WITHOUT NUCLEAR-TEST BAN, "FLOODGATES" TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OPEN, MYANMAR TELLS DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
Press Release
GA/DIS/3141
WITHOUT NUCLEAR-TEST BAN, FLOODGATES TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OPEN, MYANMAR TELLS DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
19991012General Debate Continues, with Focus on Need To Ratify Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Nuclear Testing in South Asia
Without the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- whose entry into force was in question -- the floodgates for nuclear proliferation will be open, the representative of Myanmar told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this afternoon, as it continued its disarmament and security debate, hearing 10 speakers.
Regrettably, ratification of the CTBT -- a cornerstone of nuclear non- proliferation and nuclear disarmament -- had been delayed by some nuclear-weapon States, the very countries which should lead the way for others to join the Treaty, he said. Although the Treaty was not entirely satisfactory, it could prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were indivisible. Yet, despite that compelling logic, the nuclear-weapon States were still living in a world of illusion, whereby they hoped to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely while forcing other countries to forego the acquisition of those weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must wake up from their nuclear slumber and undertake effective nuclear disarmament measures.
The representative of Indonesia warned that the uncertainties surrounding the ratification of the CTBT would have far-reaching ramifications and might well unravel decades of concerted efforts. Further compounding the situation were the ongoing plans for the weaponization of outer space and for missile defence, which were incompatible with the provisions of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty). Also, the continued intransigence of the nuclear-weapon States to initiate negotiations on nuclear and related issues had led to a virtual deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. Those retrograde developments called for a sober reassessment of the debilitating attitudes that had, for too long, determined policies and postures towards weapons of mass destruction.
The end of the cold war, said the Egyptian representative, had provided a golden opportunity to form a community of civilized nations and save the world from military doctrines based on the retention of nuclear arsenals. Regrettably, the world had witnessed not only the development, but the proliferation, of those destructive weapons. Was a further nuclear test needed to wake up the nuclear-
First Committee - 1a - Press Release GA/DIS/3141 4th Meeting (PM) 12 October 1999
weapon States from their cat nap? he asked. Those countries continued to turn a blind eye to that dangerous situation of their own creation. The series of nuclear tests in South Asia had clearly demonstrated that the legal framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the CTBT had proven inadequate to safeguard, by themselves, the global non-proliferation regime.
The Japanese representative drew further attention to what he called the deteriorating situation in South Asia. Despite international efforts to minimize the consequences of the nuclear tests conducted last year, events, such as the recent armed conflict over Kashmir and the announcement of a draft Indian nuclear doctrine, had been disturbing. Following the nuclear testing, his Government had organized the Tokyo Forum to discuss ways and means of reversing trends in nuclear proliferation and revitalizing nuclear disarmament efforts. The Forum had conducted an in-depth analysis of the current international security environment and had recommended concrete steps for advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda.
Statements were also made by the representatives of the United Arab Emirates, Norway, Oman, Malaysia, Croatia and Brazil. The representatives of Iran and the United Arab Emirates spoke in exercise of the right of reply.
Also this afternoon, the Committee completed its bureau, with the election, by acclamation, of the following Vice-Chairmen: Gunther Siebert (Germany), from the Group of Western European States; Kestutis Sadauskas (Lithuania), from the Group of Eastern European States; and Tarig Ali Bakhit (Sudan), from the Group of African States. Carlos D. Sorreta (Philippines) was elected Rapporteur.
The Committee Chairman this afternoon welcomed to the meeting members of the Disarmament Fellowship and Training Programme, which, he said, had made noble efforts to the cause of disarmament, international peace and security.
The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. Wednesday, 13 October, to continue its general debate.
Committee Work Programme
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to elect the remaining members of its bureau and to continue its general debate on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.
One such multilateral agreement -- the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- still requires the ratification of 18 countries critical to the Treaty's success. Of the necessary ratifications by nuclear-weapon States, three are pending: the United States, Russian Federation, and China. Other States whose ratification is required under Article 14 of the Treaty, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan, still have not signed the Treaty, which opened for signature in 1996.
A conference to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force concluded last Friday, 8 October, in Vienna. In a Final Declaration, the participating States parties and signatories to the CTBT called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile.
