INDIA EMPHASIZES COMMITMENT TO GLOBAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AS FIRST COMMITTEE CONTINUES DISARMAMENT DEBATE

Press Release
GA/DIS/3145

INDIA EMPHASIZES COMMITMENT TO GLOBAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AS FIRST COMMITTEE CONTINUES DISARMAMENT DEBATE

Australia Says US Failure to Ratify Test-Ban 'Deeply Disappointing’; Missile Proliferation, Nuclear Doctrines among Other Issues Addressed

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this morning continued its disarmament and security debate, with the representative of India telling the Committee that her country's commitment to global nuclear disarmament had not been diluted, as India was the only nuclear-weapon State that believed its security would be enhanced by a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Describing India's initiatives dating from 1954, which had been aimed at the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, she said India’s early proposals for nuclear disarmament had been rejected. In turn, it had been asked to join, as a supplicant, an unequal and discriminatory non-proliferation regime, underwritten by a treaty -- the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- that had proved to be better at freezing in perpetuity a slice of history as the world stood on 1 January 1967, than at reflecting the realities of proliferation. The failure of the existing non-proliferation regime had obliged her country to take measures to safeguard its security with a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence.

The representative of Australia, on the other hand, emphasized the vital security benefits delivered by the NPT, and called on those States which had not yet done so to accede to the NPT as “non-nuclear-weapon States”. Also, he added, the nuclear testing in South Asia last year had underlined the need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force. The decision of the United States Senate to vote down ratification of the Treaty was deeply disappointing, as the Treaty would advance nuclear disarmament by constraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

He said the proliferation of missiles as a means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction had seriously undermined international peace and stability. The missile tests conducted in South Asia, the Middle East and North-East Asia had triggered an increased awareness,

First Committee - 1a - Press Release GA/DIS/3145 8th Meeting (AM) 15 October 1999

as well as concern, over the dangers of missile proliferation. In view of the absence of an international norm regulating the proliferation of long-range missiles, his country agreed with the Secretary-General on the need for multilaterally negotiated norms against the spread of ballistic missile technology for military purposes, and restraint in missile development. A step by step approach would be most practical, given the complexities inherent in that issue. As a beginning, an expert group to study all aspects of the missile issue could be created.

The representative of Kenya also highlighted the development of missiles able to be fitted with nuclear warheads. Although nuclear weapons had posed the greatest singular danger to the entire spectrum of life on earth, he said, their reduction and eventual elimination had yet to occur. The massive destructive potential of such weapons had reduced their real utility, but it was hard to imagine that those weapons could be held in perpetuity and never used. Meanwhile, bilateral talks between the Russian Federation and the United States for reductions of their nuclear stockpiles had stalled and, at the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had reaffirmed its doctrine of “nuclear sharing” with its non-nuclear States partners. That development had been followed by the release in one country of a draft nuclear doctrine aimed at the development of land, sea and air-launched nuclear weapons.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Singapore, Belarus, Viet Nam, Senegal, Kazakhstan, Uganda and the Republic of Korea.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation, ostensibly speaking on procedural matters, made a statement concerning the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT. Following his remarks, the Committee Chairman said that in the future, in order to prevent a series of statements being made outside the structure of the Committee, he would only accept statements made in the context of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, although he was not rendering an opinion on the substance of the statement.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. today to continue its debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general debate on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

One such multilateral agreement -- the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- still requires the ratification of 18 countries critical to the Treaty's success. The United States Senate rejected the Treaty yesterday. Ratification by the other nuclear-weapon States, Russian Federation and China, is pending and may be in question because of the rejection by the United States. Other States whose ratification is required under article 14 of the Treaty, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan, still have not signed the Treaty, which opened for signature in 1996.

A conference to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force concluded last Friday, 8 October, in Vienna. In a Final Declaration, the participating States parties and signatories to the CTBT called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose.

On non-proliferation, the lack of positive results from the three preparatory committee sessions leading up to the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be discussed. The Treaty, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, is considered by many experts to be the bedrock of the non-proliferation regime. With 188 States parties, it is the most universal of all disarmament agreements.

