PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME

The Executive Director of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Pino Arlacchi, who is also the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna and Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, briefed correspondents at Headquarters this afternoon on his recent visit to Colombia. He also spoke on the status of alternative development projects which the UNDCP designed for Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, as a means of combating the illicit cultivation of drug-related crops in those countries.

Mr. Arlacchi said he had signed an agreement with Colombian President Andres Pastrana to assist with the alternative development strategy that would help rid the country of the drug problem by promoting the cultivation of substitute crops to the coca crop. It was also meant to help bolster the peace process between the Pastrana regime and the guerilla movements in the country.

He said he held talks with the Colombian Government on all matters relating to UNDCP's mandate, including the narcotics problem, money laundering, corruption and organized crime, and on the country's strategy for the peace process it had just initiated with the insurgents. On these and all other related matters, he provided full support to the Pastrana Adminstration. As far as he understood, there was a strong commitment both from the Government and from the insurgency groups, to cooperate in eradicating the cultivation of illicit crops and in the alternative development programme in that country. "We will be part of this effort", he added.

The UNDCP already had a plan for alternative development in Colombia, he continued. That plan, the details of which he had also discussed with President Pastrana, had been one of the major elements of the agreement they had signed. They now looked forward to increasing their cooperation and to translating the contents and strategy of the agreement into action.

Responding to a correspondent who sought to know what he specifically had in mind when he spoke about increased cooperation with Colombia and whether he had any kind of agenda in that regard, he said the UNDCP did have an agenda on alternative development and on how to get rid of coca cultivation in Colombia in 10 years. They also had an agenda that addressed the issue of corruption and would help Colombia strengthen and improve its legislation on fighting corruption.

With regard to money laundering, he said the UNDCP was starting a cooperation agreement, which would also help Colombia refine its legislation on the problem. An important chapter in that regard would be cooperation on

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the confiscation of criminal assets -- properties and money invested in Colombia as proceedings from drug trafficking and related crimes. The UNDCP would use its experience and expertise to assist Colombia to ensure the effective implementation of laws in that respect. He was confident that the process could open a new source of funding for the alternative development project in Colombia.

To a question on the alternative crops that would replace the present drug-producing crops in Colombia, he said he could not give details on those because the Colombian Government also had its own set of alternative set of crops, although it was sharing ideas with the UNDCP. He could only volunteer that palm oil and the rubber tree were among them. It was important, however, to stress that the UNDCP's alternative development strategy for Colombia did not entirely rely on crop substitution. It involved a large set of measures on the development path, including agro-industry in some areas. "We propose a full and comprehensive package of aid to countries wishing to undertake alternative development", he noted.

One correspondent sought to know if the coca growers who would be deprived of their standard crops would be retrained on how to grow substitute crops. In response, he said whenever the necessity arose, those farmers would receive proper training. It was one of the major measures to which they were committed in all alternative development projects. If the substitute crop was already known to farmers, they would be provided with the elementary means and resources to enable them grow those crops, but in all cases where the substitute crop was entirely new, the concerned farmers would receive appropriate training.

To another question seeking confirmation that either he or the United Nations had promised to provide $1 billion towards the eradication of the cultivation of illicit crops in Colombia and the related alternative development project in the country, he said there had been a misunderstanding. What was agreed was that the UNDCP would work with the Colombian Government to raise international aid for approximately $80 million a year, covering the entire period for the eradication of the cultivation of illicit crops. In 10 years, that would amount to roughly $800 million, which was nearly $1 billion.

Pressed by the same correspondent to say more about the agreement he just signed with the Colombian Government as it affected funds for financing the country's alternative development project, he said the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) had opened a credit facility worth $3.5 billion for Colombia. Of that sum, $90 million would go to the Colombian body overseeing the alternative development project and approximately $300 million would go to agricultural development, linked to alternative development.

Pressed further to say exactly how much money, if any, the UNDCP would be able to make available for Colombia, he said, "my organization is not giving money to anybody". The United Nations did not work that way. What they did was present projects and then ask donor countries to finance those

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projects. They would then give the funds to the recipient countries. All that was done in agreement with both parties. The UNDCP, as any other United Nations organization, did not have any money. The project was a complex process that involved a lot of international relations and it was important for the public to understand how the system worked.

To a correspondent seeking to know if he had received any pledges from governments willing to fund or to contribute to the funding of the project in Colombia, he said there had been some encouraging signals from some countries, but there were no precise pledges as yet. It should not be forgotten that they had presented the project only 10 days ago. It was also worth recalling the credit facility which the IDB had given Colombia. In 10 day's time, the UNDCP would organize a conference in Brussels for Peru -- a donor conference in which donor countries would examine and discuss with the UNDCP and the IDB, with a view to identifying how to assist with financial aid. A similar conference would be organized early next year for Bolivia, in which the UNDCP hoped to receive other important pledges from other multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank.

