CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION MECHANISM 'EARNING ITS PLACE' IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE TOLD
Press Release
GA/DIS/3114
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION MECHANISM 'EARNING ITS PLACE' IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE TOLD
19981019 Director-General of Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Says Inspections Proceed Steadily, Apprehension Gives Way to Mutual ConfidenceThe Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the verification mechanism triggered by the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997, told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this morning that it was earning its place in the system of international security.
José Mauricio Bustani, speaking as the Committee continued its general debate, said that if properly nurtured, the organization would become a mature, cost-effective global instrument to eliminate the scourge of chemical weapons from the planet. For a very modest budget of $70 million -- or the yearly cost of two modern fighter jets -- the inspections it conducted were proceeding at a steady pace and initial apprehension had given way to increasing mutual confidence.
He added, however, that despite the successful implementation of the Convention thus far, "storm clouds are on the horizon". He cited the failure of the United States, the largest chemical producer in the world, to declare its chemical industry and to subject it to inspections. That had created "a severe imbalance" within the Treaty regime that might, if not urgently addressed, "strike a fatal blow to the Convention". Indeed, the chemical industries of Europe and Japan were becoming increasingly concerned at the unfair commercial advantage being given to the chemical industry in the United States.
He also said that, while progress towards universality had been made, various factors had impeded the process in a number of regions. The continuing financial crisis in South-East Asia, for example, had complicated the ratification process in several key States, and attempts to establish effective communication with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had failed. Another "blank spot" on its map was central and southern Africa,
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whose future ability to acquire chemicals for peaceful purposes would be severely hampered by the Convention's export controls imposed on trade with non-States parties.
In addition, he drew attention to the absence of a number of key countries -- suspected of either developing or possessing chemical weapons -- in the Middle East, the region which saw the last large-scale use of chemical weapons. He urged Israel, a signatory to the Convention, to ratify it and he appealed to Israel's neighbours, in particular, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen to accede to it. "Last but not least", he said Iraq should also follow suit.
Statements were also made by the representatives of Uruguay, Namibia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Tunisia, Republic of Moldova, Krygyzstan and Peru. Observers for the Holy See and the International Committee of the Red Cross also spoke. The representative of Iran spoke in exercise of the right of reply.
The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. to continue its general debate.
Committee Work Programme
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.
The Committee is also expected to take up the role of the Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Discussion is likely to focus on the recent establishment in the Conference of two ad hoc committees: on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on banning the production of fissile material for weapon purposes.
Among the nuclear disarmament issues under review is the adoption in 1996 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the Treaty was negotiated in the Conference, consensus was not achieved. The Treaty subsequently adopted by the General Assembly was identical to the version negotiated in the Conference. The CTBT requires ratification by 44 States listed in its annex, including India, Israel and Pakistan.
Other treaties negotiated in the Disarmament Conference include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), which entered into force on 29 April 1997. Its complex verification mechanism will be implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Conference also concluded negotiations on the instrument governing biological weapons, namely the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).
The Committee is also expected to review the implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The underground nuclear tests conducted last spring by India and Pakistan have raised serious concerns about the future of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime overall.
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will be another focus of the debate. The zones already in existence are governed by: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok); and the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.
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Bilateral agreements negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation aimed at nuclear disarmament will also be considered, including the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). While reductions of nuclear weapons were proceeding under START I, the entry into force of START II had been delayed pending ratification by the Russian Federation. The Committee is also expected to review agreements between those two countries on the demarcation between strategic and non- strategic anti-ballistic missile systems, which sought to strengthen the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty and provide new opportunities to work together to reduce their nuclear weapons stocks.
Discussion will continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and will enter into force on 1 March 1999.
Other matters to be discussed include the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as regional transparency and confidence-building measures, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be discussed in the context of the international non-proliferation regime.
(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3106 issued 9 October.)
Statements
JORGE PEREZ-OTERMIN (Uruguay) said this year the international community must take concrete action to ensure that the NPT was respected. It was inadmissible for any State to fail to live up that commitment. In some respects, progress had been made, as a number of States had acceded to the NPT and the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines would be entering into force. However, the world had also been frustrated by the nuclear tests in South Asia. That event broke the restraint that the non-nuclear-weapon States had shown towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which was regrettable.
