PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TESTS ATTEMPT TO RESTORE MUTUAL DETERRENCE, PAKISTAN TELLS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

20 October 1998

Press Release
GA/DIS/3115

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TESTS ATTEMPT TO RESTORE MUTUAL DETERRENCE, PAKISTAN TELLS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

19981020 Says India's Tests Provocation, Pakistan's Tests a Reaction; Nine Other Speakers Address Committee in Continued General Debate

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this morning that his country's decision to conduct nuclear-weapon tests last spring was an attempt to restore mutual deterrence in the region, which India had destabilized by its earlier nuclear-weapon tests. Muhammad Siddique Khan Kanju, speaking as the Committee continued its general debate, said that the difference between the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests lay in the fact that India's tests were a provocation, while Pakistan's tests were a reaction. A growing asymmetry in conventional military forces had created the possibility of military aggression again being committed against Pakistan, and nuclear deterrence was all that stood in the way. Nevertheless, it was not Pakistan, but India, which had "inducted" the nuclear dimension into the volatile security environment of South Asia. Continuing, he said had his country failed to demonstrate its nuclear capability, it could have eroded the delicate psychological judgements that were the essence of deterrence. In the final analysis, its decision to test resulted from the steady escalation in the provocations emanating from India, the election promise by the Bharatiya Janata Party to induct nuclear weapons and to conduct "hot pursuit" attacks across Kashmir and the weak and partial response of the world community, despite Pakistan's calls for resolute action. During his statement, the representative of Israel responded to accusations made in the Committee that his country had not been forthcoming in disarmament matters. He said that some of Israel's neighbouring countries, including those which possessed weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, had openly denied Israel's right to exist and expressed their desire to annihilate it. It would be rash, therefore, for Israel not to carefully review arms control arrangements in that light. Universal instruments had a role to play, but mutually verifiable regional arrangements that enhanced the security of all States of the region were the key. Statements were also made by the representatives of Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Oman, Ethiopia, Armenia, Kenya and Senegal. The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. today to continue its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

The Committee is also expected to take up the role of the Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Discussion is likely to focus on the recent establishment in the Conference of two ad hoc committees on: security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

Among the nuclear disarmament issues under review is the adoption in 1996 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the Treaty was negotiated in the Conference, consensus was not achieved. The Treaty, subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, was identical to the version negotiated in the Conference. The CTBT requires ratification by 44 States listed in its annex, including India, Israel and Pakistan.

Other treaties negotiated in the Conference include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), which entered into force on 29 April 1997. Its complex verification mechanism will be implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Conference also concluded negotiations on the instrument governing biological weapons, namely, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).

The Committee is also expected to review the implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The underground nuclear tests conducted last spring by India and Pakistan have raised serious concerns about the future of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime overall.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will be another focus of the debate. The zones already in existence are governed by: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok); and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

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Bilateral agreements negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation aimed at nuclear disarmament will also be considered, including the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). While reductions of nuclear weapons were proceeding under START I, the entry into force of START II had been delayed pending ratification by the Russian Federation. The Committee is also expected to review agreements between those two countries on the demarcation between strategic and non-strategic anti- ballistic missile systems, which sought to strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and provide new opportunities to work together to reduce their nuclear-weapon stocks.

Discussion will continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and will enter into force on 1 March 1999.

Other matters to be discussed include the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as regional transparency and confidence-building measures, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be discussed in the context of the international non-proliferation regime.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3106 issued 9 October.)

Statements

JUAN LARRAIN (Chile) said his country was committed to the work of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. He was pleased with the impetus given to the work of the Conference by its decision to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty. Nevertheless, the Conference had not yet made any progress in relation to nuclear disarmament. He reiterated the priority he attached to the issue.

