TEST-BAN REJECTION BY UNITED STATES PROMPTS DISTRESS, ALARM, BOLIVIA TELLS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

Press Release
GA/DIS/3144

TEST-BAN REJECTION BY UNITED STATES PROMPTS DISTRESS, ALARM, BOLIVIA TELLS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

In Continuing General Debate, Speakers Also Address Missile Defence Systems, Use of Force Disguised as ‘Humanitarian Imperative’

As the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) continued its disarmament and security debate this afternoon, the representative of Bolivia told the Committee that he had witnessed -- with great distress and grave alarm -- the outcome of the vote on the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the United States Senate.

The explosion of the atomic bomb had decisively concluded the Second World War and had led to the creation of the United Nations, he continued. Yet, nuclear weapons had become the core of power politics, prompting an arms race and perpetuating an international imbalance. The end of the cold war had renewed hopes that ideological differences would diminish and a shared desire for improved stability, peace and global security would prevail. As a result of that impetus, the international community had developed a number of disarmament and security treaties, but the world had so far failed to go beyond that preliminary stage. The nuclear testing in South Asia last year had demonstrated the stimulus posed by the possession of nuclear weapons. Countries should follow the example set by South Africa in 1989 when it had voluntarily dismantled its nuclear capacity, thus, becoming first country in history to do so.

Also addressing the CTBT, the representative of Cuba said the world’s super- Power had not even complied with the commitment of a limited-scope treaty like the CTBT, and had reportedly decided not to ratify it. Certain States, with the military and economic right to do so, had fractured the General Assembly resolutions designed to be a framework for collective security and disarmament measures. Moreover, the unauthorized use of force, disguised as a humanitarian imperative, had grossly violated both the United Nations Charter and international law. Now, despite international rejection, plans for the development of a powerful so-called missile-defence programme -- in clear violation of the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- had reopened the path for an arms race in outer space. The representative of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic said that, although the CTBT was imperfect -- as it had not specified a time-bound framework for the total elimination of nuclear weapons -- its strict implementation would prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring those weapons and curtail the

First Committee - 1a - Press Release GA/DIS/3144 7th Meeting (PM) 14 October 1999

improvement of nuclear stockpiles by the possessor States. A realistic and achievable nuclear disarmament agenda demanded a commitment to the test-ban Treaty. Another international concern was the development of ballistic missile- defence systems. The States parties to the 1972 ABM Treaty must strictly comply with its provisions.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Turkey, Morocco and Peru.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Friday, 15 October, to continue its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its general debate on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

One such multilateral agreement -- the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- still requires the ratification of 18 countries critical to the Treaty's success. The United States Senate rejected the Treaty yesterday. The necessary ratification by the other nuclear-weapon States, the Russian Federation and China, is pending and might be in question because of the rejection by the United States. Other States whose ratification is required under article 14 of the Treaty, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan, still have not signed the Treaty, which opened for signature in 1996.

A conference to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force concluded last Friday, 8 October, in Vienna. In a Final Declaration, the participating States parties and signatories to the CTBT called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose.

On non-proliferation, the lack of positive results from the three preparatory committee sessions leading up to the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be discussed. The Treaty, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, is considered by many experts to be the bedrock of the non- proliferation regime. With 188 States parties, it is the most universal of all disarmament agreements.

The nuclear disarmament debate was expected to take into account bilateral arrangements, including the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems -- the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to limit the deployment and development of anti-ballistic missiles.

Attempts to revise that cornerstone treaty of strategic balance could have other ramifications, such as the further delay in ratification by the Russian Duma of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which is the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

The original treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START I, was signed in 1991 and called for a 30 per cent reduction in strategic weapons over seven years, with stringent verification. In 1993, START II provided for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. Negotiation on further reductions under START III can commence only upon entry into force of START II.

Treaties banning the production and stockpiling of other weapons of mass destruction were also expected to dominate the debate, among them the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). The call has intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification of and compliance with that 1978 Treaty. The entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) triggered the operation of a complex verification mechanism, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has completed 503 inspections and has witnessed the destruction of more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. So far, 126 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention.

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. The zones already in existence are governed by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and entered into force on 1 March 1999.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3139 issued 8 October.)

Statements

MEHMET SAMSAR (Turkey) said that his country saw arms control and disarmament as significant elements of its national security policy and attached great importance in fulfilling the obligations arising from international agreements and arrangements.

He said that in the field of conventional arms control, his country continued to regard the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe as the cornerstone of security and stability in Europe. The Treaty needed to be adapted, in light of the new security conditions in Europe. He hoped adaptation of the Treaty would be concluded positively and the adapted Treaty would be signed in Istanbul in November. Because of his country’s geographical proximity to a turbulent region, he added, it followed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with great anxiety. His Government supported all international efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of such weapons.