It was also regrettable that the process of nuclear disarmament as a whole was making no progress, he said, noting that efforts to initiate START III between the United States and the Russian Federation had been paralysed. The international community could not afford to continue with the inherent threat in that stagnation. Given that picture, he was proud of the political
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development of MERCOSUR -- the Southern Common Market -- as a zone of peace, designed to ensure the absence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. That was consonant with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
His country supported the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons, he continued. Last year, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Inter-American Convention against the Manufacturing and Illicit Trafficking in Weapons, Munitions and Explosives and Other Related Materials. That was the cornerstone of regional cooperation in disarmament. He was convinced that the international community had an important role to play in that area, and supported the idea of an international conference on the issue. His country believed in greater transparency as a key to building confidence among nation States.
He said the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament must be given an urgent consideration during the 1999 session. Arguments to the contrary were unacceptable. He reiterated the commitment of his country to general and complete disarmament, adding that it was imperative for the progress made to be consolidated. His Government believed in the need to replace the culture of conflict with that of peace and would support all international efforts to that end.
MARTIN ANDJABA (Namibia) said that the recent developments in South Asia had justified the fear that existed because of the absence of a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime, a matter that must be urgently addressed. The events in South Asia had demonstrated, once again, that nuclear weapons remained a threat to the existence of mankind. In September 1996, his country had signed the CTBT, which was a demonstration of the resolve of the international community to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that connection, the announcements by the Prime Ministers of both India and Pakistan to move towards adherence to the CTBT was welcome.
Full support for the development of the CTBT's verification regime was also important, he said. At the same time, it was not possible to talk about curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons without addressing their elimination. Although the cold war ended almost a decade ago, progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons had "left much to be desired". For example, bilaterally, little progress had been made between the United States and the Russian Federation in the START process, with the START II as yet unratified.
Anti-personnel landmines continued to cause havoc and untold suffering, he said. Some of the southern African States were victims of those weapons, which had hampered not only the utility of productive agricultural land, but also the delivery of goods and services to areas affected by that menace. His Government had signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention and he hoped that it would receive as many signatures as possible before the first meeting of
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States parties in May 1999. While the campaign to achieve universal adherence to the Convention was building momentum, the world community should not lose sight of the urgent need to demine those countries that were seriously infested with landmines.
Another source of concern was the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, he said. The outbreak of internal conflicts had increased the supply of those weapons, thereby making it impossible to control and regulate them. In some parts of the world, those weapons represented a lucrative business. In order to curb their illicit circulation, concerted efforts were required to put in place a mechanism to bring about a legally binding instrument. The efforts of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms were welcome, especially the recommendation to convene an international conference in that regard.
RENATO R.MARTINO, Permanent Observer for the Holy See, said there had been some positive trends in disarmament in recent years. The Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, already ratified by the Holy See, was a good example. Unknown numbers of innocent civilians, especially children, would be spared the cruel maiming and death caused by those evil instruments.
He was also pleased with the new momentum accorded the small arms issue, he said. Those weapons had been the cause of violent death, injury and psychological trauma to hundreds of thousands of people every year. The "weaponization of society fuels cycles of violence, despair and, ultimately, State collapse". Thus, the establishment of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, alongside the work of the Vienna Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, were positive developments.
Continuing, he said a study of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace noted the anomaly by which certain States had stringent controls on the international transfer of heavy arms, but few, if any, regarding the sale of small arms and handguns. The supply of small arms must be regulated at its source, and there was an urgent need to ensure a more effective control of stockpiles. The Holy See appealed in particular for increased measures to be taken to effectively identify individuals and groups who traffic in arms outside all bounds of legal control. More decisive international police and intelligence cooperation was required.
He said it was important for both the nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-capable States to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The establishment of an ad hoc committee by the Conference on Disarmament to consider a fissile material cut-off treaty was a measure of progress in that regard. Still, the pace of disarmament was slow. The breakdown of the preparatory process for the year 2000 review of the NPT meant that the Treaty was in trouble. Additional sources of concern included
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the impasse in the ratification processes of START II and the CTBT. The world must move towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, through a universal, non- discriminatory ban, with intensive inspection by a universal authority.
He said the continued existence of 30,000 nuclear warheads, 5,000 of them on alert status, almost a decade after the end of the cold war posed the danger of nuclear catastrophe through accident or terrorism. As was ruled by the International Court of Justice, States had an obligation to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all respects. "Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the twenty-first century", he added.
S. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka) said that there was a strong temptation to draw up a balance sheet on disarmament and international security, but it would be simplistic to assess the complex multilateral disarmament agenda in terms of debits and credits. Achievements in that regard could not be minimized. Similarly, problems could not be wished away. Although one need not be overly pessimistic, concerns remained over the lack of tangible progress on the core issue of nuclear disarmament.
Consultations on that pivotal question remained inconclusive and undefined, he said. Bilaterally, the START process appeared to have stagnated and the nuclear-weapon States appeared to be trapped in their insistence that the question remain their exclusive domain. The important consensus of the international community at the 1995 NPT review had charted a course for the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the participants seem to have lost their way. While nuclear disarmament deliberations remained virtually paralyzed, doctrines of nuclear deterrence seem to have upheld the further utility of those weapons, despite the end of their cold war rationale.
That trend could only be reversed by activating a multilateral nuclear disarmament process -- unreservedly endorsed by the international community, he said. The current Committee session would hopefully produce a framework for international action aimed at achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. His country had supported the general thrust of a number of carefully crafted proposals, which would hopefully be harmonized through a transparent consultation process.
He went on to say that the positive synergies of those proposals and the political momentum they had generated should be put to optimal use, in order to advance a broad-based nuclear disarmament process. The Committee's duty was to encourage the process of de-escalation, confidence-building and engagement through dialogue. The resolutions on the subject of nuclear tests should follow a positive and pragmatic approach, rather than an acrimonious one.
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Another security challenge of the post-cold-war era was the illicit arms trade, he said. Illicit arms, terrorism and criminal fund-raising had become a self-supporting cycle that sustained conflicts, particularly in the developing world. That cycle had brought about a major security challenge within and among States and had resulted in a rising death toll. The nexus between the illicit arms trade and international criminal organizations clearly demonstrated that cooperative international measures were needed. The manifestations of the illicit arms trade had assumed disturbing transnational dimensions, which could no longer be treated as "a law and order problem".
The forces and technologies that drove the globalization process might be unwittingly supporting the activities of criminal groups, he said. The Committee, therefore, should initiate specific action to place that issue squarely on the global agenda. He hoped a focused and specific recommendation on that issue could be developed. In that connection, there was growing support for an international conference on the illicit arms trade.
International cooperation and an enlightened multilateral negotiating process would allow the international community to deal with a world buffeted by the forces of globalization, he said. The developed countries and nuclear- weapon States should be as interested in making that multilateral process a success as developing countries. Insecurity and volatility anywhere could pose a threat to the stability and well-being of everyone in an interdependent world.
KISHORE MAHBUBANI (Singapore) said there was safety in brick houses and solid defence. The First Committee, for its part, rarely counselled countries to build brick houses and solid defence. Instead, it generally urged them to disarm, brick by brick.
Such a reflection did not mean that Singapore did not support disarmament efforts, he continued. Singapore had supported and signed a number of important international conventions, including the NPT and the chemical and biological weapons Conventions. It also planned to sign the CTBT in 1999. His country also had strict laws against the illicit ownership and transfer of arms and munitions. In addition, his Government, along with the Association of South-East Asian States (ASEAN), had worked to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone regime in the region.
The Committee should balance its promotion of disarmament with a healthy respect for the realities of history, he said. Metaphorical wolves continued to prey on the weak and defenceless and armed conflict was not likely to disappear soon. Therefore, the weak and defenceless, especially small States, should not be prematurely disarmed. They should be allowed to first build their brick houses. Citing a fourth century military strategist, he noted that those who desired peace, prepared for war.
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He pointed out that North America and the 14 European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization accounted for much of the total global military expenditures, while the 132 members of the "Group of 77" developing countries accounted for only 16 per cent. Yet, most of the developed world was at peace, while most of today's conflict occurred in the developing world. There was, thus, no empirical correlation between peace and disarmament, but between peace and armament.
The road to peace was complex and it was the associated complexities that the Committee should be discussing, he said. "We do live in a varied world, where some live in brick houses, but where most live in straw homes or wooden huts", he added. Curiously, those who lived in brick houses were advising those in straw homes to disarm. The nuclear-weapon States had continued to object to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, forcing disarmament activists to turn their attention to conventional weapons -- "the bows and arrows" that constitute the rudimentary defence of most countries. That was undermining the basic ability of States to defend themselves or maintain domestic law and order.