On non-proliferation, the lack of positive results from the three preparatory committee sessions leading up to the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be discussed. The Treaty, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, is considered by many experts to be the bedrock of the non- proliferation regime. With 188 States parties, it is the most universal of all disarmament agreements.
The nuclear disarmament debate is also expected to take into account bilateral arrangements, including the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems (the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty) -- by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to limit the deployment and development of anti-ballistic missiles.
Attempts to revise that cornerstone treaty of strategic balance could have other ramifications, such as the further delay in ratification by the Russian Duma of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which is the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
The original treaty, the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms or START I, was signed in 1991 and called for a 30 per cent reduction in strategic weapons over seven years, with stringent verification. In 1993, START II provided for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. Negotiation on further reductions under START III can commence only upon entry into force of START II.
Treaties banning the production and stockpiling of other weapons of mass destruction are also expected to dominate the debate, among them, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). The call has intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification of, and compliance with, that 1978 Treaty.
The entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) triggered the operation of a complex verification mechanism, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has completed 503 inspections and has witnessed the destruction of more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. So far, 126 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention.
The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. The zones already in existence are governed by: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok); and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.
Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and entered into force on 1 March 1999.
(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3139 issued 8 October.)
Statements
MYA THAN (Myanmar) said that 1999 had been a frustrating year for arms control and disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament was locked in an impasse and was unable to agree on even a programme of work. The third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference was unable to make any recommendations on substantive matters. Even the future of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treat (CTBT) had been called into question. Those difficulties were not due to procedural matters, but were rooted in substantive issues. It was disconcerting to note, for example, that the nuclear-weapon States were now apparently placing greater emphasis and reliance on nuclear weapons. It was also regrettable that some nuclear-weapon States were still reluctant to engage in a serious dialogue on nuclear disarmament in a multilateral context.
He said nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were indivisible. Nuclear non-proliferation could not be enforced effectively without nuclear disarmament. Despite that compelling logic, the nuclear-weapon States were apparently still living in the world of illusion, where they hoped to retain nuclear weapons for an unlimited period and force the other States not to acquire those weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must wake up from their nuclear slumber and do what was necessary to undertake effective measures of nuclear disarmament.
Meanwhile, he noted that international support for nuclear disarmament had been gaining momentum. The report of the Tokyo Forum, which outlined a range of important practical measures of nuclear disarmament, was welcome. As an ardent advocate of nuclear disarmament, his country had been tabling a resolution on nuclear disarmament at the annual sessions of the General Assembly since 1995. That resolution had introduced the concept of the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in addition to the bilateral negotiations and the possible future plurilateral negotiations. His delegation, together with the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other co-sponsors, was tabling a follow-up text on nuclear disarmament in the current session.
He reiterated his call to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament to commence multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of those weapons. All member States of the Conference were urged to show maximum flexibility and find a compromise solution to establish, on a priority basis, that ad hoc committee. It was disappointing that, once again, it had been unable to meet the urgent need to re- establish an ad hoc committee on a ban of fissile material for weapons purposes. Although the prevailing circumstances might impede negotiations, a start should at least be made on that issue without further delay.
The CTBT was a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, he said. The Treaty was not entirely satisfactory, but it was the best agreement that could be produced under the circumstances. Universal adherence to, and effective implementation of, the CTBT would prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation. Without the CTBT, "the floodgates for nuclear proliferation will be open". For that reason, it was incumbent upon everyone to ensure its early entry into force under universal and strict adherence. Now, even the matter of its entry into force was in question. Regrettably, the ratification process had been delayed in some nuclear-weapon States. In fact, those countries should lead the way for others to join the Treaty.
The issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States was another crucial issue, he went on. His country recognized the significant contribution made by the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties around the world. That constituted a major achievement, as such negative security assurances had now covered more than 100 countries. The global legal regime of nuclear non-proliferation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) required a corresponding global legal regime of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It was, therefore, incumbent on all the States parties to the NPT to create such international legal instrument on security assurances, both negative and positive, for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, at the earliest possible date.
