PRESS CONFERENCE BY LEADER OF TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

Press Briefing

PRESS CONFERENCE BY LEADER OF TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, told correspondents at a Headquarters press conference this morning that he had put forward a formula for a confederal settlement of the dispute between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus. He hoped it would be a way to break the impasse and begin negotiations between the two sides, but the equal status of both communities must be recognized.

Discussing the history of the 35 year-long dispute between the two sides, he said the problem dated back to 1963 when the Greek Cypriot leadership had forcefully ended the bi-communal partnership State, with a view to converting it into a Greek Cypriot republic. The Turkish Cypriot side, as the co-founder and partner of the partnership State, had refused to bow to the Greek Cypriot arbitrary rule.

In 1974, as a result of the Greek junta's coup in Cyprus, Turkey had come and saved the Turkish community from Greek harassment and denial of the community's rights, he said. That action, he said, had given "us the chance to live again as human beings". In 1975, when the bi-zonal existence of Cyprus had been accepted by both sides, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had helped to exchange populations on a voluntary basis. The result was that almost 100 per cent of the Greek Cypriots had moved to the south, and 100 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots had moved to the north.

The Turkish Cypriot community would not accept a stateless life, he said. They had established their own State, when they discovered that the Greek Cypriots preferred to continue under the title of the "Government of Cyprus", rather than settle the problem on a power-sharing basis, as the Secretary-General had urged. "In 1977, I agreed with Archbishop Makarios to settle the problem on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal basis. And, thereafter, we spent our lives talking about it with the Greek Cypriot side, who never believed in such a solution", he said.

For tactical reasons, the Greek Cypriots only pretended to be interested in reaching a solution, he said. While they were wasting the time of the Turkish Cypriots, they were embedding themselves as the Government of Cyprus. But the Government of Cyprus in name only, as their jurisdiction and authority never ran over the Turkish Cypriot side or over the Turkish Cypriots. Finally, in Glion, Switzerland, in August 1997, Glafcos Clerides, leader of the Greek Cypriot community, had met with Mr. Denktash.

Mr. Denktash said that Mr. Clerides had been encouraged by the unilateral application the Greek Cypriots had made for membership of the European Union and how it had been accepted as an application by Cyprus. During their meeting in Glion, the Turkish Cypriot leader had told Mr. Denktash that the activities of the Government of Cyprus could not stop. Those activities included importing missiles from Russia, contrary to Security Council resolutions; giving military bases to Greece; and putting priority on the unilateral and illegal application for entry into the European Union.

Denktash Press Conference - 2 - 2 October 1998

Mr. Denktash quoted Mr. Clerides as saying: "I know I am not your Government. I don't aspire to be your Government, but the whole world treats me as the Government of Cyprus. Do you expect me to tell the world that I am not?" Mr. Denktash said the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community preferred a title which they know to be false to a settlement.

Mr. Denktash said that because talks between the two sides had been used to waste time while the Greek Cypriot leaders tried to entrench their governmental status, he had told Mr. Clerides during their meeting in Glion that the Turkish side would talk to the Greek side from then on as State to State. "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is in its fifteenth year. We are a State, as good a democracy as you, and we can talk about how to unite the two States."

Immediately, he said, the Greek Cypriot propaganda had begun to tell the world that "Denktash did not want to reunify Cyprus" and that he would annex the north to Turkey. This was false propaganda. He did not intend to keep Cyprus a divided island forever, he said. He was ready to unite it under a confederal roof -- two States ready to cooperate on agreed terms -- and to bring peace to the island.

He said that in order to disprove their allegation that he wanted to annex the north to Turkey, he had proposed a continuation of the guarantee system of 1960, which had prevented such annexation to Greece or to Turkey. However, even before he had left the press conference where he announced that formula, Greece had immediately reacted and rejected it, thus giving the world no time to reflect on the fact that the formula was a constructive movement towards negotiations. Immediately thereafter, the Greek Cypriot leaders had also rejected it. That rejection still stood. The Turkish Cypriot formula for a confederal settlement was on the table and they were trying to inform people and countries that it was a way to break the impasse and begin negotiations.

Mr. Denktash said that was why he came to New York. He had seen the Secretary-General and explained to him that movement could now begin and that the Turkish Cypriots were ready for such a move, provided their status was recognized. The Security Council had its own resolutions and could not change immediately, but the Secretary-General said he had come to the conclusion that the first thing to do was to correct the lack of confidence between the two communities. The Secretary-General's representative would start shuttle diplomacy between the two sides to begin building confidence.