Continuing, he said there were very few safety nets in the contemporary world to protect those "who lived in wooden huts and straw homes". One safety net was the United Nations Charter and the United Nations organs that implemented it. Therefore, the higher the standing of the United Nations, the more protected small States felt. The citizens of those who lived in brick houses were tearing holes in the safety net of the United Nations, either by damaging the prestige of the Organization or by not paying their dues. It was shocking that the wealthiest State in the world was unable to pay its dues to the United Nations. That had weakened the United Nations and the safety net that protected small and weak states.
He said it was puzzling that small States were being asked to disarm "even as the fragile safety net protecting them is being torn". There was no doubt that every member of the Committee shared the goal of promoting peace -- to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. "Let us work together to find the best roads to reach this goal", he concluded.
ALI HACHANI (Tunisia) noted that the international community had committed itself, several decades ago, to seek general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The end of the cold war had given rise to a favourable geopolitical environment, which had resulted in a number of disarmament achievements. Nevertheless, a great deal remained to be done, with nuclear disarmament among the priority tasks.
He said that the General Assembly had called for nuclear disarmament through its annual resolutions and its final document of 1978. In addition, the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, had issued multiple urgent appeals for nuclear
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disarmament. The International Court of Justice, through its advisory opinion of 1996, had also urged nuclear disarmament. That emerging broad consensus offered a valuable opportunity for further progress towards nuclear disarmament.
He said his country had underlined the importance of determined efforts to that end, either through bilateral or multilateral negotiations. In that connection, START II should be ratified to enable its entry into force as soon as possible. That would pave the way for START III, thus allowing for deeper reductions. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament, especially in light of the recent events in South Asia, which had underlined the urgent need to achieve substantial nuclear disarmament progress. Regional nuclear disarmament efforts were also essential, such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
Israel had persisted in undermining the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, he said. The Assembly had adopted multiple resolutions in that regard, recently by consensus. Even following the accession to the NPT by other States in the region, Israel had refused to do so. It had also refused to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It perpetuated a "flagrant imbalance" by exclusively maintaining its nuclear capacity beyond all international controls.
He said his country welcomed the conclusion of the Ottawa Convention -- an important disarmament instrument which sought to eliminate a whole category of sadly notorious weapons. His Government had been one of the first signatories to the Convention and it would soon complete its ratification process. Also, the circulation and illicit traffic of small arms and firearms threatened the national and regional security of States. Efforts to diminish those threats should go hand in hand with determined action by the international community, under the auspices of the United Nations.
IGOR CIOBANU (Republic of Moldova), said disarmament and development were interconnected. His country had experienced conflict and still faced the problems of the post-conflict period. That experience had convinced it that disarmament was essential for effective conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction. The link between disarmament and development was even stronger in the context of the nuclear arms race. Therefore, the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be intensified and the NPT and CTBT strengthened.
The acquisition of nuclear weapons posed a threat to international security, he said. It was essential that non-proliferation and disarmament be pursued and implemented in parallel, through concrete and realistic measures. The nuclear tests in Asia emphasized the need for such an approach. A
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positive development in that regard was the action of the Conference on Disarmament in establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty. Every country with nuclear capabilities should participate in that process.
Regional and subregional initiatives should be encouraged alongside international efforts to achieve peace and security, he said. The establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones and the consolidation of existing ones, for example, would contribute to the cause of nuclear non- proliferation. The proliferation and use of chemical and biological weapons constituted another source of grave concern. It was necessary for all States parties to comply fully with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.
He said his country faced the humanitarian problem caused by anti- personnel landmines, used by the separatist regime in the eastern districts of Moldova. For that reason, it understood the importance of the Ottawa Convention and looked forward to its entry into force. His Government had signed the NPT, the Ottawa Convention and the chemical and biological weapons Conventions. It had also carried out all its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe obligations related to the reduction of conventional weapons.
The proliferation and illicit trafficking in small arms constituted a real threat to post-conflict peace-building, he said. During the conflict in the eastern districts of Moldova, huge quantities of small arms and light weapons moved unchecked into the hands of separatists. The time had come for the international community to consider action-oriented recommendations for combatting the problem of small arms proliferation. His country believed that the unchecked movement of armaments to separatist regimes, no matter the source, was a type of arms proliferation deserving the attention of the international community.
Concluding, he said his country wanted the Russian Federation to ratify the 1994 agreement it made with Moldova regarding the withdrawal of armaments and military forces. That agreement underlined the neutrality of Moldova and prohibited the stationing of foreign troops on its soil.