He said Chile deeply regretted the nuclear tests in South Asia. Those tests highlighted the urgent need to strengthen the validity and universality of the NPT and the CTBT. As long as there was no progress on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, it would be more difficult to defend the non-proliferation regime. The international community must assume its responsibility for the prevention of the threat of nuclear proliferation. His country would like to renew its appeal to all States to sign and ratify the instruments designed to

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that end. His country supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the strengthening of the four pre-existing ones.

His country believed it essential for the international community to develop and perfect new instruments to regulate the manufacture, trade and use of conventional weapons, he said. In that connection, Chile welcomed the forthcoming entry into force of the Ottawa Convention and hoped to soon ratify that important instrument.

In regional terms, he said his country was about to publish a "defence book" as a tangible manifestation of its policy of transparency in armaments. He recalled the two regional conferences of the Organization of American States (OAS) on confidence-building measures, held in Santiago in 1995 and in San Salvador in 1998, as well as the plan of action of the second Summit of the Americas, also held in Santiago in April 1998. He urged all States in the region to make progress with the formulation of their defence policies in that connection. Furthermore, he stressed the importance his country attached to its joint declaration with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries, which established a zone of peace free from weapons of mass destruction.

His country, he said, was pleased with the decision of the United Nations to revitalize and maintain the regional centres for peace and disarmament, particularly the centre in Peru. Also, his Government supported the Biological Weapons Convention and had been participating actively in efforts to conclude a protocol to improve its verification regime. He reiterated the need for a speedy conclusion of those negotiations. His Government was also committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and had established a national authority to comply with its provisions.

He said his country supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which would be an appropriate forum to consider the future course of disarmament action. His country attached special importance to the adoption of measures to regulate international maritime transport of radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel, in accordance with the highest international safety standards.

MONGA MULENDA MAKONGA (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that, at the threshold of the twenty-first century, great progress had been achieved in all areas, including social, economic, political and technological. That was especially true in the area of nuclear technology which, however, was also a potential danger. Those countries which possessed weapons of mass destruction were particularly nervous, because they were familiar with the smallest details of the devastating consequences. In that regard, the nuclear tests in South Asia had everyone's attention.

Suspicion and distrust were the basis of all disarmament agreements, which explained the inertia in implementing them, he continued. The START

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process between the Russian Federation and the United States was deadlocked, particularly with respect to the reduction of nuclear warheads. While the production of fissile material for peaceful purposes should be encouraged, his country condemned all nuclear tests and the stockpiling and possession of weapons of mass destruction. "Security lay not in the arms race, but in mutual confidence", he said.

He said that nearly one and one-half years ago, his country had ended its war of liberation. At the conclusion of that war, the Government welcomed all initiatives to achieve international peace and security. It had no warlike intentions and no greed regarding neighbouring territories. It was anxious to promote the social and economic development of the its people and had made economic development its "warhorse" in combating poverty. Furthermore, the Government's struggle against the non-proliferation of small weapons had achieved results without either internal resistance or outside assistance.

The Congolese people were able to eat regularly, he said. They praised government policies that had promoted socio-economic development over military might. As a weapon-free country, the Congolese people were simply easy victims for those neighbours who had committed a degree of human suffering one would only see in hell. Nevertheless, in order to attain subregional peace, the infrastructure of the weapons industry had been dismantled. The meagre income of those living in poverty should be devoted to their social well-being, rather than to war.

Disarming a country, however, meant exposing its sovereignty and territorial integrity to its more aggressive neighbours, he went on. That was a dilemma. Should credit be given to the argument that,in order to achieve peace, you must prepare for war? he asked. On the other hand, how was it be possible to reduce military budgets in the face of threats by neighbours? Africa produced very few weapons of war, yet it remained "the theatre of armed conflict". African lives were viewed through "the end of a gun" by weapons traders, whose investments in African society were cheap, yet profitable. There were many other areas of potentially lucrative investment on that continent that neither threatened nor destroyed human life.