Mr. Denktash said he had suggested the establishment of a committee for the exchange of property and compensation between the two parties, as their populations had moved within the island. His efforts had achieved, at least, the start of a process of confidence-building within Cyprus.

Denktash Press Conference - 3 - 2 October 1998

He said he had also given the Secretary-General a dossier that proved the Greek Cypriot policy of integrating Cyprus as a separate Greek republic with Greece. In response, the Turkish Cypriot side was pursuing a process of integration with Turkey, in order to improve its economy, which had been burdened by Greek Cypriot embargoes. The Turkish Cypriot side was not seeking political integration, only economic integration. At the same time, they would not allow the Greek Cypriots to integrate north Cyprus with Greece. "They are trying to integrate with Greece through the European Union, and to drag us with it."

A correspondent asked what impact a possible entry of Cyprus into the European Union would have on the prospects for peace between the two sides. Mr. Denktash replied that he understood from the representatives of several important European Union countries' that the Union was aware of the damage done to the process for a settlement by its acceptance of a Greek Cypriot application as an application by Cyprus as a whole. They understood that it was wrong and that they had done harm to the process of negotiation and great wrong to Turkish Cypriots. However, the procedures of the European Union were such that it was not possible to reverse acceptance of the application. They would probably delay the application for as long as possible in order to give Cyprus a chance to reunite under the guidance of the Secretary-General.

A correspondent asked whether he had been given assurances that during the period of shuttle diplomacy no S-300 missiles would go to Cyprus. Everyone he spoke to believed that the missiles would not go to Cyprus, Mr. Denktash replied. Mr. Clerides appeared to have assured everybody that the missiles would not go. If they did, however, a new situation would arise, one that would not be conducive to a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Did his proposal for a confederation fall within United Nations resolutions that called for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation? a correspondent asked. It did, replied Mr. Denktash. The Security Council had adopted his agreement with Archbishop Makarios and said that the solution should be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic. It had been adopted because the two sides had agreed to it. Now, it had been proved that the agreement by the Greek Cypriot side was a tactical pretence in order to waste time.

A correspondent asked whether there was a timetable for the all-island talks to be conducted by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus, Ann Hercus. Mr. Denktash said there was no timetable, but there was an agenda. First, there was the Secretary-General's offer on deconfrontation. It was important to start with that immediately. Then there was his own offer regarding the setting up of a committee to exchange property. There was also the idea, which he had offered to the Greek Cypriot community long ago, of entering into a non-aggression agreement -- to be under-signed by Greece and Turkey -- to put an end to the expenditure on arms, and satisfy the people that there was no fear of war.

Denktash Press Conference - 4 - 2 October 1998

On that point, a correspondent asked, how much would he agree to reduce the Turkish military presence? Mr. Denktash said the situation was not near that point. Demilitarization for the Greek side meant leaving one Turk for four Greeks. Even with shotguns -- the Greek side was on record as saying -- they could wipe the Turks out of Cyprus. The balance between Greece and Turkey, therefore, had to be maintained.

Had there been any estimates of the economic damage to Cyprus, over the years, due to the conflict? a correspondent asked. An estimate should be made by an autonomous committee under the charge of the United Nations, he replied. There were mid-term United Nations reports about the damage done to Turkish houses during the period from 1963 to 1968. However, substantial estimates were needed so that people could exchange properties and be satisfied.

The Greek side had recently said that they were upgrading their military capabilities, said a correspondent. Did that represent a threat to the Turkish community? As long as they looked upon themselves as the Government of Cyprus, and enjoyed the luxury of thinking that it was Turkey that had invaded their land -- rather than coming and saving the Turkish community from destruction -- of course it was a threat, he replied. The Greek community, therefore, had to rely on Turkey to help them live in peace.

A correspondent asked about complaints from Greece and the Greek Cypriot community that they could not have a dialogue with northern Cyprus or with Turkey. Mr. Denktash replied that was not true. He had been talking with Mr. Clerides since 1968, on and off, and with other Greek leaders. But it had been Mr. Clerides who said there was nothing to talk about, because he did not believe in a federal solution. Finally, Mr. Denktash said he himself, through the Secretary-General, had pressed for a face-to-face meeting with Mr. Clerides in Troutbeck, New York, and Glion in 1997. However, Mr. Clerides had shown that he did not intend to settle the problem, and that his priority was the European Union membership.

Mr. Denktash said he was ready to accept face-to-face talks again when the equal status of Turkish Cyprus was accepted. But, that would take time. First there must be successful shuttle-diplomacy. Face-to-face talks would follow, provided equal status was acknowledged and Mr. Clerides was told clearly that he was not the Government of the Turkish Cypriots.

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