'MUSHROOM CLOUDS IN SOUTH ASIA' MUST SHARPEN WORLD'S FOCUS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DANGERS, UNITED STATES TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE

14 October 1998

Press Release
GA/DIS/3110

'MUSHROOM CLOUDS IN SOUTH ASIA' MUST SHARPEN WORLD'S FOCUS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DANGERS, UNITED STATES TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE

19981014 India Cites Failures of Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Regime; Nine Others Address Committee in Continuing Disarmament General Debate

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, John Holum, told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this morning that it was up to the disarmament community to "find a silver lining in those figurative mushroom clouds in South Asia and other ominous developments" by sharpening the world's focus on the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Mr. Holum, speaking during the Committee's continuing general debate, said that it was "nonsense" to claim that inadequate nuclear disarmament progress had justified India and Pakistan's actions. For its part, the United States and the Russian Federation had deactivated or eliminated more than 18,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. Further, to those who believed the nuclear tests had demonstrated the worthlessness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the problem was not the Treaties -- it was that, unlike most of the rest of the world, India and Pakistan had not joined them.

The representative of India said, however, that the failure of the international community to come to grips with the threat of nuclear weapons was due to the drawbacks in the NPT. Rather than serve the objectives of non- proliferation, that Treaty might well have facilitated vertical proliferation of several magnitudes since its entry into force. It had reinforced the nuclear monopoly, accentuated security concerns and severely compromised the evolution of a sustainable international security system.

Moreover, he said that the process of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) -- between the United States and the Russian Federation -- seemed to be at a standstill, with the initial promise of deep, continuous and irreversible reductions in strategic nuclear forces fading. Even if that process was reinvigorated, the reductions planned under the extended timetables of START II and those envisaged under a future

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START III would leave the remaining nuclear arsenals larger than at the time of the 1961 Cuban missile crisis.

The representative of the Russian Federation said, though, that both his country and the United States were determined to speed up the entry into force of START II and begin negotiations in the framework of START III. His Government would press for the ratification of START II in the near future, and it was prepared to make far more drastic cuts within the framework of subsequent strategic arms agreements. At the same time, any attempts at "overly fast adoption of a strictly time-framed nuclear arms elimination programmes" would be counter-productive.

Statements were also made by the representatives of San Marino, Egypt, China, Kazakhstan, United Republic of Tanzania, Mongolia, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. The representatives of the Republic of Korea, Iran and the United Arab Emirates spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Thursday, 15 October, to continue its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

Those agreements include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), which entered into force on 29 April 1997, triggering a complex verification mechanism that will be implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The Committee will also consider the verification measures of another treaty governing weapons of mass destruction -- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). Efforts have intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification and compliance.

The effectiveness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for signature in 1996, will also be considered. It was hoped the Treaty would motivate the implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The underground nuclear tests conducted last spring by India and Pakistan, however, raised serious concerns about the future of those two treaties. The CTBT requires ratification by 44 States listed in its annex, including India, Israel and Pakistan.

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. The zones already in existence are governed by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

It is also likely to consider bilateral agreements, including the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) negotiated by the United States and the Russian Federation. While reductions of nuclear weapons were proceeding under START I, the entry into force of START II has been delayed pending ratification by the Russian Federation. The Committee is also expected to review agreements between those two countries on the demarcation between strategic and non-strategic anti-ballistic missile systems, which sought to strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

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and provide new opportunities to work together to reduce their nuclear-weapon stockpiles.

Discussion will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and will enter into force on 1 March 1999.

Other matters to be discussed include the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as regional transparency and confidence-building measures, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be discussed in the context of the international non-proliferation regime.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3106 issued 9 October.)

Statements

JOHN D. HOLUM, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, said that there were glaring exceptions to the positive disarmament trend. Just as the world's resistance to weapons of mass destruction had stiffened, the hardest cases had all grown worse. If the past First Committee session had reflected hope born of achievements, the current one should reflect the sombre reality that those common endeavours had lost ground, which needed to be recovered.

The nuclear-weapon tests conducted by India and Pakistan were deplorable and disheartening, he continued, posing a serious challenge not only to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but presenting profound dangers on the ground. The world -- along with the United States and the Soviet Union -- had learned painful lesson about how high the risk of war became when ballistic missile velocities reduced attack warning to a matter of minutes. If nuclear- capable missiles were deployed, India and Pakistan would not even have minutes. Flight times would be less than reaction times. There would be a hair-trigger on nuclear war.

Most recently, the provocative missile launch by North Korea passing directly over Japanese territory had raised serious concerns, which were shared by its friends and allies, including the United States. In the Persian Gulf region, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed additional concerns. Iraq's continuing resistance to United Nations Special Commission

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(UNSCOM) on the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and IAEA inspections and Iran's development of longer-range missiles diminished international security.