NASTE CALOVSKI (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said the present international political and security situation in many aspects was not satisfactory. There were too many conflicts and crises that threatened international peace and needed urgent solutions. It could not be said that Member States were ignorant, but the fact was that many countries felt marginalized in the effort to strengthen and improve international peace and security. That was the main reason multilateralism was going through a difficult period, and something should be done to avert that negative development. Until then, major decisions on international peace and security would be taken outside of the United Nations.

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The region around the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was continuing to experience enormous difficulties, which could threaten international peace, he said. A new war in the Balkans had recently been avoided at the last moment. It would have been the sixth in this century. At the same time, his country was optimistic that the region could leave its period of difficulties behind and soon enter a period of development, peace and security.

On the basis of an objective analysis of the political situation in his region and with the aim to have the twenty-first century free from war and conflict, he said the following positions should be reaffirmed and strictly observed: the strict compliance with international law; respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of States; promotion of international cooperation in all fields on the basis of mutual interest and respect; promotion of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights; and the speedy settlement of ongoing conflicts. The future of the region lies, therefore, in its "Europeanization", not in its "Balkanization". Moreover, it was difficult to see a stable and prosperous Europe without stability and prosperity in the Balkans.

The process of disarmament was progressing, but it was too slow, he said. There was a big gap between the awareness of the importance of the process and the readiness to undertake measures to promote it. What could be done with such huge stockpiles and armaments? he asked. Countries would have to find another means to strengthen their security, preferably through the improvement of their relations with neighbouring States.

Conventional weapons posed the major threat to international peace and security, he said. Every country had the right to have weapons for its national defence, but they should not have more than was necessary. Many countries were finding that the production of various kinds of conventional weapons was a lucrative business. There was no satisfactory international regime for the production, stockpiling, trade and use of conventional weapons. In that chaotic situation, each country was trying to protect its security and the world was witnessing an unhealthy security situation. He was, therefore, in favour of the establishment of an international regime to regulate the production, stockpiling and trade of conventional weapons and to ban illegal weapons production and trafficking.

His Government was committed to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, he said. The elimination of such weapons would immensely enhance international peace and security. The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997 was the most important event of the disarmament process. The Member States now had the duty to strengthen the work of the OPCW. He also favoured reinforcing the Biological Weapons Convention.

There had been no important progress in nuclear disarmament, as was made clear by the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, he said. Although his

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Government was not happy with the present state of affairs, there was no alterative but to continue the work to strengthen the NPT, to insist that all States became party, and to insist that nuclear-weapon States work much harder towards the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It was also very important to create nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements arrived at freely between the States of the concerned region.

He said the Conference on Disarmament should be open for membership to any Member States, and no member of the Conference should have the prerogative to block the membership of any Member States of the United Nations. Among other things, he believed the Conference should: abandon its present method of work; examine each agenda item in informal plenary meetings, and at formal meetings adopt the decisions; and abandon the practice of repeating itself on various aspects of nuclear disarmament.

MOHAMED AL-HASSAN (Oman) said there had been tremendous disarmament progress towards the creation of a safer world. For example, the indefinite extension of the NPT, the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the process towards closing the loophole in the Biological Weapons Convention were all among the fruits of the end of the cold war. His country was a party to all conventions and treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction. Also, as his Foreign Minister had told the General Assembly at the beginning of the current session, Oman would soon sign the CTBT.

Unfortunately, while the world was moving towards security, the region of the Middle East remained volatile and dangerous, he continued. Concrete steps should be taken to counter that situation. In that regard, the Israeli nuclear threat constituted a threat not only to the region, but to worldwide peace. Persisting in maintaining nuclear facilities without outside all international monitoring and safeguards was a serious problem that should be dealt with accordingly. In light of the current progress aimed at bringing the peace process back on track, the accession by Israel to the NPT would be a step in the right direction.

