PRESS CONFERENCE BY FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ

Press Briefing

PRESS CONFERENCE BY FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ

Declaring that Iraq was suffering from the severest sanctions in human history, its Foreign Minister, Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, said at a Headquarters briefing today that it was time for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to work with Iraqi officials and the Security Council to quickly deem complete the process of eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdoon, moderated the briefing and introduced the Adviser to the President of Iraq, Amir Alsaadi, who would be available for questions following Mr. Al-Sahaf's opening statement.

Mr. Al-Sahaf said that during the nine days that his delegation had been in New York, it had had discussions and a meeting with Security Council members. It had also conducted lengthy, technical talks with UNSCOM, which, in the last few days, had held a marathon of presentations and briefings to the Security Council in the hope of obtaining new support for its so-called "road map", or list of outstanding disarmament actions to be completed by Iraq.

From the very beginning and throughout its discussions with UNSCOM, his delegation realized that there was no road map, he said. There was nothing new, although UNSCOM insisted on casting doubts and building their understanding on assumptions and suspicions, rather than on facts and figures. Luckily, the Council had not agreed with UNSCOM on its so-called road map. The Commission's explanations and answers had contributed nothing more than ambiguity, proving that the correct and proper path for both UNSCOM and Iraq was the professional, technical and scientific approach which confined itself to the requirements and criteria of disarmament. Anything else implied political motivation on the part of UNSCOM and the people whom it employed.

He said that the last Security Council exercise, as well as the bilateral talks between Iraq and UNSCOM, had shown that the two choices were either a professional, scientific and technical approach or a politically motivated, "vicious circle" which sought to complicate the situation for all concerned. His delegation would therefore talk to the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, and his colleagues on the basis of the former approach; it would not accept any further drifting towards a vicious circle. By taking the professional approach, UNSCOM would realize that Iraq had implemented all the disarmament requirements.

Asked about UNSCOM's prospects of obtaining a new mandate from the Security Council, Mr. Said Al-Sahaf said that UNSCOM had tried and it had failed. Mr. Butler had telegraphed his intention of presenting a road map to the Security Council and to the Iraqi side, and had indicated that he would have a new approach towards information sharing with the Iraqis. He then claimed he had been misquoted. When he presented the same vague, meaningless

points to the Council, it had not found anything new or specific. Indeed, it had not agreed with Mr. Butler on the so-called road map because there was no road map.

To a question about whether those remarks meant that the Iraqi delegation was going to refuse Mr. Butler's presentation of a road map next week in Baghdad, the Foreign Minister said that it was not a road map, adding that Mr. Butler should rethink his presentation.

In judging his meeting with Security Council members, would he conclude that a stalemate had persisted? another correspondent asked. Mr. Al-Sahaf said he had not viewed the situation as a stalemate. Iraq had implemented all the requirements of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which contained a technical outline of the disarmament tasks, and on that basis, it would demand implementation of paragraph 22, which provides for lifting the sanctions. Anyone who cast the situation in the light of a stalemate was effectively preventing Iraq from exercising its rights, and preventing implementation of paragraph 22.

Continuing, he said that the Council now seemed to be more involved in the issue of sanctions and very much involved in the disarmament requirements of its resolution. The majority of Council members sought a specific accounting of the remaining issues, if any, in the light of the eight-year sanctions regime. Moreover, it had started asking UNSCOM to be specific and to detail its remaining issues. The situation was moving towards finalizing Section C, which meant that implementation of paragraph 22 was approaching.

To a question concerning Iraq's plan if UNSCOM was politically motivated, despite its claims, and if the process did not move towards a lifting of sanctions, he said Iraq's plan was to not accept any political motivation, but rather, through its contacts with Security Council members, to proceed according to the letter and spirit of the resolutions. Those who wished to politicize the situation essentially sought to prevent the Council from discharging its duties towards Iraq. Politicizing UNSCOM's work was unacceptable.

In a follow-up question, the correspondent asked for the Foreign Minister's reaction to remarks made to the press by the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, prior to the Council meeting, that "it was a bad day for Iraq". Mr. Al-Sahaf said the Council now was "squeezing" UNSCOM and asking it "real" questions. It wanted the facts, and not a "twisted history". Its members sought information on what was new, what issues remained, if any, and on where things stood. In that context, Mr. Butler's remarks indicated that he was nervous. Moreover, he and the British Ambassador had left the meeting before it ended, and they went to the press to "shout about it". "I think they are nervous", he added.