It was up to the disarmament community to "find a silver lining in those figurative mushroom clouds in South Asia and other ominous developments", he said. The events of this year might show the way forward, and the international community's response to those problems gave cause for hope. Within a few days of the South Asia nuclear tests, international forums -- including the General Assembly, the Rio Group, the Security Council and 47 members of the Conference on Disarmament -- responded in a broad condemnation of the tests and laid out measures those two countries would have to take.

He cited some progress in that regard, including the announcements by both India and Pakistan that they were preparing to adhere to the CTBT and to engage in negotiations of a cut-off of fissile material for weapons purposes. Those two leaders also agreed to resume their review of outstanding disputes. Clearly, tangible progress would take more time and a steadfast approach by the international community. For the United States, until further progress was achieved, lifting sanctions and strengthening cooperation with India and Pakistan would be difficult.

He said that the events in South Asia had underscored the tremendous importance of efforts to enhance common security through international agreements and norms. Some had said that inadequate nuclear disarmament progress had justified India and Pakistan's actions. With all due respect, that was "nonsense". His Government yearned for more progress, but could anyone honestly believe that the nuclear tests in South Asia were good for the cause of disarmament? he asked. Were more nuclear explosions and proliferation really the route to fewer nuclear weapons?

Others had said the tests showed that the CTBT and NPT were worthless, he went on. In fact, they had confirmed that those were essential. The problem was not the Treaties. The problem was that, unlike most of the rest of the world, India and Pakistan had not joined them. Now, in response to international appeals, both had declared that they would indeed join the CTBT, rather than pursue "sabre-rattling" with more tests. They had also said they would adhere to the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Even before its entry into force, the CTBT had helped create widespread condemnation of South Asia's nuclear testing, he said. Its early entry into force would cement the prohibition against such tests and provide a robust verification regime to help the international community detect and deter them. Negotiations for a cut-off of fissile material production was the next multilateral step in advancing disarmament objectives. He urged all Conference members to negotiate in good faith, with an eye towards completing those negotiations in a timely manner.

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It was also vitally important to forge ahead on other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, he said. The international community must devote itself to fully implementing the prohibitions of biological and chemical weapons. That meant completing next year a compliance protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention and destroying existing stocks of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention's regime. Those particularly repulsive weapons should not proliferate further.

He said his Government supported the efforts by those involved in the Ottawa Convention. While the United States shared that goal, security concerns had prevented it from signing. His Government would do so by the year 2006, if it succeeded in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives. Meanwhile, it was important for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a ban on the transfer of anti-personnel landmines to help eliminate the supply of those weapons from States not party to the Convention. He also underscored the growing concern to restrict and regulate the flow of small arms.

The United States remained committed to nuclear disarmament, pursuant to article VI of the NPT, he said. Indeed, his Government had eliminated more than 10,000 nuclear weapons from its military arsenal, along with 1,700 missile launchers and bombers under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles (INF Treaty) and START I. It had not conducted a nuclear-weapon-test explosion since 1992, it had ceased the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons many years ago, and it had removed more than 200 metric tons of fissile material from its military stockpile.

Together, the United States and the Russian Federation had deactivated or eliminated more than 18,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, he said. Their two leaders had agreed that the next step would result in a cumulative 80 per cent reduction from cold war peaks of deployed weapons. At a recent summit in Moscow, they agreed on the principles for the disposition, by each country, of approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium released from defence programmes. Although not participants in formal negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arms, the United Kingdom and France had eliminated entire classes of nuclear weapons and substantially reduced overall levels of their nuclear forces.

The significance of those reductions was in what it revealed about the lessened role of nuclear weapons in world affairs. Who could now believe that the great Powers of the future would be defined as those possessing nuclear weapons? he asked. Surely not the courageous leaders of South Africa, who had abandoned a nuclear weapons programme, recognizing that their country would be more secure by adhering to global non-proliferation norms. Surely not Germany and Japan, which had decided it was not in their interest to develop nuclear weapons. Surely not the 182 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, which had decided they could better maintain their security and prestige by agreeing to forswear nuclear weapons.

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ELENA MOLARONI (San Marino) said her country's policy was based on promoting just and rational principles on the conviction that the ultimate result of war was destruction. She had once been told that countries like San Marino should not interfere with the international scene by "propagandizing useless ethical principles and ideals". However, if one did not tend to the ideals, the best would never be attained. One had to remember that San Marino was quite young and entered into the international system only recently.