At the dawn of the next millennium, it was necessary to lay down a new set of principles, objectives and priorities for arms control and disarmament for the first decade of the next century and beyond, he said. The international community would have two great opportunities to do so in the near future: the 2000 NPT Review Conference; and the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was crucial that such principles, objectives and priorities be substantive in nature and constitute a distinctive advancement over the indefinite extension in 1995 of the NPT.
MOHAMMAD SAMHAN (United Arab Emirates) said that, despite the end of the cold war, and numerous treaties on disarmament, the international environment still faced conflicts and wars. Certain countries continued the production and storage of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The international community must continue its work to remove such weapons and to reach peaceful settlements for regional conflicts. Those settlements could not be achieved through the threat or use of force, or the occupation of others lands.
The Arab region had experienced many wars and occupations, he said, including the Iranian occupation of United Arab Emirates islands and that of Kuwait by Iraq. Some countries in the region continued to develop forbidden weapons, which had led to a prohibited weapons race in the Gulf region. Eradication of all weapons of mass destruction and peaceful ways to end disputes based on the United Nations Charter and international law were necessary, so the Gulf region could change from one of instability and tension to a new era of coexistence and strengthened economic and cultural relations. That would require political will and courageous decisions. States of the Gulf region recognized that peace and security could not be achieved in the region without the peaceful end of the Iranian occupation of the three islands that were part and parcel of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates. His country renewed its call on the Iranian Government to translate political discourse into positive action and respond to the peaceful initiatives put forward by his country.
Security was a legitimate right of all countries, he said, and should not be limited to prohibited armaments only. The issue of arms transparency should get priority in the building of confidence towards peace and stability. The United Arab Emirates had signed the NPT, the CTBT and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and urged other nations to do so, as well. He was greatly concerned at the increase in nuclear and other arsenals of certain countries, and attempts by some to possess and even test nuclear weapons, using security as a pretext. He supported proposals calling for strengthening the role of the Disarmament Commission, and emphasized the need to guarantee the universality of all treaties. He also called on Israel to join the NPT.
He added that the NPT Review Conference should guarantee the implementation of the Middle East resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. His country also supported the international communitys efforts to curb illegal transactions in small arms, as well as efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines and give humanitarian support to victims. He looked forward to the third millennium as an era in which all weapons of mass destruction would be eradicated, bringing about a new era of stability and security.
JORG WILLY BRONEBAKK (Norway) said that nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation continued to be a primary concern of Norway, whose ultimate goal remained complete nuclear disarmament. His country was prepared to enter into a dialogue with countries of the new agenda coalition and others to discuss ideas and means that might contribute to new momentum in that area. Several practical steps should be given priority.
The review process of the NPT needed to be revitalized, he said. It was important to agree on a strategy that clearly defined the substance, direction and objectives of the process. Other forums should also be utilized for that purpose. All measures were important and needed to be viewed as mutually reinforcing. Norway, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands had submitted a proposal that the Conference of Disarmament should establish an ad hoc working group to study the ways and means of establishing information and views towards nuclear issues and policies. That would give the nuclear-weapons States an opportunity to supply information on both the results achieved through unilateral and bilateral initiatives and on their nuclear policies.
He called upon the Russian Federation to ratify START II without further delay, so the Treaty could enter into force as soon as possible. Negotiations on START III should commence as soon as possible, with a view to reducing nuclear arsenals. Further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons and their destruction were also needed. There could be no justification for nuclear testing. Achieving universal adherence to the CTBT and securing its entry into force at the earliest possible date must be given highest priority. His country had ratified the Treaty since the First Committee last met, and it called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay.
He said negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons had, unfortunately, not yet commenced, and the Conference of Disarmament was responsible for getting these negotiations on track -- a challenge that must be given top priority. Thus, the ad hoc committee to negotiate such a treaty should be re-established immediately. Such a treaty was not only a contribution to, but also an integral and indispensable part of, nuclear disarmament. There would be merit in establishing voluntary measures that would increase transparency on military inventories of fissile material. Focusing on a ban on future production of fissile material, however, was not enough. A set of principles for dealing with weapons usable fissile material was needed. Such a norm should ensure irreversibility. In other words, none of those stocks should be returned to or diverted to weapon programmes. The stocks must be made secure from theft and sabotage, and the material must not be permitted to harm human health or the environment.