The nuclear disarmament debate was expected to take into account bilateral arrangements, including the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems -- the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to limit the deployment and development of anti- ballistic missiles.

Attempts to revise that cornerstone treaty of strategic balance could have other ramifications, such as the further delay in ratification by the Russian Duma of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which is the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

The original treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START I, was signed in 1991 and called for a 30 per cent reduction in strategic weapons over seven years, with stringent verification. In 1993, START II provided for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. Negotiation on further reductions under START III can commence only upon entry into force of START II.

Treaties banning the production and stockpiling of other weapons of mass destruction were also expected to dominate the debate, among them the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). The call has intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification of and compliance with that 1978 Treaty.

The entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) triggered the operation of a complex verification mechanism, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has completed 503 inspections and has witnessed the destruction of more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. So far, 126 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention.

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. The zones already in existence are governed by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and entered into force on 1 March.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3139 issued 8 October.)

Statements

LES LUCK (Australia) said that while some countries had emphasized the economic and development benefits to be gained through multilateral non- proliferation and disarmament instruments, the bottom line for most was a calculation about the respective security benefits. The task of assessing those benefits had not been made easy over the past year or so, owing to a complex and challenging international security environment. The recent period had been marked by the relaxed pace of several key multilateral and bilateral negotiations in the wake of the “boom” period immediately following the end of the cold war. The international environment had been clouded by renewed tensions within countries -– as well as between countries -– often with a strong ethnic or religious component. That had presented fresh challenges to the United Nations in determining how it should act in the face of humanitarian crises.

Recently, the international non-proliferation norms and disarmament aspirations had been confronted by a number of challenges, he said. The immediate consequence had been a heightened risk to both the regional and international security environment and a fuelling of regional arms competition and proliferation pressures. That troubling picture was an indication that much remained to be done to constrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and foster long- standing disarmament goals, including the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Those challenges had underscored the value of the existing security system, by which countries were expected to address their security needs with the lowest practical level of armaments and, most importantly, without acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. It was also a reminder of unfinished business, namely the priorities identified in the principles and objectives of the NPT.

He said the nuclear testing in South Asia last year had underlined the continuing need to bring the CTBT into force. All those who had not yet signed or ratified that Treaty should do so without delay. His country was deeply disappointed about the decision of the United States Senate to vote down United States ratification of the Treaty. The United States Government should continue its efforts to build support for the Treaty in order to enable its early ratification and encourage other countries among the required 44 to ratify it, thereby enabling its entry into force. The Vienna Conference last week had underscored the determination of States "ratifiers" and signatories to work towards an early entry into force. Another clear priority was the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. In the nuclear field, both those treaties were “crying out” for attention, as both could bring early security benefits to all Member States.

The CTBT would make a vital contribution to advancing nuclear disarmament by constraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, he went on. It would not, of itself, bring about nuclear disarmament. A fissile material cut-off treaty would provide valuable security benefits to both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. By capping the quantitative development of nuclear arsenals -– a commitment which all the nuclear-weapon States were evidently prepared to make –- it would be an essential step in the process of nuclear disarmament, and one which should be urgently seized upon. It was not realistic to overload negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty by insisting that it cover existing fissile material stocks, as that would make the negotiation about nuclear arsenals themselves. As desirable as that appeared, it simply was not realistic.

He drew attention to the next major event on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament calendar, namely the 2000 NPT Review Conference. He said it was essential to keep in view the vital security benefits delivered by that Treaty. It was important to foster an acute appreciation of the value of all the Treaty’s elements, while ensuring that expectations remained realistic. The value of the NPT had been clearly reflected in its near universal adherence. Its universality had remained an essential objective of his country, which called again on those States which had not yet done so to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. Fresh concerns about the need for ballistic missile defences and the debate about implications for the international security system, including the ABM Treaty, were relevant to the collective endeavours. Those principally involved should negotiate, in good faith, their respective security concerns and ensure that those issues did not delay progress in other established areas.