The threat of the use of nuclear weapons, even if only for self-defence, was totally irresponsible, she said. A chain reaction based on retaliation was a danger for all humanity. Her country welcomed the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CTBT and the NPT, among numerous disarmament initiatives. Yet, the recent nuclear tests in Asia had opened a new and worrying chapter of the nuclear era. Her country was committed to better transparency in armaments, which was the only way to achieve a total elimination of nuclear weapons, and supported the International Court of Justice opinion that the use of nuclear weapons was illegal.

Her country supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a significant step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, she continued. Both nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to real nuclear disarmament. She believed that a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament could be useful in promoting awareness of the international community and in enhancing the momentum of the disarmament process. Her country had been among the first to sign and ratify the Ottawa Convention and urged those that had not done so to accede to the agreement.

Much could be done at the regional level to tackle the problem posed by the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, small arms, she said. Her country recognized the danger those arms represented to a country's political stability and underlined the absolute merit of transparency in armaments. Concluding, she noted that San Marino, in 16 centuries of history, had not produced or traded in armaments, had not had an army, had never declared war, nor had ever taken part in one. In that respect, it "humbly hopes to be considered as an example".

MAGED ABDELAZIZ (Egypt) said the Committee was convening in the aftermath of serious developments in the international arena directly relevant to the field of disarmament. Those should be properly reflected upon and carefully analysed, in order to remain focused on the ultimate goal of complete and general disarmament. The end of the cold war created a rare window of opportunity and generated the hope that the world be spared the most destabilizing military doctrines based on the possession of nuclear weapons. It should be abundantly clear to those who still upheld those doctrines that their policies were the greatest deception of all times.

He said the recently held Summit of the Non-aligned Movement in Durban, South Africa, reiterated its call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish

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an ad hoc committee to negotiate a phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons, within a specific time frame. He expected that programme of action to be able to "overcome the lacuna in explicit commitments" relating to nuclear disarmament, especially from the nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, the nuclear-weapon States lacked the genuine political will needed to fully and completely implement their obligations under the NPT.

The nuclear tests conducted recently in South Asia created a new reality, which had to be addressed by the international community, he said. The tests demonstrated that both the NPT and the CTBT were inadequate instruments for maintaining the global non-proliferation regime and the international community had to address that at the regional and global level. Globally, it was important for all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work faithfully towards the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and a total ban on fissile materials. Also, special attention should be accorded to achieving the universality of the NPT and the CTBT.

On the regional level, he said it was important for more nuclear-weapon- free zones to be established, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia. It was a matter of deep regret that the proposals for the creation of the Middle East zone, dating back to 1974, had so far failed. Only one country in the Middle East was suspected to possess a significant arsenal of nuclear weapons and only one country refused to join the NPT or even to discuss the nuclear issue. "It is broadly acknowledged now to name that country, Israel", he added.

Double standards in the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation was dangerous and counter-productive, he continued, adding, "the international community should clearly choose -- either it is or it is not, against the proliferation of nuclear weapons". His Government could not understand how certain countries could severely condemn and take strong action against one proliferator, while all but condoning the actions of another. Similarly, it was incomprehensible how a country could claim to be seeking a just peace in the Middle East, while, at the same time, insisting to maintain the ability to annihilate its neighbours.

He said Israel's attitude undermined efforts to create a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East and induced a similar position in many States in the region, particularly in regard to international instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, such as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Security could not be divided among various types of weapons of mass destruction, on the one hand, nor between weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, on the other hand.

He said his Government supported the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms as a confidence-building mechanism, but was disappointed over the failure to broaden its scope. The panel of governmental experts mandated to consider the functioning of the Register should rectify that deficiency.

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LI CHANGHE (China) said that 1998 was far from tranquil. In disregard of the strong opposition of the international community, some country conducted nuclear tests in an attempt to gain regional hegemony and the so-called "big power status". Such acts had posed a serious threat to regional and global peace, security and stability, and had caused a major setback to international arms control and disarmament efforts.

He said that the nuclear tests conducted by India demonstrated "outrageous contempt" for the widely supported international non-proliferation regime. Pakistan had been forced to respond with its own nuclear tests. The international community reacted strongly. His country would call upon India and Pakistan -- especially the initiators of the nuclear tests -- to take measures as soon as possible to meet the various requirements set forth in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). Settlement of the Kashmir issue was one of the key elements towards peace and security in South Asia. The international community should facilitate a peaceful and just resolution of that issue.

Regrettably, while the cold war was over, the cold war mentality "dies hard" he said. Besides the South Asian nuclear tests, people were concerned that instead of ending the cold war, some military blocs and alliances established in that era were expanding and gaining strength. A few countries, bolstered by their economic and technological superiority, were intensifying efforts to develop sophisticated weapons, which undermined global strategic balance and stability. Those countries were frequently resorting to the use or threat of use of force in international affairs. Such a practice of seeking one's own security at the expense of others was detrimental to easing the international situation. Moreover, such behaviour would negatively impact on international arms control and disarmament efforts.

Complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons was the common aspiration of mankind, he said. His country fully understood the wish of the large number of non-nuclear-weapon States for general and complete nuclear disarmament, as well as their concern over the slow pace of that process. The indefinite extension of the NPT did not imply that the nuclear-weapon States could possess nuclear weapons forever. Rather, they should intensify efforts to fulfil the obligations contained in article VI of the NPT.

His Government called upon the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals to implement their existing bilateral agreements on nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and to further drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals, he said. At the same time, the current pace of nuclear disarmament should not be used by any country as an excuse for conducting nuclear tests.

He said that China, as a nuclear-weapon State, had never participated in a nuclear arms race nor had it ever evaded its nuclear disarmament responsibility. It had stood all along for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and it had unilaterally and unconditionally undertaken not to be

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the first to use those weapons and not to threaten their use against non-nuclear- weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. His country's limited nuclear force and its related policies had demonstrated that its nuclear weapons did not constitute a threat to any country. It had also called for the early conclusion of a convention banning nuclear weapons.

In August, China had ratified the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which concerns landmines, as well as the newly annexed Protocol on blinding laser weapons, he said. It favoured proper and reasonable control on landmines aimed at protecting civilians. While perfecting relevant international laws to impose strict control on the use and transfer of landmines, however, the most pressing issue at present was to assist mine- affected countries in removing mines that still threatened civilian lives. His country would actively participate in international mine-clearance efforts.

He said that despite some of China's worst flooding of the century, the Government would still contribute $100,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, which would be earmarked for demining activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, in cooperation with the United Nations, China would host two training courses on mine clearance in the next two years. Mine-clearance experts from the Chinese military would provide technical training to mine-affected countries and it would provide them with mine-detection and mine-clearance equipment.

SHARAD PAWAR (India) said that the international security and disarmament agenda was burdened by a flawed security paradigm constructed during the cold war. It had been underscored by the privileged possession of nuclear weapons by a self-anointed few, and it had been legitimized by the NPT. Clearly, that security paradigm was in need of replacement. A paradigm shift should contribute to a forward-looking disarmament agenda for next year and one which would enable the international community to greet the next millennium with the confidence that the nuclear weapons threat would be eliminated forever.

He said that the failure of the international community to come to grips with the threat of nuclear weapons was due to the drawbacks in the NPT. Indeed, "the global non-proliferation regime was challenged by none other than the Non- Proliferation Treaty itself", he said. While India remained committed to the goals of a global non-proliferation regime, events had reconfirmed the Treaty's shortcomings. Rather than serving the objectives of non-proliferation, the NPT might have facilitated vertical proliferation of several magnitudes since its entry into force.

Moreover, the NPT had reinforced nuclear monopoly and accentuated security concerns, he said. By seeking to perpetuate inequality and differentiated standards of national security, it had severely compromised the evolution of a sustainable international security system. It had not prevented countries -- nominally non-nuclear -- from enjoying the security of a nuclear umbrella. Even

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the aim of preventing the transfer of nuclear materials and technology had not been adhered to.

Lessons aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons could be learned from the successes achieved in the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, he said. The non-discriminatory Conventions prohibiting those weapons were based on a devaluation of the military utility of those weapons and on the belief that international security was best served by their complete prohibition and elimination, rather than by partial and discriminatory arms control.

He said that the START process seemed to be at a standstill, with the initial promise of deep, continuous and irreversible reductions in strategic nuclear forces fading. Even if that process was reinvigorated, the reductions planned under the extended timetables of START II and those envisaged under a future START III would mean that the remaining nuclear arsenals would be larger than at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. Reductions since 1990 in the United States and Russian strategic nuclear forces -- in terms of the number of warheads by delivery systems -- amounted to just one third, mostly in the older generation of nuclear forces. Those remaining under deployment could be modernized through non-explosive nuclear testing.

He said that doctrines of first-use of nuclear weapons and the substantial numbers of those weapons under hair-trigger alert posed unacceptable risks, including the accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. Even with the end of the cold war, there were more than 5,000 nuclear weapons on hair- trigger alert. Serious attention should be given to global "de-alerting" and deactivating nuclear weapons. His delegation planned to introduce a draft resolution aimed at focusing global attention on reducing the nuclear danger.

His country, conscious of its responsibilities as a nuclear-weapon State, would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, he said. Moreover, it remained willing to enter into bilateral agreements or multilateral negotiations on no- first use of nuclear weapons. There was no basis for their use against countries that did not have those weapons. While nuclear-weapon-free zones did not serve the wide range of concerns emanating from the global nature of the nuclear-weapon threat, his country respected the sovereign choice exercised by non-nuclear- weapon States to establish such zones.