ZAMIRA ESHMAMBETOVA (Kyrgyzstan) said that despite the end of the cold war, the world still faced a number of challenges, including widespread hunger, poverty, illicit traffic in drugs, arms smuggling, international terrorism and ethnic conflicts that threatened world peace and stability. Against that background, nothing justified high military spending.
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan flew in the face of the nearly global consensus against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, she continued. It was a great relief that both countries had promised to join the CTBT and to enter into dialogue. Her Government urged both countries and all
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those that were not parties to the NPT to join the Treaty regime. Her government also welcomed the unilateral and bilateral efforts of the nuclear- weapon States to reduce their arsenals. The entry into force of START II and the commencement of START III would constitute truly positive developments.
The harmful effects of armed conflicts were not confined to the territories of those directly concerned, she noted. Those effects spilled over into the broader region to threaten the stability of peaceful societies. From that perspective, the proliferation of small arms was not less dangerous than the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in some parts of the world, small arms had turned into "weapons of mass destruction". She, therefore, supported the idea of convening an international conference to address the problem. Her country promoted all avenues for reducing conflict and promoting global peace and security. It continued to actively participate in efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.
FERNANDO GUILLÉN (Peru) said that his country had always supported general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The only way to achieve a world of peace and sustainable development was through an international order based on respect for international treaties and the United Nations Charter. Over the past few months, certain serious events had occurred -- namely the nuclear tests in South Asia -- which reaffirmed earlier convictions of the need to strengthen the nuclear non- proliferation regime.
He said his country rejected all forms of nuclear testing anywhere and at anytime. Such activities threatened international peace and security and violated Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). In addition, efforts must be intensified to achieve progress in the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the year 2000 NPT review. Further, the opinion of the International Court of Justice had acquired greater validity and relevance in the light of the recent events. In light of all of that, his country would support the recent proposal aimed at achieving a nuclear-weapon free world.
The considerable increase in the number of States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention had reflected a growing awareness of the need to work together to ban those terrible weapons, he said. The critical work being done by the OPCW deserved unconditional support. Similarly, a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention must be negotiated. His country also granted special importance to the non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons and, in that regard, the early entry into force of the Ottawa Convention signalled a positive change in the international arena.
He said that the proliferation of small and light weapons -- low-cost, easy to manage and easy to use -- had promoted an increase of violence among criminal organizations. Moreover, the use of those weapons threatened
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regional and subregional security. Most internal conflicts were fought with those weapons and the majority of victims were civilians. All States, in particular the producers, exporters and importers of those weapons, must publicly report on the measures being undertaken to eradicate the illegal traffic in those weapons. Further, a system of intelligence cooperation must be set up to detect unlawful trafficking.
He said that Peru, for its part, had adopted internal legislation to deal with that problem and was developing a model system of control. The 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the Manufacturing and Illicit Trafficking in Weapons, Munitions and Explosives and Other Related Materials could serve as a model for an international instrument. The Secretary- General's initiative to convene an international conference in that area also had his country's support, as did the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In order for the Register to be fully effective, however, States must provide information to it in a timely and open manner.
PATRICK ZAHND, of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), said there had been several important landmarks in the development of international humanitarian law governing specific weapons in 1998. Those included the entry into force of Protocol IV of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons prohibiting the use and transfer of blinding laser weapons. For the first time since 1868, he said, "an abhorrent weapon was prohibited before it could be used on the battlefield". The ICRC urged States that had not done so to ratify the instrument. Protocol II of the Convention strengthened restrictions on the use of landmines, booby-traps and similar devices.
He said the achievement of the 40 ratifications required for the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention was an extraordinary accomplishment, reflecting the sense of urgency with which most States had responded to the global scourge of anti-personnel mines. That instrument was the comprehensive solution to the immense suffering caused by that weapon. As States prepared to adjust their arsenals to ensure compliance with the Convention, he wanted to highlight the consideration that anti-vehicle mines should be designed not to detonate upon the innocent passage of a person or inadvertent contact with the mine.
Continuing, he said the application in the field of the Ottawa Convention must figure among the highest priorities for the future. That would require a tremendous long-term mobilization of resources and considerable organization. The ICRC was ready to advise States on how to adapt national legislation in that regard. He welcomed the efforts of the United Nations Mine Action Service to promote a coordinated international approach. In cooperation with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC would be developing a long-term strategy on landmines, with an emphasis on victim assistance, to be adopted next year.