Concerning biological weapons, he said his country was committed to the establishment of a “robust” compliance regime that would strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. To ensure the adoption of that protocol in 2000, it was essential to build upon the momentum achieved during the last session of the ad hoc group, with the introduction of a range of substantive new proposals, including by the Non-Aligned Movement. The positive steps taken by the States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and by the OPCW in implementing the Treaty and consolidating its verifiable, legally-binding norms were welcome. Implementation of that Convention had demonstrated the strength added to a disarmament and arms control instrument through a verification machinery. If the Convention were to succeed in its goal of ridding the world of chemical weapons, however, those countries which had not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention must do so.

KISHORE MAHBUBANI (Singapore) said that finding the right balance would be one of the key challenges faced by the First Committee in the coming century. Disarmament issues were almost inherently complex and difficult. There were no simple black and white answers. Simplistic logic may work well in academia, but in the real world mankind had come to accept the five nuclear Powers as an undeniable and irreversible fact of history. It was important and necessary to prevent proliferation, but the nuclear Powers in turn needed to retain the trust and confidence of the rest of mankind by behaving responsibly on all nuclear issues.

Given the horrifying capability of weapons of mass destruction, he added, it was surprising that so few non-governmental organizations and public personalities had vigorously pursued any campaign to wipe them from the face of the earth. Their preoccupation with landmines and small arms was understandable, but it was distressing to see disarmament advocates behaving like fashion designers, going with the flavour of the day and not looking at long-term needs.

Weapons in themselves did not ignite wars, he said. In some cases they might actively prevent wars. Sometimes the international community helped defuse conflicts, but often it did not. Self-reliance in defence might yet be necessary for some time to come. It was, therefore, puzzling that so much of the international community’s attention was taken by disarmament of small weapons. Most of mankind was still relatively poor. To deprive them of the basic means to defend themselves would be unfair. In the event of a crisis, they would be defenceless. Certainly the illicit trade in small arms should be terminated, but it would be folly to curtail the legal trade in small arms.

That did not mean, he went on, that the international community should not persevere in disarmament work. Small gains made over the years were valuable and should be strengthened. It was a pity that last year only 66 countries out of 188 Member States submitted their returns to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. By contrast, over 100 Member States were addressing the Committee on Disarmament issues this year. The international community should work towards a more universal participation in the Register, before thinking of expanding it. Similarly, a useful verification regime had been established for chemical weapons. Each such regime contributed to greater compliance. Compliance, in turn, inspired trust.

SERGEI MARTINOV (Belarus) said that the process of international disarmament was rapidly approaching its critical point. New approaches and solutions were needed. A draft resolution would be submitted at the current session by his country aimed at preventing the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The goal of the resolution was to maintain an international action, if such would be required. He hoped the resolution would be adopted without a vote and would become another modest element of the “preventative” disarmament trend.

He called for a strict and full compliance with the ABM Treaty by all parties through preserving its substance and without undermining or revising its basic provisions. The actual deployment of national anti-ballistic missile systems would torpedo all the efforts made earlier by the international community in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, undermine the START process, as well as create conditions for the escalation of an arms race in new spheres. His delegation, with the delegations of China and the Russian Federation, had tabled a draft resolution concerning preservation of and compliance with the ABM Treaty. The purpose was to provide an impetus to the efforts in ensuring security and stability. He counted on the broadest possible support of the draft resolution.

He added that his country considered the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a positive step, which was why his country had presented an initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. He was convinced that its realization would become a clear priority for the nations of the region in the first half of the twenty-first century.

SAVITRI KUNADI (India) said the present century had arguably been an extraordinarily bloody one. The Committee, dealing as it did with international security issues, had much to learn from the lessons of the past to ensure that those were not repeated in the future. The failure of the international community to effectively address the threat posed by nuclear weapons over the past 50 years made it all the more necessary to redouble efforts for their elimination in the coming years. The instrument designed to deal with those weapons and promote global nuclear disarmament and genuine non-proliferation in all its aspects –- the NPT -– had proved to be ineffective. Genuine and long-lasting non- proliferation in all its aspects was difficult to measure and achieve. Global nuclear disarmament demanded that the international community look beyond the old framework and embrace a new security paradigm that could ensure international peace and security on the basis of equal and legitimate security for all.