The Committee was aware of the circumstances leading to India's "standing aside" from the CTBT in 1996, he said. That decision was governed by considerations that had been addressed, in part, through the limited series of five underground nuclear tests it conducted on 11 and 13 May. Those tests were "a measured response to a deteriorating security environment", and they had not violated any legal obligation entered into by India. Thereafter, his country announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground test explosions, thereby accepting the basic obligation of the CTBT.

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He said that the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons might produce only a partial measure and would not eliminate existing nuclear arsenals. Through its participation in those negotiations, India would strive to ensure that such a treaty was non-discriminatory and was consistent with India's security interests. Discriminatory restrictions of access to materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, including restrictions that negatively impacted on nuclear safety, must give way to open and transparent arrangements.

The peaceful applications of nuclear technology were of critical importance to developing countries, he said. India remained fully committed to maintaining and further strengthening a system of export controls on technologies, in line with the objectives of non-proliferation. As a developing country, however, it had had to pay a high developmental cost, in view of the persistence of discriminatory control mechanisms. At the same time, it had fully supported multilaterally negotiated, universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use technologies and of high technologies with military applications.

AKMARAL KH. ARYSTANBEKOVA (Kazakhstan) said there were grounds for satisfaction at the increase in the number of States that had acceded to the most important disarmament treaties and agreements, such as the CTBT and the NPT. Still, the international community should intensify efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A priority was to strengthen the NPT and ensure its universality. She hoped that the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000 would be successful in that regard.

She said Kazakhstan had voluntarily given up its nuclear heritage and had been the first in the history of mankind to close a major nuclear-testing ground. It supported the CTBT and signed it in the first week it opened for signature. Her country was a firm proponent of strengthening regional and global security, and called upon India and Pakistan to heed the international community and accede to the CTBT and the NPT.

She said her country had declared its desire to work for the strengthening of the regime for monitoring nuclear tests. For a number of reasons, her country would have a unique opportunity to make a significant contribution to the monitoring of nuclear explosions. For example, the country's seismic stations were included in the International Monitoring System under the CTBT, and it was among the 10 countries with the largest number of seismic stations in that system, "thus enabling us to make a real contribution to the test monitoring regime".

She said her country would continue to contribute to the non- proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. In that connection, its export of nuclear materials and technologies had been in compliance with the guiding principles of the nuclear suppliers group since 1997. Her country was

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also interested in joining the Missile Technology Control Group. "Since we have a space-vehicle launching site in our territory and possess scientific and technical potential in missile-building, we can make a considerable contribution to that regime", she added.

She said non-nuclear-weapon States were fully justified in making their case for security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. Since they had renounced the possession of those weapons and were keeping up with their obligations under the NPT, they were entitled to receive firm and legally binding negative security assurances. Her Government would continue to work for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. It was, however, aware of the complexities and responsibility of establishing such a zone.

Despite the fact that Kazakhstan had not yet acceded to the Ottawa Convention, it fully supported the humanitarian orientation of that instrument. As a contribution to the anti-landmine campaign, the country had adopted a moratorium on those weapons, including their export and transit. In addition, her country consistently advocated the establishment of security structures in the Asian continent and continued to work on the implementation of the proposal of its President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, that an international conference be convened on interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia. Also, due to its firm and consistent positions in the sphere of disarmament, her country expected full membership in the Conference on Disarmament.

M.H. JABIR (United Republic of Tanzania) said the Committee was meeting against a background of positive developments in the disarmament arena. Last year, the Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force and the OPCW had begun its work. His country had already ratified the Convention and called on all Member States to accede to it as early as possible.

He said the Ottawa Convention had been opened for signature last December and, on 16 September 1998, had recorded its fortieth ratification, the minimum provided for its entry into force. Not only would that Convention make history as the fastest disarmament treaty to enter into force, it also reflected the great importance the world attached to the elimination of the scourge of anti- personnel landmines.

The first battle had been won against weapons that indiscriminately killed or maimed innocent people long after the end of the wars in which they had been employed, he said. Efforts should now be directed towards mine clearance, by making available the technology and resources needed for that difficult but urgent task. Hand in hand with mine clearance, efforts must be made to treat and reintegrate the victims of mines into society. His Government, having signed the Convention and while processing ratification, called on those States that still had doubts and reservations to accede to it and give it universal application.