Norway was committed to completing the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention during the year 2000, he added. It was crucial that the measures set out in the verification Protocol were effective. It was also a matter of concern that a considerable number of signatories had yet to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. And, it was essential that effective implementation of the Ottawa Convention was insured. Mine-action projects should be integrated into overall plans for national reconstruction, and victim assistance should be regarded as an integral part of mine action and viewed in a broader context of national health plans and general disability issues. Solutions to the small arms problem could, at the current stage, probably best be found at the local, national and regional level. Thus, he strongly supported regional efforts, such as the moratorium and code of conduct adopted by the European Union.
AHMED ABOULGHEIT (Egypt) said the high priority accorded nuclear disarmament and other weapons of mass destruction by the 1978 Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be observed until the international community decided otherwise. The convening of a fourth special session should not be held hostage to the consent of one party or another. The end of the cold war had created a golden opportunity to form a community of civilized nations and save the world from military doctrines based on the retention of nuclear arsenals. Regrettably, the world had witnessed not only the development, but the proliferation, of those destructive weapons.
The logical quest posed today was whether the matter required a further nuclear test to awaken the nuclear-weapon States from their cat nap, he said. Those countries had continued to turn a blind eye to the dangerous situation of their own creation. The thrust of the new agenda coalition to rid the world of nuclear weapons had already received much support. He hoped the upcoming draft resolution, which reflected the repeated calls of the international community for urgent action on nuclear disarmament, would enjoy overwhelming support. He regretted the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on its agenda, as well as the continued absence of a genuine political will among nuclear-weapon States to embark on serious multilateral negotiations leading to the full implementation of the article VI provisions of the NPT.
That position, particularly in the aftermath of the indefinite extension of the NPT, had not only contravened their obligations, but had undermined the entire purpose of the non-proliferation regime, he said. The series of nuclear tests in the subcontinent had created an urgent need to review disarmament policies, in order to address the existing lacunas. Those tests had clearly demonstrated that the legal framework of the NPT and the CTBT had proven inadequate to safeguard, by themselves, the global non-proliferation regime. Priority must, therefore, be accorded the following issues: negotiations towards a universal and non- discriminatory treaty banning nuclear weapons; a treaty banning the production of fissile material, including the destruction of existing stockpiles; and achieving the universality of, and adherence by, all States, without exception, to the NPT. It was paramount that the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, whose 1995 package included three decisions and a resolution on the Middle East, devote special attention towards achieving universality to that cornerstone instrument.
Concerning the need for effective international arrangements to assure non- nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, he said the Conference on Disarmament had a special role, but the Security Council also had a responsibility to discharge, namely, that of adequately safeguarding the security of Member States. In that respect, the Council should adopt a new resolution that would surpass the limited scope of prior resolutions on that subject.
He said that since 1974 the First Committee and the General Assembly had been adopting annually a resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Such zones had spread worldwide and numerous new initiatives had been launched. Regrettably, the case in the Middle East had remained stagnant. Despite the severe frustration over that issue, his country remained committed to the earliest establishment of such a zone in the region and, indeed, of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. In the Middle East, such a zone could be an essential confidence-building measure, leading to a just, comprehensive, stable and lasting peace in the Middle East. Only one country in the region was widely suspected of possessing a significant arsenal of nuclear weapons; only one operated unsafeguarded nuclear installations and facilities; only one had refused to join the NPT or even to discuss the nuclear issue. It was Israel -- which had singled itself out in that regard.
Nonetheless, he said the reaction of the international community to that dangerous and provocative situation had remained mitigating, at best. Double standards in the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation were dangerous and counter- productive. The international community should clearly choose whether it was for or against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was no in between and no room for hypocrisy. He failed to understand how certain countries could fail to condemn and take certain action against an outlaw State. The arguments employed by Israel to justify its erroneous position against adherence to the NPT and the safeguarding of its nuclear facilities were pretexts to shield its nuclear policies, programmes and ambitions.