She said the non-discriminatory international conventions banning chemical and biological weapons had been based on a devaluation of the military utility of those weapons and on the belief that, rather than partial and discriminatory arms control, the interests of international security would be better served through the complete prohibition and elimination of those weapons. The delegitimization of nuclear weapons and their progressive reduction through a step-by-step process was the most credible way forward towards the elimination of those weapons. As an original State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, her country had shared the collective concern that some parties, despite voicing support for that Convention, had not provided full declarations to the OPCW, adversely affecting inspection schedules.

The initial promise of deep, continuous and irreversible reductions in strategic nuclear forces –- held out by the positive climate of the early post- cold-war years –- appeared to be fading fast, she said. Those countries with the largest nuclear arsenals had the main responsibility for advancing the process of nuclear arms reductions. He hoped the agreements reached during the Cologne Summit would lead to an early revitalization of the bilateral process. The current stalemate in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations should not be taken as a disincentive for the other long-established nuclear-weapon States, each with substantial arsenals of their own, to undertake reductions in a multilateral framework.

Doctrines of first-use of nuclear weapons had been revalidated, even though the perceived threat that had given rise to those doctrines had long since disappeared, she went on. The only remaining military alliance with transcontinental dimensions had continued to assign nuclear weapons the highest priority, with several of its members –- ostensibly non-nuclear-weapon States -- permitting the peace-time deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories and giving war-time access to those very weapons, in violation of their treaty obligations. Further steps should build upon the historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation, not only to begin, but to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

With the end of the cold war a decade ago, she said there was no justification for thousands of nuclear weapons -- maintained in a state of hair- trigger alert –- posing the unacceptable risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons that could have catastrophic consequences for mankind. The international community was entitled, therefore, to clear commitments from all the nuclear-weapon States that the most important objective of their policies was to remove the danger of war and reduce the risk of accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons, including through what had been referred to as the “Y2K problem”. Her country’s introduction of a new resolution on reducing nuclear danger had received widespread General Assembly support. It would reintroduce the text at the current session with the expectation that the international community would take necessary action, both individually and collectively, to reduce the risks posed by hair-trigger alert postures and related doctrines of use.

There was no dilution of India’s commitment to the goal of global nuclear disarmament, she said. India was the only nuclear-weapon State that believed that its security would be enhanced in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Thus, it had continued to press for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention that would prohibit forever the development, production, stockpiling, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and provide for the elimination of all existing weapons under international verification. Convinced that a world without nuclear weapons would enhance global, as well as national security, her country had submitted several initiatives towards that goal. For example, it had been the first to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954, for a non-discriminatory treaty on non- proliferation in 1965, a treaty on non-use of nuclear weapons in 1978, a nuclear freeze in 1982 and, in 1988, a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. None of those proposals had been accepted.

Continuing, she said that, in turn, India had been asked to join –- as supplicants -– an unequal and discriminatory non-proliferation regime, which was underwritten by a treaty that had proved to be better at freezing in perpetuity a slice of history as the world stood on 1 January 1967, than at reflecting realities of proliferation which that Treaty had been either unable or unwilling to prevent. The failure of the existing non-proliferation regime had obliged her country to take measures to safeguard its security. The Indian Government had already spelled out the main elements of its policy of minimum nuclear deterrence with the stated purpose of meeting the requirements of its democratic policy –- of openness and transparency consistent with national security.

That minimum deterrent posture, she said, governed both the quantum, as well as the operational mode of its nuclear policy. That policy had been characterized by restraint -– an essential confidence-building element owed by all nuclear-weapon States. The deployment posture, with a civilian command and control structure, would be governed by India’s abiding commitments, voluntarily offered and unconditionally undertaken, for a no-first-use of nuclear weapons and a commitment of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Her country had already stated its willingness to strengthen that undertaking by entering into bilateral agreements on no-first-use or multilateral negotiations on a global no- first-use of nuclear weapons.

She said the Committee was aware of the circumstances leading to India standing aside from the CTBT in 1996. That decision had been governed by considerations, some of which had been addressed through the limited series of five underground nuclear tests conducted by India in 1998. Her country had announced, thereafter, a voluntary moratorium on further underground test explosions. The Government was committed to creating the widest possible consensus, which had required as an essential enabling element, a positive national environment. It also expected other countries to adhere to the CTBT without conditions. Recent developments had indicated, however, that the Treaty was complicated; among other things, it required a national consensus in the countries concerned, including in India.