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In their work for war victims, ICRC witnessed the increasingly devastating effects on civilian populations of the proliferation of weapons, particularly small, military-style arms, he said. The combination of inadequate controls on the transfer of such arms and their frequent use in violation of the basic norms of international humanitarian law threatened to undermine international legal norms relating to protecting civilians from suffering and abuse in combat situations. Efforts to protect and assist war victims were being undermined by the flow of weapons and he encouraged States to urgently consider the elaboration of rules to govern the transfer of those weapons.
He said biological and chemical weapons should rapidly become a relic of the past, following the 1972 and 1993 Conventions prohibiting their use in warfare. Vigilance and determination would be required, however, to ensure that those "evil genies remained in their bottles". He urged the conclusion, in 1999, of negotiations on a monitoring regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. He also called upon States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to ensure that the verification practices developed within the OPCW fully reflected the far-reaching commitments, openness and cooperation contained in that important Convention.
JOSE MAURICO BUSTANI, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), recalled that during his address to the Committee last October he was preoccupied with the absence of the Russian Federation -- the largest known possessor of chemical weapons -- from the OPCW. Shortly after his statement, on 5 November 1997, that country concluded its ratification process, thereby becoming a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
He said that by August, the initial inspections of all 24 chemical weapons production facilities and all seven chemical weapons storage facilities declared by the Russian Federation had been completed. Its exemplary level of cooperation with the OPCW inspection teams had led to the completion of the initial inspection of the Russian chemical weapons-related facilities, bringing to 59 the total number of chemical weapons production facilities declared and inspected in all Member States. Of those, 10 had been completely destroyed, and another 10 to 12 were likely to receive destruction certificates within the next 12 months. International assistance was required for the further destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation, in the light of its severe economic and financial crisis.
He said that requests for the conversion of two chemical weapons production facilities in two States parties had been endorsed by the Conference of the States Parties. The remaining 35 facilities were either subject to conversion requests, again for peaceful purposes, or would be destroyed within the 10-year deadline set by the Convention. Regular inspection of the remaining facilities would continue until their destruction
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or conversion. A total of 34 declared chemical weapons storage facilities had been initially inspected, resulting in a counting and checking of more than 8 million chemical munitions and more than 25,000 bulk chemical agent containers.
He said the United States -- because it had begun voluntary destruction activities prior to the entry into force of the Convention -- was the only State party that had been able to launch and sustain a programme for the elimination of its chemical weapons stockpiles. It was anticipated that the other States parties with chemical weapons stockpiles would soon follow suit.
Indeed, in its first 17 months, the Organization's inspectors had spent the equivalent of 13,000 days monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons at destruction facilities in the United States, he added. During that period, they had witnessed the destruction of almost 200,000 chemical munitions and nearly 2,000 metric tons of chemical agents. While that was impressive, more than 8 million chemical munitions had been declared worldwide, all of which must be destroyed by the year 2007 in order to meet the time-lines established by the Convention.
Inspections of declared industry facilities now proceeded at a steady pace and initial apprehension had given way to increasing mutual confidence, he said. Those inspections were being conducted at the rate of two or three per week and, to date, some 100 industrial facilities had been inspected in 25 States parties. The level of cooperation extended to the inspectors by inspected States parties had been extremely high. Both sides had learned much during the last 18 months.
Slowly but steadily, progress was being made in implementing other important areas of the Convention, including international cooperation and assistance, he said. The initial "climate of suspicion" which had characterized debate in that area and which could well have led to a rift between developed and developing States parties to the Convention was beginning to be overcome. With respect to the right of States parties to request assistance in the event of the threat or actual use of chemical weapons against them, the voluntary fund for such assistance had been established.
He said that another key component of the Convention was its Article XI, designed to foster -- for legitimate commercial and humanitarian purposes -- free trade in chemicals between States parties. The majority of States parties had already demonstrated, or were in the process of demonstrating, their compliance with the Convention's provisions. The time had perhaps come for all States parties to review their policies on export controls in the chemical area, and to report the results of that review to the OPCW. That would encourage universal adherence to the Convention perhaps more than any other action by States parties.