Iraqi Press Conference - 3 - 5 June 1998

Another correspondent asked what Iraq's strategy would be to change what it called a "vicious circle" when Mr. Butler took his "non-road map" to Baghdad next week, and how could the Council empower UNSCOM to continue its ongoing verification tasks in a post-embargo period.

As long as there was no road map, Iraq would continue to work hard with UNSCOM in order that they might together and very soon reach an end to the disarmament phase, he said. Iraq was very clear on its position concerning its adherence to the Security Council resolution. It had clearly outlined two phases, namely the disarmament process, which had been going on for more than seven years, and the ongoing monitoring and verification. The legal interpretation suggested that the ongoing monitoring would succeed the disarmament phase. Yet, starting in 1994, the two phases had overlapped since the establishment by UNSCOM of an ongoing monitoring capability, which had been up and running effectively since then. Iraq would not accept any additional political or other kinds of conditions.

Asked if he was more pessimistic following the Security Council meeting and the statements made by Mr. Butler in Sydney, Australia, he said not at all. What his delegation had witnessed in the Council's discussions was very encouraging, namely that its members were more directly involved in that very important issue of a nation under the most severe and inhumane sanctions for eight years. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had died during those eight years, which burdened the conscience of the majority of Council members. Their more direct involvement in squeezing and questioning UNSCOM in order to finalize its work, which it had delayed for seven or eight years, was reason for optimism.

Asked to briefly review the priority issues outlined in the "non-road map", Mr. Alsaadi said there was nothing new on that list. In fact, it contained "minor and secondary" items which were of no consequence or relevance to the disarmament part of UNSCOM's work. They represented an excuse to ask for a new slogan, that of access to documents. In the last crisis, it sought access to search and destroy; now it called it access to documents. All of the documents pertaining to disarmament had been submitted, he said.

Did not Iraq bear some responsibility for the vagueness of UNSCOM's list, particularly in the category of biological weapons in the light of its reticence in that regard? another correspondent asked. Mr. Al-Sahaf said that contrary to the old allegations by UNSCOM, the biological file was the most finalized file.

Mr. Alsaadi added that the characterization by the Executive Director of UNSCOM of the biological file as "the black hole", was exaggeration and hyperbole, and absolutely devoid of any truth. The biological programme ceased to exist in 1991. Since 1995 when Iraq decided to tell that programme's entire past history, UNSCOM had confirmed practically all the

Iraqi Press Conference - 4 - 5 June 1998

relevant disarmament points made. UNSCOM was now raising questions which were irrelevant to disarmament, such as the structure of a programme, how it was run, political decisions, concepts of use, and so forth. All the (biological) agents had been identified, along with the weapons that had been made and filled, whose destruction had been proven. The entire complex formerly involved in their production was almost completely destroyed.

To a question on how Iraq would respond if nothing changed in the next sanctions review, Mr. Al-Sahaf said "let us wait and see". It had invited UNSCOM to work with Iraq and the Security Council according to the letter and spirit of the resolutions in order to quickly finalize the work. For now, any other response would be hypothetical.

To a related question about how Iraq might counter UNSCOM's concern that lifting of sanctions meant losing leverage in the ongoing verification process, Mr. Alsaadi said that the ongoing monitoring and verification system was functioning very well, even by UNSCOM's own admission. Moreover, his Government had stated that it would not refuse to deal with any future disarmament issue requiring verification or further investigation, even after the implementation of paragraph 22. Furthermore, the design of a monitoring system took into account all of UNSCOM's prior fears. When in 1994, for instance, Iraq had not admitted to the full scope of its biological weapons programme, UNSCOM had designed a system which took care of that, and that was the worst case scenario.

To a number of questions concerning the "oil-for-food" programme, Mr. Al-Sahaf said that the programme was temporary and it was not a valued programme by the Iraqis. Rather, it had become an issue for political gains. The same two Ambassadors who had addressed the press to talk against Iraq were the ones putting roadblocks in the approval process of oil contracts. Moreover, unless Iraq quickly obtained the spare parts it needed for the maintenance of its oil installations, it would be unable to increase its widely known production capacity.

Replying to a question concerning the welfare of the Iraqi people, he said that Iraq was a nation of more than 22 million people that had suffered for eight years from the most inhumane and unprecedented sanctions regime in history. There were dangerous shortages in all fields, including food, medicine, and infrastructure. The death rate among Iraqi children was rising, and the elderly and the sick also faced a very critical situation. The health system, formerly among the most sophisticated in the region, had deteriorated to a critical state. The only proper path was lifting sanctions, especially since Iraq had met all the requirements under paragraph 22 of the resolution.

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