While he understood the national positions that had caused India and Pakistan to resort to nuclear testing, he called on those two neighbouring countries to sign the NPT and the CTBT. He hoped that, in time, those countries would be able to solve their problems without jeopardizing their national security interests. He supported the role of the United Nations in disarmament and looked forward to further involvement by the Secretariat, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction. There was also a role to be played in the Middle East, as well as in the Gulf region.

DURI MOHAMMED (Ethiopia) said the post-cold-war period had witnessed encouraging developments in the field of disarmament. Notable examples included the indefinite extension of the NPT, the conclusion of the CTBT, the Ottawa Convention and the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad

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hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty, among others. Despite those positive developments, however, much remained to be done to achieve the goal of complete and general disarmament, especially in the nuclear field.

It was essential to complement the effective implementation of the NPT and the CTBT with multilateral negotiations on nuclear-weapon issues, he said. Failure to implement the CTBT would mean a retrogression in the disarmament process. Appropriate steps should be taken to begin negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, within a specified time frame. The strong commitment and cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States would be indispensable in that regard. The establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones also contributed to the consolidation of the international non-proliferation regime.

He said his country welcomed the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The attainment of universal adherence to the Convention demanded a strong commitment from all States. Also, the international community had recognized that the proliferation of, and illicit trafficking in, small arms and light weapons posed a significant threat to international peace and security, igniting conflicts and causing immeasurable social and economic harm. The problem was particularly evident in Africa. The problem should be addressed urgently, and he supported the convening of an international conference on the matter.

His country had participated fully in the Ottawa process and signed the Ottawa Convention as soon as it opened for signature, he said. As a country that had been highly affected by those weapons, Ethiopia attached paramount importance to the implementation of that Convention and sought substantive support for its demining efforts. As for developments in the Horn of Africa, he referred to the "irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land mines by the Eritrean Government" aimed at terrorizing civilians. That action constituted a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and a serious challenge to international and regional efforts to ban and eliminate those weapons.

In the past few years, his Government had made concerted efforts, through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to work for peace and prevent conflicts, he said. His country continued to assist in efforts to resolve the crisis in Somalia. It was convinced that regional cooperation and mechanisms could play an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

He said a major disappointment for his country in the area of peace and security in the subregion was the "naked aggression unleashed by Eritrea against Ethiopia" since May 1998. That aggression had been a challenge to Ethiopia's effort to strengthen regional security and disarmament. Still, his country was attempting to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.

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ROBBIE SABEL (Israel) said his country was a small State with a population of less than 6 million, concentrated mostly in a coastal strip some 20 kilometres wide. The vulnerability inherent in his country's geography, combined with "the potentially existential threat" posed by some of its neighbours, influenced its approach to arms control and disarmament arrangements. Still, Israel fully shared the concern of the international community regarding the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons.

Israel was in the unhappy situation of having neighbours armed with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, he said. Some of those States openly denied Israel's right of existence and claimed to be working for its annihilation, which had made his country cautious about its security. Arms control initiatives in the region could only succeed if conceived to enhance the security of each and every State.

He said his country was optimistic that the peace process that started with a peace treaty with Egypt, followed by the ongoing peace talks with the Palestinians and a peace treaty with Jordan, would eventually lead to regional stability. Optimism, however, must be tempered with realism. The region included States that threatened its security and denied its very right of existence. "One of those States, Iraq, devoted a major part of its income from oil to attempt to develop nuclear weapons", notwithstanding its ratification of the NPT. It developed chemical and biological weapons and used poison gas against its own population and against Iran. During the Gulf war, it fired its missiles, capable of carrying non-conventional warheads, at cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Other States in the region, he continued, had also developed chemical weapons and maintained ballistic missiles. It sounded strange to hear some of those States in the Committee berating Israel for not being forthcoming on disarmament. It would be rash in the extreme for Israel not to carefully review arms control arrangements, in light of the behaviour of such States. Arms control was fundamentally a regional endeavour. Universal instruments had a role to play, but regionally negotiated arrangements, reinforced by mutual verification by States in the region, were the key.