The Conference on Disarmament in 1999 had been unable to address issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, she said. Technological developments, including in ballistic missile defences, could open new areas of competition, adding to pressures against the ABM Treaty. Her country shared the concerns expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement on 23 September regarding the negative implications of those developments and the further erosion of the international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. India supported the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference on an appropriate instrument that would, as a first step, ensure the non-weaponization of space, while at the same time preserving the use of space for the full range of peaceful and developmental activities.

She said it was disappointing that the deliberations in the 1999 Disarmament Commission on a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had failed. While her country remained committed to the convening of such a session, its convening was contingent upon a reaffirmation of priorities, including of nuclear disarmament. India could not be a party to attempts to overturn that consensus. Other initiatives, especially on the nuclear disarmament issue, would complement as well as contribute to the success of a fourth special session.

PHAM BINH MINH (Viet Nam) said his nation shared the view that a concrete, step by step programme called for in the new agenda for nuclear disarmament was a practical and achievable approach. It joined many delegations in calling on the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves immediately to a programme of eliminating their nuclear stockpiles within a time-bound framework. Nuclear-weapon States were obligated under legal instruments to conduct genuine negotiations to eliminate each and every nuclear weapon they had produced.

In that context, he said that discussion on the measures needed to make the upcoming NPT Review Conference a success was of special significance. Urgent actions should be taken to pave the way for the review process. The record of accomplished work in implementing the decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference was poor. Further, he said the fourth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened as early as possible. The objective of the session should be to chart a new course in the field of disarmament. His country supported the proposal put forward by the representative of Chile to set up an informal working group to sound out the positions of member countries, in order to arrive at a satisfactory programme and agenda for the special session.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, he went on, Viet Nam shared the concerns of other delegations on the failure of that important multilateral negotiating body on disarmament to reach an agreement on its working agenda. He was also disappointed that, due to the divergence of views of the member countries, the Conference had not been able to set up an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. He was pleased, however, that after years of negotiations, five more countries had been admitted to the Conference. He wished to underline that the Conference should be further expanded, so as to become a more representative and strengthened body.

IBRA DEGUÈNE KA (Senegal) said that the disarmament momentum had been slowing for the last few years and posed wrenching questions about how to regain the pace. His Government deplored the uncertain situation of the Disarmament Commission, which was entrenched in sterile considerations and suspicion of every proposal made. That important multilateral negotiating body was incapable of continuing negotiations on halting the production of fissile material for military purposes. He wished consultations would be less passionate, and based more on a spirit of goodwill and consensus.

He said so-called conventional weapons, in particular small arms and light weapons, continued to cause great suffering, especially in Africa. More attention must be paid to the proliferation and illicit traffic of those weapons, which were major obstacles to the democratic process, without which no development could be successful. Absolute priority needed to be given to combating the proliferation of those small weapons. Anti-personnel landmines were also a major concern, and efforts to support implementation of the Ottawa Convention towards demining and aid to victims must be redoubled.

YERZHAN KAZYKHANOV (Kazakhstan) said his nation was in favour of steady, step by step nuclear disarmament through fulfilment of the commitments by all States parties to the NPT. On the eve of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials remained tasks of paramount importance.

The problem of providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States continued to be a major concern, he added. Measures must be taken to legalize the so-called “negative” security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States on the basis of Security Council resolution 984 (1995). He said that article VII of the NPT and the decisions of the 1995 Conference on Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament had provided a solid legal basis for establishing new, internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones that would help strengthen peace and security at the global and region levels. His country attached paramount importance to the preservation of peace and security in Central Asia and was keenly interested in progress towards implementing the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-fee zone there.