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He said the end of the cold war had created hopes for an atmosphere conducive to arms control and disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Those hopes, however, had been shattered by the reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Today, nuclear weapons remained the greatest menace to civilization, and the lack of political will on the part of nuclear-weapon States remained the biggest hindrance to the abolition of those weapons. Once again, his Government called on them to commit themselves to a time-bound framework to eliminate nuclear weapons, through multilateral negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

His Government deeply regretted the recent developments in South Asia, which had added to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, he said. Nuclear weapons could neither keep peace among nations nor guarantee its achievement. Instead, they created suspicion, raised tension and caused instability. In fact, deterrence prevented genuine nuclear disarmament.

He said the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones had acquired increased significance in the overall context of regional disarmament. The Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok were evidence of the determination by non-nuclear-weapon States to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted an important confidence- building and disarmament measure, which enhanced both regional and global peace and security.

According priority to nuclear disarmament did not imply any disregard for the urgent need to work for arms control and disarmament in other areas, he said. In that regard, he placed particular emphasis on the control of the transfer of small arms and light weapons, whose extensive accumulation and proliferation was an issue of grave concern. Africa had increasingly become a victim of the scourge of small arms, which increased the intensity and duration of conflicts. Although they were not the root cause of conflicts, small arms contributed to heavy casualties, particularly among non-combatants, and increased human suffering.

VASILY S. SIDOROV (Russian Federation) said the broad agenda of the Committee covering issues of disarmament and international security was a clear evidence that today's world was certainly breaking away from "stereotypes of global confrontation". Peace and cooperation in eliminating the threats that had remained from the cold war period and meeting the common security challenges of the twenty-first century provided great opportunities for interaction in many areas.

He said more than 1,700 heavy bombers, missile launchers and submarines capable of carrying nuclear warheads had been eliminated in the framework of the implementation of the Russian-United States agreements on strategic arms. At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Presidents Boris N. Yeltsin and William Clinton reaffirmed their adherence to strict compliance with their

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commitments under the START and ABM Treaty. They also expressed their determination to cooperate in speeding up the entry into force of START II and to begin negotiations on lower levels in the framework of START III, once Russia ratified START II.

He pointed out that Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov had expressed firm determination to press for the ratification of START II by the Federal Assembly in the near future. In fact, Russia, within the framework of subsequent strategic arms agreements, was prepared to make far more drastic cuts. "At the present stage, we deem it important that the United States also ratifies all START II-related instruments", he added. He noted unilateral measures being taken by other nuclear Powers to reduce their arsenals and thought that such steps could be appropriately incorporated into international commitments. It was, indeed, high time all nuclear-weapon States joined the process of nuclear arms control and reduction.

His Government welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a treaty that would ban the production of fissile materials. It was important that all member States of the Conference endorse those negotiations, especially the trio that had not yet acceded to the NPT -- Israel, India and Pakistan. While his country remained committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament, no one should harbour illusions that it could be done easily and quickly. The world was still far from being ideal.

Although threats to international security persisted, there were economic problems caused by the considerable spending on nuclear arms elimination, he continued. Thus, "attempts aimed at overly fast adoption of a strictly time- framed nuclear arms elimination programmes are counterproductive", he said. The international community should instead consider a stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear capabilities. The prevention of nuclear proliferation was paramount.

He said his country was one of the depositories of the NPT and believed the Treaty to be a key instrument in the maintenance of international security. The main goal of the NPT review in the year 2000 should be to strengthen the Treaty and make it universal. Meanwhile, he called upon all States that had not acceded to the Treaty to do so. In addition, the adoption of the CTBT was one of the most significant achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan seriously challenged that Treaty and global nuclear non-proliferation, in general. His Government condemned those actions and urged both countries to accede to the CTBT, settle their differences and ease tension in the region.

His Government advocated the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, he said. The concept was consonant with the Russian President's initiative to limit the deployment of nuclear arms within the national boundaries of the respective nuclear-weapon States. The creation of such zones was the best way to provide additional security assurances to non- nuclear-weapon States. It was particularly important to deprive terrorists of the opportunity to obtain nuclear weapons. To that end, his Government submitted a draft convention to combat acts of nuclear terrorism to the Sixth Committee (Legal).

Due to increased interdependence in the modern world, the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had become global, he said. His

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Government had taken a responsible approach towards its commitments to ban chemical and biological weapons. Thus, it submitted timely notifications to the OPCW, as required by the Convention. In order to bolster the Convention and the status of the OPCW, the international verification mechanism should be adhered to and a way should be found to reduce the Organization's expenditures. He also hoped that the recent joint statement by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton would give a new impetus to the negotiations aimed at drafting the protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Outer space belonged to humanity and should not serve as a testing ground for new types of weapons, he continued. Attempts to build anti-satellite systems would militarize outer space and undermine strategic stability. His Government also understood concerns caused by the proliferation and launch of ballistic missiles and, in cooperation with the United States, it agreed to exchange information on missile launches and early warning. Furthermore, he backed initiatives to combat the illegal trafficking in small arms and supported an international conference on the issue.

