PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL ENVOY ON BALKANS

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL ENVOY ON BALKANS

The Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans, Eduard Kukan, told correspondents today that there was definite support for the inclusion of the United Nations in the process of finding a solution to the crisis in the Balkans, but differences in the extent and timing of that inclusion remained to be negotiated.

Speaking at the daily noon briefing, Mr. Kukan said that he and Carl Bildt, also recently appointed by the Secretary-General as a Special Envoy for the Balkans, were now assuming their duties. Their activities and Secretariat support staff were presently being established in Geneva. The agreement was to work and travel together at some times, and separately at others, but at all times to inform each other and the Secretary-General about discussions and next steps.

Mr. Kukan said that during his two-day visit to New York, he was meeting with all the members of the Security Council. He was also attending the meetings of various departments at Headquarters. At this stage, the role of the two Special envoys was to contact all of the parties concerned and all of the governments and get as much information as possible, in order to contribute, in the future, to the United Nations role in that whole process.

He said he would travel to Washington, D.C., tomorrow to meet with United States Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. On his way back to Europe, he would stop in Moscow and meet with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on Thursday. He would very much like to meet with Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, but so far, they did not know where he was going to be. Mr. Chernomyrdin was now meeting with Martti Ahtisaari, the President of Finland, and Strobe Talbott, United States Deputy Secretary of State. They were also discussing possible next steps.

A correspondent, referring to a report today in The New York Times about a British initiative for ground troops, asked how that would affect the United Nations diplomatic initiative. He also asked about Mr. Kukan's first step in his mission in the Balkans.

Mr. Kukan said that the very first step, as he had mentioned, were his meetings at Headquarters to establish the forms of future cooperation, and to contact the governments involved.

Concerning the British initiative, he said he did not have any details, but United Nations efforts to contribute to a solution would continue. Very deep coordination was indeed needed, just now, especially in light of Mr. Chernomyrdin's possible trip to Belgrade. Neither he, nor Mr. Bildt wanted to compete with that mission. So, it was necessary to coordinate each future step, in order to avoid the overlap of too many envoys at once.

Another correspondent noted that China's representative had stated that China would not support any United Nations role unless there was a pause in the bombing first or a Group of 8 settlement. He asked if Mr. Kukan had met with the Chinese and would he persuade them to come on board and support the diplomatic efforts in the absence of a bombing pause. He further asked if any effort was being made to keep Russia directly involved in the diplomatic initiative, specifically through daily contact with Moscow.

Mr. Kukan said he had met with the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations yesterday, during which the Ambassador had told him almost exactly what the correspondent had just said. Of course, that was the question to be negotiated, and a lot of time would likely be devoted to it. So far, he seemed very adamant on the position he had expressed. All those issues would be part of the negotiations.

Concerning the Russian participation in the process, it was very important to keep Russia "in", and to cooperate with that country. He did not have daily or preferential contacts with the Russians, but he was going to meet Mr. Ivanov on Thursday and would very much like to meet Mr. Chernomyrdin during his stay in Moscow. He would maintain contacts with them, as well as with other players in the conflict.

In a follow-up question, the correspondent asked if Mr. Kukan had any sense that China would be more flexible? Did the Chinese Ambassador signal that they would be?

Mr. Kukan said he did not get that impression from his conversation yesterday, and it would be necessary to negotiate that issue. The negotiations should produce some results, and he was hopeful that, in the long run, "we shall move forward" on it.

A correspondent asked whether there were any other specific problems besides the problem with China, and whether he had any "guesstimate" of when a United Nations resolution might be formulated?

Mr. Kukan said he didn't like to guess about the time or day when a Security Council resolution would be formulated and adopted. It was not good to start his mission with predictions and get into trouble later. Concerning the correspondent's first question, Mr. Kukan added that he had provided an incomplete report of his talks so far, but had wanted to emphasize that everyone was definitely supporting the United Nations role, but in a different way.

Another correspondent said that the State Department of the United States seemed to believe that Mr. Kukan and Mr. Bildt would move in after a peace settlement to deal with reconstruction and a future civilian administration in Kosovo, as Mr. Bildt had done in Bosnia. Did Mr. Kukan

Kukan Briefing - 3 - 18 May 1999

share that vision, or did he think the United Nations should be there before a peace settlement?

He said he would learn much more about the vision of the United States when he met with Secretary of State Albright tomorrow at noon. He added that his own vision was flexible -- namely, to serve the United Nations and the Secretary-General, in order to veer the United Nations into the process. That very issue was at the heart of discussions now -- the role of the United Nations and the Secretary-General's envoys, and whether that would start after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, or whether a contribution could be made before that time. In either case, it was necessary these days to have as many contacts and as much information as possible, to be very clear on the picture and to take the right steps at this stage.

How many envoys were there now to the Balkans and how was everyone coordinating with each other? a correspondent asked, adding that, since it had not even been possible to figure out where Mr. Chernomyrdin was going to be when Mr. Kukan was in Moscow, what was the means of communication?

Mr. Kukan said that developments were very dynamic and any day could bring some new developments. Thus, it was necessary to react immediately -- that was why it was not possible to predict where Mr. Chernomyrdin was going to be the day after tomorrow.

To the question about the number of envoys, he said he knew of four -- Mr. Ahtisaari, Mr. Chernomyrdin, Mr. Bildt and himself. There might be others, but not officially. Two of them -- Mr. Bildt and himself -- had a mandate from the Secretary-General. Mr. Chernomyrdin was the high representative of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Mr. Ahtisaari's mandate was not quite clear, but he definitely had a role to play and enjoyed confidence as the President of a neutral country playing a positive role.

He added that he did not want to travel to Belgrade just now, because there was a plan for the other two gentlemen to travel there, and he did not want to create chaos. Their meetings would produce clearer ideas about the coordination of such activities.

Some analysts said that the "Americans and the Russians were doing an end-run around" Kofi Annan's envoys, a correspondent said. Although Mr. Kukan had said he did not want to be competitive with them, had he observed that they were usurping him or being competitive with him, especially in his discussions with Security Council members? he asked. What were the different visions being offered about the role of the envoys, the United Nations and the Security Council in the Kosovo peace process?

"I don't want to say they are competing with us," Mr. Kukan said. He was going to give them enough time, space and chance to do their job, and he did not want to interfere with that. Concerning the issue about the

Kukan Briefing - 4 - 18 May 1999

differences -- those were about the timing, specifically when the envoys should start their activities. Some Security Council members thought the envoys should start to play an active role following a resolution by the Council.

Although it would be possible to make some guesses, could you name those members? the correspondent asked.

"I think that your guesses will be right", Mr. Kukan said. Some of them would prefer that the United Nations and the envoys play a more active role, even now. Others would negotiate only after the bombardment was stopped. So, those were the main differences.

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