PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNSCOM
Press Briefing
PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNSCOM
19981111
The decision made last night to remove United Nations weapons inspectors from Iraq this morning was based on a "strong recommendation" by the United States Government, and in the context of an "increasingly hostile atmosphere" in Iraq, the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to monitor disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (UNSCOM), Richard Butler, told correspondents this afternoon at a Headquarters press briefing.
Mr Butler said that since agreeing to brief correspondents, he had learned that the Security Council would meet this afternoon at 3:30. He would, therefore, restrict the briefing because his first duty was to brief the Council. A little while ago, he had sent a letter to the Council President, which would soon be circulated as a Security Council document.
In the letter, he said, he had explained to the Council the reasons for his decision last night to withdraw all UNSCOM personnel from Baghdad. He had also expressed regret that he was unable to consult more widely than with the Council President, who was this month the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations; the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the acting Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations (because of the presence among UNSCOM staff of a Chilean airforce contingent); and representatives of the Secretary-General, in the Secretary-General's absence from New York.
Noting that his consultations had been confined to those persons, he said he was obliged to act quickly to take that decision, because of the strong recommendation that had been put to him, which could have had impact upon the safety of UNSCOM staff. The decision was motivated, overwhelmingly, by concern for the safety of UNSCOM personnel in Iraq. The decision was, hopefully, temporary. The staff had been relocated to Bahrain, where they would remain, pending a decision by Iraq to resume cooperation with UNSCOM. If that occurred, the UNSCOM staff could be back in Baghdad and on the job within 24 hours.
The Iraqi Government had been informed of that decision and of its basis, which was precautionary, he said. The Government had also been informed of the Special Commission's hope that the decision was temporary and that its personnel wished to be back at work in Iraq, in accordance with its mandate, as soon as possible.
To a correspondent's question about where that recommendation came from, Mr. Butler said that the "strong recommendation" given to him in the first instance came from the United States Government. Asked in a follow-up question if he could provide any further detail, Mr. Butler said, no.
Was it important that the decision was taken last night rather than tonight or tomorrow night? the correspondent asked.
Mr. Butler said he took a decision based on safety and on his view that it was best that there be no delay. Moreover, the atmosphere in which UNSCOM personnel had been working in recent weeks had been declining. He had not spent any time on the decision during daylight hours yesterday; that had taken place during the evening. He spent the overwhelming portion of the day dealing with an absolutely unfounded allegation by Iraq that one of the weapons inspectors had committed an act of espionage.
He said that charge was without basis, yet, Iraq had demanded of Mr. Butler that the person be punished and removed. He was prepared to tell them that he would not comply with that request, but that was now academic because that person was removed along with the rest of the UNSCOM staff this morning. That kind of atmosphere was hardly conducive to the safety and security of UNSCOM staff.
Asked who had requested the meeting yesterday between Mr. Butler and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, A. Peter Burleigh, Mr. Butler asked why that mattered. The correspondent replied that it was because Mr. Burleigh was the one making the recommendation. Mr. Butler said that the two had agreed to consult late in the day yesterday. He consulted frequently with Mr. Burleigh, as well as with other Council members. When they did meet in the early evening, he had not known the subject of the meeting, but it was not long after it began that he became well aware of the subject.
To a question about whether Mr. Butler would elaborate on the safety issue, particularly on Iraq's demand that he remove one of his staff, he said that issue was an "atmospheric" one and evidence of a background of increasing hostility towards UNSCOM staff. The fundamental point was that he had formed the view last night that he would be making a serious mistake if he did not act in the interest of the safety of those personnel by removing them from Baghdad immediately. That was a precautionary measure only, but one which was justified and, hopefully, temporary, as he would explain to the Council this afternoon.
How optimistic was he that UNSCOM would be invited back into Iraq and was it still necessary to be invited back in? another correspondent asked. Mr. Butler said that, as the Secretary-General had said earlier today, the situation was very serious. It was wrong-headed because Iraq knew very well what needed to be done in order to complete the disarmament work and move towards the removal of sanctions. Hopefully, the Iraqi authorities had seen from Council resolutions that the course they were on now was only extending sanctions by cancelling periodic reviews.
He went on to say that a lot of people were going to be active on the matter in the days ahead, and, hopefully, Iraq would return to the orthodox way of getting through disarmament and towards the removal of sanctions. The UNSCOM had a role in that, along with the skills, the honesty and objectivity
UNSCOM Briefing - 3 - 11 November 1998
required to do the job. The staff was in Bahrain and if Iraq changed its mind, they could be back in Baghdad in 24 hours and start their work.
Mr. Butler said he would not reveal the nationality of the individual to whom he had referred, out of concern for that person and the Government that sent him to UNSCOM. In the present circumstances, it was probably useful to disclose that he was not a United States national.
The correspondent, referring to a comment made by Mr. Butler last night, asked how military strikes would help UNSCOM get back into Iraq. Mr. Butler said there were two relevant points about enforcement, if it was to occur. The first point was that the international community would not likely let go of the business of bringing into account Iraq's illegal weapons. That was intrinsically important and a very important part of overall efforts to restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Regardless of whether enforcement action took place, the international community would not likely let go of that matter.
Secondly, he said he did not accept the logic espoused by some that a strike would "blow away UNSCOM". If such action were taken, it would be taken to enforce the disarmament law. "The reason going in would be the same as the reason going out in that sense." It was not in his purview to recommend a military strike, but he did not accept the logic that such action would inevitably be the end of the international community's efforts, and through an organ such as UNSCOM, to get that job done. That was illogical.
Asked what kind of security was left at the monitoring centre in Baghdad, and specifically whether UNSCOM had taken any equipment or documents, and so forth, he said he was satisfied that the important information needed by UNSCOM had been secured.
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