He said the problem posed by anti-personnel mines was a pressing disarmament issue. Fifty years after the end of the Second World War, Russians still faced threats from mines buried in the country. Therefore, his country fully understood the global scale of the problem and believed that international cooperation was crucial in tackling it. His country had enforced a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines. Further, global security was largely based on regional security, and his Government considered it important for the United Nations to support regional disarmament processes. The renewed Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) reflected new circumstances on the European continent. That would help soften the consequences of the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has had a negative impact on European security.

Russia hoped that the negotiating States would soon reach mutually acceptable solutions on key issues to ensure the stability of Central Europe and settle the "flank" issue. All were highlighted in the Russia-NATO Founding Act. The world now lived in an epoch of information revolution, affecting all aspects of society's vital functions. It was important to ensure that that did not constitute a threat to the maintenance of international stability and security.

JARGALSAIKHANY ENKHSAIKHAN (Mongolia) welcomed the re-establishment of the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, which, together with further

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improvement of the work of the First Committee and some other disarmament bodies, would be a positive step in strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. He also welcomed the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of the ad hoc committees on nuclear security assurances and on fissile material and other explosive devices. They were timely steps towards making long-overdue progress in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Despite the encouraging signs, he said, in reality not much progress had been registered lately in the field of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States had yet to embark upon serious nuclear disarmament negotiations, as required by article VI of the NPT and upheld by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion. Moreover, his Government had expressed its deep regret over the recent nuclear tests in South Asia, urged India and Pakistan to refrain from any further tests and appealed to them to become parties to the NPT and the CTBT, without delay. It also welcomed the declaration by China not to resume nuclear tests, despite those tests.

His Government attached great importance to the contributions of non-nuclear States, especially by establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, he said. Such zones were important measures in the cause of creating a nuclear-weapon-free world, and he hoped that a zone in Central Asia would be created before the year 2000. His country did not physically border on any of the Central Asian States, but that was no reason to exclude it from common disarmament efforts, including the efforts to expand the network of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Moreover, Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992.

Disarmament and ensuring international security were not the exclusive prerogatives of the powerful, he said. The role of smaller States in the process of disarmament and strengthening international security should not be underestimated. Forming the vast majority of the international community, those States would play a more active role in the disarmament and confidence- building process.

He said some progress had been registered with respect to the question of convening the fourth special session on disarmament during the last session of the Disarmament Commission. However, no consensus had emerged in the Commission on the objectives and agenda of the session. The implementation of the special session needed proper review and appraisal. The world had been undergoing dramatic changes and transformations that demanded adequate collective responses and adjustments. All those changes called for the speediest convening of the special session. Fixing a concrete date for convening the session should be the least that the Assembly should do at the current stage.

VOLODYMYR YEL'CHENKO (Ukraine) said that disarmament and international security remained the key issues of the United Nations agenda. Looking back,

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one could see some distinct progress in that domain. Despite some disappointments, the disarmament achievements had been significant and had infused the process with confidence. Step by step, a new security architecture was being shaped.

He said the world should be free of weapons of mass destruction, and the international community should develop every opportunity to attain that goal. Recent developments in South Asia, however, had seriously challenged those aspirations. His country's reaction to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan was motivated by its well-known position on nuclear disarmament and on its commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It would appeal, once again, that those two countries adhere to the international non-proliferation regime and refrain from further nuclear tests.

The entry into force of the CTBT would significantly further the process of practical nuclear disarmament, he said. As a party to START I, Ukraine considered the START process an integral part of nuclear disarmament. Criticism was mounting among non-nuclear-weapon States for the lack of progress in that crucial field. Undoubtedly, ratification of START II by the Russian Federation, without delay, would enable its rapid entry into force and would pave the way for START III negotiations. The declaration made by a group of countries in June, entitled "Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons", had his country's support. Similarly, it supported negotiations prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The scope of any future treaty in that regard, however, should not be limited to banning the production of such material, but also to reducing the stockpiles.

The illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons, as well as their accumulation and proliferation, continued to threaten regional and national security, he said. The time had come for the international community to consider action-oriented recommendations, as a starting point for negotiating a global convention. The achievements of the Ottawa process were welcome. For its part, his country had strictly adhered to the national moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines since 1995. Although it did not produce those weapons, it had undertaken unilateral measures to destroy its stockpiles. Last spring, it had destroyed more than 100,000 anti-personnel landmines.

MOHAMMED J. SAMHAN (United Arab Emirates) said his country was concerned about the way the international system was structured. There was no equality and conflicts raged in many parts of the world, especially where foreign occupation persisted. In particular, Iran's occupation of three islands threatened the peace and security of the region. Additional problems were being created by the degradation of the environment, which threatened the stability of the countries concerned.