He said his country supported the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a confidence-building mechanism, not as an arms control instrument. The outcome of the latest meeting of the Panel of Governmental Experts was disappointing, in light of their failure to broaden the Registers scope and include additional categories of weapons of mass destruction. Transparency of those weapons was as important as the transparency of conventional arms; security was indivisible. The 2000 Panel of Governmental Experts should not be bound by a renewed vague assignment. Rather, it should be given a concrete mandate enabling them to overcome the blatant deficiencies crippling the normal functioning of the Register in its present form. The illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons should be accorded higher priority. As one of most heavily mined countries in the world, his country urged that international efforts aimed at curbing landmines should be accompanied by serious and concrete steps geared towards their clearance.
MOHAMED AL-HASSAN (Oman) said his country was a peace-loving nation and, as such, had adhered to all multilateral treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction, including the NPT, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and the CTBT, which it just signed on 23 September. The time had come for the First Committee to revitalize its work and change its orientation in terms of its agenda. The new millennium, which marked a historic turn in the history of mankind, had necessitated new thinking.
He said that, in the Middle East, Isaraeli nuclear programmes remained a disturbing issue. Thus, he could not help but call on the Israeli Government to adhere, as soon as possible, to the NPT, and to place all its nuclear facilities under strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. On the question of small arms, his country supported the convening of a conference in 2001, but preparations had to be thorough and take into account the views of many States.
MAKARIM WIBISONO (Indonesia) said the international community had come a long way towards achieving arms control and reduction agreements, but those had not adequately curbed the arms race or alleviated the nuclear threat. Those proscribed certain dangerous development, but had not resulted in substantial reductions in any of the major weapon systems. The situation had been further compounded by the regional arms races and the accumulation of ever more destructive weapons by a growing number of countries. Regional instabilities, the emergence of ethnic and religious tensions, as well as the heightened risk of proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional armaments, together with the frequency of internal conflicts, had created serious challenges, and now - more than ever - had undermined regional peace and international security.
As the tumultuous twentieth century drew to a close, he said, the global community had the solemn obligation to embark upon a course of action that would build on past achievements and truly reflect its collective aspirations. Despite such notable developments as the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention and the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the global disarmament scene was dismal. The steady progress in eliminating nuclear arsenals had come to a virtual halt. Indeed, nuclear weapons had made a disturbing comeback. START II had not entered into force. Modernization of nuclear arsenals had proceeded apace, while new missions for nuclear forces were continually envisioned. Strategic doctrines had not only been reaffirmed, but also made more ambiguous. He said the uncertainties surrounding the ratification of the CTBT would have far-reaching ramifications and might well unravel decades of concerted efforts by the General Assembly. Further compounding the situation were the ongoing plans for the weaponization of outer space and for missile defence, which were incompatible with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The continued intransigence of the nuclear-weapon States to initiate negotiations on nuclear and related issues had led to a virtual deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, which had not augured well for future disarmament endeavours.
Those retrograde developments had called for a sober reassessment of the debilitating attitudes that had, for too long, determined policies and postures towards weapons of mass destruction, he said. The indefinite retention of nuclear weapons carried the grave risk of their use, either by design or by accident, with calamitous consequences. The report of the Tokyo Forum had warned of continuing dangers posed by nuclear armaments and had projected its vision of resolving nuclear issues. It called for, among others, concrete steps to reduce nuclear dangers, to adopt nuclear transparency measures, to stop the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and end the hair-trigger alert status of thousands of nuclear weapons. It also called for the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons and parallel reductions by the two leading military Powers to 1,000 deployed weapons, regardless of START II ratification, and the commencement of START III negotiations.
He said that recent political, security and technological developments had rendered a nuclear-weapon-free world a realizable goal, and the opportunity should be seized to take irreversible steps towards eliminating those weapons. As recent events had demonstrated, however, the non-proliferation regime could not be ensured in the absence of credible advancement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The often-repeated claims of sustained progress in nuclear disarmament were a distortion of the truth. As the Non-Aligned Movement had stated, there was no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals for the security of a handful of powerful nations. Neither could there be any justification for the insistence that nuclear weapons had provided unique security benefits. Countries could not continue to monopolize those weapons while pursuing the objective of non-proliferation.
