PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE BALKANS

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE BALKANS

An important meeting this morning involving Kosovar Albanian leaders and representatives of the local Serb community had ended with the leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) shaking hands with Serb representatives, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans, Carl Bildt, said today during a Headquarters press briefing on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

The Serb representatives had included both the few politicians remaining in that part of Kosovo and representatives of the Orthodox Church, Mr. Bildt continued. The handshake had been an act of considerable symbolism that had not been planned and had not been easy to achieve. It had been achieved, however, and it would hopefully be covered by whatever local media there was, since those kinds of pictures were important to show in that region.

Mr. Bildt said he had arrived yesterday from Pristina and would be returning to Europe today for continued consultations on setting up various aspects of the UNMIK mission. He had come directly to New York after several days on the ground in Pristina assessing the situation in Kosovo. The set-up of UNMIK was going well although it was not fully deployed. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) operation, which was only half strength, was exercising full legal authority with a number of meetings held. In fact, a number of foreign defense ministers had been there yesterday.

Mr. Bildt said the risk of a security vacuum, seen in the early phases of the operation, was beginning to close now. Much attention in Kosovo was now centred on the power vacuum. It was important to prevent one or another of the groups from assuming functions and powers they did not have. It was up to UNMIK to establish the interim administration. That was well under way, and concerns over the power vacuum would eventually subside.

Attention would then focus on the economic vacuum in Kosovo -- the fact that there was virtually no functioning economy, he said. That had many implications, focused on refugee return, which was going fast, although there were risks such as unexploded mines and ordinances. Also, there was a need for food, jobs and regulation of economic life to prevent different sorts of activities from developing. Thus, the economic vacuum indicated a need to develop, fairly quickly during the coming days, that part of the UNMIK operation which addressed those issues.

Very important was the dialogue pursued between UNMIK and the different Kosovar Albanian political groups, he continued, especially where there was concern over the fact that groups had gone off in different directions and where active efforts were under way to bring them together in some sort of consultative structure. Possibilities for meetings over the next days were being explored. There was also discussion of forming the civilian commissions that would bring the Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and international

representatives together in the management of the most basic functions that were needed, such as water and utilities. Garbage collection was a major problem, he added.

What were the lessons of Bosnia about what should be done in Kosovo and what should be done to avoid making the same mistakes, bearing in mind that the civilian aspect of the Dayton peace accords had not been carried out very well? Mr. Bildt was asked.

It was important to keep in mind that one problem at the beginning of the Bosnia implementation had been the fact that the military had had a very restricted interpretation of its mandate. That had caused a lot of problems. At the same time, the civilian side had been made very weak in the Dayton agreements. Richard Holbrooke had said in his book that he, Mr. Bildt, had been right in his warnings on this issues, which was an unusual admission for Mr. Holbrooke, but it was there on the record. Both those lessons had been learned. The KFOR was having a much more proactive interpretation of its mandate. Cooperation on the ground between Sergio Vieira de Mello, the acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and General Michael Jackson, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Commander in Kosovo, was excellent, and they saw eye to eye on all the issues. That was important.

Hadn't there been good cooperation in Bosnia? the correspondent asked.

Yes, but the mandate given at the time had prevented doing even basic things supportive of the civilian implementation efforts, Mr. Bildt said, citing the Sarajevo transition problems, which were well documented in books by Mr. Holbrooke, himself and others. There was a stronger mandate and a stronger civilian component now, which made a world of difference. "This is a chapter VII Security Council operation, with all of the authority of the country, while in Bosnia the civilian side had virtually no authority even over the civilian efforts," he said. Those two components were operating differently in Kosovo than they had in Bosnia, which created a somewhat better situation.

Civilian implementation would be a fundamentally different thing, Mr. Bildt continued. The problem in Bosnia had been that the operation had been working with existing structures where there had been three armies and three States. In effect, there had allegedly been three Serb self-proclaimed States operating in the territory, three political leaderships, three ways of asserting power, three political agendas. The effort had basically involved reconciling those and molding them gradually into some common political structure. In Kosovo there was nothing whatsoever. "We're starting from ground zero in terms of building institutions", and as a matter of fact, the institutions to be built were those to be set up either by UNMIK itself or through it. In Kosovo, there were no local authorities to deal with; there were local authorities to be set up, "by us". That made for a fundamental difference. Time would tell whether it would make things easier or more

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difficult in the long run. But it was an advantage that a number of people involved in Kosovo had profound experience. Sergio Vieira de Mello had lots of experience from Bosnia, as did General Jackson and he, himself. All "spoke the same language"; they all knew what to do.

The Security Council had called for respecting the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a correspondent pointed out. How would that be reconciled? What kind of liaison mechanism could bring about respect for that portion of the resolution, since the Yugoslav Ambassador had complained already?

