PRESS BRIEFING BY FORMER ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR KOSOVO

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY FORMER ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR KOSOVO

The fact that some outside forces were moving into municipal lacunae in Kosovo was not an entirely negative development, because the United Nations was not a colonial Power and internationals should not be running Kosovo from top to bottom, the newly returned Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Chief of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Sergio Vieira de Mello, said this afternoon at a Headquarters press briefing.

The purpose of the deployment in Kosovo was to promote self-governance and autonomy, Mr. Vieira de Mello, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, continued. UNMIK was not a superstructure imposed from abroad on the Kosovo people, and to the extent that some of the persons who had moved in at the municipal level were doing a good job, both in terms of their competence and their inclusive, multi-ethnic democratic approach to their jobs, they would be retained. There were enough competent resources in Kosovo, of different ethnic backgrounds, to do the jobs. The key was for such integration to be done under the strict supervision and authority of the newly named Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner.

Asked whether Mr. Kouchner would be able to control the situation, Mr. Vieira de Mello said, "Absolutely. We have established the closest possible relations and understanding on the ground with the Kosovo Security Force (KFOR). And despite the fact that soldiers are not policemen, General Jackson and the KFOR soldiers have done a terrific job of policing even as we are setting up the police component."

Law and order in Kosovo was the major concern at present, Mr. Vieira de Mello emphasized. Just over a week ago, four to six Kosovo inhabitants were being killed daily, mostly Serbs and Roma but also Albanians accused of collaborating with the former authorities. Often, those killings had been carried out in a way contributing to a climate of terror, which could not be tolerated. KFOR had been given a clear mandate to establish security and it had been doing remarkably well, short of placing a KFOR soldier in front of every Serb house or apartment throughout Kosovo. The Kosovo police force would eventually restore law and order fully, not the international policemen and not an international military force.

However, to stem the recent spree of killings and violence in Kosovo, some of which were attributable to organized crime or to individuals who were not Kosovo citizens in any way, Mr. Vieira de Mello said the Albanian Kosovars needed satisfaction and an assurance that justice would be done. That made the role of the International Tribunal and that of the new judiciary so

important. Suspected war criminals remaining inside Kosovo had to be identified and dealt with in a democratic and yet swift manner, in order to deter the understandably disgruntled Kosovars from taking justice into their own hands. That was being done in earnest. During discussions with the Kosovo political leaders, particularly with Mr. Thaci of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the responsibility of the Kosovo political leaders in assuring that Kosovo remained multi-ethnic had been made clear. They had agreed on that responsibility and a number of very practical measures had been agreed upon at the inauguration of the Kosovo Transitional Council two weeks before. "It is accepted that creating terror and replacing one injustice with another is not a viable formula for a democratic Kosovo, a Kosovo we all hope will become exemplary in south-eastern Europe".

Meanwhile, some press in recent days had focused on the old theme of all that the United Nations has not yet done, and on its slowness about what remained to be done, Mr. Vieira de Mello said. However, in the weeks since UNMIK entered Pristina on Sunday, 13 June, just 24 hours after KFOR went in on Saturday, much had been accomplished, however modestly, but also not in a slow performance either, by any means. First, the mission structure had been accomplished, the first truly integrated mission of its kind in the Organization.

"What we have is the United Nations providing an umbrella to United Nations agencies, but also to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)", Mr. Vieira de Mello said, recalling that the OSCE was in charge of the pillar for institution-building, democratization, and eventually the organization of free and fair elections, as well as the establishment of an environment allowing a free media to perform a role it had been prevented from doing in the past. The UNMIK mission also provided an umbrella for the European Commission, in charge of the reconstruction pillar. And with regard to KFOR, seldom before had there been as close, strong and smooth relationship and understanding between a United Nations civilian operation and a peacekeeping force which was not a United Nations military force.

