the rest of the world not to acquire the same weaponry, was unacceptable. As long as the exclusivity of the nuclear club was maintained, there would always be irresistible temptation on threshold nuclear powers to knock at the door and gain entry.

In his part of the world, he said, it was not possible to de-link problems related to unauthorized weapons possession, criminality and intra-state armed conflict from drug trafficking, car smuggling and money laundering. The experience in southern Africa was that the sharing of tactical and strategic information was vital in combating the small arms menace. Responsibility in arms transfer policies was crucial in addressing the problem. Zimbabwe believed that Africa’s arms exporters should adopt an ethical policy, such as the Code of Conduct on arms exports approved by the European Union.

JOHN DE SARAM (Sri Lanka) said that the last time the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean had reported to the General Assembly in 1997 it had not found it possible to reach a consensus on the manner of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. He had the honour today to introduce the 1999 report of the Committee.

However difficult the implementation of the objectives of the Declaration may be, he said, he believed, as Chairman of the Committee, that those objectives should continue to be preserved by the General Assembly as an ideal towards which all concerned should continue to strive. He hoped that the First Committee would find it possible to propose to the General Assembly that it maintain the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace on its agenda; that the Ad Hoc Committee on the India Ocean should continue with its endeavours to arrive at an appropriate consensus; and that a report should be submitted to the General Assembly in the year 2001. An appropriate draft resolution, he added, would be submitted to the Secretariat very shortly.

DAUDI MWAKAWAGO (United Republic of Tanzania) said that in the past year there had been more setbacks than achievements in the process of disarmament. More than ever nuclear-weapon States were determined to cling to the doctrines of deterrence. Their words and actions were evidence of their determination to maintain their weapons for an indefinite future.

His country believed that the NPT was an important instrument of nuclear non-proliferation, but it was critical of the failure by nuclear-weapon States to live up to their obligations under the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily given up any ambitions for nuclear programmes intended for military use. Nuclear-weapon States had failed to honour their commitment to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. Such assurances should have been given in return for the legal commitment by the non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States were obliged to engage in serious negotiations leading to an unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

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