PRESS BRIEFING BY HEAD OF UN POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY HEAD OF UN POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA

At a Headquarters press briefing this afternoon, the Head of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, David Stephen, told correspondents that there was a change in the approach of the international community towards Somalia. Having lost patience with the country's warlords, the international community was abandoning its "top-down" approach, and looking instead at approaches that rewarded regions for maintaining peace.

Touching on the history of the conflict, Mr. Stephen said that in 1991, the Somali State collapsed, and civil war engulfed the capital, Mogadishu. The following year, a United States diplomat described the situation in Somalia as the worst humanitarian crisis faced by any people in the world. At that point there had been massive international intervention, in the form of the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), the United Nations International Task Force, and UNOSOM II. Since 1991, there had been a total of 12 peace agreements among the leaders of Somalia, not one of which had yet been implemented.

Mr. Stephen said that in March 1995, having wound up the very large UNOSOM II operation, the United Nations reduced its political operation to the small office in Nairobi, where he was based. At first that office had been largely a monitoring operation, but it had later taken on a political role, working with the regional actors to assist the parties in Somalia in reconciliation efforts. After March 1995, the responsibility for peacemaking had passed from the United Nations to regional actors. A subregional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had taken the lead in peacemaking in Somalia; Ethiopia had taken on the most active role within that organization.

However, according to IGAD, the peace process was in disarray, he said. Egypt had attempted in December 1997 to bring together the parties at an all- inclusive meeting, but that had still not been implemented. Somalia was a country without a state. There was no war, but no peace either. Sporadic hostilities continued, along with banditry and clan warfare in some parts of the country. The situation therefore posed a special challenge to the international community.

The end of a road had been reached, he said. The approach where peace agreements signed by leaders, with the underlying assumption that agreements from the top down could be implemented, had been proved wrong. The international community had therefore begun a process of reappraisal: an informal ambassadorial meeting of the Security Council with regional actors yesterday was part of the beginning of that process. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had also discussed Somalia at Oagaduggu last week. There

was now talk of a new "bottom up" approach, whereby instead of centralist agreements among leaders, regions would be invited to do their best to form peaceful administrations. The international community would be invited to support those regions of Somalia that reached peace. There was also a move to concentrate more on the institutions of civil society, away from the exclusive concentration on warlords.

IGAD was pursuing a number of suggestions at the moment. The heads of government of IGAD had proposed an international conference on Somalia that would bring together the international community and the leaders of Somalia, in addition to the normal warlords. That had been raised yesterday at the Security Council meeting. There was also great concern about the humanitarian situation in some parts of the country, and about rift valley fever -- a disease affecting humans and animals -- and the Government of Saudi Arabia's ban on the import of live animals from Somalia. Letting Somalia "become a dark hole into which the Somali people are allowed to fall, is not a tolerable situation for the international community". However, after the experience of the past seven years, and the 12 failed peace agreements, people were moving forward with caution.

The Italian Government had taken the lead in a donor community that supported the process, the IGAD Partners' Forum. Italy was helping to coordinate the efforts of those that wanted to help, including Egypt, which was not a member of IGAD, France, Norway, the United States, the European Commission and the United Nations. All were joining in the effort to support the nascent new process in Somalia, but the new process would be slow as "fingers have been burned in the past".

A correspondent asked what the international community was doing in terms of development in Somalia. Very little, replied Mr. Stephen. The international community had not seen evidence of progress there. It would hopefully respond when a political advance was achieved. At the moment, the situation could hardly be worse: the international press was reporting banditry, kidnappings, anarchy and madness. That was not an image likely to mobilize resources from donors. The United Nations consolidated interagency appeal for 1996-1997 had asked for just over $100 million for projects in Somalia. It had raised only $38.9 million.

In the face of what had happened to peacekeeping operations in Somalia, what would be a good future course -- without repeating the mistakes of the past? a correspondent asked. There was very great caution among the Security Council members and regional States about moving forward, Mr. Stephen replied. However, peace in Somalia was in the interests of the international community -- from a humanitarian viewpoint, and for strategic reasons. It was in no one's interest to allow a stateless country to descend even further into a situation where it might provide haven for criminal elements, terrorists and others. There was also no regulation of the environment or marine resources in

Briefing on Somalia - 3 - 17 June 1998

Somalia. Resolution of that situation had to be brought about by the Somali people, supported by the international community.

How was the new approach going to work, and what were the chances of defining tension among the armed factions? a correspondent asked. The approach had been endorsed by the subregional organization, which had invited the international community to put money into the regions where there was evidence of a commitment to peace, Mr. Stephen said. It was a system of rewarding those who brought peace to their regions. There were already several regions that were largely at peace: for example, in the north-west, the unrecognized, self- styled state of Somaliland, the former British protectorate; the north-east of the country was at peace and was forming an administration with a constitution. Those could be the building blocks of a new federated Somalia.

A correspondent asked how Ethiopia was managing to conduct its leadership in the process, considering its own problems. Mr. Stephen said he could not speak for the Ethiopian Government, but that he had seen no evidence of it being distracted from its concern about peace in Somalia. Ethiopia shared a very long border with Somalia, and had a national interest in securing peace there.

Was the purpose of his visit to ensure that donors support the peaceful regions of Somalia? asked a correspondent. Mr. Stephen said he was not here to raise funds, but to brief the Security Council and the ambassadors from the so-called regional actor countries in the meeting which took place yesterday. The international community had lost patience with the various faction leaders in Somalia.

Before 1973, China had played an extremely active role in Somalia, said a correspondent. Was there any connection now? she asked, and were Somali leaders getting input from other countries? Mr. Stephen replied that he could not speak for China, although, as a permanent member of the Security Council, it was following the situation closely. The Somali leaders had considerable international contacts; indeed, one of the criticisms of them by the regional groups was that they had not spent enough time in Somalia. They tended to go from one capital to another. If a faction believed it was not getting what it wanted in peace negotiations sponsored by one government, it would start negotiations sponsored by another. A peace process in Somalia had to be single, universally legitimized through the United Nations and the OAU, even if it was negotiated by IGAD.

In response to a question about where the weapons were coming from, Mr. Stephen said it was a very low-level war. "We are not talking about major artillery or other equipment." However, there were persistent rumours that some countries in the region were backing some factions. It was too early to say that the clan warfare was being internationalized, but some of the tendencies were worrying.

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