Another correspondent sought to know if he foresaw any problems with the plan to eradicate the cultivation of the coca in Colombia, given the likelihood that the linchpins would not cooperate. In response, he said it was certain that the affected farmers would react. But the UNDCP was able to predict part of their reaction and to act accordingly. For example, there would be satellite and ground monitoring of all the illicit cultivations in the world. That would be conceived to avoid moving cultivation to other parts of Colombia or to other countries.

Responding to a correspondent who sought to know if he had any estimation about when funds would be available for the Colombian project; what his office would be doing in Colombia pending the availability of the funds; and how much money Colombia, Peru and Bolivia needed to proceed with the projects against drugs, he said the three countries would require about $800 million in the next five years. Half that sum would be provided by the countries themselves. The other half should come from donors and from the international community.

Continuing, he stressed that funding was not really the issue. It did not constitute as much of a potential problem as the political commitment of the recipient countries, in terms of credible strategies, and the political commitment of the international community as well. For Colombia, in particular, the biggest issue was the peace process. To end the cultivation of illicit crops in that country, a viable peace process between the Government and the guerillas was indispensable.

In further response to the last set of questions, he said while waiting to receive the required resources for funding the alternative development in those three countries affected by the cultivation of illicit crops, the UNDCP was already working at a technical level with them. The aim had been to do a

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more precise mapping of illicit crops and to prepare the technical plans for the project. It was worth noting that the project would focus on no fewer than a million people involved in growing illicit crops. For the first time, alternative development was at the centre of the anti-narcotics strategy in Latin America and the UNDCP was working very hard not to miss the opportunity of being the anchor of the three projects presently in process.

To a question asking if he had any idea of who the donors for the Colombian project would be, he said he did not, although that was not a major problem. It had been more important to start the process of restoring credibility in what the country could do. It had been a kind of confidence- building exercise. What was needed was to convince public opinion and Governments that the concept of alternative development in this respect was the pillar of the strategy for eliminating the supply of drugs worldwide.

A correspondent argued that some of the farmers of illicit crops in Colombia did not care very much about the peace process and could continue to operate even in a peaceful political climate. How then could he firmly suggest that the success of the peace process would be decisive in terms of efforts to stop the cultivation of those crops. To that, he noted that the guerillas controlled almost 50 per cent of the territory of Colombia -- the same areas where most of the illicit cultivation occurred. Taking that on board, the agreement between the Colombian Government and the major guerilla group in that country was that the guerilla group would cooperate in the effort to eliminate illicit crops and to foster alternative development. That highlighted that the two problems were somewhat related.

He added that the peace process was very important because it would break the current linkage between the insurgency group and the traffickers. At the moment, the insurgency groups, the dominant political authority in the key areas of illicit crop production, took a substantial amount of money from the traffickers. The breakage of that linkage would mean that the traffickers would become the target of both the Government and civil society, without the backing of the guerilla group. In a few days there would be the demilitarization of five municipalities in Colombia, to create a kind of pilot area in which the commitment, both of the Government and of the guerillas, would be tested. That process would last 90 days and would be of crucial importance in testing the feasibility of the peace process.

To a related question on what alternative sources of income would be available to the guerillas to encourage them to forgo their benefits from the production of illicit crops, he said the peace process envisaged the integration of everybody into the normal political process. It was also obvious that the financial requirement of the guerrillas for buying arms would be over with the peace process. Thus, the situation would change drastically if the process succeeded.

Another correspondent sought to know if the alternative development project and the related eradication of illicit crops would be put on hold

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until the Colombian Government and the guerillas reached a peace agreement. In response, he said they did not exactly have to wait, since there would be a pilot programme in precise areas of the country, in which both the peace process and alternative development should take place.

To a follow up by the same correspondent on whether the guerillas would be taught how to eradicate the production of illicit crops, he said the foremost objective of the alternative development project in Colombia was to restore the credibility of the State authority. It was too premature to talk about the details of the project. It was an extremely delicate political process in which reciprocal trust was the main element.

Responding to a question on whether he had any plans of meeting with President Pastrana again in the near future, he responded in the affirmative, adding that they had established a very good relationship. He added that he would give another briefing at the end of the pilot project he mentioned. The Colombian President was currently visiting the United States and he believed that the alternative development project as a whole would be at the centre of his discussions with President William Clinton.

A correspondent noted that the UNDCP had been accused of having not been flexible enough to consider alternative approaches to the problems posed by the cultivation of illicit crops and sought to know if he had reconsidered that position and would now consider other ideas. In response, Mr. Arlacchi said they were currently engaged in a much more important debate.

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