His country also welcomed the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention, he said. The security situation faced by Turkey, however, was distinctly different from that which the proponents of the Ottawa process faced, also including the fact that mines were being used indiscriminately by terrorist organizations. His Government was developing a range of bilateral initiatives with some of its neighbours to establish regimes aimed at keeping the common borders free from anti-personnel mines and preventing their use in the future. Although Turkey was not yet party to the Ottawa Convention, he anticipated that it would be ready to sign at the beginning of the next decade, if the current conditions did not take a turn for the worse.

He also nation supported international efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of conventional weapons, he said. The illicit flow of such weapons to criminals, terrorist groups and drug traffickers was of particular concern to his country, and the prevention of such transfers was among its security policy priorities. There was an urgent need for better cooperation in such areas as border control, intelligence sharing and international monitoring. His Government promoted transparency in transfers of conventional weapons and advocated expanding the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include small arms and light weapons. He added that his country did not possess any chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and had no intention of acquiring them. Turkey was an ardent supporter of the NPT and had signed the CTBT.

RAFAEL DAUSÁ CÉSPEDES (Cuba) said even those who were optimistic at the beginning of the current decade, when it was fashionable to assert that the cold war had ended, could not hide their scepticism on the eve of a new century, and at the threshold of the next millennium. Developing countries faced more difficulties, yet, every year nearly $800 billion was spent on sophisticated weapons. The use of force -– practised by some States without qualms -– was in gross violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law. Those countries had even tried to disguise, under “humanitarian” terms, interventionist acts carried out without United Nations authorization.

Despite international rejection, he said, the plans for the development of a powerful so-called missile-defence programme, in clear violation of the ABM Treaty, had reopened the path for an arms race in outer space. Further, the world’s super-Power had not even complied with the commitment of a limited-scope treaty, like the CTBT. Indeed, it had reportedly decided not to ratify it. Although the Committee had met annually to adopt a series of resolutions that could be used as a framework for the design and implementation of United Nations collective security and disarmament mechanisms, such mechanisms had been fractured by those States with the military and economic might to ignore them.

He said his country had shared the grave concerns expressed by the Non- Aligned Movement in a communiqué adopted on 23 September regarding the “new strategic concept” of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The strategic concept not only reiterated the fundamentals of the well-known unacceptable and indefensible doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but consecrated that organization’s right to military intervention worldwide. Ignoring United Nations authority, NATO -– headed by the military super-Power -– had declared itself the “world police”. In the absence of the cold war and any real enemy, NATO had become an offensive alliance, ready to act beyond its border and attack without being attacked, when it deemed its interests were at stake. The “nuclear umbrella” would protect a few select countries, while the rest of the world was ever more exposed to unilateral acts of force.

The objectives of the United Nations in the Final Document and Programme of Action of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would remain unattainable as long as some countries continued to advocate the security paradigm conceived during the classic, cold-war years, he said. His country firmly supported the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, and that would continue to be its top priority at the Conference. How could it be argued that nuclear weapons negotiations were responsive only to bilateral formats when such weapons threatened humanity at large? he asked. If those weapons were used -– either consciously or accidentally -– there would be no distinction between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, or between combatants and non-combatants. As an immediate measure, an international legally binding instrument must be completed to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with negative security assurances.

Consistent with its insistence on nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, his country had decided to sign an additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, as a concrete contribution to a strengthened and effective international safeguards regime, he said. Thus, in the next few days, Cuba would become the first country with that particular safeguards agreement. At the same time, all Cuban nuclear facilities would continue to be safeguarded by the IAEA. His country had not yet signed the NPT, as it was discriminatory and selective. The non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty had weakened the principle of sovereign equality by establishing two categories of States with different rights and obligations. In practice, the NPT had legitimized a “nuclear-States club” and, after its indefinite extension, those States had indicated their right to retain those weapons indefinitely.

He said his country had actively participated in efforts to negotiate a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, it was imperative that all States parties strictly complied with the obligations contained therein, including the submission of annual declarations. It was worrisome that an agreement governing the relations between the OPCW and the United Nations had not yet been adopted. In order to accelerate that process, Member States should be guaranteed the opportunity to participate directly in the discussion of the draft agreement.

ALOUNKEO KITTIKHOUN (Lao People’s Democratic Republic) said that the unjustified stockpiling and development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction continued to pose a serious threat to world peace. He was concerned that the strategic defence doctrines of some major Powers had been updated and had set out new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons remained the greatest menace on earth; the disarmament effort was so important that it could not be abandoned.

He said a number of countries said the reason the entry into force of the CTBT had been delayed was that the Treaty did not specify a time-bound framework for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons at the global level. However, although imperfect, the CTBT, if sincerely and strictly implemented, would help prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring those weapons of mass destruction. More importantly, it would prevent the nuclear-weapon States from improving their nuclear stockpiles. To put forward a realistic and achievable agenda for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the First Committee should reaffirm its commitment to the CTBT.

