SECRETARY-GENERAL SAYS LESSONS LEARNED IN BOSNIA MUST BE APPLIED EMPHATICALLY WHERE HORROR THREATENS
Press Release
SG/SM/6598
SECRETARY-GENERAL SAYS LESSONS LEARNED IN BOSNIA MUST BE APPLIED EMPHATICALLY WHERE HORROR THREATENS
19980615 Expressions of Determination To Never Permit Another Bosnia "Will Be Cruelly Mocked If We Allow Kosovo To Become Another Killing-Field"The following is the text of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's address to the Conference on "Crisis Management and NATO Reform: The Test Case of Bosnia for Collective Security in the Next Century", in Rome today:
It is good to be among such old friends and colleagues. We have gone through much together over the last decade -- coped with many crises, in Bosnia and elsewhere -- but we are still standing, still here, still seeking to secure the peace.
Ever since serving as United Nations Special Envoy to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I have valued immensely the bonds between our two organizations. I am determined to see these bonds grow ever stronger. While there is much that we have learned about the limits to even our best efforts, we have also learned that we can make the difference between war and peace -- with the right tools and under the right conditions. We have learned that sometimes diplomacy must be backed by the threat of military force if it is to succeed.
I am very grateful for this opportunity to join you for a discussion on the larger implications of the Bosnian experience for our overall mission to ensure collective security for the next century.
I will concentrate today on what I consider to be the basic condition for the achievement of that mission: the credibility and legitimacy of the international community's collective efforts to prevent conflict, promote the peaceful resolution of disputes, and, when necessary, end them by force.
Whether it is ethnic conflict in Africa and Europe, disarmament in Iraq or the threat of nuclear confrontation in South Asia, we know that security must be crafted collectively if it is to be enjoyed collectively.
If, in the Balkans, the issue of Kosovo is not resolved peacefully, tensions may spill across a range of borders and create instability -- even war -- elsewhere.
If, in Iraq, UNSCOM is not allowed to complete its mandated mission, the Gulf will continue to be threatened by conflict. If, in South Asia, immediate steps are not taken to reduce hostilities and create confidence-building measures, large populations could be threatened by war.
Collective security, in other words, is not just a slogan or a simplistic expression of faith in mutual interests; it is the very condition for national security. That is not to say that national interests will disappear or always be aligned with the collective interest. Nor is it to argue that disputes should not, where possible, be resolved bilaterally. It is only to say that in the vast majority of cases, nation-States have a better chance of confronting their challenges in concert, collectively.
This morning, you have been discussing the lessons of our experience in the former Yugoslavia. Whether we are considering the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) or the Stabilization Force (SFOR) -- and of course there are critical differences between them -- our experience offers invaluable lessons for the future of collective security. Before turning to those lessons, allow me to reflect briefly on the United Nations history in pursuit of collective security, particularly through peacekeeping.
In the half-century since the founding of our United Nations, United Nations "blue helmets" and "blue berets" have deployed in 48 operations on four continents in a wide variety of theatres and circumstances.
The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping from the traditional kind of patrolling ceasefire lines to the modern, more complex manifestations in the post-cold war era has been neither smooth nor natural. This evolution has in too many cases been characterized by expectations outstripping abilities and by demands ignoring realities on the ground.
We have learned the hard way about the critical importance of unity of purpose, adequate mandate, appropriate force structure and efficient command and control systems. We now know, from real and practical experience, that any operation must have the unified support of the international community, the Security Council and the troop contributing countries.
Without unity, the credibility of our pleas and, if necessary, threats of force, will be undermined.
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We know that any credible deployment must be given the mandate and the means -- in terms of force structure and strength -- to carry out the necessary operations. Too often, the demands and expectations of peacekeeping missions have far outstripped what was practically possible.
We know that coherence, consistency and cooperation in the international community's efforts must be maintained at all times and even under great pressure. This is particularly important regarding questions of command and control, where the lines of authority must be clearly delineated and fully respected.
We know that the availability of solid intelligence and precise political analysis must be maintained not only in the midst of conflict but also in pre- and post-conflict situations. We know that sober and truthful public information must be disseminated as widely and equitably as possible. This will provide people caught in conflict situations with unbiased news that is not employed as a tool of incitement. In Bosnia as well as Rwanda, we saw how a campaign of hatred was conducted day in and day out over the airways, poisoning the atmosphere and sowing distrust between neighbour and neighbour, community and community.
These are lessons, however, that only four years of war in Bosnia and far too many deaths were able to teach us.
With the willingness of the international community to provide the means to carry out the mandate, however, peace became possible. With the arrival of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR)/(SFOR), peace was consolidated. The world has recognized that diplomacy, whether in the Balkans or in Baghdad, has to be backed by firmness and by force.
Peacekeeping today requires not only rethinking the means but also the method of implementing the mandates set out by the Security Council. We have learned that while impartiality is a vital condition for peacekeeping, it must be impartiality in the execution of the mandate -- not just an unthinking neutrality between warring parties.
We recognize that the rapidity with which we are able to deploy may determine not only the success of the mission, but also the ability to prevent the massive loss of innocent life. We recognize, too, that the peacekeeping force must be a credible one; sometimes a convincing show of strength can prevent the need for its use. All these lessons have been brought to bear in NATO's Stabilization Force in Bosnia.
But they apply equally to comparable United Nations operations, now and in the future. The pursuit of collective security by the international community must be credible and it must be legitimate.
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While traditional observer missions may still be enough in certain situations, the joint NATO/United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission in Bosnia represents a model of credibility and legitimacy in large-scale international peacekeeping.
Credible force without legitimacy may have immediate results, but will not enjoy long-term international support. Legitimate force without credibility may enjoy universal support but prove unable to implement the basic provisions of its mandate. Combined, however, under the umbrella of a United Nations mandate, credibility and legitimacy in the use of force can create lasting peace.
I am convinced that we are beginning to draw the right lessons from our experience in the Bosnian war -- about such critical factors as credibility, legitimacy and the morality of intervention and non-intervention. But there is only one way in which we can prove that we have done this: by applying those lessons practically and emphatically where horror threatens.
Such a challenge is now before us. All of you who have been following the last few months' events in Kosovo must begin to wonder whether another Bosnia looms on the horizon. Already, the shellings, the "ethnic cleansings", the indiscriminate attacks on civilians in the name of "security", are taking place. Already, thousands have fled and thousands more seem about to follow.
Already, excuses for the inexcusable are being offered by those who seem to have learned little -- or only the wrong lessons -- from the war in Bosnia. This time, however, we cannot be taken by surprise -- neither by the means employed or by the ends pursued. This time, ethnically driven violence must be seen for what it is -- from the outset.
Recently, I recommended that the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force mandate be extended so as to sustain its success on the border of The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and maintain stability. I have also been gratified to learn of the determination of NATO governments to prevent a further escalation of the fighting, and encourage all steps that may deter the further use of ethnically-driven violence in Kosovo.
A great deal is at stake in Kosovo today -- for the people of Kosovo themselves; for the overall stability of the Balkans; and for the credibility and legitimacy of our words and deeds in pursuit of collective security.
All our professions of regret; all our expressions of determination to never again permit another Bosnia; all our hopes for a peaceful future for the Balkans will be cruelly mocked if we allow Kosovo to become another killing-field. It is in our hands now.
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