Mr. Vieira de Mello said the deployment of civilian administrators, with support staff, had begun three weeks before, with the appointment of five district civilian administrators. Those "districts" were the five brigade areas of KFOR: Pristina, Mitrovica, Pec, Prizren and Gnjilane. Those administrators would require stronger support at the municipal level in the 29 municipalities, and those civilian administrators at the communal municipal levels were arriving at a daily basis.

Some 10 joint consultative committees had also been created, Mr. Vieira de Mello continued. Those were intended to seek or mediate solutions to the many problems that arise on a daily or hourly basis in Kosovo, in particular concerning the question of reintegrating Albanians who had been dismissed from jobs, either in 1989 to 1990 or during the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign. Those people's rights had to be restored

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without unjust infliction of displacements onto others of Serb or other ethnic origins. "I assure you, this has not been easy", he said.

The Kosovo Transitional Council had also been established, and not without difficulty, the Under-Secretary-General said. The first meeting of that Council had been chaired by the incoming and outgoing United Nations Special Representatives two weeks ago. It would be the supreme political body in Kosovo, providing the Special Representative both with a sounding board and with support in decision-making. That Council represented all the Kosovo communities, including the Albanian political parties, the Kosovo Serbs, and communities such as the Turks and Bosnian Muslims. The Roma were not yet represented on the Council because no single respected and credible leader had been identified for the Gypsy community, but the search was on and the person would be found.

In addition, Mr. Vieira de Mello continued, decrees had been issued, defining the UNMIK's authority, and in that respect the foundations for a credible judicial system had been laid. So far, 32 investigative judges had been appointed as well as prosecutors, again representing all the different ethnic communities, and their oaths taken by democratic principles rather than the old ethnically based principles. Those judges would help control the level of criminality that in Kosovo was intolerably high. Recruitment for the local police service had begun; 20,000 application forms had been distributed throughout the country, and as of two days ago, 8,000 applications had been received. The Police Academy, for which the OSCE had assumed responsibility, would start functioning by mid-August. Also, close to $1.5 million had been disbursed for salaries in urban areas to allow vital utilities such as electricity and water to continue. Radio and television Pristina had been brought back on the air. Assisting the return of refugees and distributing humanitarian assistance to them would continue to hundreds of thousands of returnees throughout the winter. A comprehensive damage assessment was being carried out, particularly of housing and public utilities, and a comprehensive donor appeal for humanitarian needs and rehabilitation, not only in Kosovo but in south-eastern Europe as a whole, had been issued earlier this week.

"This is not to say that everything is all well. More resources are needed, there is no doubt about that", Mr. Vieira de Mello asserted. Only six Governments -- Norway, Finland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands and France -- had contributed to a Public Administration Trust Fund established in Pristina to raise money until the Interim Administration could raise its own financial resources through custom duties and taxation in Kosovo. Relatively modest resources were needed for the next three months to pay salaries of civil servants in Kosovo, some who had not been paid since March.

For those who said events were moving too slowly, Mr. Vieira de Mello said, "I wish the United Nations had battalions of civilian administrators and civilian policemen on standby in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as KFOR did. We didn't. We can only start recruiting and looking for such

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contingents after the Security Council resolution has been passed." The Department of Peacekeeping Operations had been desperately trying to raise offers from Member States to perform tasks that the United Nations civilian police force was not used to, executive and enforcement tasks. "We're talking of an armed civilian police, as distinct from the classical monitoring role of United Nations civilian police forces in other peacekeeping operations", he added.

In response to a question concerning Member State shortcomings in establishing the police force more quickly, Mr. Vieira de Mello said he was of the opinion that responsibility was always shared. Obviously, the United Nations was very dependent on Member States. A main difficulty was receiving offers for police contingents of the type needed. Monitors, unarmed police and small contingents were not needed in Kosovo, where large contingents willing to perform executive tasks were needed once the law enforcement role was taken over from KFOR. "Some countries are reluctant to expose their soldiers, and even less, their policemen, to that kind of environment." That had created difficulties and delays in some capitals, but again, in recent days, the offers for the needed 3,100 policemen in Kosovo had been exceeded. Now, a mechanism had to be worked out for getting those offered police out into the field as quickly as possible.