The development of ballistic missile-defence systems was another subject of international concern, he added. The development of such a system would not serve the purposes of peace and disarmament. Full and strict compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty by the States parties would be the appropriate way of responding to the cause of world disarmament.

He added that, while his country shared the concern of the international community at the deadly consequences of the indiscriminate use of landmines, it maintained that States had the right to use such weapons in the defence of their national independence, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. His country also deeply regretted the lack of consensus in the Disarmament Commission this year on the objectives of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The special session should be regarded as an important conference for addressing and negotiating various aspects in disarmament.

ALBERTO SALAMANCA (Bolivia) said the United Nations’ objective had been to establish a new collective security regime and to foster peace and cooperation worldwide. The aim of preserving mankind from the scourge of war was inseparable from the values of human solidarity. The explosion of the atomic bomb had decisively concluded the Second World War and led to the creation of the United Nations, which was charged with guaranteeing international peace and security. Yet, it had offered few foundations of international relations, and nuclear weapons had become the core of power politics. Those weapons had encouraged the arms race and created international imbalances. The end of the cold war had carried a resurgence of hope that ideological differences would diminish and that a shared desire for improved stability, peace and global security would prevail.

As a result of that impetus, the international community had developed a number of instruments, including the NPT and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Although those achievements had demonstrated political will, the world had not gone beyond that preliminary stage. The joint participation of nuclear-weapon States needed to be defined in order to turn those efforts into realities. The nuclear testing in South Asia last year had demonstrated the stimulus posed by the possession of nuclear weapons. Countries should follow the example set by South Africa in 1989, when it had voluntarily dismantled its nuclear capacity, thus, becoming first country in history to do so.

Discussions of nuclear weapons should not be limited to the various international instruments, as those had only deepened the rifts between those who had them and those who did not, he went on. His country had agreed with the position of the new coalition agenda concerning the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and their permanent retention. It was “utopian” to ask those Powers that possessed nuclear weapons to take measures to eliminate them. Indeed, the countries that had possessed those weapons were constantly increasing their stockpiles. He had witnessed -- with great distress and grave alarm -- the outcome of the vote on the ratification of the CTBT in the United States Senate, which had only affirmed his position regarding the nuclear weapons issue.

Regarding other items under consideration, he said he fully supported the Non-Aligned Movement's position with respect to the Ottawa Convention. Those weapons had exposed civilian populations to danger and contributed to making the current century the bloodiest in history. It had been a century in which human beings had developed arms of mass destruction capable of annihilating mankind. It was time to abandon hegemony. The future should be one of certainty and justice, requiring general disarmament that would foster a negotiated solution to controversies. The use of force should be replaced by reason and dialogue.

MOHAMED AMAR (Morocco) said that in acceding to the NPT, nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to proceed systematically to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. The policy whereby some States thought they were justified in possessing nuclear weapons, while demanding that others did not, was extremely discriminatory, destabilizing, and could not go on forever. He urged that the START process take place in more multilateral setting and that the Conference on Disarmament play a more important role in nuclear disarmament.

His country reaffirmed its total support for the principles of nuclear non- proliferation, and deplored the fact that one State in the Middle East still refused to accede to the NPT. Non-nuclear States were entitled to demand assurances from nuclear-weapon States against use of those weapons. Such assurances were part of strengthening the non-proliferation regime and a fundamental aspect of confidence-building. It was one of basic principles that should be discussed in the review process, as non-nuclear States could not tolerate the constant threat posed by the absence of negative reassurances.

He added that the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament was regrettable, and that his country fully supported negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons as an essential step in both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. His Government was also closely following discussions on full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and wanted to discuss the ways and means to achieve universality. Stimulating cooperation, especially on a regional level, was a good way to make progress. While his Government supported the aims of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines, it could not accede to it until sovereignty issues in its southern territory could be settled.

FERNANDO TUDELA (Peru) said that the danger of nuclear proliferation was growing very serious. Increased military budgets ran the risk of initiating a new arms race, even one reaching into outer space.

The Latin American and Caribbean States rejected weapons of mass destruction, he continued. His nation’s commitment to peace and disarmament was ongoing. It was crucial to strengthen both the NPT and the CTBT and to ensure their universality. Peru supported a treaty to ban fissile material for nuclear weapons, and believed that the next conference to review the NPT could reach positive results, given a real desire on the part of all Member States.

He added that his country supported the strengthening and consolidation of nuclear-free zones, as well as a conference on the illicit traffic in small arms, to be held in 2001. In his country, such deadly weapons were closely linked to organized crime and drug trafficking. Preparatory work for such a conference must specify the objective, scope and goals. Also, the revitalization of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Lima was already yielding positive and concrete results. A regional approach to disarmament matters was extremely important and required greater contributions, so that regional centres could continue to grow.

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