The future of non-proliferation could not be assured by the wilful violation of its legal basis, by the retention of dubious privileges, by perpetuating inequality, by usurping decision-making, and by the strategic subordination of an overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, he went on. Those majority States had also suffered from discrimination, which was epitomized by the possession of more than 30,000 weapons in stockpiles, which was unjust and unacceptable. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States would uphold the demand for nuclear disarmament in a phased approach and within a time frame.
Significant differences had prevailed in the three meetings of the Preparatory Committee leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, he said. Clearly, its success would depend, to a large degree, on the ratification of the CTBT by all nuclear-weapon States and by those deemed nuclear-weapon capable. The countries which had taken the lead must now set an example by ratifying the CTBT. Progress would also depend upon the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty that would focus equally on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Progress on the objective set by the 1995 NPT Review Conference must be pursued in the context of an agenda to roll back existing arsenals, in order to address related issues of past stockpiles and future production, verification mechanisms and the right of civilian applications, universality and non- discrimination. Above all, it would depend on the resumption of bilateral efforts and the initiation of multilateral negotiations for the total abolition of nuclear arms. Hence, it would be a testing time for the NPT, as it navigated unknown terrain.
HASMY AGAM (Malaysia) said that the outlook for nuclear disarmament for the foreseeable future remained bleak, because the established nuclear-weapon States still clung to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, encouraging others to aspire to similar status. The nuclear-weapon States remained averse to any serious multilateral engagements on current disarmament problems. They continued to take the attitude that the issue was best left to them to negotiate, yet, there was no real progress in that sphere, either. Unless concerted action was taken, existing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes could very well become hollow instruments.
The prospect of a successful outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, he said, remained dim. The inability to agree on substantive issues reflected the chasm between the nuclear-weapon States and their allies and non-nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament. Malaysia was concerned that the legal obligations of article VI of the Treaty continued to be unfulfilled. As in previous years, Malaysia would again table a resolution to remind the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, of their obligation to take serious steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons once and for all.
He added that, to facilitate the work of the Conference on Disarmament, its programme of work should be automatically renewed without having to seek a fresh mandate each year. If not for that procedure, the working group on fissile material cut-off treaty, established in late 1998, would have been reconstituted and engaged in serious negotiations. The Conference admitted five new members in the current year, including Malaysia. There were still 21 others waiting for admission, and they should be admitted without further delay.
AKIRA HAYASSHI (Japan) said that, while it was an irrefutable fact that efforts in pursuit of nuclear disarmament had stalled during the past several years, some modest steps towards progress had been made. The recent commencement of the discussions on START III between the United States and the Russian Federation, which are expected to facilitate the future START III negotiations, was an example. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament had demonstrated strong common will to preserve this years achievement and impetus to move forward through the intersessional consultations.
The situation in South Asia, however, was deteriorating, he said. While international efforts had been made to minimize the consequences of the nuclear tests conducted last year, events, such as the recent armed conflict over Kashmir and the announcement of the draft Indian nuclear doctrine, were sources of concern. It was essential for the international community to continue to address the problem from the global and regional points of view. All the measures that needed to be taken were spelled out in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), and Japan called upon the two countries concerned to make every effort to implement those measures, especially signing and ratifying the CTBT.
He added that directly after the nuclear tests last year the Government of Japan organized the Tokyo Forum to discuss the ways and means of stopping trends in nuclear proliferation and of revitalizing nuclear disarmament efforts. The Forum conducted an in-depth analysis of the current international security environment and issued its report containing a number of concrete recommendations. While Japan recognized that all of those recommendations might not be readily accepted by some countries, it believed they outlined concrete and realistic steps for advancement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
If countries were not yet in a position to agree on the entire roadmap to our destination, he went on, they needed to agree on certain medium-term measures. It would be more realistic to negotiate the successive steps, while proceeding first with those within reach. Feasible in the near term, for instance, were the early entry into force of the CTBT, the early conclusion of the negotiations on the fissile material and progress in the START process. Regarding the NPT, the international community stood at a crossroads and did not have the luxury to allow the Review Conference in 2000 to fail. Everyone had to summon the political will to ensure the Conference would not be convened in vain.