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He said the situation in the Middle East and in the Gulf constituted a serious threat to regional and international security. The threat of an arms race still loomed in the region, due to the unjustified polices of some countries. That had led to other problems, including terrorism and the proliferation of small arms. Such a situation did not favour the development of the people.

He said his country supported the efforts of Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and others to contain the dispute between Turkey and Syria, as well as the efforts being made to settle the dispute between Iran and Afghanistan. He hoped the conflict between India and Pakistan would be resolved peacefully, without recourse to an arms race. The United Arab Emirates deeply believed in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. His country had acceded to both the NPT and the CTBT, and welcomed the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions.

He said the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was especially urgent, as there was need for a just and durable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on the principle of land for peace. Israel should accede to the NPT and subject all its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards agreements. His country supported the banning of all nuclear- related materials to Israel. He believed that the task of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, was a collective responsibility of the international community. His country favoured current efforts aimed at concluding an international agreement banning fissile materials, as a step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Right of Reply

The representative of the Republic of Korea, speaking in exercise of the right of reply to a statement made yesterday by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had argued as if it was currently under no obligation to comply with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and to cooperate in its implementation. That was incorrect. As a party to the NPT, its obligation to fully comply with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement was a legal one, which could not be replaced or superseded by a bilateral arrangement. Indeed, the agreed framework signed in Geneva could only complement and reinforce the obligations to which the Democratic People's Republic was bound.

He said that for the purpose of full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement, it was of paramount importance for the Democratic People's Republic to fully cooperate with the IAEA to enable the Agency to verify its past nuclear activities. It was also crucial that the Democratic People's Republic demonstrate full transparency, in the context of IAEA monitoring activities of the freeze and of its nuclear facilities. He urged a positive response in that regard by the Democratic People's Republic.

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With regard to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, he said he was very disappointed to note that the Democratic People's Republic had virtually declined to implement the Joint Declaration, which it had freely entered into with the Republic of Korea. Nothing could justify any attempt to turn such an important legal instrument into "a scrap of paper". Freeing the Korean peninsula from the danger of nuclear proliferation was vitally important to its peace and stability and to the Korean people, as a whole. He appealed to the Democratic People's Republic to implement the Joint Declaration as soon as possible.

He said that the representative of the Democratic People's Republic had also spoken of political and military threats against it and the unwarranted misgivings regarding forced unification by others. That perception was groundless. The Republic of Korea was actively pursuing the so-called "sunshine policy" on the basis of three principles: no tolerance for any military provocation by North Korea; no attempts to absorb North Korea for unification; and the active promotion of inter-Korean reconciliation, exchange and cooperation.

He said he fully agreed with the statement by the Democratic People's Republic that priority should be given to dismantling the cold war structure. To achieve that goal, however, required concrete actions for non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. During the Korean War, the Korean people experienced the second largest number of casualties of the century. That was enough, he said.

Given the volatile and tense situation of the Korean peninsula, it was imperative that, first and foremost, it be cleared of any horrific weapons of mass destruction, he said. The Republic of Korea was party to the NPT and to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. It had also signed the CTBT and was proceeding with domestic procedures to ratify it next year. The Democratic People's Republic had no reason not to take similar steps and renounce, once and for all, weapons of mass destruction.

The representative of Iran, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that Iran was a party to all conventions concerning weapons of mass destruction, without exception, and it considered its missile technology to be a legitimate conventional means of defence, which did not constitute a threat to any country and was not set for first use.

He said that attention should be given to the weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities of Israel, the only country in the Middle East not party to the NPT. Ironically, Iran's missile test had not raised any concern on the part of the countries in the region. Meanwhile, Israel's weapons of mass destruction and planned missile programme had posed a regional threat, about which there was a strong regional consensus. The speaker could have referred to that fact and to the real threat in the Middle East.

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Continuing, he said that the representative of the United Arab Emirates had made some unacceptable claims against the territorial integrity of his country. That issue should be addressed with good will in bilateral negotiations. His country was fully committed to international obligations, including those arising from the 1971 agreement. Iran had friendly relations with its neighbours in the Persian Gulf, including the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, it stood ready to enter into negotiations in good faith and on the basis of historical facts and international law, without preconditions, in order to remove any and all misunderstandings.

The representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was most regrettable that Iran would respond to his statement. Iran had occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates since 1971. Hopefully, Iran would respond bilaterally to the peace initiatives or resort to the International Court of Justice, in order to settle the question of the occupation of the three islands. That would reinforce joint cooperation between them and between Iran and the other countries of the region, as well.

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that he would speak at tomorrow's meeting in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made today by the representative of the Republic of Korea.

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