FARES M. KUINDWA (Kenya) said that numerous developments in 1999 had not augured well for international security. Chief among them had been the continued recourse to arms as a means of resolving conflict. In Africa, the ready availability of illicit small arms and light weapons continued to cause untold suffering and hardship. The situation in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were cases in point. Small arms and light weapons had been used especially in armed conflicts fought by “irregular” troops. In that connection, he highlighted a resolution of last year requesting the Secretary- General to continue his efforts in curbing the illicit flow of small arms in Africa through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subregional organizations. His country had looked forward to the conference on the illicit arms trade by 2001. It was also exploring the possibility of organizing a conference on the illicit arms circulating in its subregion.

He said that the Conference on Disarmament had come to a complete standstill, arising from disagreements over how to address the issue of nuclear disarmament and of the prevention of an outer space arms race. Nuclear weapons posed the greatest singular danger to the entire spectrum of life on earth, but the reduction and eventual elimination of those weapons had yet to occur. Indeed, the existing nuclear-weapon stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States were enormous. Estimates had indicated that the two largest nuclear-weapon States each had approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads. Those included various types of missiles launched from the air, land or sea, most of which were on alert status. Although the massive destructive potential of such weapons had reduced their real utility, it was hard to imagine that they could be held in perpetuity and never used.

The preparatory period of the 2000 NPT Review Conference had shown a rather negative balance sheet, he said. It was disappointing that the reaffirmed commitments of nuclear-weapon States under that Treaty had become an end in themselves, as those had not been followed by any concrete steps. It had been nearly 30 years since the NPT came into force, and almost five years since the five nuclear-weapon States had renewed their commitments at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Yet, progress towards nuclear disarmament had been “dismally slow”. The START II talks had stalled, owing to the failure of one party to ratify that Treaty. At the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had recently reaffirmed its doctrine of “nuclear sharing” with its non-nuclear-Power partners, in contravention of the NPT. That development had been followed by the release in one country of a draft nuclear doctrine aimed at the development of land, sea and air-launched nuclear weapons.

He said the two critical issues –- nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space -– should be seriously tackled by the Conference on Disarmament. The two major treaties concerning nuclear non-proliferation –- the NPT and the CTBT -- were at risk. The CTBT had yet to enter into force. While the efforts of the United States Government in seeking the ratification of the Treaty were appreciated, it was disquieting that the United States Senate had rejected ratification and put into serious jeopardy the very survival of the Treaty. In a nutshell, nuclear disarmament was in a state of disarray. The nuclear-weapon States, except one, did not seem to have the political will to seriously undertake nuclear disarmament in any forum.

The disarmament agenda had become skewed because of the near total absence of tangible measures and effective action on nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States, he said. Although the international community had successfully adopted instruments banning chemical and biological weapons, the nuclear weapons area had remained untouchable. In order to restore some balance in the disarmament agenda, it was time to lay the foundation for an eventual instrument outlawing the use of nuclear weapons and banning their production, with a view to their eventual elimination. The prevention of an arms race in outer space was vital. The rapid pace of technological development in both space and military science had increased the prospects of the weaponization of outer space. As every country had a “border” with outer space, each had a legitimate interest in its peaceful use.

FRED BEYENDEZA (Uganda} said the nuclear-weapon States had turned a deaf ear to the objectives and ideals of nuclear disarmament. They had become indifferent to any serious multilateral arrangement on current disarmament programs. It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had once again failed to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Members of the Conference should expedite those negotiations.

Of particular concern to developing countries was the question of small arms and the use of landmines, he said. In Africa, most armed conflicts were fought exclusively with small arms and light weapons. The degree of destruction and the loss of life and property as a result of these arms was overwhelming. The roots of those conflicts should be addressed, in particular, the lack of social and economic development. He welcomed the practical measures taken to collect and destroy those weapons.

LEE SEE-YOUNG (Republic of Korea) said that at the twilight of the twentieth century, it was utterly frustrating to see that the generation that had invented and experimented with nuclear weapons had been unable to take any effective measures to control them. The NPT remained the first and only attempt to establish a global non-proliferation regime, but last year’s nuclear testing in South Asia had dealt a serious blow to efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free world and undermined the credibility and integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Further, the continuing non-compliance with the NPT by some States parties had also damaged the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, there was growing concern over the limited progress made by the nuclear-weapon States in reducing those weapons.

