PRESS CONFERENCE BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL

Press Briefing

PRESS CONFERENCE BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL

Antonio Monteiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations, informed correspondents at a Headquarters press conference today, that he had requested a formal meeting of the Security Council on East Timor because the situation in the Territory was desperate.

Mr. Monteiro said that the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was pulling out, the Organization’s observers were obliged to leave, there was no security and neither were there any guarantees. “We consider that now is the moment for the international community to do something”, he stressed.

He said that the Security Council was now meeting in informal consultations –- that was not the appropriate forum for a meeting. The briefing by Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast should have been made public for the entire international community to be aware of what was taking place in East Timor.

Therefore, Mr. Monteiro said, under Article 35 of the Organization’s Charter he was requesting the President of the Council, Arnold Peter van Walsum (Netherlands), to hold a formal meeting on the issue of East Timor. That would depend on the President’s ruling, and if there was no unanimity in the Council, it would be his obligation to put the matter to a vote, where there was no veto since it was a procedural question.

[Article 35 states that any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute or situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Council or the General Assembly. Under Article 34, the Council may investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security]

“We want this meeting to take place today”, Mr. Monteiro stressed. Some delegations were asking for more time so the President of Indonesia, B.J. Habibie, could meet with a mission from the Council. There were telephones, however, and after that meeting in Indonesia, the Secretary-General and the Council could be quickly informed about the results. While there was a call for the meeting to be convened today, the hour of that meeting would depend on the Council President.

Responding to a question, Mr. Monteiro said Portugal still hoped that President Habibie would agree to an international force, but if

Monteiro Briefing - 2 - 8 September 1999

the Indonesians refused, the Security Council should go ahead. Under international law, Indonesia had no sovereignty over East Timor and the United Nations had never recognized its occupation. Indonesia was an occupying power, but not a legal one.

He said last week's referendum in favour of independence had given East Timor legitimacy. Portugal wanted the Security Council and the international community to assume their responsibilities. The entire popular consultation process had been conducted by the United Nations, which had a strict obligation to act.

What options would remain in the absence of consent by Indonesia and if intervention was vetoed in the Security Council? another journalist asked.

Mr. Monteiro said any country that vetoed intervention after all the tragedy in East Timor should be considered a rogue State. Portugal considered the Indonesian military to be outlaws and criminals who should stand trial.

Was Portugal prepared to send troops? another correspondent asked. Which other countries would do so?

The Permanent Representative replied that several countries were prepared to send troops, although they all wanted Indonesian consent. That was understandable because no war was being waged against Indonesia. The point was that the international community could not waste any more time. The Security Council should be confronted with the fact of the killings and displacements taking place in East Timor.

Why had Portugal agreed to a referendum with Indonesia running security? the same journalist asked, noting that before intervention in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nobody would have agreed to a referendum under Serbian security.

Mr. Monteiro said his country had been negotiating with Indonesia since 1983. The Secretary-General had finally brokered the 5 May 1999 Peace Agreement, which Portugal had signed in good faith and with the consent of the East Timorese resistance, including Xanana Gusmao.

He said that East Timor had been ignored for more than 20 years, even by countries that had only started defending the territory after the signing of the 5 May accords. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had said publicly several times that he wanted to call independence leader Ramos Horta's bluff concerning the wishes of the East Timorese. Instead, the referendum had called the bluff of the Indonesians. Eighty per cent of the vote had favoured independence despite intimidation and terror. The Indonesian military was in control of East Timor, and had formed and identified with the militias. Portugal was calling on the United Nations to sever all links with the Indonesian military and to impose sanctions on it.

Monteiro Briefing - 3 - 8 September 1999

Asked what precedents there were for what he was proposing, Mr. Monteiro said he did not want to be bureaucratic about precedents. East Timor was an absolutely unique case. There had been an illegal occupation supported by the world's indifference; there had been an agreement and a formal vote; and there had been a formal Security Council session where the Secretary-General had announced the results. After all that, one country was now destroying another. East Timor was not and never had been part of Indonesia.

Mr. Monteiro said in response to another question that he hoped there was no truth to claims of an April 1999 meeting between United States military officials and General Wiranto, the Indonesian Defence Minister, where the "green light" had been given to work with anti- independence militias in East Timor.

He said security had been the most difficult question in the negotiations leading up to the 5 May Peace Agreement and disarmament of forces had been the key point of the Memorandum presented by the Secretary-General. The Indonesian military had started arming the militias which had in turn started acting illegally.

In response to another question, he said that, in line with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, there were two reasons for international intervention: a breach of the security provision of the peace accords; and the humanitarian situation in East Timor.

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