He said Israel fully supported the CTBT and had duly signed it. An Israeli delegation participated in drafting the Treaty, and his country remained constructively involved in the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Although Israel had not yet ratified the Treaty, it was aware of its international obligations as a signatory State.

Continuing, he said his country supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It would like to see such a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. Such a zone should be established by direct negotiations between

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States, after they had recognized each other and established full peaceful relations. It could not be established in a situation where some of the States claimed they were in a state of war and refused, in principle, to maintain peaceful relations.

He said the agenda item concerning the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East was blatantly political. Israel was not a threat to its neighbours and had not violated any international norm. That agenda item was directed against Israel. It was uncalled for and should be removed from the agenda. The real dangers of proliferation had been ignored and they did not emanate from Israel. The evidence produced on Iraq by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA was ignored, as were the North Korean crisis and Iran's efforts to acquire non-conventional capabilities. Israel sought no dispute with Iran. It could not, however, fail to be worried when Iran developed long-range ballistic missiles and declared that they were intended for use against Israel.

Israel was not opposed to the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to consider a fissile material cut-off treaty, he said. Nonetheless, the scope of the proposed treaty was not yet clear, and Israel, like other States, would have to examine its position on the basis of the exact scope. His country viewed with great concern the illicit transfer and proliferation of small arms and explosives. That proliferation threatened international security and exacerbated conflicts, and he supported international cooperative efforts to combat the problem.

His country had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but had yet to ratify it, he said. His Government was not happy that Egypt was among the Arab States that had not signed that instrument. While making a decision on ratification, his Government must consider the fact that none of the chemical- weapon-capable Arab States had signed, let alone ratified the Convention. Also, although Israel was not a party to the Ottawa Convention, it had ceased the production of anti-personnel landmines and had declared a moratorium on their export.

CHRISTINE SIMONE (Armenia) said 1998 had been a year of setbacks and achievements in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. The nuclear tests conducted in South Asia had reminded the world how much work remained to be done. Yet, the ratification of the Ottawa Convention by over 40 countries in nine months had been a significant achievement.

She reaffirmed her country's commitment to full implementation of the NPT and called for States to continue to abide by the safeguards system of the IAEA. Her country had become the first State with an operating power plant to sign the protocol additional to its safeguards agreement, she said.

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The non-proliferation regime had been seriously tested over the past six months, she said. The nuclear tests in South Asia undermined the objectives of the NPT and the CTBT. She welcomed the indications given by India and Pakistan that they were moving towards adherence to the CTBT.

Her Government had joined the Chemical Weapons Convention with an underlying commitment towards strengthening regional stability, she said. Unfortunately, Armenia and Georgia were the only two States in their region to take that step. It was hard to see how an effective chemical weapons control regime could be established in the Caucasus, if all those in the region were not a party to the Convention.

Also, she said, her country considered the Ottawa Convention an important step forward in the elimination of one category of excessively injurious conventional weapons. However, to assume legally binding obligations, her country expected a clear and observed readiness and reciprocity from its neighbours in the region. Her Government was concerned by Azerbaijan's reluctance to accede to the Convention. The existence of a large amount of landmines along Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan was a great source of concern which must be addressed.

She said the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was an essential instrument to guarantee stability in the region and prevent large-scale conventional attacks. Despite the major role and stability the CFE Treaty had provided, States still flagrantly violated the Treaty. For example, Azerbaijan considerably exceeded its Treaty limitations in three ground categories and its continued disregard of the Treaty's principles threatened the stability in both the Caucasus and in Europe.

As a sign of its commitment to the principles of disarmament, Armenia wished to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament, she said. Such membership would allow the country to better contribute in disarmament.

MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE KHAN KANJU, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, said that many statements in the Committee's general debate had drawn attention to the nuclear tests conducted last may by India and, in response, by Pakistan. He wished to explain Pakistan's perspective and, in so doing, its challenging security environment, its patient endeavour for non-proliferation, its calculated decision to respond to India and its responsible approach in the aftermath of South Asia's nuclearization.