Mr. Bildt said he hadn't seen the text, but understood that the Ambassador was less than pleased with certain aspects of things. There would be an answer to that forthcoming. But as to the legalities of the situation, the Security Council resolution suspended the power of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the power of Serbia inside Kosovo, transferring it to the UNMIK operation. The UNMIK had all the power in Kosovo, but it still respected the integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, meaning UNMIK wouldn't change the international personality of Kosovo. The multilateral international agreements that affected the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the framework, still applied to the UNMIK operation.

Those were the principles, Mr. Bildt said. When getting down to the details, some situations would undoubtedly be faced where creative interpretations of international law would have to be made in order to handle a situation that was fairly unique. "We've been discussing those fairly extensively during my two days here," he said. The basic structures, however, were fairly clear. The UNMIK was the authority in Kosovo, which didn't change Kosovo's international status.

With regard to the power vacuum and an appeal for civilian administrators, how long could the situation go on without the Kosovo Liberation Army trying to fill the power vacuum, which was of major concern to at least some people there? Mr. Bildt was asked. What was being done to get some people into key positions, particularly in the major cities and towns where there was conflict?

The situation was considerably better now than a week ago, Mr. Bildt answered. He said he had been concerned at first on seeing armed Kosovo Liberation Army formations trying to take over police stations, but that was no longer the case. The guns were off the streets and the police stations had not been taken over by anyone. It was a far better situation. The UNMIK was deploying quickly, but gradually. It had moved into its permanent headquarters in Pristina yesterday, which was the big complex -- the Pristina Corps of the Yugoslav Army -- so it was amply provided with most things. It hadn't been looted, for example, although a fair number of documents had been destroyed when the army had left. Then it was a matter of deploying civilian representatives in the five different brigade areas, and then eventually into

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the 28 different municipalities. That would happen in the course of the next few weeks.

"We do not intend to nominate an international to every single public function in Kosovo," he said. "But every single public function in Kosovo will be exercised under the ultimate authority of UNMIK". That meant that local Kosovo Albanians who were helping to run local governments would be encouraged, but would have to respect the ultimate authority of the Special Representative. There were pressing tasks to be dealt with on the part of the people of Kosovo. "The issue of garbage collection may not be a big thing when you talk to the press in New York, but go to Pristina, and I think the local people of Pristina are more concerned with the lack of garbage collection than with some of the academic arguments concerning the future of Kosovo at the moment. They would probably like their local politicians to do something like that and we would encourage that".

"What kinds of creative interpretations of international law might there be?" a correspondent asked.

Mr. Bildt said "I don't know. It's too early to tell. But we are in a new situation. There's never been anything like it before. A chapter VII interim administration on the territory of another nation. To take a couple of examples: stamps? passports, taxes? If we don't collect taxes, say on petrol, then petrol prices in Kosovo will be substantially lower than elsewhere in the region. You don't need to be an expert on Balkan economies to understand the implication of that fairly fast". Taxes had to be fairly similar to what they were in the surroundings or else there were all kinds of effects, he continued. Customs and the tariffs regime were very important. Essentially, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia tariffs would have to operate on the external borders. Otherwise, internal borders would have to be set up to prevent economic distortions that had political consequences which enabled the building up of the somewhat creative economic structures that were a feature of Balkan economic life. A practical mind, aware of Balkan realities but connected to international law, would be needed to sort out all the situations.

What in Chapter VII allowed NATO to take over the country? a correspondent asked.

Mr. Bildt said that the resolution tasked the United Nations with setting up the interim administration of the country -- so UNMIK was the administration of the country. It was similar to the government of a country being its administrator, as in the Russian Government being the administrator of the Russian Federation. The UNMIK was the administration, or the government, of Kosovo. The Security Council had authorized a uniquely strong concept that went well beyond anything. There was also the fact that there were no other local authorities. In the Eastern Slavonia transitional administration, local authorities had existed.

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What kind of passports would Kosovars use for travelling? a correspondent asked.

Most travelled on old Yugoslav passports, Mr. Bildt answered. It was how they had travelled before. Passports were one of the issues still to be determined, and while some Kosovar Albanians travelled all over the world with passports of other countries, such as Sweden, in essence they all had Yugoslav passports.

A correspondent asked whether a Special Representative had been discussed and how soon one was expected to be named.

There were names in the public domain and it was up to the Secretary- General to name one, Mr. Bildt said, adding that he had not discussed it with the Secretary-General in the last days but that he knew the Secretary-General intended to take a decision as soon as possible.

Had it been confirmed that Mr. Bildt himself was not in the running? Mr. Bildt was asked.

"Confirmed by me", Mr. Bildt answered. But there were deputies and other positions, and those had been heavily focused on during the meetings at Headquarters. "Not just the king of the place has to be chosen but the footservants. To do the work while the king sits in the sun", he said.

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