Mr. Vieira de Mello made a distinction, in response to another question, between recruitment and deployment, as well as between the international police force and the Kosovo police being trained at the academy UNMIK was re- establishing. The target for recruitment to the Kosovo police academy was between 3,000 and 4,000 strong, with 20 per cent of the recruits women. The academy would be functioning by mid-August, two weeks from now. The OSCE would be in charge and over 80 trainers had arrived. Five to six weeks later, the first contingent would leave the academy and would start the on-the-job training, lasting four to five months, alongside the international police force. The internationals, in other words, would supervise the local trainees during that on-the-job training period. The first Kosovo police units would be operating on their own by the end of the year or early next year.

Responding to another question on whether the United Nations would be able to assert its authority over that of the KLA, Mr. Vieira de Mello emphasized that the KLA were not the only political players in Kosovo. Secondly, the KLA had signed an undertaking with KFOR for its demilitarization and transformation. A military force could only transform itself into a political force. The test would come in the next weeks, if the KLA metamorphosed into a political party functioning on the basis of democratic principles that all participants expected of the KLA.

As far as the self-appointed mayors at the municipal level who were occupying the lacunae at present, Mr. Vieira de Mello said each case would be studied to see who they were, who had appointed them and how they were performing their functions. Many of them had seemed quite competent. Those

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who were determined to be fit to maintain their positions would do so under the supervision of the district civilian administrator, assisted by civil affairs officers being deployed at present, under the authority of the Special Representative. "And of course, we have KFOR there, which is quite prepared to back UNMIK in case of need, as they demonstrated each time I asked for help", he said.

"Is the KLA behind organized crime in Kosovo and is it playing any unilateral policing role in any of these places?", the Under-Secretary-General was asked. Mr. Vieira de Mello said it was obvious that elements either now or formerly belonging to the KLA were attempting to establish a parallel or shadow police force. KFOR had uncovered two detention centres and when confronted, Mr. Thaci had denied that his KLA was in that sort of business. He had, in fact, welcomed the identification of the locations of the detention centres and the freeing of the Serb and Roma detainees found there. However, there was no UNMIK intelligence at present in Kosovo. Once the international police force was fully deployed and had a structured headquarters in Pristina, there would be more information.

Mr. Vieira de Mello said his feeling was that organized crime did function in Kosovo, not necessarily run by Kosovars, and Mr. Thaci had certainly denied any interest in the flourishing of organized crime in Kosovo. He had expressed concern about the presence of organized crime in Kosovo and had stated it was not in Kosovo's best interests. He had also claimed that many of those now committing crimes and presenting themselves as KLA through uniforms or insignia were not in fact KLA members. At present, there was not enough intelligence to make a determination, and in response to a follow-up question by another correspondent, Mr. Vieira de Mello said there had been no crack-down on such organizations by the time of his departure.

"What percentage of the police force would be former KLA fighters and what would be done to ensure the protection of the Serb minority?", a correspondent asked.

It was a good question and he had discussed it with Mr. Thaci and the commander of the armed wing of the KLA, Mr. Vieira de Mello answered. They had indicated they understood that recruitment into the new Kosovo police force would be individual. Thousands of applications had been distributed and would be received from men and women regardless of ethnic background. Those applications would go through a very strict selection process using a number of criteria applied in the past in the constitution of new police forces. Those selected would go through a strict training period in the police academy, followed by on-the-job training side by side with international policemen. Thus, both through the screening process and in the six-month training period, and then subsequently in the two to three years before being confirmed as a policeman, as happens in any democratic country, there would be many ways to determine whether that individual intends to behave in ways consistent with democratic and ethnically tolerant principles.

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