He said that an objective evaluation of those tests must bear in mind the history and context of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, as well as India's ambitions and Pakistan's compulsions. A growing conventional asymmetry had created the possibility of military aggression being committed against Pakistan once again. Nuclear deterrence was all that stood in the

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way. Moreover, it was not Pakistan, but India, which "inducted" the nuclear dimension into the volatile security environment of South Asia.

Many in Pakistan were convinced that only Pakistan -- and not India -- was the target of the crusade for nuclear non-proliferation, he said. Conspiracy theorists gained further credence when India's preparations for its nuclear tests were not detected either by national technical means or by human intelligence. That was all the more surprising since, four days before the tests, a non-governmental group had circulated a paper in Washington, D.C., which warned of preparations for an Indian nuclear test and the feverish night-time activities in the vicinity of Pokhran in Rajasthan state.

When India conducted its "three plus two tests", the Government of Pakistan was confronted with a fateful decision, he said. It waited 17 days before responding. In formulating its decision, the Prime Minister of Pakistan took full account of the views and suggestions of a number of world leaders. In the final analysis, its decision to test became inevitable for the following three overriding reasons: the steady escalation in the provocations and threats emanating from India -- including its declarations that it was a nuclear-weapon State in possession of a "big bomb"; the Bharatiya Janta Party's election manifesto, which promised to induct nuclear weapons and to conduct "hot pursuit" attacks across the line of control in Kashmir; and the weak and partial response of the international community, despite Pakistan's calls for resolute action.

Thus, Pakistan decided to demonstrate its nuclear capability to deter aggression, he said. Its failure to do so could have eroded the delicate psychological judgements that were the essence of deterrence. Any consequent miscalculation could have had disastrous consequences. Pakistan's actions, therefore, was a legitimate act of self-defence against the possibility of a military aggression. Its tests were consistent with Pakistan's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. No international norm -- certainly not one to which it had subscribed -- could compromise or supersede that fundamental right.

He said that the difference between the Indian and Pakistani actions was crucial. India's tests were a provocation and Pakistan's tests were a reaction. India's tests had destabilized the "existential" deterrence that had existed in the region for the last 20 years, while Pakistan's tests had restabilized the mutual deterrence. His country was grateful to China for recognizing the distinction and to the many others who had privately done so. It was sad and regrettable that many friends had failed to make that distinction. The sanctions and actions against Pakistan were unfair and unjust, especially since those had hurt Pakistan much more than India. His country condemned that counterproductive combination of coercion and inequity.

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Even as it conducted its nuclear tests, he said his country was conscious of the need to take measures to prevent a nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia, as well as of the need to contain their proliferation impact. The international community had focused on the non-proliferation implications of the tests, rather than on the security and arms escalation dangers in South Asia. While that approach envisaged a comprehensive approach to regional security, it had not addressed the core dispute over Kashmir. Furthermore, it was not an acceptable basis for progress, because it had incorporated unrealistic objectives, exhibited double standards and failed to fully distinguish between India's provocation and Pakistan's reaction.

Nevertheless, he said his country was convinced that there was no fundamental difference in the essential objectives espoused by the international community and by Pakistan. Both sought to: lower tensions and avoid war; prevent nuclear escalation; promote stability; seek solutions to Kashmir and other underlying causes; and contain the threat of further nuclear proliferation. A serious dialogue had begun with the United States on a realistic agenda aimed at promoting those objectives. His country had also resumed the Foreign Secretary-level talks with India. In Islamabad last week, both countries had addressed the priority issues of peace and security and Jammu and Kashmir.

He said his country had been responsive to the concerns of the world community. Soon after conducting its tests, it had announced a unilateral moratorium on further testing. Earlier in the Assembly session, its Prime Minister had reaffirmed support for the CTBT, which would hopefully enter into force before next September. He had made clear, however, that Pakistan's adherence to the Treaty would take place only in conditions free from coercion or pressure, and he had indicated his expectation of the speedy removal of "arbitrary restrictions" and "discriminatory sanctions".