He said the START process should be revitalized, on an urgent basis, through the earliest possible entry into force of the START II and through an early commencement of negotiations for START III. It was now universally recognized that the CTBT would significantly contribute to preventing the nuclear arms race. His country welcomed the Final Declaration adopted last week in Vienna and called upon all States which had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, especially those whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, to do so at the earliest possible date. He joined others in expressing profound disappointment at the inability of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT. He sincerely hoped that the United States, which had led international efforts to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, would continue to play a leadership role by resolving the CTBT ratification issue as soon as possible.

Those States which remained outside the Chemical Weapons Convention, especially the major possessors of chemical weapons, should accede to the Convention at the earliest possible date, he said. The recent rapid developments in biotechnology had made the prospect of biological weapons even more frightening. The important task of creating a verification regime of the Biological Weapons Convention should be tackled more constructively, in order to conclude negotiations for the Convention protocol before the fifth review conference. The development of weapons of mass destruction would lead to the diversion of enormous financial resources away from the socio-economic development needs of those countries in need of international assistance. The international community should continue to develop appropriate responses to ensure universal adherence to all agreements related to the elimination of those weapons in a more vigorous and comprehensive manner.

He said the proliferation of missiles as a means of the delivery of weapons of mass destruction had seriously undermined international peace and stability. The missile tests conducted in South Asia, the Middle East and North-East Asia had triggered an increased awareness, as well as concern, over the dangers of missile proliferation. In view of the absence of international norms regulating the proliferation of long-range missiles, his country agreed with the Secretary-General on the need for multilaterally negotiated norms against the spread of ballistic missile technology for military purposes and restraint in missile development. A step-by-step approach would be most practical, given the complexities inherent in that issue. As a beginning, an expert group to study all aspects of the missile issue could be created.

The international community had exerted strenuous efforts to bring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea into full compliance with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, he said. Unfortunately, the Democratic People’s Republic had so far failed to cooperate fully with the IAEA in implementing that agreement. It was imperative that, as a State party to the NPT, the Democratic People’s Republic implement the Safeguards Agreement fully and faithfully. The adoption, without a vote, of the resolution on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement two weeks ago bore witness to the repeated calls of the international community for full compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic.

He said the Geneva Agreed Framework was an important step forward in addressing the “nuclear problem” of the Democratic People’s Republic. His own Government had faithfully fulfilled its commitment to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization by playing a central role in the organization’s project of constructing lightwater reactors in the Democratic People’s Republic. It would continue to do so as long as the Democratic People’s Republic lived up to the letter and spirit of the Agreed Framework. He also looked forward to an early implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed by the two Koreas in 1991.

He said his country had been a staunch supporter of the global non- proliferation regime, and had acceded to and faithfully complied with all major instruments related to weapons of mass destruction. His Government hoped that the Democratic People’s Republic would follow suit by joining non-proliferation efforts, thus contributing to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and beyond.

Taking the floor for procedural reasons, ANDREI GRANOVSKY (Russian Federation) said he was disappointed and seriously concerned at the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT. That important international instrument had been the result of many years of efforts by many countries and had principle importance for global stability and security and for strengthening the NPT regime. At all stages of elaboration of the Treaty, the United States had taken the most active part in it and was the first one to sign it. The decision by the United States Senate was a “serious blow” to the entire system of agreements in the area of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly with regard to the NPT.

He acknowledged the statement made by United States President William Clinton to the effect that his administration would observe the moratorium on nuclear testing, adhered to by all the nuclear Powers. At same time, the Russian Federation, while committed to the CTBT, had felt bound, in the most serious manner, to take into account the results taken by the United States Senate regarding the Treaty, for its own security and for stability throughout the world. Following those remarks, the Committee Chairman, RAIMUNDO GONZALEZ (Chile), made a brief statement indicating his obligation to be as neutral as possible. He said he had been told by the Secretariat that the statement would be procedural in character. From now on, he would only accept the type of statement just made in the context of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, as a right of reply, and so forth. That was the only way to maintain order in the general debate. He was not rendering an opinion on the substance of the statement just made, which was the country’s sovereign right. He was just trying to establish a minimum order. Otherwise, there would be a series of statements made outside the structure of the Committee.

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