The verification mechanism for biological weapons required the support of the industry concerned, he said. The mechanism needed to be efficient, as well as cost effective. In order to ensure that the negotiations were concluded before the next Review Conference in 2001, further efforts to bridge the differences were urgently required. In addition, bearing in mind the significance of the international conference on small arms, Japan would table a resolution again this year. Also, anti-personnel landmines were one of the most pressing global disarmament issues. Many important countries had not acceded to the two important legal instruments on anti-personnel mines -- the Ottawa Convention and the amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It was essential to create a legal framework that could involve these countries while maintaining the global and total ban on anti-personnel mines as a goal.
The importance of regional efforts for peace and security could not be overstated, he continued. His Government paid particular attention to the activities of the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, and had pledged financial contributions to boost their activities. His Government also welcomed the recent announcement by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea on its restraint regarding a missile launch as a result of the bilateral consultation held in Berlin. That development would improve the security environment of the region.
ANA MARIJA BESKER (Croatia) said she considered the recent adoption of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe as a significant step towards the democratic stabilization of the region and its integration into the European whole. Croatia urged all participating countries to live up to their commitments, so that the activities envisaged by the Pact might begin to materialize.
Croatia had fully complied with global disarmament treaties, she added. It would shortly ratify the CTBT and Protocols II and IV of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It remained committed to advancing the arms control and disarmament process. It recognized the promising disarmament achievements of the first half of the decade, but recalled that last year the First Committee took action on 48 draft resolutions - and almost none were pursued with any productive effect. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was a blatant case in point.
She fully supported the Secretary-General in his appeal for better prevention in strategies and disarmament, especially in regard to small arms and light weapons. She also concurred with the Tokyo Forum conclusion that there was an urgent need for concerted action and a realistic dialogue, so that recent setbacks could be reversed.
GELSON FONSECA (Brazil) said that together with other members of the new agenda coalition, the level of support the initiative had gathered since it was launched in June 1998 encouraged his country. The motivating force behind the new agenda formulation was the pursuit of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The new agenda countries believed it was imperative to speed up the pace of negotiations towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
Having ratified the CTBT and the NPT last year, his country, he said, added its voice to those who rightfully demanded the early entry into force of those treaties. It welcomed the admission of Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia to the Conference on Disarmament and hoped that they would bring ideas and proposals that would help its fresh start. His country also hoped to see progress in the forthcoming Review Conference of the NPT, and that the international community would not waste the opportunity to roll back recent negative developments in the process of nuclear disarmament.
He added that his country continued to welcome efforts towards expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and that it would once again present a draft resolution on the Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas Free of Nuclear Weapons. The proposal received 154 votes in the last General Assembly, a sign of support of a large majority of Member States to the consolidation and expansion of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. His country was also extremely concerned that the Disarmament Commission had failed to reach consensus on the question of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. A carefully prepared special session would enable the international community to make an inventory of what had been achieved and lay the foundations for future work.
Right of Reply
The representative of Iran, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that given the vital peace and security items on the Committees agenda, he was disappointed that a misunderstanding in bilateral relations between Iran and the United Arab Emirates had been raised.
He said that the claim raised today by the United Arab Emirates against the territorial integrity of Iran had been unacceptable and baseless. Since his position on that issue was very clear, he need not get into specifics, but he would emphasize that Iran was fully committed to its obligations, including those arising from the 1971 understanding. His country had friends and ties with neighbours in the Persian Gulf and stood ready to enter into substantive discussions with the United Arab Emirates, in good faith, to solve any possible misunderstanding.
He said his countrys message to its neighbours, including the United Arab Emirates, was one of friendship and cooperation. Iran continued to work towards strengthening cooperation in the Persian Gulf region. The consolidation of peace and security was a matter of great importance in that region, and Iran had so far spared no efforts in furthering that cause.
The representative of the United Arab Emirates, also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said he did not want to engage in a legal or political dialogue. If his colleague from Iran would like to know the history of the occupation of the three islands from the Emirates in 1971, he should go to the Security Council, which had been seized of the matter since then. He said the notion that Iran had worked to re-establish stability and peace in the area was untenable, because the occupation of a small country like the Emirates was not acceptable. Such occupation was similar to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the Golan. Iran was occupying Arab territories in the form of its occupation of three islands of the Untied Arab Emirates. That issue was before the Security Council. Moreover, the international community was fully aware that Iran had occupied the islands.
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