In anticipation of such an environment, he said his country had agreed to commence negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The wide disparity in the fissile material stockpiles of India and Pakistan could erode the stability of nuclear deterrence. The impact of such asymmetry could be further exacerbated once India acquired the S-300 missile systems and additional anti-aircraft systems. In the course of negotiations in the Conference, his delegation would seek a solution to the problem of unequal stockpiles.

He said his country was prepared to improve implementation of its policy of not exporting sensitive nuclear technology or equipment. That process should promote non-discrimination and reciprocal benefits. Pakistan could not simultaneously be considered a partner and a target of non-proliferation regimes. Its priority was to construct a durable structure of peace and security in South Asia, which would involve nuclear and conventional arms

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restraint, as well as solutions to underlying issues. It must also be based on the principles of equal security and equal treatment of both Pakistan and India.

Although India had claimed to have weaponized, and even deployed its nuclear capability, he said his country was prepared to explore the possibilities for mutual restraint in order to avoid a nuclear arms race and a hair-trigger security environment. But, it could not accept efforts to restrain capabilities at unequal levels, which would seriously jeopardize mutual deterrence. The stability of mutual deterrence might also be adversely affected by those countries' asymmetry in conventional weapons. That asymmetry was growing steadily due to the embargoes against Pakistan by some major States and the massive arms acquisitions by India, particularly from Russia. Concerted action should be adopted by the international community to redress the conventional inequality, which would inevitably intensify Pakistan's reliance on its nuclear capabilities.

The Secretary-General had recognized the Kashmir dispute as a possible "nuclear flashpoint", he noted. Indeed, Kashmir held the key to resolving the security crisis in South Asia. It would not be sufficient, however, merely to "lower tensions" over Kashmir. Rather, there must be genuine progress towards a just solution, based on the freely expressed wishes of the Kashmiri people. His country would endeavour to resume bilateral dialogue with India in order to promote progress towards a final settlement of that dispute. Despite bilateral dialogue, the United Nations should not divest itself of the responsibility to promote a solution to the Kashmir dispute.

He said that the call for nuclear restraint in South Asia was based on moral concern about the danger of the use of nuclear weapons. That danger did not arise solely or even primarily from South Asia. Despite the end of the cold war, the danger posed by those weapons had not significantly diminished. Despite the NPT's indefinite extension, for example, some nuclear-weapon States had claimed the right to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely. Periodic report of "glacial progress" in the bilateral nuclear talks was not enough. A genuine process of nuclear disarmament in the single multilateral forum for disarmament, namely the Conference on Disarmament, was essential.

The propulsion of technology and political ambition threatened to militarize outer space, he said. In that regard, Pakistan would press for the creation of an ad hoc committee in the Conference next year to negotiate a legally binding instrument to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes. His country also fully supported the conclusion of a protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Agreement in that regard was more likely to result from greater flexibility by certain major countries than by more negotiating time.

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He said that the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention had revealed the unpleasant reality of India's clandestine chemical weapons programme, despite the solemn Pakistan-India declaration of 1992 that neither country possessed those weapons. He urged the destruction of India's chemical weapon stocks under close international scrutiny.

NJUGUNA MAHUGU (Kenya) said the last 12 months would be remembered for the progress made towards the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines, an issue that had been a source of anguish to the entire international community, particularly Africa. In Africa, landmines had had a devastating effect, mutilating and killing civilians, especially innocent women and children, and rendering whole agricultural areas physically inhabitable and economically unproductive.

It was, therefore, appropriate that Mozambique, a country that had endured and continued to endure tremendous suffering from that scourge, would provide the venue for the first meeting of the States parties in May 1999, he continued. It was fervently hoped that such countries as Mozambique and Angola would become the first beneficiaries of the remarkable international effort to rid the world of anti-personnel landmines and make their victims productive members of their communities.