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He said that encouraging countries that had not yet joined the Convention was critically important to the OPCW's work. Progress continued to be made in that regard. Another 20 countries had ratified or acceded to the Convention, bringing its current membership to 120, and several additional Governments had indicated their intention to join the Convention before the end of the year. The continuing financial crisis in South-East Asia had complicated the ratification process in several key States in that region and the OPCW had been unsuccessful in its attempts to establish effective communication with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Central and southern Africa was "a blank spot on our map," he said. Although a number of African States had joined in the last year, only 29 of the 53 African countries were States parties to the Convention. While most of those countries did not have any significant chemical industry, they did import small quantities of those chemicals controlled by the Convention for commercial purposes. Unless they joined the Convention, their future ability to acquire such chemicals would be severely hampered.
The Federal republic of Yugoslavia posed another complex problem, but one for which a solution might be found, he said. Another area of serious concern in the context of universal adherence was the Middle East, where a number of key States had not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention. That situation was "all the more worrying" since the Middle East was, after all, the region which saw the last large-scale use of those terrible weapons. Suspicion had also been expressed that a number of the countries in that region either possessed chemical weapons or had engaged in programmes to develop them.
Israel was a signatory State to the Convention and, in that capacity, had participated actively and fully in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the OPCW, he said. As such, Israel was able to ensure that its important security concerns in relation to the implementation of the Convention's verification regime were satisfactorily addressed. That country would, he hoped, be able to soon ratify the Convention. Such a step, among others, would further demonstrate its commitment to a lasting peace and security in the Middle East.
Israel's neighbours should consider the advantages of joining the Convention -- in terms of security, economic development and political standing -- and of following the example of its neighbours, including Jordan, which had ratified the Convention at its entry into force. He appealed to Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen to follow that "courageous" example. There was indeed a special opportunity for Egypt -- with a strong and respected record in the field of disarmament -- to once again demonstrate its leadership role by acceding to the Convention.
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"Last but not least, one might ask why Iraq should not also follow suit," he said. The Security Council, through its resolution 687 (1991), had urged Iraq to accede to all existing instruments related to the banning of weapons of mass destruction. Accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, even though it post-dated that resolution, was clearly foreseen by those countries that drafted it.
Despite the successful implementation thus far of the Convention, particularly in relation to its disarmament pillar, "storm clouds are on the horizon", he said. The failure of the United States -- the Member State with the largest chemical industry in the world -- to submit declarations with respect to its chemical industry under Article VI of the Convention and to subject its chemical industry to inspections had already created "a severe imbalance" within the Treaty regime. If that was not addressed urgently, it might "strike a fatal blow to the Convention".
Indeed, he said that the chemical industries of Europe and Japan -- which had complied fully with the Convention and which were being inspected on an almost weekly basis -- were becoming increasingly concerned at what they saw as the "unfair commercial advantage" being given to the chemical industry in the United States. Their Governments were coming under growing pressure to request a scaling down of inspections of their respective chemical industries -- a scenario which the drafters of the Convention had never envisaged.
He, therefore, appealed to the United States to live up to everyone's expectations by adopting, tomorrow, the vital legislation to enable the United States to fulfil its leadership role in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. It was also important that the small number of States parties that had not yet provided their initial declarations, do so without delay. Iran -- which had ratified the Convention at the end of 1997 and had played a particularly active and valuable role -- was among them.
Other clouds on the horizon related to the success of the OPCW, he said. Some States parties seemed uncomfortable with its rapid rate of activation and its unavoidable emerging political role -- and that of its Director-General -- on the world scene. It was not easy to come to terms with the fact that a disarmament and non-proliferation international agreement, fast moving towards universality, was working. Much political courage and trust had enabled States to finalize the Convention. It was now time for the States parties to exhibit the same political courage and trust in moving its verification mechanism from its "adolescent phase into full adulthood".
The OPCW was earning its place in the system of international security, he said. If properly nurtured, it would become a mature, cost-effective global instrument to eliminate the scourge of chemical weapons from the planet for a very modest budget of $70 million, or the yearly cost of two modern fighter jets. Yet, to flourish, it required the sustained political support
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of all States parties. In the end, the Chemical Weapons Convention served the political, security and economic interest of all States, while advancing the cause of international disarmament.
Right of Reply
The representative of Iran, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his country would submit its declaration to the OPCW very soon. He earnestly hoped that all provisions of that very important Convention would be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and that the OPCW would be able to solve the outstanding issues, including those related to Article XI, in a satisfactory manner as soon as possible.
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