Similarly, he said, his delegation was concerned about the continuing illicit transfer and use of conventional arms, which constituted a major cause of conflict in many regions of the world, particularly in developing countries. In his 13 April report to the Security Council, on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace in Africa, the Secretary-General had clearly identified the proliferation of conventional arms as an issue that needed to be addressed by the international community as a matter of urgency. The critical role and responsibility of countries manufacturing and exporting those weapons could not be overemphasized.

The dumping of radioactive and toxic wastes on the shores and in the waters of some developing countries remained a source of concern, he said. The tragedy therein was twofold: a section of the global village produced more waste than it could treat and chose insensitively to dump it elsewhere; and the dumping ground was totally unprepared to handle such wastes, both in terms of technological expertise, which it desperately lacked, and in terms of resources, which it did not have. In addition, the indiscriminate dumping of hazardous wastes caused untold harm to the environment, livelihood and health of the people. That issue must be addressed urgently and comprehensively.

He said that the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan would be remembered as having dealt a serious blow to aspirations for a world free of nuclear weapons. It was regrettable that the insecurity created from the lack of serious disarmament progress by the nuclear-weapon States had created an excuse for others to test. A wake-up call had most definitely been sounded. To that end, the need for security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States

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and an even more urgent need for renewed efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons must be stressed.

All tests posed a threat to humanity by increasing the chances of proliferation and of an arms race, he said. He attached great importance to the NPT, which, together with such regional measures as the nuclear-weapon- free zone treaties, fortified the commitment of the international community towards nuclear disarmament. Regional arrangements were a useful means of reducing tension, encouraging sustainable socio-economic development, promoting confidence and enhancing regional stability and security.

He said it was clear that any achievement in the field of disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, would allow the world to focus on more crucial matters pertaining to socio-economic development. Concerted efforts must be made by all to break the cycle of poverty and tackle the debt burden. Massive resources should not continue to be diverted to disarmament. As it had been intended to do, disarmament should free resources for development purposes. Member States should strive towards that end, as the next millennium approached.

IBRA DEGUENE KA (Senegal) said that, although there had been some significant progress over the last decade, global disarmament still had a long way to go. International attention should, however, accord priority to chemical, biological and conventional weapons. Small arms, in particular, ignited many conflicts, especially in Africa, where they had become a real scourge. They constituted an obstacle to peace and to the democratic process. His country wanted the sale and illicit traffic in small arms to be abolished in areas of conflict.

He said his country was delighted with the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to combat the small arms scourge, which had led to a regional moratorium on the import and export of those weapons. Some progress had been made on a draft mechanism that would also address peacekeeping and other security issues. Despite those commendable and encouraging initiatives, Africa alone could not tackle the danger posed by those weapons. Therefore, it must be dealt with at the international level. In that regard, the efforts of Norway and Canada to harmonize action on the issue was a positive development. His delegation supported the idea of convening an international conference on the issue.

His Government was delighted that the 40 ratifications required to bring the Ottawa Convention into force had been obtained, he said. His country ratified the Convention soon after its adoption. It was significant and heartening that the international community had entered a phase towards a world free of anti-personnel mines. He paid tribute to the Government of Mozambique for offering to host the first conference of States parties of the Convention in 1999. No other continent had been as affected as Africa by the scourge of anti-personnel mines.

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Concluding, he stressed that nuclear proliferation should continue to be a source of international concern. It was encouraging that the Conference on Disarmament had decided to establish an ad hoc committee to consider a fissile material cut-off treaty, and he hoped that the negotiations would lead to a rapid conclusion of such a treaty. He was also pleased that India and Pakistan had promised to accede to the CTBT, and Brazil had acceded to the NPT. The vast resources that were wasted on the arms race and the hopes for a disarmament dividend should act as a motivation for nuclear disarmament progress.

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